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ABSTRACT 
How effective is the European Neighbourhood Policy as a mechanism for transposing 
the European Union's democratic values in the South Caucasus? 
The central focus of the research conducted is the European Neighbourhood 
Policy aimed at developing the relations of the European Union with its neighbours in 
the East and South. The European Neighbourhood Policy has an extensive nature: it 
covers a wide-stretching geopolitical area including sixteen countries. The policy is 
also extensive in tenns of its all-encompassing substance: it envisages cooperation 
between the parties on issues ranging from trade to border control. The research 
question contextualises the policy in geographical and substantive tenns. The region 
of the South Caucasus was chosen to limit the research question to certain 
geographical framework. This is motivated by the complexities inherent in this 
geographical area. The nominal region of South Caucasus comprises Georgia, 
Annenia and Azerbaijan. The peculiarities of these states derive from complexities 
inherent within these states, complexities between the states, as well as between 
various geopolitical actors whose interests come across here. In substantive tenns the 
research question is limited to the framework of promoting the European Union's 
democratic values. The main questions addressed in this relation are: what the 
Union's democratic values are and whether the policy in question offers sufficient 
mechanisms for their transposition to the South Caucasian countries. For this 
purposes the instruments and methodologies of the policy have been analysed. The 
democratic values of the Union have also been considered. Within this narrative, a 
comparative analysis of the process of the ENP implementation in three states has 
been undertaken to evaluate its effectiveness in promoting the democratic values of 
the European Union. The research is finalised with a summary of findings. 
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CHAPTER! 
How effective is the European Neighbourhood Policy as a 
Mechanism for Transposing the European Union's Democratic 
Values in the South Caucasus? 
Introduction! 
1. Research question 
The political developments of the last decade of the 20th century have 
irreversibly changed the European continent and its vicinity. The unification of 
Europe which took place through the 2004 enlargement had transformed the 
European Union (hereinafter the EU or the Union) into an actor of a 'continental scale 
of operation.,2 Most importantly, as a result of the 2004 enlargement, the 
neighbourhood of the Union became an inalienable element of its foreign policy. 3 The 
European Neighbourhood Policy (hereinafter the ENP) is the mechanism established 
for developing closer relations with the Union's new and old neighbours. 
The neighbours of the EU both in the South and East are included within the 
ENP.4 Initially Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova and South Mediterranean 
countries were the states included in the ENP by the Wider Europe Communication. 5 
Accordingly, the ENP fused together different regions: the Eastern neighbours as the 
immediate geographic periphery and the Southern Mediterranean as the historical and 
I The thesis was completed in November 2009 before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The 
Treaty articles are numbered as they were before December 2009. Provisions of the Lisbon Treaty are 
used as an indication of the current state of constitutional development of the EU. 
2 Kok, 'Enlarging the European Union: Achievements and Challenges,' Report to the European 
Commission, EUI, 19 March 2003, at 6. 
3 Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 December 2002, Presidency Conclusions, at 6; Wider 
Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 11.04.2003 COM 
(2003) 104 final, (hereinafter Wider Europe Communication), at 3,4,5,9; 10hansson-Nogues, 'The 
EU and its Neighbourhood: an Overview' in Weber, Smith and Baun, (eds.), Governing Europe's 
Neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery, (Manchester University Press, 2007),21-35, at 22. 
4 Cremona, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Framework for Modernisation' in Maiani, 
Petrov, Mouliarova, (eds.), European Integration without EU Membership: Models, Experiences, 
Perspectives, EUI Working Papers, MWP 2009/10, 5-15, at 5. 
5 Wider Europe Communication, at 4. 
2 
economic neighbourhood.6 The countries of the South Caucasus were omitted from 
the initial list of neighbours with whom the EU was prepared to establish closer 
relations. However, in June 2004 the European Council decided to offer Annenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia the opportunity to participate in the ENP. The reorientation 
towards the region was a consequence of the inter-institutional stance on the South 
Caucasus: the European Parliament, the Commission, and the High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereinafter the CFSP) had recommended 
the inclusion of the region in the ENP.7 
However, the ENP is not merely reactionary to outside events, as is usually 
the case with the EU's foreign policy making and for which it has been often 
criticised.8 On the contrary, the initiation of the ENP had serious external and internal 
underpinnings. 
The development of the ENP has been significantly affected by global 
security challenges facing the EU from the beginning of the millennium.9 Global 
security threats, such as international terrorism brought by the 9/11 attacks, and the 
EU's inability to react to international events demonstrated in the Iraq crisis, required 
6 A Global Mediterranean Policy was adopted at the 1972 Paris summit aimed at promoting regional 
stability and trade cooperation with the Community. In 1995 the EU launched a new ambitious policy 
towards the Mediterranean region, which is the Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
aimed at creating a large free trade area with the North African and Middle Eastern countries. 
Association Agreements have been signed within the Barcelona Process with countries concerned; 
Missiroli, 'The EU and its Changing Neighbourhood' in Dannreuther, (ed.), European Union Foreign 
and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, (London: Routledge, 2004), 12-26, at 23. 
7 General Affairs and External Relations Council, 14 June 2004, Press Release, JO 189/04 (Presse 195), 
paragraph 12. 
Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1999), at 4. 
9 Aliboni, ·The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy·, ~ 2 0 0 5 ) ) 1 ~ ~ E!,roFean 
Foreign Affairs Review 1, at I; Cremona and Hillion, 'L'Union fait la force? Potential and LimitatIOns 
of the ENP as an Integrated EU Foreign and Security Policy', in Copsey and Mayhew, (eds.), 
European Neighbourhood Policy: The Case of Europe, Sussex European Institute, SEI Seminar Papers 
Series Number 1, 2006, 20-44, at 23. 
3 
elaboration of a comprehensive security strategy for the Union. lo The European 
Security Strategy was established by the Council in December 2003, which not only 
envisaged the EU's role in tackling global security threats but, most importantly, 
stressed that 'geography is still important.' II In particular, the European Security 
Strategy identified the South Caucasus as a region where the EU should have a 
'stronger and more active' interest. 12 
The internal rationale for the development of the ENP is mostly related to the 
Eastern neighbours, the European countries. While some of the European neighbours, 
such as Ukraine and Moldova, were hopeful of prospects of EU membership, the EU 
was far from being prepared for it. First of all, the failure to ratify the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty imposed a pause in any further developments of the 
organisation, without clear identification of the direction the EU will take in its future 
integration. 13 Moreover, the unprecedented scale of 2004 enlargement, in addition to 
the anticipation of Romanian and Bulgarian accession, created the need to adapt the 
EU institutions and policy making to the accession of the new member states. This 
caused so-called 'enlargement fatigue.' 14 The enlargement fatigue meant that the 
10 A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy Paper, Brussels, 12 December 2003, 
(hereinafter the European Security Strategy Paper); Missiroli and Quille, 'European Security in Flux' 
in Cameron, (ed.), The Future o/Europe: Integration and Enlargement. (London: Routledge, 2004), 
114-134, at 118-119; Lynch, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy,' Institute for Security Studies, 
Paper presented at the workshop "European Neighbourhood Policy: Concepts and Instruments", 
Prague, June 2004, organised by the European Commission with DGAP, CEFRES and I1R, at 2. 
II European Security Strategy Paper, at 7. 
12 Ibid, at 8. 
13 Dannreuther, 'Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy' 
(2006) 11 European Foreign Affairs Review 183, at 186: Meloni, 'Is the Same Toolkit Used during 
Enlargement Still Applicable to the Countries of the New Neighbourhood? A Problem of Mismatching 
between Objectives and Instruments' in Cremona and Meloni, (eds.), The European Neighbourhood 
Policy: A New Framework/or Modernisation?, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2007121, 97-111, at 97; 
Comelli, Greco, Tocci, 'From Boundary to Borderland: Transforming the Meaning of Borders through 
the European Neighbourhood Policy', (2007) 12 European Foreign Affairs Review 203, at 214-215. 
14 Comelli, Greco, Tocci, ibid, at 214-215; Smith and Webber, 'Political Dialogue and Security in the 
European Neighbourhood: The Virtues and Limits of 'New Partnership Perspectives', (2008) 13 
European Foreign Affairs Review 73, at 75; Smith, 'The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood 
Policy' (2005) 81 International Affairs 757, at 758; Del Sarto and Schumacher, 'From EMP to ENP: 
4 
EU's absorption capacity was stretched at the time and demonstrated that it could not 
'enlarge ad infinitum.' 15 While further enlargement would threaten the union of 
current Member States in tenns of its institutional operability,16 closing the EU to 
other willing countries would breach one of its basic principles, which is to be open 
to all European democracies under Article 49 EU. In this context, the ENP is an 
attempt to solve the 'inclusion-exclusion' dilemma brought about by the 
enlargement. 17 Therefore, both neighbours ineligible for EU membership and those 
whose membership perspective the EU was not ready to consider, were included in 
the ENP with the Wider Europe Communication clearly stating that in the medium-
tenn at least the perspective of membership would be ruled out. IS 
There were suggestions for the enlargement to be crafted as a 'bridge-
building' to the countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter the 
CIS),19 left outside the EU. 20 It, nevertheless, created a new dividing line with its hard 
borders 'generating differences across it and homogeneity within.,ll The ENP is 
What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?' 
(2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review 17, at 25-26. 
15 Ferrero-Waldner, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU's Newest Foreign Policy 
Instrument', (2006) 11 European Foreign Affairs Review, at 139-140. 
16 Emerson, 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy of Placebo?', Centre tor European Policy 
Studies, Working Document No 215INovember 2004, at 1. 
17 Smith, 'The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy'. (2005) 81 International Affairs 757, 
at 757-758. 
18 Cremona, supra note 4, at 5; Wider Europe Communication, at 5. 
19 CIS included all former members of the USSR, excluding Baltic countries. It was created by Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus in December 1991, and joined later on by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Turkmenistan. Georgia withdrew from 
CIS in 2008 after Georgian-Russian war. Turkmenistan withdrew from CIS in 2005 and currently has a 
status of an associate member. This organisation is aimed at creating a free trade space between the 
member states and also it has serious defence dimension. However, during the last years, the 
organisation has been going through a crisis period with certain countries not seeing any benefits in 
participating in the alliance. Nonetheless, it is still operative as a forum for periodical meetings 
between the leaders of the member states. 
20 Hyde-Price, 'The New Pattern of International Relations in Europe' in Curzon Price, Landau, 
Whitman, (eds.), The Enlargement o/the European Union: Issues and Strategies, (London: Routledge, 
1999), 111-117, at 116. 
21 Mungiu-Pippidi, 'Facing the 'Desert of Tartars': The Eastern Border of Europe' in Zielonka. (ed.), 
Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries 0/ the European Union, (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 51-77, at 55. 
5 
aimed at diminishing the importance of hard borders through establishing close 
relations between the EU and its neighbours spreading security, stability and 
prosperity in the whole region by 'sharing the benefits of enlargement. ,22 Promising 
European integration short of membership, the ENP entails cooperation. on a wide 
range of matters touching upon economic and political development of countries, 
including trade and economic liberalisation, justice and home affairs issues, common 
security threats, cultural development, environment and others. 23 
Most importantly the ENP is built around the EU's normative image. In 
December 2002 the Copenhagen European Council confirmed that the Union should 
take the opportunity offered by enlargement to enhance relations with its neighbours 
on the basis of shared values. 24 Subsequent ENP documents endorsed the EU's 
democratic values, proclaiming that the adherence to shared values will be the ground 
for enhanced relations with neighbours.25 
Within this context the ENP immediately attracted the attention of major 
research institutions both ofEU legal and political studies.26 Various scholars focused 
on different aspects of the ENP. One of the distinctive approaches had been the 
regional contextualisation of the policy, where the research focused on Eastern 
neighbours or on the Southern Mediterranean region. 27 A prominent line of research 
22 Wider Europe Communication, at 3, 4, 9. 
23 Wider Europe Communication, at 10-14. 
24 Copenhagen European Council Conclusions, 12-13 December 2002, paragraph 22. 
25 Wider Europe Communication, at 4; General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, 
Brussels, 18 March 2003,6941103 (P4; Presse 63), at 6; General Affairs and External Relations 
Council Conclusions, Luxembourg, 16 June 2003,10369/03 (Presse 166), at V; ENP Strategy Paper, at 
3, 12, 13. 
26 For instance, European Policy Centre, Centre for European Policy Studies, EUI Academy of 
European Law. 
27 Del Sarto and Schumacher, 'From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood 
Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean? (2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review 17; Baracani, 
'From the EMP to the ENP: A New European Pressure for Democratization?, (2005) 1 Journal of 
Contemporary European Research 54; Stritecky, 'The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the ENP' in 
Kratochvil, (ed.), The European Union and Its Neighbourhood: Policies, Problems and Priorities, 
(Prague: Institute ofInternational Relations, 2006), 59-76; Longhurst and Nies, 'Recasting Relations 
with the Neighbours-Prospects for the Eastern Partnership', Institut Fran9ais des Relations 
6 
has been the study of the ENP mechanisms, instruments and objectives with reference 
to the enlargement experience.28 Others have explored the security dimension of the 
policy.29 The vast amount of literature that has been generated around the EU and its 
neighbours since the initiation of the policy serves as an extensive ground for any 
possible additions to the topic. 
This research question was chosen with an intention to contextualise the 
ENP's effectiveness in regional perspective and with reference to promotion of the 
EU's democratic values as a constituent element of the policy. 
As noted above, in the EU's own rhetoric, the ENP is designed to spread the 
EU's values to the neighbourhood. Democracy is among those values with which the 
EU identifies itself. 30 In the view of the debates on the EU's democratic deficit it is 
apposite to ask whether this normativity is justified and to what extent the EU 
upholds it in its foreign relations. The ENP represents a legal tool of EU external 
relations through which its values can be spread to the neighbourhood. Thus, the ENP 
will be analysed in order to assess what values the EU is transposing in its 
neighbourhood, and to what extent these values are promoted. On the other hand, the 
ENP is a political instrument which allows the EU to pursue its strategic and 
Internationales, February 2009; Wolczuk, 'Adjectival Europeanisation? The Impact of EU 
Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy', European Research Working 
Paper Series, Number 18, August 2007. 
28 Kelley, 'New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Learning and Adaptation in the New European 
Neighbourhood Policy', (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 29; Magen, 'The Shadow of 
Enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy Achieve Compliance?', Centre on Democracy, 
Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford Institute for International Studies, Working Papers, No 
68, August 2006; Meloni, 'Is the Same Toolkit Used during Enlargement Still Applicable to the 
Countries of the New Neighbourhood? A Problem of Mismatching between Objectives and 
Instruments' in Cremona and Meloni. (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy: A New Framework 
for Modernisation?, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2007/21, 97-111; Dannreuther, 'Developing the 
Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy', (2006) 11 European Foreign 
Affairs Review 183; Balfour and Rotta, 'Beyond Enlargement. The European Neighbourhood Policy 
and its Tools', (2005) 40 International Spectator 7 etc. 
29 Lynch, 'The Security Dimension ofthe European Neighbourhood Policy', (2005) 40 The 
International Spectator 33; Smith and Webber, 'Political Dialogue and Security in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy: The Virtues and Limits of 'New Partnership Perspective,' (2008) 13 European 
Foreign Affairs Review 73. 
30 Article 6 TEU includes democracy among the founding principles of the EU, OJ C 321 Ell, 
29.12.2006. 
7 
economic interests in vital regions in its immediate or historical neighbourhood. In 
this sense, the purpose of the research is to find out whether the initiation and the 
primary implementation of the policy endorses the institutional changes required at 
instrumental level, that is on the level where the EU can require or influence political 
reforms. Thus, the promotion of democmcy within the ENP will take place within a 
framework aimed at spreading security and advancing the interests of the EU in its 
neighbourhood. 
The region of the South Caucasus, comprising Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, was chosen to contextualise the research question due to its complexity. 
The region is challenging for the EU for several reasons. In spite of its size, tensions 
between the constituent countries of this region have remained high since the break-
up of the Soviet Union. In addition to internal tensions, the region attmcts the interest 
of various powers eager to establish their dominance and of those that have historical 
dominance, thus creating international and regional rivalry. Another aspect, which 
motivated the selection of the South Caucasus, is the increased attention of 
international community towards the regions after the signature of the Contract of the 
Century, when the US chose to support the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, thus 
highlighting its geostrategic importance as an energy corridor. 31 Within this wider 
pattern, the inclusion of these states within the ENP manifests the shift of attitude 
from the EU towards the region, where it has its own interests to pursue. In addition, 
with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, the South Caucasus became part 
of the immediate vicinity of the Union, where Georgia shares maritime border with 
existing EU members, thus increasing its importance for the EU's security purposes. 
31 Stritecky, 'The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the ENP' in Kratochvil, (ed.), The European Union 
and Its Neighbourhood: Policies, Problems and Priorities, (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 
2006), 59-76, at 69. 
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First of all, the proximity of the region is particularly important due to unresolved 
conflicts of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh which pose immediate 
threats to the Union. Secondly, the South Caucasus should be considered as a buffer-
zone between the EU and farther unstable regions, increasing its importance for the 
purposes of international security. Thus, a research question focusing on the South 
Caucasus will explore the ability of the policy to affect democratic development of 
countries located in an area of high importance for the EU security purposes, 
including economic security. 
The attractiveness of the region for research purposes also lies in the possible 
characterisation of the countries as European. Such characterisation will immediately 
include Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan within the countries whose membership the 
ENP tried to rule out. Although sometimes the South Caucasian countries are 
considered to be 'non-European, ,32 the European Commission refers to Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan as European countries. 33 Despite the fact that the ENP 
rejects membership in the visible future, the issue of 'Europeanness' of neighbours 
cannot be dismissed. The 'Europeanness' is still considered to be a central condition 
for accession to the EU.34 If the country is qualified as 'European,' the possibility of 
an EU membership application cannot be ruled out.35 In this sense, it is interesting to 
note the effect of the ENP on Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan as European 
countries in the process of integration to the EU other than membership. 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have different aspirations for closer ties 
with the EU. The Rose Revolution in Georgia, which inter alia prompted the decision 
32 Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, (Oxford: Hart, 2006), at 364. 
33 http://ec.europa.euJextemalrelations/we/indexen.htm. 
34 HilIion, 'Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis· in Arnull and Wincott, (eds.), 
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 401-
418, at 403. 
35 Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-Accession Conditionality in the 
Field of Democracy and the Rule of Law, (Austin: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2008), at 29-30. 
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to include the South Caucasus within the ENP, 36 brought European integration to the 
top ofthe country's foreign policy agenda. The public discontent with paralysed state 
institutions and dysfunctional economy due to widespread corruption reached its peak 
in the fraudulent 2003 parliamentary election. 37 This led to revolutionary protests 
which brought pro-Western Mikhail Saakashvili to power after the resignation of 
President Shevardnadze and after winning 96 percent of the vote in the January 2004 
presidential election.38 Saakashvili's United National Movement party secured the 
majority in the Parliament in April 2004 elections. Most importantly for the purposes 
of this research, Georgia's new ruling elite accepted a clear pro-Western course with 
an unrealistic short-term objective of joining both NATO and the EU, including 
Georgia in a group of countries clearly manifesting their political orientation towards 
the EU accession as opposed to its neighbours. 39 
The political leadership of Armenia has expressed the country's aspirations 
for European integration on several occasions.4o It is mainly the economic integration 
to the EU's internal market which interests the country due to its past economic 
isolation.41 
Azerbaijan's interest in the EU is conditioned with flows from the increasing 
trade between the partners. Rich in natural resources, Azerbaijan is interested in 
36 Tocci, 'Does the ENP Respond to the EU's Post-Enlargement Challenges?' (2005) 40 International 
Spectator 21, at 23. 
37 'Georgia: Sliding Towards Authoritarianism?' International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 189, 19 
December 2007, at 1. 
38 'Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective', Giorgi Kandelaki, Special Report, United 
States Institute of Peace, Washington, at 4-5. 
39 Tulmets, 'Can the Discourse on 'Soft Power' Help the EU to Bridge its Capability Expectations 
Gap?' (2007) 7 European Political Economy Review 195, at 205. 
40 'Working visit of President Sargsyan to the Kingdom of Belgium and European structures', 
06.11.2008, available at http://www.president.amlevents/visits/eng/?visits=1 &id=45; 'Minister 
Oskanian addressed the Armenia-EU Parliamentary Cooperation Committee', April 182006, available 
at http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/; 'Armenian President: EU Should Adopt Position Over 
The South Caucasus', 15.09.2003, available at 
http://www.armeniaforeignministrv.comlPRlPR262.html; 'European integration Armenia's foreign 
~ l i c y y priority' Arka News Agency, 07,02.2007. 
I The dynamics in relations between Armenia and its neighbours will be explored in Chapter III. 
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cooperation with the EU, however it does not have, unlike Georgia and Annenia, a 
strong urge to integrate into the EU market. It is rather more interested in balancing 
relations with major international partners and establishing a role of its own as a 
political actor. 42 
The complexity of the region for security purposes and the distinctions of 
each of the states in their aspirations to integrate into the EU provide a complex 
ground for evaluating the ENP's effectiveness in their democratisation. 
2. Methodology 
The complexity of the research question requires a complex methodological 
approach. First of all, the ENP represents a foreign policy tool, the elements of which 
are at crossroads between politics and external relations law of the EU. In order to 
obtain a comprehensive picture of the ENP, application of an interdisciplinary 
approach is required, where 'inter' means 'derived from two or more' disciplines.43 
Bringing together various definitions of interdisciplinary studies it can be noted that 
this method allows for establishment of a more comprehensive framework for 
answering a question,44 and 'cognitive advancement' via integration of knowledge 
and modes of thinking extracted from a few disciplines.45 The interdisciplinary nature 
of this research will be apparent in the consideration of both political and legal 
aspects of the policy. Reference to legal studies only would omit the bigger picture of 
42 Statements for media representatives by President Ilham Aliyev and President of the European 
Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, 28 April 2009, available at 
http://www.president.aziarticles.php?item id=20090430122621112&sec id=70; Nuriyev. 'EU Policy 
in the South· Caucasus: A View from Azerbaijan'. Centre for European Policy Studies. Working 
Document No. 272/July 2007, at 18-19. 
43 Repko, Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory, (London: Sage, 2008), at 5. 
44 Klein and Newell, 'Advancing Interdisciplinary Studies" in Graft: RatcIiffand Associates, (eds.), 
Handbook of the Undergraduate Curriculum: A Comprehensive Guide to Purposes. Structures. 
Practices. and Change, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996), 393-415, at 393-394. 
45 Boix Mansilla. 'Assessing Student Work at Disciplinary Crossroads". (2005) 37 Change 14, at 16. 
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the ENP, while consideration of the political side of the ENP based on 
conceptualisation of the EU as a political actor would ensure 'cognitive advancement' 
for the purposes of answering the main research question. 
2.1. International Relations theory and the conceptualisation of the EU 
In order to explore the EU's ability to transpose its democratic values through 
the ENP the EU needs to be conceptualised as a foreign policy actor. 
The initial presence of International Relations theory in the EC/EU studies has 
been focused on the explanation of the European integration process and the 
appearance of European Common Foreign policy.46 In drawing on states as the main 
actors in an international scene characterised by a state of anarchy, realist and 
neorealist theories have been sceptical about the political integration in Europe. 47 
Liberal trends allow for a more flexible approach to understanding the European 
integration. Such flexibility is apparent in accepting international actors other than 
states, who are able to play role in international politics, within network of relations 
between various actors on international stage.48 Within these theoretical frameworks a 
number of contending theories of European integration have been developed 
throughout the existence of EC/EU. Drawing on earlier functionalist approaches, 
Haas and Lindberg developed the theory of neofunctionalism, which occupied a 
central place in the debate on EC integration until the mid-1970s.49 Neofunctionalist 
46 Andreatta, 'Theory and the European Union's International Relations', in Hill and Smith, (eds.), 
International Relations and the EU, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 18-38, at 25-26, 30. 
47 Wayman and Diehl, (eds.), Reconstructing Realpolitik, (University of Michigan Press, 1994), at 17; 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), at 105. 
48 Various accounts of liberal theory have been explored by Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: 
Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Keohane, After 
Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1984); Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nation: Economic Growth. Stagflation. and 
Social Rigidities, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). 
49 Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1968); Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963). 
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accounts in the liberal tradition do not assume that states are the only actors on the 
international scene, and consider the bargaining between elites at supranational level 
as the main driving force behind the integration. 50 The central concept of the theory is 
spillover expressed in the interconnection between various sectors, where a certain 
goal cannot be effectively achieved without establishing new goals in a related 
sector. 5 I 
Liberal intergovemmentalism, as developed by Andrew Moravcsik, is the 
rival approach explaining the process of European integration. 52 Drawing on previous 
realist conceptualisation of the EU integration in terms of intergovemmentalism, 
Moravcsik shifted the focus back to Member States which are acting at both a 
domestic level, where preferences are formed, and at the international level, where 
states are bargaining. The EU institutions are solely perceived to be the agents of the 
Member States ensuring a permanent arena for inter-state bargaining. 
Without referring to theories of European integration that follow, it should be 
noted that a major shift took place in relation to the role of International Relations 
theory in EU "Studies. Thus, the EU is not only a phenomenon that researchers attempt 
to explain, but rather one of the concepts contributing to explanation of other 
phenomena. 53 This shift is fIrst of all concerned with the departure from rationalist, 
both realist and liberal approaches, whose focus was on exogenous factors, such as 
50 Stroby Jensen, 'Neo-functionalism' in Cini, (ed.), European Union Politics, 2nd edition, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007),85-97, at 91-92. 
51Spillover can be functional, expressing the interconnectedness of the economy, or political implying 
links between policy areas for political or ideological reasons; Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Politica/, 
Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), at 243,283-317; 
Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1963), at 10. 
52 Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovemmentalist 
Approach', (1993) 31 Journal of Common Market Studies 473; Moravcsik, . Liberal 
Intergovemmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder' (1995) 33 Journal of Common Market Studies 
611. 
53 Rosamond. 'New Theories of European Integration' in Cini, (ed.) European Union Politics, 2nd 
edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 117-135, at 121. 
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interests and self-interest, detached from social structures, and where the structures 
matter to the extent that they are material contributing to the 'logic of 
consequences' .54 On the contrary, constructivists suggest that social structures 
influence interests, and they are not merely pre-established. Wendt is among the 
leading authorities in this area.55 Identities formed by agents in their socialisation 
predetermine the subsequent action. 56 As opposed to rationalist perspective, it is the 
'logic of appropriateness' which is the driving force behind the action predetermined 
by established identity. 57 Identities, ideas, norms and values are the concepts most 
frequently used within this approach. Constructivist accounts for the EU's foreign 
policy have been developed by a number of scholars. 58 From a constructivist 
perspective, the foreign policy of the EU derives from shared identity and 
understanding stemming from certain values as a basis for a collective action aimed at 
transfonnation.59 
The first categorisation of the EU in tenns of its distinctive identity was the 
concept of 'civilian power' developed by Duchene. Two elements have been 
identified within this concept, including the prominence of economic means in 
achieving foreign policy objectives as opposed to military forces, and 'a force for the 
international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards.' 60 It is mainly the first, 
54 March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, (New York: Free 
Press, 1989), at 160; 'New Theories of European Integration' in Cini, (ed.) European Union Politics, 
2nd edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 130; Sedelmeier, Constructing the Path to 
Eastern Enlargement, (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2005), at 18. 
55 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
56 Wendt, ibid, at 41,371. 
57 Sedelmeier, supra note 54, at 18. 
58 Christiansen, Jorgensen and Weiner, 'The Social Construction of Europe,' (1999) 6 Journal of 
European Public Policy 528; Jorgensen, (ed.), Reflective Approaches to European Governance, 
(London: Macmillan, 1997); Tonra, 'Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The 
Utility ofa Cognitive Approach,' (2003) 41 Journal of Common Market Studies 731; Checkel, 'Why 
Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change,' (2001) 55 International Organisation 553. 
59 Tonra, ibid, at 741, 747. 
60 Duchene, 'The EC and the Uncertainties of Interdependence' in Kohnstamm and Hager, (cds.), A 
Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community, (London: Macmillan, 
1973),1-21, at 19-20. 
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descriptive element of the concept of civilian power, which was largely used for 
analysing the EU foreign policy subsequently.61 In particular, the introduction of the 
CFSP with the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent development of European Security 
Defence Policy (hereinafter the ESDP) were among the reasons to question the 
existence of 'civilian power' EU.62 Within this debate, Stavridis and others brought 
the focus back to the second, normative element of Duchene's definition, where the 
'civilian nature' of the power is not determined by the use of force per se, but rather 
by the way in which the force is used, i.e. for promotion of civilian values.63 
Such normative understanding of the EU has been subsequently developed by 
MaIll1ers with the notion of "normative power.' Manners adds to the understanding of 
the EU as a 'civilian power' where the EU's unique normative basis is 'diffused' in 
its international relations predisposing the EU to act 'normatively.'64 Among these 
norms are those defming the EU's identity, including democracy and human rights. In 
this sense, the norms do not only influence the foreign policy, but most importantly 
they constitute elements of that very policy. Therefore, promotion of democracy and 
human rights are considered to be 'identity objectives' for the EU, manifesting its 
61 Hill 'European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc. Civilian Model-or Flop?' in Rummel. (ed.) The 
Evolution of an international Actor: Western Europe's New Assertiveness (Boulder: Westview, 1990); 
Smith, 'The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause tor Concern?' (2000) 35 The 
international Spectator 11, at 13. 
62 The CFSP constitutes the second pillar of the EU legal order created by the EU Treaty, Title V on 
Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, OJ C 340,10 November 1997. The second 
pillar is intergovernmental in nature implying unanimity in the Council. The ESDP was established by 
the Amsterdam Treaty in Article 17 and 25 with 1998 St Malo summit heralding common 
understanding between France and Britain on the security policy; Howorth, 'European Defence and the 
Changing Politic of the European Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately', (2001) 39 Journal 
of Common Market Studies 765, at 767,769; Smith, 'The End of Civilian Power Europe: A Welcome 
Demise or Cause for Concern?' (2002) 35 The international Spectator 11. 
63 Stavridis, 'Militarising' the EU: the Concept ofCiviJian Power Revisited'. (2001) The International 
Spectator 43, at 44, 48; Biscop, 'The European Security Strategy and the Neighbourhood Policy: A 
New Starting Point for a Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership?' in Attina and Rossi. (eds.). 
European Neighbourhood Policy: Political. Economic and Social Issues, The Jean Monnet Centre 
"Euro-Med", Department of Political Studies: 2004, 25-36, at 29. 
64 Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms', (2002) 40 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 235, at 236, 244, 252. 
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value-driven power as opposed to other actors on the international scene. 65 In 
addition, promoting democracy abroad is considered to be a factor enhancing the 
EU's identity and its values internally in reference to its democratic deficit debate. 66 Jt 
has been noted that the EU's 'self-representation' even on rhetorical level can be 
'performative,' which, given necessary structural context can contribute to the 
formulation of identity of relevant actors.67 
However, the identification of the EU in constructivist terms does not 
ultimately dismiss the rationalist accounts for the EU's foreign policy action. The 
general debate between rationalism and constructivism in International Relations 
theory has been reflected in the EU studies.68 In particular, the current level of EU 
integration has been identified as one of the factors affecting its international identity, 
which continues to represent a fusion of both supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism.69 The inability of the EU to act as a unitary actor in foreign 
relations is influenced by the complexity of its internal decision-making and sporadic 
and ad hoc manner of reacting to international events. 70 Most importantly, the 
presence of multiple policy-makers of EU international action increases scepticism as 
to the possibility of formulating a single presumption of the EU's identity and 
65 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008). at 223; Youngs, 'Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External 
Identity', (2004) 42 Journal of Common Market Studies 415, at 416; Olsen, 'Promotion of Democracy 
as a Foreign Policy Instrument of'Europe': Limits to International Idealism', (2000) 7 
Democratization 142, at 143. 
66 Youngs, ibid, at 419. 
67 Lucarelli, 'Values, Identity and Ideational Shocks in the Transatlantic Rift', (2006) 9 Journal of 
International Relations and Development 304, at 319-320. 
68 Aspinal and Schneider, (eds.), The Rules of Integration: Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of 
Europe, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); Checkel and Moravcsik, . A Constructivist 
Research Programme in EU Studies?' (200 I) 2 European Union Politics 219. 
69 Whitman, From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), at 28, at 205. 
70 Dannreuther, (ed.), European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood 
Strategy, (London: Routledge, 2004), at 207. 
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upholding it with equal intensity. 71 Therefore, despite the emerging value-dimension 
of the EU's foreign policy action, general inconsistencies have been observed In 
relation to geostrategic concerns or security-driven actions. 72 
Thus, for the purposes of this research, the EU will be perceived as an actor 
whose identity requires it to act 'normatively' in its external relations, not however 
excluding rationalist presumptions behind its actions. 
2.2. Review of primary and secondary sources 
For the purposes of answering the general research question a review of 
primary and secondary sources has been undertaken. EU legislation should be 
considered as the primary source providing the basis for studying the institutional and 
constitutional aspects of the EU foreign policy action. The primary legislation of the 
EU constructs the basis for identifying the normative identity of the EU, in particular 
the place of democratic values within this identity. The founding and revising 
Treaties of the European Union will be used for the purposes of this research. The 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty should frame the narrative for exploring the current 
state of the EU's constitutional development. In addition to its founding Treaties, EU 
international agreements signed with the Member States' participation in the context 
of the EU neighbourhood will be reviewed for analysis of the relations between the 
EU and relevant neighbours within the existing contractual framework. Most 
importantly, the secondary legislation of the EU will be revised for the purposes of 
71 Sedelmeier, supra note 57, at 36. 
72 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, supra note 65, at 334; Youngs, supra note 65, at 431; Lucarelli, 
supra note 67, at 320; Smith, 'The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third 
Countries: How Effective?' (1998) 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 253, at 254,272,273. Tocci, 
'The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor', Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Working Document No. 281/January 2008; Johansson-Nogues, 'The (Non-) Normative Power EU and 
the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor?' (2007) 7 
European Political Economy Review 181, at 185-186. 
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analysing the development of the ENP and its initial implementation. The secondary 
sources, such as Communications, Recommendation and Conclusions play the most 
important role in the process of ENP formulation and subsequent implementation. 
Other soft law instruments ensuring the implementation of the policy are among 
legislative sources reviewed. 
The wide scope of legal research undertaken in the field of the EU external 
relations with its neighbours provides a broad foundation for understanding different 
aspects of the ENP. The scholarly research is particularly relevant for analysing the 
institutional and constitutional aspects of policy development. In addition, the 
substance of the ENP in tenns of its instruments and mechanisms will be discussed 
with reference to the research undertaken by leading scholars in the area. 
2.3. Comparative perspective 
One of the leading general definitions of comparative law has been given by 
Zweigert and Kotz as 'an intellectual activity with law as its object and comparison as 
its process. ,73 Among various streams of defining comparative law is accepting it as a 
method of study rather than a body of law which allows examination of legal rules in 
comparative context. 74 For the purposes of this research comparative law will be used 
as a mean of understanding legal rules. Within this approach two comparative 
frameworks have been constructed for the purposes of the research question. 
First of all, the study is aimed at exploring the transposition of democratic 
values through the ENP to the countries of the South Caucasus. Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan are the three countries comprising the region. In order to answer the 
general research question, the discussion follows comparative logic. Comparative 
73 Zweigert and Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edition,( Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), at 
2. 
74 De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World, 3rd edition, (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 
2007), at 3, 5. 
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perspective is present m the initial discussion on the democratic reality of the 
countries in question, and in the EU's previous and current relations with each of the 
countries. Most importantly, the analysis of legal instruments of the ENP as 
demonstrating the EU's approach to democracy promotion will be conducted on a 
comparative basis. A frame for such comparison is construed around the democratic 
values of the EU with reference to the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on democratic 
principles ofthe EU. Construction of this comparative frame requires identification of 
the democratic elements of the EU governance constituting its normative basis, which 
the EU is willing to share with its neighbours. Various theories of democracy have 
been considered in order to establish a frame for subsequent comparative analysis. 
The second comparative narrative present in the thesis is built around the 
study of the ENP through the prism of the enlargement experience. The instruments 
and tools of the ENP are borrowed from the pre-accession strategy, which 
automatically entails comparison. Moreover, the transposition of democratic values to 
candidate countries serves as a ground for analysing the ENP's potential success or 
failure to affect democratic development of the South Caucasian countries. The 
mechanism of conditionality borrowed from the pre-accession strategy is of particular 
significance for assessing the effectiveness of the ENP in transposing the EU's 
democratic values. This comparative framework is particularly apparent in Chapter 
IV and Chapter VI of the thesis. 
2.4. Interviews 
Selecting interviews as a method for the purposes of this research was 
influenced by a number of considerations. 75 The insights into the formation and 
7S With the view of conducting interviews at certain stage of my research, I attended an 'Interviewing 
Workshop: organised by the Graduate School of Nottingham University. The workshop gave me an 
insight into the purpose of using interviewing as research method, designing and analysing interviews, 
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implementation of the ENP acquired through the interviews were an important 
contribution to the analysis undertaken in the thesis. First of all, the selection of 
interviewees was undertaken in the light of their immediate relation to the ENP as it 
is taking place in the three Caucasian countries. Three features are considered to be 
required for effective interview: 
• Accessibility-possession of requested information, 
• Cognition-understanding of the interviewee of the information 
required, 
• Motivation-the interest of the interviewees to participate In the 
interview. 76 
Interviews were conducted both with European Commission officials and 
representatives of Government, Parliament and representatives of NGOs involved in 
activities related to democratisation of the countries in question. The interviews were 
conducted in Brussels on January 28th, in Tbilisi on April 6-7th and in Yerevan on 
ApriI20-21th, 2009. Due to practical reasons as an Armenian citizen from Nagomo-
Karabakh, I could not visit Azerbaijan, and therefore no interviews have been 
conducted on ENP implementation in Azerbaijan. 77 
The presence of 'cognition' element has been ensured by acknowledging the 
purpose of interview when establishing contacts with interviewees. Accordingly, e-
mails have been sent to the interviewees explaining my position, the purpose of the 
interview and the information that might be required during the interviews. With 
types of interviews and others. The workshop was led by Dr. Peter Gates from School of Education, 
Nottingham University. The interviews were conducted in accordance with Nottingham University 
Code of Research Conduct. 
76 Cannel and Kahn, The Dynamics ojlnterviewing: Theory, Technique and Cases, 2nd edition, (New 
York: Wiley, 1968), at 535-538. 
77Despite these obstacles, contacts have been established with the representatives of Azerbaijan 
National Committee for European Integration. Special gratitude is expressed to Arzu Abdullayeva. 
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those interviewees with whom contacts have been established via telephone, the 
purpose of the interview has been explained during the initial conversation. 
The interviewees in Brussels were chosen according to the official position 
they occupy as desk-officers responsible for the countries of South Caucasus. The 
purpose of interviewing these particular officials was identifying the role of political 
refonn within the ENP, negotiation, implementation and monitoring of the Action 
Plans. In other words, to establish the extent to which the normative rhetoric is 
present in practice. The interviewees in Georgia and Armenia were also chosen due to 
the first-hand infonnation they have on the ENP issues in respective countries. The 
choice of the representatives of Government, Parliament and the civil society has 
been motivated by the intention of identifying their respective roles in the process of 
the Action Plan implementation and their vision of the role of democratisation within 
the ENP.78 
The motivation to participate in the interview depended on different 
considerations for each category of interviewees. For representatives of the European 
Commission it has been a continuous practice to communicate with representatives of 
academia, so as to demonstrate that the EU is more than merely bureaucratic. 79 It 
appears that for the representatives of the civil society in both Georgia and Armenia 
the motivation was not to miss an opportunity of criticising their respective 
governments. The representatives of state institutions in Georgia were very willing to 
present information on the ENP in Georgia as a demonstration of their enthusiasm for 
Georgia's EU integration. Similar motivation was noted in relation to the 
representative of the Armenian Government responsible for the ENP implementation. 
The absence of motivation on behalf of the representative of Armenian Parliament 
78 For the interview transcripts see Annex A, B, C. 
79 Interview with Anonymous Commission official I, DG RELEX, European Commission, 28 April, 
2009, Brussels. For interview transcript see Annex A. 
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dealing with the issues of European integration was the reason why that particular 
interview did not take place. 80 
Design of interviews 
The interviews have been designed in a semi-structured way. Questionnaires 
have been prepared beforehand, however they did not have a pre-established set of 
answers. 81 The questions set in the questionnaire were used as guidance in the 
interview, which allowed the conversation to flow, where at points the interviewee 
could answer more than one question. 
The questionnaires prepared for the interviews with the officials of the 
European Commission included a number of common questions, such as the role of 
democracy promotion at various stages of the Commission engagement with each of 
the countries through the ENP. Country-specific questions were also included in the 
questionnaires. Similarly, a common set of questions and country specific questions 
were used in the questionnaires in Georgia and Armenia. The questionnaires varied 
depending on the type of actor was interviewed. 
Transcribing and Translating 
The interviews were audio-recorded. This allows the interviewer to 
concentrate on the conversation with the interviewee and not to lose the focus by 
making notes. Although notes were taken during the interview, they nevertheless did 
not have the purpose of recording all the information provided by the interviewee. 
Rather they fixed certain data provided by the interviewee that seemed particularly 
valuable at the time. 
so Despite numerous efforts to organise an interview with representatives of the Armenian Parliament, 
the interview did not take place. 
SI Structured interviews assume that there is a set of questions established beforehand with a limited set 
of response categories; Fontana and Frey, 'Interviewing: The Art of Science', in Denzin and Lincoln, 
(eds.), Methods of Collecting and Analyzing Empirical Materials, 3rd edition, (London: Sage, 1994 ), 
361-375. 
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The recorded interviews have been subsequently transcribed by me. The 
transcribing of the interviews allowed making preliminary analyses of the 
information provided by the officials or representatives of the NGOs. In addition, 
most of the interviews conducted in Georgia and Armenia required translation into 
English from Russian or Armenian. The translation did not entail any complications, 
since both Armenian and Russian are my native languages and the ENP vocabulary 
used by the interviewees was translated from English in the first place. 
Ethical issues 
As noted above, the purpose of the interviews and the intended use of the 
information provided were explained via initial correspondence and at the beginning 
of the interviews. In accordance with the University of Nottingham Code of Research 
Conduct,82 the interviewees were given an opportunity to decide on the 
confidentiality of the information they have provided. Those who decided not to 
disclose their identity are cited anonymously. In addition, the transcripts of the 
interviews, to which the thesis makes reference, were offered for revision to all 
interviewees. Those interviewees who took up the offer were provided with the 
relevant transcript of the interview. No objections to the transcript have been raised 
by any of the interviewees to whom the document was sent. 
3. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis includes six substantive chapters and is finalised with conclusions. 
Chapter II, as the first substantive chapter, is aimed at setting a background for the 
EU's involvement in the South Caucasus through the ENP. The background will 
include both the presentation of the current stage of economic and political 
82 Available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uklris/local/research-strategy-and-
policy/code of conduct.pdf 
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development of the countries in question, and the relations the countries had with the 
EU prior to the ENP. Chapter III will be aimed at the discussion of the next phase of 
the relations between the EU and Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. This phase is 
primarily concerned with the ENP and its political aspects, including the EU's 
interests in the region and the objectives pursued through the ENP. Following the 
political aspects of the ENP, Chapter IV will be aimed at revealing the legal aspects 
of the ENP. The legal aspects of the policy will be discussed in reference to 
institutional and constitutional issues, instruments and methods of the policy. In order 
to assess the effectiveness of the ENP in transposing the EU's democratic values to 
the neighbourhood, those values will be identified with reference to the constitutional 
development of the EU as established in the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in 
Chapter V. Also, as the most successful example of transposition of democratic 
values to the neighbourhood, the experience of the 2004 enlargement will be 
considered. Chapters VI and VII will analyse the EU's actual engagement with 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. With reference to political considerations behind 
the ENP, the legal framework of the policy and the EU's democratic values, both 
chapters will be aimed at revealing the consistency of the EU's self-representation as 
an organisation spreading democracy to its neighbourhood. Chapter VI will focus on 
the Action Plans with each of the countries in comparative perspective, while Chapter 
VII will be based on the monitoring of Action Plan implementation in the three 
countries and the assistance provided to each of them. Finally, Chapter VIII will 
conclude the thesis with a summary of findings. 
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c -.- II 
South Caucasus and the EU before the ENP 
1. Introduction 
While the EC was going through heated debates on its identity in the end of 
1980s and early 1990s, its most powerful neighbour, the Soviet Union, was 
collapsing.83 It would have been logical to assume that the atmosphere of 'freedom' 
in the USSR, created by the trends of 'perestroika' and 'glasnost' introduced by 
Gorbachev, should have turned newly independent countries to establish a certain 
form of liberal democracy as their new political order. Almost two decades after the 
disintegration of the USSR very few of the fifteen newly independent states have 
succeeded in following this path. 
The Baltic states, which joined the EU in 2004, should be included within 
these few states. With reservations, to be discussed in Chapter V, they succeeded in 
establishing accountable democratic institutions based on the principle of· the 
separation of powers, checks and balances, and other features of liberal democratic 
regimes mainly due to their strong motivation for EU membership. 84 
Meanwhile the rest of the former Soviet republics established the CIS 
intending to retain cooperation in certain areas, including economic, legal and 
military cooperation. 85 In the CIS Almaty Declaration the signatory states 
acknowledged their intention of 'seeking to build democratic law-governed states.'86 
This seemed to have a declaratory character, since the CIS Charter, adopted by the 
Council of Heads of States on 22 January 1993, did not have any recall to the 
83 Soviet Union included fifteen member states, namely Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaij an, Georgia and Armenia. 
84 Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have gained their independence amongst the first countries and had 
immediate orientation towards the EU. This was due to the fact that all three countries preserved strong 
European identity after being occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940. 
85 See note 19, Chapter I. 
86 Deyermond, Security and Sovereignty in the Former Soviet Union, (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2008), at 42. 
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democratic order of the member states whatsoever. 87 In addition, establishing 
democratic institutions or other attributes of liberal democracies had not been an item 
on the agenda of this organisation. Even more, some of its members are considered to 
be modern autocracies. In the officially democratic republic of Belarus the political 
power is concentrated in the hands of the president with a state planned economy and 
suppressed opposition. Belarus is an example of the EU's application of political 
conditionality in its external relations. A Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(hereinafter the PCA) was negotiated between the parties in 1995, which, 
nevertheless, did not come into force due to the deteriorating democratic situation 
after President Lukashenka came to power.88 The same obstacles prevented Belarus 
from benefiting from the ENP. ~ 9 9
Most of the former Soviet countries,90 including the countries of the South 
Caucasus, stepped onto the painful path of building democracy through Soviet 
heritage, establishing new institutions, and changing citizens' conception of 
participation in political life of the country, alongside efforts to create a market 
economy. In the South Caucasus this process was interrupted with armed conflicts in 
87 http://www.cis.minsk.by/main.aspx?uid= ISO 
88 The Conclusion of the European Council of September 1997 stated that 'the EC and their Member 
States will conclude neither the interim agreement nor the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement" 
due to the deteriorating situation. Available at http://www.delblr.ec.europa.eulpageS4.html. 
Also the European Parliament has expressed its concerns over the situation in Belarus in a number of 
resolutions: European Parliament Resolution on the EU's Rights, Priorities and Recommendations for 
the 60th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva (15 March to 23 
April 2004); European Parliament Resolution on Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework 
for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours (COM(2003) 104 -2003/2018(INI); 
European Parliament Resolution on Relations between the European Union and Belarus: Towards a 
Future Partnership (2002/2164(1NI»; European Parliament Resolution on the Freedom of the Press in 
Belarus (July 4, 2002). 
89 In its conclusions of23 November 2004, the Council reiterated its political conditionality and 
acknowledged Belarus'S opportunity. as an EU neighbour. to benefit from the ENP. It called upon 
Belarus's leadership to revise their policies and improve their democratic record to comply with EU 
values; Council Conclusions of22-23 November 2004, 14724/04 (Presse 325), page 26. 
90 The reference is made with an intention to exclude Belarus and Turkmenistan and the Baltic 
countries. 
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all three countries in the beginning of 1990s influencing the political life of Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan to this day. 
At the same time, the EU, being pre-occupied with its constitutional 
transformation, forthcoming enlargement and conflicts in the Balkans, was not 
particularly concerned with engaging with the region and its problems. Hence, the 
relationship between the EU and the South Caucasus can be generally divided into 
two stages. The first stage includes the establishment of bilateral relations between 
the parties and is described with a rather cautious attitude by the Union to the region 
marked by an absence of a coordinated policy. This attitude persisted until the end of 
the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium. During the second stage of the 
relationship, the new geopolitical reality raised the importance of the region through 
its proximity after the anticipated enlargement of the EU's which led the Union to 
acknowledge its interests therein. It expressed a willingness to engage in the region 
and to develop a comprehensive policy towards the latter with a reference point of 
2003.91 This period mainly reflects the security concerns of the EU and is primarily 
related to the inclusion of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the ENP. 
The aim of this Chapter is to present the background of the development of 
South Caucasian states and the first phase of relationship between the EU and each of 
the countries. It is the background against which the ENP has to operate. In this 
context, this Chapter will be aimed at presenting the internal situation of the states in 
question with reference to their general description, the armed conflicts and their 
influence on the rise of nationalism. In addition a brief recourse will be made to the 
current state of democracy building process in the three countries with respect to 
distribution of power, representative element of democracy, citizens' participation 
91 Popescu considers that the , 1 990s-style of the EU policy' the region ended in 2003. See Popescu, 
'Europe's Unrecognised Neighbours: The EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia'. Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Working Document No 260/March 2007, at 4. 
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and freedom of speech. The relations between the EU and the South Caucasus in the 
first phase as identified above will be discussed next. The PCAs with Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan as the main instrument of cooperation will be considered 
with reference to their general features and their particular role as regards democracy 
promotion within the first phase. 
2. The South Caucasus and its democracy 
There is a presumption that the South Caucasus does not constitute a region 
and that it is just a 'cliche' created during the Soviet era.92 The term 'South Caucasus' 
was an alternative to 'Transcaucasus' in order to nominally separate it from Russia, 
from whose perspective it was considered to be 'Transcaucasus,' that is. beyond 
Caucasus.93 Also, the reference to the region as 'South' Caucasus distinguishes it 
from North Caucasus as a part of the Russian Federation. Although initially the EU 
was referring to the region as 'Transcaucasia,94 Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are 
currently referred to as the South or Southern Caucasus. Despite the fact that the three 
countries share much in common, including internally displaced persons, corruption 
and organised crime,95 in fact the relations between all three states do not leave any 
doubt as to the absence of regional cooperation or identity in general and therefore 
require a distinctive approach to each of them. 
92 Heinrich Boll Foundation, . Regional Preconditions tor the Development of an Integrated European 
Policy Towards the South Caucasus', Documentation of the Conference at the Heinrich Btill 
Foundation, Tbilisi, June 2004, at 12-13. 
A vailab Ie at http://www.boell.de/alt/ down loads/europa/caucasus conference04. pdf. 
93 Sabanadze, 'International Involvement in the South Caucasus', ECMI Working Paper No. 15 
(Flensburg, European Centre for Minority Issues 2002), at 3. 
Available at http://www.einiras.orgipub/details.cfm?lng=en&id=19647 
94 Towards a European Union Strategy for Relations with the Transcaucasian Republics, Commission 
Communication, Brussels, 31.05.1995, COM(95) 205 final. 
95 Labedzska, 'The Southern Caucasus' in Blockmans and Lazowski, (eds.), The European Union and 
Its Neighbours: A Legal Appraisal of the E U 's Policies of Stabilisation. Partnership and Integration, 
(Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2006), 575-612, at 577-578. 
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As identified by Lynch, there is no regional dialogue and an atmosphere of 
suspicion and insecurity is 'sustained by a lack of trust' .96 It can be assumed that at 
the stage of establishing relations with the three countries they were not perceived as 
constituting the South Caucasus separately, since the conclusion of the PCAs was a 
part of a general approach to the former Soviet Union states, which was itself a 
regional category for the EU.97 Apart from the general attention to the former Soviet 
space through the conclusion of the PCAs, excluding the Baltic countries, the EU has 
been rather reluctant to intervene in the problems of the South Caucasus, in particular 
in the armed conflicts. The violent conflicts in Nagomo-Karabakh, Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia received modest attention from the Union which was more preoccupied 
with the doorstep conflicts of the Balkans. 98 
96 For the purposes of this research the South Caucasus will be referred to as region; Lynch. 'A 
Regional Insecurity Dynamic' in 'The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU', Chaillot Papers No 
65, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003, 171-200, at 10. 
97 Lynch, 'The EU: Towards a Strategy' in 'The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU', Chaillot 
Papers No 65, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003, 9-21, at 179. 
98 Cop pieters, 'An EU Special Representative to a New Periphery' in 'The South Caucasus: A 
Challenge for the EU', Chaillot Papers No 65, EU Institute for security Studies, Paris. 2003. 159-170, 
at 169. 
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2.1. General description of the countries 
Situated between the Black and Caspian Seas the region of South Caucasus 
has land borders with Russia, Turkey and Iran. 
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Armenia is the smallest of all the fonner Soviet Republics and the only 
landlocked country among the South Caucasian countries which leads to high 
transportation costs. 100 The country's population is 3.1 million comprised mostly of 
ethnic Armenians with minorities totalling less than 3% of the population. 101 The 
current GDP of the country comprises 13.80% per annum with its small economy 
highly dependent on external markets for sustaining high growth and poverty 
reduction. 102 With scarce natural resources (gold, copper, zinc and alumina), 
99 The conflict areas of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh are marked on the map. 
http ://www.c-r.or1!l0ur-worklcaucasus/ images/map.htm 
100 The total territory of Armenia is 29.8 quare km. 
101 Asatryan and Arakelova. 'Ethnic Minorities of Armenia' , Yerevan 2002. 
Available at http://www. hra .am/file/minorities en.pdf. 
102 Armenia Country Brief, World Bank, -
Available at 
http://www.woridbank.org.amlWBSIT E/ EXTERN ALiCOUNTRI ES/ ECAEXT / ARM ENI A EXTN/O"c 
ontentMDK:20628754- menuPK:301586-pagePK: 14 I 137- piPK: 141127- theSitePK:30 1579,OO.html. 
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agriculture sector employs about 46 percent of total labour and amounts to 18 percent 
of national GDP. 103 
Azerbaijan's rich natural resources of oil and gas should be considered as one 
of the major attractions of the region. With a population of almost 8.3 million, the 
GDP per capita amounted to 21.0 US$ billion as of 2006. 104 The oil and gas boom 
ensures 86% of total exports and 56% of fiscal revenues. lOS The economic prospects 
connected to oil and gas resources promised even further growth with the new 
pipelines exporting country's reserves to the Western market. The Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (hereinafter the BTC) pipeline launched in May 2005 transports oil from the 
Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. 106 The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum 
(hereinafter the BTE) natural gas pipeline was launched in 2006 and transports gas 
from Azeri Shah-Deniz gas field. Signs of the so called 'Dutch disease' led to 
creation of an extra budgetary State Oil Fund which is supposed to invest in other 
sectors of economy. 107 
Also for Georgia the cooperation on BTC and BTE pipelines due to its transit 
position are considered to be good prospects for the development of the economy. lOS 
Similar to Annenia, Georgia is a small country with a population of 4.4 million and 
limited natural resources, including manganese, iron, coal, copper, gold, granite, 
limestone, marble, and mineral waters. 109 Georgia's climate and fertile land create 
favourable conditions for the development of agriculture, including production of 
103 Ibid. 
104 World Bank data, available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/aze aag.pdf. 
lOS Country Report Azerbaijan, European Neighbourhood Policy, Commission Staff Working Paper, 
SEC (2005) 286/3, section 3.1.1. 
106 The pipeline was built by a consortium under BP. 
107'Azerbaijan's 01 inflation rate 16.6%, National Bank chief says.' Today.Az, April 14, 2007; 
Azerbaijan Country Report, section 3.1.1. 
108 Labedzska, supra note 13, at 582. 
109 Georgia Country Brief, World Bank. 
Available at 
http://web.worldbank.orglWBSITE/EXTERNALICOUNTRIES/ECAEXT/GEORGIAEXTN/O"menuP 
K:301755-pagePK:141132-piPK: 141107-theSitePK:301746,OO.htmJ. 
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citruses and tea. The liberalisation of economy after the Rose Revolution led to the 
raise in the GDP to 10% annually reaching 12% in 2007. 110 The August 2008 war 
with Russia, which wiJI be discussed in Chapter III, had major impact on Georgia's 
growing economy damaging macro-level perfonnance and increasing the numbers of 
Internally Displaced People. III 
2.2. Nationalism and conflicts 
Nationalism should be considered as one of the major factors leading to an 
unstable situation in all three countries and constituting a significant barrier to the 
development of their young democracies. It plays a significant role in almost all fields 
of political life of these states since their independence. Whilst it replaced 
communism as the major ideology in the fonner Soviet Republics first years of 
independence, 112 nationalism in Annenia still dominates the political agenda 
undennining frameworks for democratisation with national security matters. 113 This 
observation of Freire and Simao can be equally applied to Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
The major issues building up the nationalism narrative should be considered the 
unresolved conflicts in the region. 
2.2.1. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
Though the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict erupted in the end of 1980s, it is 
rooted in the history of the beginning of the 20th century. After the d?wnfall of the 
Russian Empire, and the short lived Transcaucasian Republic, three new republics 
were fonned within its territory in 1918: Annenia, and Georgia, which restored their 
110 Ibid. 
III Ibid. 
112 Khazanov, After the USSR: Ethnicity. Nationalism and Politics in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, (London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), at 58. 
113 Freire and Simao, 'The Armenian Road to Democracy. Dimensions ofa Tortuous Process,' Centre 
for European Policy Studies, Working Document No. 267/May 2007, at 4. 
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statehood after centuries, and Azerbaijan which created its first state. 114 Armenia 
found itself in a position of fighting against Azerbaijan which claimed the historical 
territories of Armenia-Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh, predominantly inhabited 
by Armenians. After both Azerbaijan and Armenia were Sovietised, the disputed 
territories were incorporated in Armenia. I 15 In July 1921 Stalin decided that Nagorno-
Karabakh together with Nakhichevan were to be passed to Azerbaijan,116 in a 
continuation of the Imperial Russian policy of creating administrative divisions not 
according to their ethnicity as a form of 'divide and rule.' 117 
Despite the reluctance of Armenians to accept the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh 
in the Soviet era, the powerful Soviet centre successfully suppressed national 
sentiments for decades. I 18 With the sense of freedom appearing in the Soviet Union 
after Gorbachev led 'perestroika' and 'glasnost' and his famous speech on self-
determination, Armenians in both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh raised their 
dormant hope of unification. Mass demonstrations took place in the beginning of 
1988 in the capital of Armenia, Yerevan, as well as in Stepanakert, the main town of 
Nagomo-Karabakh, followed with a petition to Soviet authorities in Moscow 
requiring change in the status of the region. 119 In February 1988 the Regional 
Committee in Stepanakert voted to request the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to 
114 Georgia and Azerbaijan declared their independence on 26th and 27th of May 1918 without even 
considering the demarcation of borders with Armenia: at the time Armenia was fighting against Turkey 
advancing in the Eastern Armenia, and neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan considered that Armenians had 
any chance against Turkey. Armenia's independence was proclaimed on 29 May 1918 in Tit1is; 
Walker, Armenia: The Survival 0/ a Nation (London: Croom Helm, 1980), at 246-257. 
liS On December 1, 1920 it was acknowledged by the Chairman of Azeri Revolutionary Committee 
Narimanov and Commissioner of Foreign Affairs Huseinov that the disputed territories of Nagorno-
Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan are considered to be part of Armenia; Libaridian, (ed.), The 
Karabakh File, (Cambridge, MA: Zoryan Institute, 1988). at 34. 
116 Ibid, at 36. 
117 Karabakh was included in Yelizovetpol gubernia in Tsarist Russia after the territory of Eastern 
Armenia was conquered in the Russian-Persian war of 1826-1828; Masih and Krikorian. Armenia at 
the Crossroads, (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1999), at 3; Walker, supra note 32, at 46-47,75. 
1\8 Libaridian, supra note 33, at 42-52. 
1\9 Miller, Armenia: Portraits a/Survival and Hope, (London: University of California Press 2003), at 
37-38. 
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Annenia, which was rejected by the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet in June of the same 
year. Violence broke out in different parts of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan from 
1988 to the early 1990s, including the pogroms of 22 February, 1988 in Aghdam and 
Karabakh,120 and the massacres of Armenians in the Azeri town of Sumgait in 
1989. 121 The culmination of violence took place in January of 1990 in the Baku 
pogroms of Annenians which urged the central Soviet authorities to react by sending 
in troops.122 Throughout this period there was an exchange in refugee populations 
from both sides. \23 The violence turned into full-scale military operations, when, by 
September 1992, Azerbaijan had captured more than half of Nagorno-Karabakh. The 
Annenians fought back recapturing most of Nagorno-Karabakh and six surrounding 
Azerbaijani regions by May 1994. 124 According to the International Crisis Group the 
conflict left behind around one million Internally Displaced Persons on both sides. 125 
A ceasefire was signed in May 1994 with the efforts of the OSCE which was 
followed by numerous high-ranking negotiations on the possible resolution of the 
conflict within the OSCE Minsk Group. Mainly fruitless negotiations for over a 
decade accorded the conflict with the status of 'frozen.' 126 Though it has been hoped 
that the parties will come to an agreement suitable for all based on the Madrid Basic 
120 Masih and Krikorian, supra note 35, at 7. 
121 Shahmuratian, (ed.), The Sumgait Tragedy: Pogroms against Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan, (New 
Rochelle, NY/Cambridge, MA: Caratzas Publishers/Zoryan Institute). 
122 De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, (New York: New York 
University Press, 2003), at 89-93. 
123 'Azerbaijan: Turning Over a New Leaf?', International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 156, 
Baku/Brussels, 13 May 2004, at 6. 
124 According to De Waal it comprises 14% of official territory of Azerbaijan, supra note 40,240. 
125 'International Crisis Group, supra note 41, at 5. 
126 Azerbaijan made an attempt to bring the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to the UN level by passing a 
Resolution on 14 March 2008 in the UN General Assembly requiring 'immediate, complete and 
unconditional' withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azeri regions (UN General Assembly Resolution 
62/243 on 'The Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan', 14 March 2008). 
The US, France and Russia, the three co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, opposed this resolution 
considering Azerbaijani efforts of bringing the issue to the UN level to be destructive for the 
negotiations within the OSCE framework; Press Release Concerning UN General Assembly 
Resolution on Situation in Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation, 341-15-03-2008. 
Available at http://www.un.int/russiainew/MainRootidocs/offnews/150308/newenl.htm. 
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Principles,127 the recent meetings between the Presidents of Annenia and Azerbaijan 
did not lead to major developments. 128 
While the EU was not involved in the establishment of peace, the OSCE 
framework also left it out of the negotiation process. Moreover, the parties of the 
conflict themselves were not particularly enthusiastic of the EU's involvement. 129 The 
constitutional referendum and subsequent presidential elections ofNagomo-Karabakh 
in 2007 received condemnation from the EU Presidency and Council of Europe. 130 It 
should be noted, that in contrast, in Kosovo the EU supported a 'standards before 
status' policy where it placed high importance on the democratic development of 
Kosovo 'irrespective of its final status. ,131 Whether this is conditioned with the UN 
involvement in Kosovo or it is an evidence of double-standards is not clear. 
The resolution of the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict in Armenia serves as a 
matter of speculation in national elections particularly in presidential elections. As an 
example, taking the 'wrong position' on the Karabakh conflict appeared to be the 
127 The Basic Principles is the latest framework for peace negotiations proposed by the OSCE Minsk 
Group. 
128 'More innuendos, stiJllittle substance: Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations in Moscow set stage for 
tense autumn in regional diplomacy,' ArmeniaNow, 20 July, 2009. 
Available at 
http://www.armenianow.coml?action=view ArticJe&AID=3955&CID=3 756&1 10= 1244&lng=eng. 
129 Stritecky, 'The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the ENP' in Kratochvil, (ed.), The European 
Union and its Neighbourhood: Policies, Problems and Priorities, (Institute ofInternational Relations, 
Prague, 2006), 59-76, at 65. 
130 Nagorno Karabakh adopted a Constitution in 2006 in a national referendum with 99 percent positive 
votes. The Constitution describes the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as 'a sovereign, democratic legal 
and social state' based on separation of powers and protection of human rights and freedoms. Though 
the issue of refugees is not particularly referred to in the document, nevertheless it recognises a right of 
return for 'every citizen and foreign citizen having the right to live in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Republic.' The Constitution did not solve the issue of citizenship, and citizens of Karabakh currently 
hold Armenian passports; 'Declaration by the Presidency on behalf ofthe European Union on 
'Presidential elections' in Nagorno Karabakh on 19 July 2001', Presidency of the European Union, 
Portugal 2007, 20.02.2007, available at 
http://www.eu2007.ptIUE/vENlNoticiasDocumentos/DeclaracoesPESC/20070719PESCNAG.htm ; 
Chair of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers: Declaration on the "presidential elections" 
to be held in Nagorno Karabakh on 19 July 2007, Strasbourg, 12 July 2007, available at 
https://wcd.coe.intNiewDoc.jsp?id=1164313; 
Nagomo Karabakh gains a Constitution, but little clarity for future', Eurasia insight, December 13, 
2006, available at http://www .eurasianet.orgldepartments/insightlarticles/eav 121206.shtml#. 
131 Tocci, The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor' Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Working Document No. 281/January 2008, at 16. 
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only issue that could bring down a party or a government in Annenia as in the case of 
the fall of the government of President Levon Ter-Petrosyan in 1998 leading to his 
resignation. 132 The 'wrong position' was expressed in the enthusiasm about the 
'step-by-step' plan according to which after the withdrawal from occupied territories 
and the demilitarization of Karabakh, negotiations would continue on the further 
issues, including the most important one: the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. 133 
The Karabakh conflict is widely articulated by the politicians due to the fact 
that it helped previously to unify Armenia's political elite.134 The presidential 
elections of 2008 illustrated the opposite potential of the same issue to polarise public 
opinion. Levon Ter-Petrosyan's coming back to politics showed how the issue can be 
articulated to divide the public opinion and link the more general Karabakh issue with 
the dissatisfaction of certain part of the population with the governing circle referred 
to as the 'Karabakh clan'. 135 He used the speculation that President Kocharian had 
agreed at OSeE negotiations to hand over the Megri region instead of Nagomo-
Karabakh. 136 He also argued that the Madrid Basic Principles mentioned above were 
similar to the 1997 peace plan that was rejected by the then Prime-Minister 
Kocharyan almost a decade ago. 137 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was similarly causing instabilities for the 
political life of Azerbaijan. The military losses in 1992 brought the Popular Front 
party to power in Baku with Abulfaz Elchibey replacing President Ayaz 
\32 De Waal, supra note 40, at 259. 
133 Disintegration started in the ruling party headed by Ter-Petrosian after the Prime-Minister 
Kocharian, together with the Ministers of Defence and Interior opposed to the plan leading to Ter-
Petrosian's resignation in February 1998; ibid, at 258-259. 
134 'Armenia: Internal Instability Ahead', International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 158, 18 
October 2004, at 5-6. 
135 This is due to the fact that at the time President Kocharian and Prime-Minister Sarkisian are 
originally from Karabakh. 
136 The Megri region is situated in the South of Armenia and, if handed to Azerbaijan, will link 
Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan mainland. . _ 
137 'Armenia: Picking up the Pieces', International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing, Europe Bneflng No 
48, YerevanlTbilisi/Brussels, 8 April 2008, at 10. 
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Mutalibov. 138 The continued military setbacks also discredited the new government 
resulting in a uprising and other separatist movements in the country, eventually 
forcing President Elchibey to call to power the former Soviet Politburo member 
Heydar Aliyev who assumed the presidency in June 1993. 139 Currently the unresolved 
conflict and the presence of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons is one of the 
major reasons for political instability in the country.140 In addition, it has been noted 
that the lasting conflict is also being used by the authorities to distract public attention 
from the poor state of the rule-of-law, human rights and democracy issues. 141 
.2.2. The conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia before August 2008 
Similar to the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict, the South Ossetian and Abkhaz 
conflicts were based on the rise of nationalism in the Soviet Union at the end of the 
1980s. Both Ossetian and Abkhaz people have different ethnicity from Georgians and 
speak their own language. Abkhazia had a status of an Autonomous Republic within 
Georgia, while South Ossetia was an Autonomous region. Ossetia claimed to upgrade 
its status to 'autonomous republic' at the end of 1989, in response to which the 
Georgian Supreme Council decided to establish the Georgian language as the main 
language in the country.142 The situation in South Ossetia got out of control after 
Georgia banned local parties which was viewed in Ossetia as a move against them 
and led to the proclamation of the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic in 
September 1990.143 Georgia responded by abolishing the status of autonomous region 
138 International Crisis Group, supra note 41, at 6. 
139 Ibid, at 6. 
140 Nuriyev, 'EU Policy in the South Caucasus: A View from Azerbaijan', Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Working Paper No.272/July 2007, at 10. 
141 'Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War', International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 187, 14 
November 2007, at 14. 
142 'Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia', International Crisis Group, Europe Report 159, 
November 2006. 
143 'Hastening the end of the empire', Time Magazine, 28 January 1991; available at 
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in December 1990. 144 Violence in South Ossetia started in 1991 and lasted until 1992 
when the • Agreement on the Principle of the Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian 
conflict between Georgia and Russia' was signed establishing a Joint Control 
Commission and deploying joint peacekeepers combining R ~ s s i a n s , , Georgians and 
Ossetians. 145 
The ethnic tension present in the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic from the end 
of the 1980s reached its peak after the military coup in January 1992 in Georgia 
forcing the first President, Gamsakhurdia, to leave his post. In particular, the 
restoration of the 1921 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Georgia was 
considered by Abkhazia as a threat to their autonomy and led to the declaration of 
independence in July 1992.146 The new President Shevardnadze sent military troops 
to Abkhazia to preserve its status, and without any resistance gained control over 
much of Abkhazia. 147 In 1993 the Abkhaz armed forces in fierce fighting managed to 
get control over Abkhaz territories, apart from Kodori gorge, leaving thousands of 
dead and displaced people behind. 148 Abkazia adopted a Constitution in 1994 and' 
declared independence in 1999. 
Both the Ossetian and Abkhaz conflicts were considered to be frozen before 
2008 when hostilities resumed, this time involving Georgia and Russia. 149 One of the 
reasons for the resumption of military activities has been the rise of nationalist 
rhetoric of the post-Revolutionary Georgian Government which made one of its 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/articIe/O. 9171. 972214,OO.htmL 
144 International Crisis Group, supra note 60, at 3. . . 
145 The Joint Control Commission included r e p r ~ s e n t a t i v e e of Georgia, South and North Ossetla, RUSSIa 
and participants from the OSCE. 
146 Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethno-political Conflict in the Caucasus, 
(London: Routledge 2001), at 345-349. 
147 Mirsky, On Ruins of Empire: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Former Soviet Union, (London: 
Greenwood Press, 1997), at 72. 
148 • Abkhazia Today', International Crisis Group, Europe Report 176, 15 September 2006: at 6. 
149 The Georgian-Russian war of August 2008 will be discussed in Chapter III below, sectIOn 2.2. 
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objectives the integration of both breakaway regions. 150 While the militarisation of 
the country did not allow focusing the efforts of the new leadership on political and 
economic refonns solely, lSI the August 2008 war destabilised Georgia's political and 
economic life even further. The country faces being held back for several years in its 
development through its ruined infrastructure, new wave of displaced population and 
apparently lost regions. 
This will certainly have a negative effect on the democratic development of 
the country. First of all, political instability draws the attention of the public and the 
authorities away from the democratic issues, which is natural in conditions, where the 
country's sovereignty and security is at stake. Second, if immediately after the war 
the political forces, including the opposition, seemed to have united in the struggle 
against the 'common enemy', that is Russia, such unity did not last long. The long-
lasting mass protests organised by the opposition in 2009 have been demanding the 
resignation of Saakashvili Government inter alia blaming the latter for the events of 
August 2008. 152 
2.3. Democratic reality of the South Caucasus 
As noted in the Introduction, Annenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia after 
proclaiming their independence expressed their choice for the principles of liberal 
150 'Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly: Europe Report No. 183, 7 June 2007, 
International Crisis Group, at 1. 
151According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia as a key field in cooperation with the US 
Train and Equip Program, followed by the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program in 2005 were 
implemented. These programs were fully financed and supervised by the US and enhanced Georgia's 
military capability and stimulated military reform. The unprecedented military assistance of the US 
ever extended in the entire former Soviet Area helped Georgia not only to eliminate any presence of 
terrorists on the territory of Georgia but also enabled it to become one of the most active members of 
the US-led Anti-Terror Coalition. Available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?sec id=268&lang id=EN G. 
152 'Georgia: opposition gives Saakashvili ultimatum to resign'. EurasiaNet, 9 April 2009. 
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democracy.153 After a few years of transition all three countries adopted new 
Constitutions proclaiming their respective countries as democracies. 154 The internal 
orientation towards democracy coincided with the obligations the three countries 
undertook in their external relations. All three countries became members of the UN, 
Council of Europe and OSCE, as well as undertaking obligations as regards to 
democracy under different international agreements, including the peAs. 155 On the 
surface this ensures that 'fundamental values are officially shared and co-owned' with 
the Eu. 156 However, official adoption of democratic values is not always reflected in 
the political reality of the countries in question. 
Despite constitutional provisions on foundations of democratic state and 
separation of powers, the President is the most influential political institution in 
Armenia based not only on legislation, but also the informal practices. 157 The 
misbalance of power is present in relations with the National Assembly. The 
Parliament, which despite influential constitutional powers, including the right to 
impeachment of the president, is considered to be a 'rubber stamp' with weak and 
153 For instance, the Declaration of Independence adopted by the Supreme Council of the Armenian 
Soviet Socialist Republic in August 1990 stipulated the adherence of the newly proclaimed republic to 
the principles of freedom of speech, press, and conscience; the separation oflegislative, executive, and 
judicial powers; a multi-party system; the equality of political parties under the law; the depolitisation 
of law enforcement bodies and armed forces; Georgian Declaration of Independence on 9 April 1991; 
Armenian Declaration ofIndependence on 23 September 1991; Azerbaijani Declaration of 
Independence on 18 September 1991. 
154 The Constitution of Georgia, adopted on 24 August 1995, last amended 27.12.06, Articles 1, 5, 7. 
Available at http://www.parliament.ge/files/68 1944 951190 CONSTIT 27 12.06.pdf; 
The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, adopted on 12 November 1995, Articles 7,26. 
Available at http://www.azerbaijan.az/General1nfo/Constitution!constitutione.html; 
Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, adopted at national referendum on 5th of July, 1995, Articles 
1,4,5,7. 
Available at http://www.armeniaforeignministry.comlhtms/conttitution. html. 
155 AlJ three states joined the UN and the OSCE in 1992. Armenia and Azerbaijan became members of 
the Council of Europe in January 2001, while Georgia was admitted earlier in April 1999. 
156 Emerson, 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy of Place boT, Working Document No 
2l51N0vember 2004, Centre for European Policy Studies, at 10. 
157 Articles 1,2,5 establish Armenia as a democratic state based on separation of powers, where power 
belongs to people exercising it directly or indirectly. Article 55 provides for wide powers for the 
President of Republic, including the appointment of the Prime Minister and the Members of the 
Government, dissolution of the National Assembly. In addition, the President appointed the members 
of the Constitutional Court, the Prosecutor General and was the head of the procuracy, the police, the 
National Security Service and the military. 
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limited opportunity for political discourse. IS8 One of the reasons for Parliament's 
weak role is the failure of the multi-party system. The vast number of parties can be 
described as leader-based with power concentrated on top of the party and the 
selection of candidates lacking transparency and open debate. IS9 Despite preaching 
liberal democratic values, the parties are detached from the voters and civil society, 160 
creating rivalry over power and not over certain political course. This statement is 
confirmed by the polarisation of the party system, where parties can be described 
only as either pro-governmental or as opposition. Distortion in separation of powers 
in Armenia has been also apparent in relations between the executive and the 
judiciary.161 
In 2005 amendments have been made to the Armenian Constitution on the 
issues of the appointment of an Ombudsman, independence and plurality of the 
media, independence of the judiciary, separation of powers and local self-governance. 
The amendments were drafted in consultation with the Council of Europe Venice 
Commission and adopted at a national referendum. 162 The amendments on the 
abolishment of the general immunity of the President, convening of extraordinary 
meeting of the Parliament by its Speaker, involvement of the Parliament Speaker or 
the Prime Minister in the process of dissolution of the Parliament for 'technical' 
158 International Crisis Group, supra note 52, at 8. 
159 Armenia Political Party Assessment, USAID Report, May 2005, at 10, 12 
160 Ibid, at 13. 
161 The 1995 Constitution allowed for a misbalance between the executive and the judicial, which 
heavily depended on the President due to his powers of appointing the judges of different instances 
based on the annualIist drafted by the Judicial Council headed by the President who also appointed the 
fourteen members of the Council. 
162 The referendum was held on November 27, 2005 after the National Assembly passed the 
Constitutional amendments in the third reading on September 27,2005; Council of Europe, Venice 
Commission (2005), 'Opinion on constitutional reform in the Republic of Armenia', adopted at 64th 
Plenary Session, Venice, 21-22 October. 
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reasons by the President and others are expected to restore the balance between the 
executive and the legislative and create more checks and balances. 163 
Even more apparent is the concentration of power in the President's hands in 
Azerbaijan. Despite the constitutional separation of powers, the predominance of the 
executive branch is noted not only in relation to the legislature and the judiciary, but 
also most elements of society are characterised with authoritarian features. l64 It is 
noted that the formation of the executive 'has developed into a sprawling bureaucracy 
that appears mainly to search for bribes and 'official' transaction fees', where the 
Ministers pay to obtain their position or alternatively they have to be linked to the 
President of the country. 165 
In particular, Azerbaijan is infamous due to its 'corrupt patronage networks' 
dominating both the political and economic life of the country. 166 The fact that the 
Parliament is tightly controlled by the President creates imbalance between the 
executive and the legislature. As in the case of Armenia, the International Crisis 
Group qualifies the Azerbaijani Parliament as a 'rubber stamp' whose task is to 
approve the legislative drafts proposed by the presidential administration with the 
163 The new Constitutional amendments on the composition of Judicial Council by the General 
Assembly of the judges instead of the President will ensure that the judiciary will no longer have the 
dependence on the executive it had previously. In addition, the inclusion of the Prosecutor's office in 
the judiciary branch and the appointment of the Prosecutor General by the Parliament based on a 
recommendation from the President should also be considered as major development in establishment 
the independence of the judiciary; 'Honouring the obligations and commitments by Armenia', Report 
ofthe Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Doc. 11117,20 December 
2006, paragraph 40. 
164 Article 1 of Azerbaijani Constitution provides for people as the only source of power and for 
separation of powers, where the directly elected President appoints the government which afterwards 
obtains the confidence of the Parliament; • An Assessment of the Development of Political Pal1ies in 
the Republic of Azerbaijan', USAID, 2003, at 4; Azerbaijan Country Report. European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Commission Staff Working Paper COM(2005) 72 final, Brussels, 02.03.2005, 
SEC(2005) 286/3, section 2.1. 
165 International Crisis Group, supra note 41, at 9-10. 
166 'Azerbaijan's 2005 Elections: Lost Opportunity,' International Crisis Group, Europe Briefing No 
40, Baku/Brussels, 21 November 2005, at 1. 
43 
members of the Parliament directly loyal to the President. 167 The practices of political 
parties are considered to be non-democratic producing 'a system of patronage and 
ingrained corruption' without offering the citizens a platform for political debate. 168 
In addition, it has been noted that Azerbaijan's political parties are more personalised, 
than those in the neighbouring countries, where at least constant changes are 
occurring in political domain. 169 Furthermore, imprisonment for political reasons has 
been an ongoing practice in Azerbaijan. 170 
Despite high hopes attached to Georgia's post-Revolutionary democratic 
rhetoric, the subsequent political developments proved a disappointment. After 
coming to power, President Saakashvili initiated constitutional amendments resulting 
in centralisation of power in his hands without proper system of checks and balances 
and practical absence of Parliamentary opposition.17I The new institutional 
arrangement entitled the President with power to dissolve the Parliament and call new 
elections, and the parliament lost its right to dismiss the prime minister in a no-
confidence vote. l72 Also the new amendments provided that the majority of the 
Council of Justice members should be appointed either directly by the President or by 
the majority in the Parliament which is controlled by the President. 173 Similar to its 
neighbours, Georgia's political parties are largely based on personalities rather than 
167 International Crisis Group, supra note 41, at 9-10. 
168'An Assessment ofthe Development of Political Parties in the Republic of Azerbaijan', USAJD, 
2003, at 5; International Crisis Group, supra note 84, at 12. 
169 An Assessment ofthe Development of Political Parties in the Republic of Azerbaijan', USAID, 
2003, at 9. 
170 'The Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Azerbaijan', Report of Monitoring Committee, 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Doc. 11627,6 June 2008, paragraphs 114-133; 
Resolution 1359 (2004) on Political Prisoners in Azerbaijan of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe; Resolution 1457 (2005) follow up to Resolution 1359 (2004) of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
171 'Honouring of obligations and commitments by Georgia', Report, Doc. 10383, 21 December 2004, 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Introduction, paragraph 4,6. 
172 'Georgia: Sliding Towards Authoritarianism?' International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 189, 
19 December 2007, atl8. 
173 • Honouring of obligations and commitments by Georgia'. Report, Doc. 10383, 21 December 2004, 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, paragraph 41. 
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ideology or a framework for assembling citizens around certain interests. 174 
Saakashvili's ruling United National Movement has a presence at all levels of 
society; however it does not offer a transparent management, and also it has been 
claimed that its apparent public support is boosted by use of state resources. 175 The 
confidence in adherence of new authorities to democratic values has been further 
undermined with certain undemocratic practices in the so called 'fight against 
corruption. ,176 
The representative element of democracy in all three countries is undermined 
with fraudulent elections of both to the Parliaments and the Presidents. 177 While 
Armenia's first presidential elections in 1991 are considered to be the only fair 
elections held in the country,178 in Georgia the 2008 extraordinary presidential 
elections were considered by international observers as 'the first genuinely 
competitive post-independence presidential election.' 179 It should be noted that 
though the shortcomings were similar to those taking place at the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani elections, they did not affect the 'genuinely competitive' nature of the 
Georgian presidential elections. 180 The past fraudulent elections in the three countries 
174 International Crisis Group, supra note 90, at 19. 
175 Ibid. 
176 It was perceived to be selectively applied, where the procedures for removing allegedly corrupt 
judges have lacked transparency and due process. Arrests of several former officials accused of 
corruption were arbitrary often without warrants or with the use of excessive force. The 'plea 
bargaining' system, which allowed to reduce or drop charges for suspects in return for the payment of 
the money they supposedly misused, was criticised by the Council of Europe; 'Honouring of 
obligations and commitments by Georgia', Resolution 1603 (2008). Parliamentary Assembly of 
Council of Europe, at 15,47-49; Human Rights Watch, 2006. 
177 Parliamentary Elections, 12 May 2007, Republic of Armenia, Final Report, OSCE/ODlHR Election 
Observation Mission; Presidential Election, 19 February 2008, Republic of Armenia, Final Report, 
OSCE/ODlHR Election Observation Mission, Warsaw, 30 May 2008; Republic of Azerbaijan, 
Parliamentary Election Observation Mission Final Report, OSCE/ODIHR, Warsaw 2006. 
178 International Crisis Group, supra note 52, at 3. 
179 Georgia Extraordinary Presidential Election,S January 2008, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation 
Mission, Warsaw, 4 March 2008; 'Honouring of obligations and commitments by Georgia', Resolution 
1603 (2008), Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, paragraph 1. 
180 During the pre-election campaign the line between the state and Saakashvili's party was blurred 
which gave him an advantage over the other candidates. Among the events overshadowing the proper 
conduct of the elections were the prompt amendments to the Election Code passed shortly before the 
election, which caused the concerns of the opposition as to their prompt adoption and inadequate 
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are largely tolerated by international community, which results in 'electoralist 
fallacy': 'the superficial legitimation of elections as relatively free and fair, even 
when the regimes that come to power are authoritarian.' 181 For instance, criticism 
from the EU either has occasional nature,182 or is left to extreme cases, such as the 
2008 post-election violence in Armenia resulting in emergency situation. 183 As a 
result of fraudulent elections, the power is retained in the hands of the same 
governing elite or the same family, as in Azerbaijan, undermining the legitimacy of 
the ruling regimes. 184 
The dark side of the representative democracy in the three countries IS 
complemented with underdeveloped forms of political participation. In Armenia the 
main forms of political participation by citizens are considered to be demonstrations 
and public complaints, but even these forms are practised by a very small percentage 
of the population. 185 While there is a wide NGO sector specialising in different areas, 
the majority of citizens are not aware of their activities. 186 NGOs are mostly 
interested in social service delivery or in helping disadvantaged groups than in 
inclusiveness of the process. PACE has also expressed its concern over such reforms which did not 
allow the public to become adequately aware of their consequences. Throughout the pre-election 
campaign there were allegations of vote buying, instances of intimidation and pressure, including on 
the employees of public institutions and cases of violence against opposition activists. The voting day 
was also marked with irregularities, such as tampering with voter list entries, election results or results 
protocols, not allowing the observers to examine the ballots during counting procedures, not well 
organised and chaotic tabulation process etc. 
181 Light, 'Exporting Democracy' in Smith and Light, (eds.), Ethics and Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 75-92, at 89. 
182 For instance, Commissioner of External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner has criticised the 
Parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan: 'Azerbaijan: EU doubtful of Baku's commitment to 
democracy', RFEIRL, 27 October 2005. 
183 The EU presidency expressed its concerns about the aftermath of the elections calling on the 
Armenian authorities to release detained citizens and to refrain from further arrests of leaders of 
opposition; 'EU Presidency Statement on the Situation in Armenia', 12 March 2008.Available at 
http://www.eu2008.silenlNewsandDocuments/CFSPStatements/March/0312MZZarmenia.html 
184 MacFarlane, 'The Caucasus and Central Asia: Towards a Non-Strategy' in Dannreuther, (ed.), 
European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, (London: Routledge, 
2004),118-134, at 123. 
18S 'Citizens' Awareness and Participation in Armenia' Survey 2004, International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems, at 23; available at www.ifes.org. 
186According to Human Rights Watch some 3000 NGOs are registered with the Ministry of Justice 
(Human Rights Watch, Armenia Report 2007); 'Citizens' Awareness and Participation in Armenia' 
Survey 2004, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, at 28. Available at www.ifes.org. 
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advocacy or advancement of the democratic process. 187 Despite certain increase in a 
number of NGOs in Azerbaijan, they faces such constraints, as, serious interference 
in their activities and harassment by the Government, exclusion of foreign funded 
NGOs from various important areas, social apathy etc. 188 
At the time of the Rose Revolution, Georgia's civil society also faced 
constraints, including a burdensome regulatory framework on financial sustainability, 
lack of links with governmental institutions, as well as general public: the former did 
not include NGO's expertise in their practice, and the latter lacked understanding of 
NGO's activities leading to social abstention. 189 However, after the Revolution 
Georgia's civil society is much more vibrant. One can hardly apply similar 
observation in relation to freedom of media which after the Revolution became more 
controlled with authorities' noted intolerance to criticism. 190 Despite certain 
legislative developments in Annenia in this field, the broadcast media lacks pluralism 
with prevailing self-censorship. Certain incidents of interference by the authorities 
have taken places in the cases of criticism of their activities. 191 The print media 
187 '10 Years ofIndependence and Transition in Armenia; National Human Development Report, 
United Nations Development Programme, Armenia 2001, at 42. 
188 Azerbaijan Civil Society Sector Assessment', Final Report, USAID Azerbaijan, USAID Centre for 
Democracy and Governance, January 11 2005, at 8-9; 'Azerbaijan and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy', Human Rights Watch Brieting Paper, June 15,2005, at 12-13; Azerbaijan Country Report, 
European Neighbourhood Policy, Commission Staff Working Paper, COM(2005) 72 final, section 2.2. 
189 Citizens Advocate Programme, Mid-Term Evaluation, Final Report 2004, USAID Georgia, at 6, 14. 
190 Within 18 month of the Revolution, 76 journalists and 20 media outlets signed an open letter 
protesting against government pressure and citing 'attacks against the media sources from the very first 
days: The ruling elite has conducted campaigns to discredit its critics, including financial pressure to 
control the media, giving a reprieve from tax debts to those outlets it perceives as pro-government and 
dispatching tax inspectors to those that it perceives as unnecessary critical. In 2007 oppositional Imedi 
TV station has been stormed destroying much of the station's equipment; International Crisis Group, 
supra note 90, at 24; 'Crossing the Line: Georgia's Violent Dispersal of Protestors and Raid on Imedi 
Television', Human Rights Watch, Volume 19, No. 8(D), December 2007. 
191 In 2002 "AI +", Armenia's main independent television station lost its broadcasting license which is 
considered to be the response by the authorities to their criticism. The subsequent rejections of 
broadcasting license was challenged in the ECHR, which subsequently ruled in favour of A 1 +. 
Another incident involved Armenia Liberty radio station which was rebroadcasting Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty in the Armenian language. The government complained about its alleged lack of 
objectivity, and the US-funded program has been forced to use a private station, which reached only 
Yerevan and delivered poor quality transmissions; Case Mellex Ltd and Mesrop Mm'sesyan v Armenia 
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enjoys a significantly higher level of independence from state interference, although 
the production and distribution of newspapers is not widespread, and its readership is 
less than 2% of the population. In The media in Azerbaijan is even more restricted, 
since even the print media is strongly controlled by the state through various 
measures. 193 All main TV broadcasters are owned or controlled by the state due to the 
fact that the licensing authority consists solely of members appointed by the 
President. 194 Only the state-funded AzTV's broadcasting covers almost the entire 
territory with the other broadcasters having only limited coverage. 195 
It is this political state of the South Caucasian countries the EU has to face in 
its endeavours to democratise them within the new phase of relations, in particular 
within the ENP. The previous phase was not marked with overall success, and in 
particular in the area of democratic development. 
3. South Caucasus and the EU: Phase I 
The establishment of relations between the EU and the South Caucasus was 
part of a general approach towards the countries of the former Soviet Union, which 
has a history of almost two decades in contrast with the Mediterranean region. At the 
time the EC stepped into a new stage of external relations towards these regions in the 
late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. This was conditioned with such outstanding 
events as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 
(32283/04), 17 June, 2008; 'Kocharian: Activities of Radio Liberty Aimed at Shattering Statehood,' 
Noyan Tapan, 5 April 2008; International Crisis Group, supra note 55, at 15. 
192 Armenia Political Party Assessment, USAID Report, May 2005, at 4. 
193 'The Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Azerbaijan'. PACE, Committee on the Honouring of 
Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), 
Doc. 116276 June 2008, at 13; 'Azerbaijan: Turning Over a New Leaf'?" International Crisis Group, 
Europe Report No 156, Baku/Brussels, 13 May 2004, at 13-14. 
194 'Azerbaijan and the European Neighbourhood Policy', Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, June 
15 2005, at 10. 
195 After the recommendation from Council of Europe and the OSCE the Public TV was founded; 
Republic of Azerbaijan, Parliamentary Election Observation Mission Final Report, OSCEIODlHR, 
Warsaw 1 2006, at 14; 'Azerbaijan and the European Neighbourhood Policy', Human Rights Watch 
Briefing Paper, June 15 2005, at 10. 
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and the birth of independent states on its territory, as well as the collapse of the 
Communist regimes in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. 
The EU's relationship with these countries commenced with a framework 
agreement with the Comecon trade bloc concluded in 1988. 196 Shortly after this, in 
December 1989, the Community signed a Trade Development and Cooperation 
agreement with the USSR. 197 However, the agreement did not have a chance to cause 
significant consequences for the parties due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and, 
only for Belarus and Turkmenistan the agreement continues to serve as a framework 
for relations with the EU .198 Thus, the collapse of the Soviet Union challenged the Ee 
with a task of refonnulating its relationship with newly independent states and 
deciding on the prospect of the Central and Eastern European countries (hereinafter 
CEE) to 'return to Europe.' 199 As a result, the EU chose different frameworks for 
cooperation with the CEE countries. The Union concluded Europe Agreements 
(hereinafter the EAs) with Eastern European states which were not members of the 
Soviet Union and only the Baltic states among the members of the USSR, which were 
returning 'back to Europe. ,200 Meanwhile with the rest of the countries cooperation 
was established through the PCAs. 
196 Comecon, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, was an economic organization of 
communist states. The members included the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Albania, Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam; EEC-Comecon Declaration, 
1988, OJ Ll57/35. 
197 Council Decision 901116/EEC of 26 February 1990 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the 
European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on trade and commercial and economic cooperation, \990, OJ L68/1. 
198 Petrov, 'Legal and Political Expectations of Neighbouring Countries from the European 
Neighbourhood Policy' in Cremona and Meloni, (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy: A 
Frameworkfor Modernisation?, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2007/21,7-21, at 10. 
199 Hillion, 'Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between the European Union and the New 
Independent States of the Ex-Soviet Union', (1998) 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 399, at 403. 
200 Borko, 'The New Intra-European Relations and Russia' in Maresceau, (ed.), Enlarging the 
European Union: Relations between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe, (London: Longman, 
1997),376-390, at 377. 
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Though the EAs concluded before the 1993 Copenhagen European Council 
were not initially considered as an instrument for pre-accession by the Union, 20 I they 
contained a reference to accession by relevant countries. It was only after the 
Copenhagen Council when membership was recognised as a common objective of 
both the EU and the CEE countries that the importance of the EAs has increased, 
where they were supposed to be interpreted with reference to Copenhagen criteria. 202 
The first PCAs were concluded with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the 
Kyrgyz Republic, followed by Moldova and Belarus during 1994. The PCAs with 
Annenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were concluded in 1996 and entered into force in 
1999.203 It has been noted, that with the view of the ethnic conflicts present in the 
region the EU was ambivalent about concluding the PCAs with the three countries at 
all.204 Contrasting with the EAs, the preambles of the PCAs do not provide for 'the 
process of European integration' or the 'objective of membership': they aim at a 
gradual rapprochement between the relevant country and a wider area of cooperation 
in Europe and neighbouring regions. Thus the PCAs stand 'several levels below the 
EAs. ,205 In addition, by establishing different frameworks for cooperation, the Union 
has drawn a dividing line between these countries, which it is now keen to erase with 
the ENP. 
201 Maresceau •• Pre-Accession , in Cremona, (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 9-42, at 15. 
202 Copenhagen criteria will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV; Inglis. 'The Europe Agreements 
Compared in the Light of their Pre-Accession Reorientation', (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 
1173, at 1178. 
203 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other, OJ 1999 L 239/3; Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, 
and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other, OJ 1999 L 246/3; Partnership 'and Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Georgia, of the other, OJ 1999 L 205/3. 
204 Popescu, supra note 9, at 2. 
20S Peers, 'From Cold War to Lukewarm Embrace: the European Union's Agreements with the CIS 
states', (1995) 44 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 829, at 829, 831. 
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3.1. The peAs with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
As a result of conclusion of the PCAs with the South Caucasian Republics 
political dialogue and cooperation on a wide range of issues was established between 
the EU and each of the countries,206 including trade in goods, provisions on business 
and investment, payments and capital, competition, intellectual, industrial and 
commercial property protection, legislative cooperation, economic cooperation, 
cultural cooperation, financial cooperation and institutional, general and fiscal 
provisions. 
A cursory examination of the content and scope of the PCAs with Armenia, 
Georgia and Azerbaijan would reveal little difference, that is, the name of the country 
in signing the agreement. The PCAs with all three countries merely repeat each other, 
which is evidence to the fact that the EU did not actually differentiate between them. 
It implies also that they did not reflect the concerns of any of these countries and 
were not meant to address specific challenges they faced at the time,207 while all of 
these countries had already gone through the first years of their independence and 
dealt with different problems with the transition of their economies, as well as the 
conflicts discussed above. This confirms the statement, according to which the 
conclusion of the PCAs took place more 'by default than design.'208 
Though the PCAs were drafted in similar fashion to the EAs, there were 
important features which gave the emerging relationship an entirely different 
character. The distinction made by the EU between these countries is apparent, first 
of all, through the legal basis chosen for each group of agreements. The EAs were 
206 As mixed agreements the PCAs were concluded by the European Communities and the Member 
States. 
207 Balfour, 'Promoting Human Rights and Democracy in the EU's Neighbourhood; Tools. Strategies 
and Dilemmas' in Balfour and Missiroli, 'Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy', European 
Policy Centre, Issue Paper No. 54, June 2007, at 15. 
208 Lynch, 'The New Eastern Dimension ofthe Enlarged EU' in 'Partners and Neighbours: A CFSP lor 
a Wider Europe', Chaillot Paper 64, Institute for Security Studies, September 2003, 34-59, at 42. 
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based on Article 310 EC which provides for 'association' with the Community which, 
according to the European Court of Justice is establishing a 'privileged relationship' 
between the parties.209 The PCAs however, were based on Articles 133 and 308 EC 
as a classic trade and economic cooperation agreement.210 In addition, a number of 
other Treaty provisions, including Articles 44(2), 55, 71, 80(2), 93 and 94 EC were 
included as a legal basis, which according to Peers was influenced by the mixed 
nature of the PCAs in light of the ECJ's Opinion 1/94.2lI Nevertheless, the difference 
in legal basis is not only a matter of law, but rather has substantive and political 
implications,212 which puts the PCAs on a level below the EAs as to the 'closeness' 
of relationship relevant countries can obtain with the EU. At the same time, the PCAs 
should be considered as more advantageous than the standard trade agreements 
concluded between the EU and a number of countries, since they have established 
political dialogue between the parties which did not exist previously.213 
Despite the fact that in both types of agreement political dialogue was 
established, their aims differed substantially. Dialogue established by the EAs was 
used for the pre-accession process, whereas dialogue provided by the PCAs, in 
particular with South Caucasian countries, aims at accompanying and consolidating 
the rapprochement between the parties, as well as supporting the political and 
economic changes taking place in these countries. Though the Preambles of the PCAs 
209 Case 12/86, Demirel v. City ofSchwabisch Gmund, [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 9. 
210 Maresceau and Montaguti, 'The Relations between the European Union and Central and Eastern 
Europe: A Legal Appraisal,' (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 1327, at 1342. 
211 The conclusions of the Court according to which the Community and the Member States share the 
competence to take external action over the matters covered by GATS and TRIPS made the 
Commission base the new 'transversal' agreements on a number oflegal provisions instead of basing 
it solely on Articles 133 and 308; Peers, 'EC Frameworks of International Relations: Co-operation, 
Partnership and Association' in Dashwood and Hillion, (eds.), The General Law of EC External 
Relations, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2000), 160-176, at 164-165; Opinion 1194, WTO [1994] ECR 
1-5267. 
212 Maresceau and Montaguti, see above, at 1342. 
213 Peers, supra note 123, at 829; Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, (Hart: Oxford, 2006), at 
364. 
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highlighted political conditions, in analogy with the EAs, it nevertheless did not 
provide for any tangible incentives.214 Thus, the conclusion of these different types of 
agreements created the distinction between these two groups of states. The political 
reorientation of the EAs to the pre-accession process after the Copenhagen summit 
deepened this differentiation even more, and in practice the PCAs did 'establish and 
consolidate in reality a new dividing line in Europe. , 215 
The institutions provided by the PCAs generally responded to those 
established by the EAs, which provide for similar institutions referred to as 
'association' instead of 'cooperation.'216 These institutions include the Co-operation 
Council, meeting at ministerial level once a year, which will be assisted by a 
Cooperation Committee (members of the Council, Commission and government of 
relevant country), as well as a Parliamentary Cooperation Committee.217 The major 
difference in institutional set up of the EAs and the PCAs, influencing the nature of 
the agreement, is the power of the Association Council to make decisions for the 
purpose of attaining the objectives of the EA, which will be binding upon the 
parties.218 Meanwhile, the Cooperation Council established within the PCAs is not 
entitled to take decisions implying obligations for the parties, which diminishes the 
importance of this very institution. In addition, in case of a dispute between the 
parties, the Cooperation Council is entitled only to issue a recommendation or, if it is 
214 The preamble stipulates that 'convinced of the paramount importance of the rule of law and respect 
for human rights, particularly those of minorities, the establishment of a multiparty system with free 
democratic elections and economic liberalization aimed at setting up a market economy ... '. 
215 Maresceau, 'Association. Partnership, Pre-accession and Accession' in Maresceau, (ed.), Enlarging 
the European Union; Relations between the EU and Central and Eastern European Union, (London: 
Longman, 1997),3-22, at 12. 
216 E.g. EA establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, 
of the one part, and the Republic of Estonia, of the other part, OJ L 68/3, 09.03.1998, Title X. 
217 PCA with Armenia, Title XI 'Institutional, General and Final Provisions.' 
218 Article III EA with Estonia. 
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not possible to solve the dispute by means of a recommendation, the Council can 
appoint a conciliator together with the parties. 219 
Nevertheless, the option of appointing a conciliator cannot be considered 
more effective, since also in this case the conciliators are allowed to issue a 
recommendation which will not be binding on the parties. Therefore, the EAs dispute 
settlement mechanism has more 'far-reaching effects. ,220 The choice of a 
recommendation for dispute resolution with the PCA countries is evidence of a 
remote attitude by the Union, which implies the reluctance of the latter to get 
involved in a special relationship which would have allowed the partner countries to 
have their input in the dispute resolution process. What the PCAs provide is on the 
one hand a non-effective method of dispute resolution, where the opposite parties 
cannot have any influence on the position of the EU, and on the other hand, an 
opportunity for the Union to suspend the implementation of the Agreement when it 
considers its essential elements to be violated. 
While the EU made a distinction between these countries by concluding 
different types of agreements, it also put certain distinctions between the countries of 
the CIS, which gave reason to some commentators to divide the PCAs into groups or 
categories. Berdiyev distinguishes three different groups of the PCAs, those with the 
Western (sometimes also referred to as European fonner Soviet Union countries) 
countries which are Russia, Ukraine and Moldova, the Caucasian PCAs and the 
Central Asian PCAs.221 Maresceau and Montaguti divide them in two groups bringing 
the PCAs with the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia together. 222 
219 Article 89 peA with Armenia. 
220 Maresceau and Montaguti, supra note 128, at 1343. 
221 Berdiyev, 'The EU and Former Soviet Central Asia: An Analysis of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements.' (2003) 22 Yearbook of European Law 463, at 463-464. 
222 Maresceau and Montaguti, supra note 128, at 1340-1341. 
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Indeed, the so called 'Western' PCAs are much more extensive and detailed in 
comparison with the PCAs with Armenia, Georgia or Azerbaijan. 
The major difference between these two groups of PCAs is the possibility of 
creating a free trade area provided in Western PCAs, which is omitted in any other 
PCA either with Central Asian countries or South Caucasian countries. 223 Whereas, 
the PC As concluded with Ukraine and Russia refer to 'close' political relations, those 
with South Caucasian countries do not have such formulations, which highlights the 
importance the EU was attaching to Russia and Ukraine in comparison with at the 
time called 'non-European' countries ofthe former Soviet Union.224 Probably, at the 
time they seemed to be rather remoter and had little offer to the EU. 
3. 2. Democracy promotion within Phase I 
Democracy promotion being the focus of this research, urges consideration of 
democratisation issues within Phase I of the relations between the parties. 
Before the conclusion of the PCAs the Declaration on the recognition of new 
states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, among the conditions for 
recognition, mentions respect for provisions of the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act 
and the Charter of Paris, 'especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and 
human rights. ,225 It has been noted that these provisions served as a basis for 
inclusion of provisions on human rights and democracy in the future agreements with 
the newly independent countries.226 
223 As noted by Hillion, as well as Koutrakos inclusion of this provision is an evidence of a different 
attitude to this group of countries. 
224 Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, (Hart: Oxford, 2006), at 364. 
225 Declaration on the 'Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the 
Soviet Union', 16 December 1991. 
226 Cremona, 'Human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the EC's Trade Agreements' in Emjliou & 
O'Keeftee, (eds.), The European Union and World Trade Law: After the GATTUruguay Round, 
(Chichester: Wiley, 1996),62-77, at 65. 
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Before turning to the provisions on democracy, another distinction between 
the PCAs concluded with Western ex-Soviet countries and those with Armenia, 
Georgia and Azerbaijan should be emphasised. Besides the provisions on essential 
elements and establishment of political dialogue, the agreements with countries of the 
South Caucasus also provide for a separate title devoted to Cooperation on matters 
relating to democracy and human rights. Moreover, as noted by Cremona, the PC As 
with these three countries, in addition to democracy and human rights, stress also the 
rule of law both in the essential elements provision, as well as include them among 
227 
the areas of cooperation. It should be assumed, that at the time of concluding the 
PCAs, the countries of the South Caucasus were perhaps less democratic in the eyes 
of the EU than the Western CIS countries. 
The first reference to the issues related to democracy is made in the Preamble 
of the PCAs, which acknowledges that the parties are 'convinced of the paramount 
importance of the rule of law and respect for human rights, particularly those of 
persons belonging to minorities, the establishment of a multiparty system with free 
and democratic elections and economic liberalization aimed at setting up a market 
economy. ,228 
The main provisions of the PCA on democracy promotion are similar to those 
in the EAs and present a so called 'standard clause' included in trade agreements 
concluded by the EU at the time.229 Such a clause consists of several provisions 
situated in different parts of the agreement, which are an essential element clause, a 
suspension-clause, and a Joint Declaration included in the Final Act of the PCAs. 
Article 2 of all three PCAs, which is similar to the relevant provision of the EAs of 
227 Cremona, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: Legal and Institutional Issues', Centre on 
Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. Working Papers, No 25,2 November 2004, at 20. 
228 Article 1 of the PCAs. 
229 Berdiyev, supra note 139, at 469; Peers, supra note 123, at 831. 
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the second round or second-generation,230 states that respect for democracy 
promotion, inter alia, as defined in international law is an essential element of the 
agreements and the partnership established. It also contains references to international 
documents, including the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris 
for a New Europe as opposed to tout court approach which does not provide for 
additional information.231 It should be noted that the Charter of Paris in a rather 
detailed manner defines democracy as the regime for new governance with a focus on 
free and fair elections, respect for human person and the rule of law, where freedom 
of expression and tolerance of all groups of society is ensured.232 
This provision is a 'strong version' of the human rights and democracy clause 
as opposed to the 'weaker' clause which does not consider democracy and human 
rights as an essential element of the agreement. 233 According to Cremona, the 'strong 
version' of the human rights and democracy clause in PCAs should be considered as 
linking these principles to the EC's trade policy.234 The distinction between 'strong' 
and 'weaker' clauses on human rights and democracy is rationalised with the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties. According to Article 60 the 
material breach of the treaty provisions, that is breach of a provision 'essential to the 
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the Treaty,' entitles the opposite part to 
terminate or suspend the agreement. 235 It this spectrum, the non-execution or non-
compliance clause is included in the PCAs similar to the EAs of the second round.236 
230 According to Smith, the EAs of the 'second-generation' were much more political than the 
Association Agreements concluded with the Eastern European countries before the Copenhagen 
European Council; Europe Agreement with Bulgaria, OJ L358, 1994; Europe Agreement with 
Romania, OJ 1994 L357; Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, 
(Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1999), at 92. 
231 Fierro, The EU's ..I.pproach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, (Hague, London: M. 
Nijhoff, 2003), at 234, 231. 
232 Ibid, at 114. 
m Cremona in Emiliou and O'KeetTee, supra note 44, at 66-69. 
234 Ibid, at 70, 75. 
m Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law Treaties. 
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The PCAs' non-compliance clause consists of three provisions. The first 
provision establishes the obligation of the parties to undertake measures necessary for 
the implementation of the Agreement. The second provision contains the so called 
'Bulgarian clause.' As opposed to the 'Baltic clause,' which was included in the EAs 
with the Baltic countries and Albania and provided for immediate suspension of the 
agreement in case of breach of its essential provisions, the 'Bulgarian clause' first 
appeared in the EA with Bulgaria and ensures confonnity with Article 65 of the 
Vienna Convention.237 The provisions provide for 'appropriate measures' to be taken 
by the party in case of a breach of the agreement by the other party. Before doing so 
however, except for the cases of special urgency, the party should provide relevant 
information to the Cooperation Council which should seek for a solution acceptable 
for both parties.238 According to the last paragraph of the provision, in selecting the 
'appropriate measures' the relevant party should give preference to those measures 
which distract the functioning of the agreement the least. Joint Declarations attached 
to the three PCAs link the essential provision with the non-execution clause setting up 
conditions for its application in accordance with intemationallaw. 239 
It should be noted that the breach of essential provisions of the PC As in 
general has never been invoked by the ED. The example of Belarus and 
Turkmenistan demonstrate that the EU was more willing to use its leverage at the 
time of ratification of the agreements.240 In the case of Turkmenistan, the European 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english!conventions/! 1 1969.pdf 
236 With the exception of the EAs with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which did not 
incorporate any democracy and human rights provisions. 
237 Fierro, supra note 149, at 218,223; Hillion, 'Russian Federation' in Blockmans and Lazowski. 
(eds.), The European Union and its Neighbours: A Legal Appraisal of the EU's Policies of 
Stabilisation, Partnership and Integration, (Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2006), 463-497, at 482. 
238 Article 95, PCA Armenia; Article 98, PCA Georgia; Article 98, PCA Azerbaijan. 
239 Joint Declaration on Article 95. 
240 Hillion, 'Introduction to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements' in Kellerman. Zwaan. 
Czuczai, (eds.), EU Enlargement: The Constitutional Impact at EU and National Level, (Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser Press, 2001), 215-228, at 224. 
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Parliament did not ratify the PCA due to human rights concerns which delayed entry 
into force of the agreement for up to five years. 241 However, the PCA with 
Turkmenistan was ratified in a few years without significant political developments in 
the country,242 undermining the consistency ofthe EU's approach. In particular, in the 
South Caucasus the PCA with Azerbaijan was concluded despite the criticism of its 
political developments.243 Subsequently, the non-execution clause in all the three 
PCAs has not been referred to in respect to any of the countries, despite, for instance, 
the elections being constantly marred with serious violations. 
As mentioned above, in addition to the 'standard clause' on democracy 
promotion, the PCAs with the three South Caucasian countries contain a separate title 
on 'Cooperation on matters relating to democracy and human rights.'244 The title 
provides for cooperation between the parties on all issues related to the establishment 
or reinforcement of democratic institutions, as well as the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in accordance with international law and OSCE principles. 
The issues related to establishment or reinforcement of democratic institutions also 
include those required to strengthen the rule of law. Relevant articles in the second 
paragraph specify how the parties should cooperate in this field. 245 The cooperation 
will be carried out in the fonn of technical assistance programmes which would assist 
in the drafting of relevant legislation and regulations, as well as implementation of 
such legislation, the operation of the judicial system, the role of the state in matters 
related to justice and the operation of the electoral systems. 
241 Berdiyev, supra note 139, at 469-470. 
242 Ibid, at 469-470. 
243 Kelley, 'New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Learning and Adaptation in the New European 
Neighbourhood Policy', (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 29, at 48 
244 See Title VII of the peAs with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. 
245 Article 68 peA Armenia Article 71 peA Georgia; Article 71 peA Azerbaijan. 
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The cooperation provided above was carried out through the 'Technical Aid to 
the Commonwealth of Independent States' programme (TACIS) which was 
conceived in December 1990 at a meeting of the European Council in Dublin and 
Rome. The programme was designed to assist centrally planned economies to move 
towards market economies and it provided support for economic reform initiatives. 246 
Within the period of 2000-2006 the TACIS programme was governed by Council 
Regulation 99/2000 concerning the provision of assistance to the partner states in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia.247 T ACIS Regulation introduced an element of 
negative conditionality into the PCA framework providing an option of taking 
appropriate measures by the Council in case of serious breach of the PCA. 248 
Despite the fact that the Regulation qualifies the programme as one 'to 
promote the transition to a market economy and to reinforce democracy and the rule 
of law in the partner States', 249 a closer look at TACIS documents and programmes 
for the three countries indicate absence of particular initiatives directed at 
democratisation of the countries.250 Whether due to lack of commitment from the 
parties to the PCAs or the fact that TACIS has been 'cash-starved',25I it hardly had 
any impact on the democratic processes in the countries concerned. In its assessment 
of the project, the Commission found that in the overall region covered by T ACIS 
246 Council Regulation No 1279/96 of 25 June 1996 concerning the provision of assistance to economic 
reform and recovery in the New Independent States and Mongolia, OJ L 165, 04.07.1996. 
247 OJ L 12, 18.1.2000. 
248 Article 16 of T ACIS Regulation. 
249 Article 1 of Council Regulation 99/2000/EC of 29 December 1999, OJ L 12, 18.1.2000. 
250 Armenia Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006- T ACIS National Indicative Programme 2002-2003; 
T ACIS National Indicative Programme for Armenia 2004-2006; Georgia T ACIS Action Programme 
2002/2003; T ACIS National Indicative Programme 2004-2006 Georgia; Azerbaijan Country Strategy 
Paper 2002-2006-T ACIS National Indicative Programme 2002-2003; T ACIS Indicative Programme 
2004-2006 for Azerbaijan. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eulexternalreJations/georgia/docs/indexen.htm 
http://ec.europa.eulexternalrelations/armenia! docs/index en.htm 
http://ec.europa.eulexternaIrelations/azerbaijan/docs/indexen.htm 
251 Stritecky, supra note 47, at 63-64. 
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there has been little real progress towards democratisation and respect for human 
rights, and the situation even worsened since the ratification of the PCAs.252 
Outside the PCA framework, the EU engaged with the democratic 
development of Annenia and Georgia through the European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR). The initiative was primarily concerned with the 
development of the civil society, and was established under the auspices of the 
European Parliament in 1994, relying on its budgetary powers, with the main aim of 
promoting human rights and democracy and conflict prevention in third countries.253 
The main difference of the EIDHR from other Union instruments is that it has 
a complementary nature and it can be implemented with different partners, such 
NGOs and international organisations, and, most importantly, without consent from 
the government of the host country.254 While such an arrangement allows it to bypass 
the government and engage with the public sector, it nevertheless did not have 
significant impact on democratic development of the countries concerned due to the 
fact that the assistance is directed to small and had hoc programmes.255 
252 Cremona, supra note 145, at 21; Kelley, 'New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Learning and 
Adaptation in the New European Neighbourhood Policy', (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 29, at 50. 
253 The initiative did not function in Azerbaijan until 2008. This initiative is regulated by the Council 
Regulations EC 975/1999 of 29 April 1999 laying down the requirements for the implementation of 
development cooperation operations which contribute to the general objective of developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, OJ L 120/1, 08.05.1999 and (EC) No 976/1999 of 29 April 1999 laying down the 
requirements for the implementation of Community operations, other than those of development 
cooperation, which, within the framework of Community cooperation policy, contribute to the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in third countries, OJ Ll20/8, 08.05.1999; Emerson, Aydin, 
Noutcheva. Tocci. Vahl and Youngs, "The Reluctant Debutante: The European Union as Promoter of 
Democracy in its Neighbourhood', Working Document No 223/July 2005, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, at 3. 
254 http://ec.europa.euleuropeaidlprojects/eidhr/eidhren.htm#eidhr2 . . 
255 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, (Basmgstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), at 227. 
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4. Conclusion 
It is against this background that the EU will be challenged to engage with the 
democratisation of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan through the ENP framework. 
While economically the performance of the countries improved throughout the 
independence period, the political development of the countries did not prove to be 
fruitful. Despite initial orientation towards liberal democratic values after gaining 
independence from the USSR, the political transformation of all the three countries 
was abruptly interrupted with the violent conflicts. The consequences and the 
unresolved status of the Nagorno-Karabakh, the South Ossetian and the Abkhazian 
conflicts persist being a source of political instability and rivalry over power in the 
countries. The efforts of seventeen years to establish liberal democracies with freely 
elected and accountable institutions, protection of human rights and freedoms resulted 
in similar 'paper' democracies in alI three countries. Although it can be noted about 
the three countries their democracies are liberal on paper, but barely existent in 
practice, there are, nevertheless, certain distinctions where Georgia and Armenia are 
considered to be in transition, and Azerbaijan being defined sometimes as an 
autocracy. 
The cooperation with the South Caucasian states was established through the 
PC As only in 1999 more 'by default than design.' The reluctance of the EU to closely 
engage with the region has been apparent not only in the distinctions to be found 
between the PCAs and the EAs, but also the PCAs between the South Caucasian 
countries and those with the Western NIS. The partnership and cooperation under the 
PCAs was 'a label on a mere trade agreement. ,256 As generally noted, the core of the 
256 Three possible developments as regards the future of the ENP w e r ~ ~ e n v ~ s a g e d d by HiIlion, which 
were partnership as a label on a mere trade agreement, where the partIes fall t ~ ~ d ~ v e l o p p the ~ C A : : . 
partnership as a consistent alternative to the EAs, and the PCA as a 'pre-assoclatlOn strategy; HIIhon. 
supra note 117, at 419-420. 
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PCAs was trade and economy where the cooperation aimed at bringing the countries 
to world economy.257 Despite the provisions on democracy and human rights in the 
PCAs with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the agreements did not have significant 
impact on the political developments of the countries. Whether due to the lack of 
positive conditionality, or commitment and eagerness by both parties, or due to the 
fact the assistance under T ACIS remained largely technical, the PCAs proved to be 
inadequate for entailing serious political reforms. Accordingly, the ENP is considered 
to be an attempt to reform previous unsuccessful policies,258 especially as it does not 
abolish the PCAs and the Barcelona Process and the institutional setup of the 
cooperation. 259 
Finally, the political cooperation established within the PCAs was symbolical 
of the EU's initial attitude towards the region, which can be described as engagement 
through 'entry-level agreements,260 without real involvement. The relations 
established within the PCAs did not manifest any differentiation in terms of particular 
interests in the three countries or their thorny transformation. However, they provided 
a legal basis for the fostering of trade relations between the EU and each of the states 
turning the EU into the biggest trade partner for all three ofthem.261 
257 Petrov, 'The PCAs with the Newly Independent States' in Ott and Inglis, (eds.), Handbook on 
European Enlargement: A Commentary on the Enlargement Process, (Hague: T.M.C Asser Press 
2002), 175-194, at 193; Lynch, 'The New Eastern Dimension of the Enlarged EU' in 'Partners and 
Neighbours: A CFSP for a Wider Europe', Chaillot Paper 64, Institute for Security Studies, September 
2003, at 43; 
258 Dannreuther, 'Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy', 
(2006) 11 European Foreign Affairs Review 183, at 190. 
259 Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
11.04.2003 COM (2003) 104 final, at 15; Council Conclusions on Wider Europe-New Neighbourhood, 
Thessaloniki European Council, 19-20 June 2003. 
260 P etrov, supra, at 177. 
261 In 2008 both imports and exports with the EU comprised 35% of Armenia's foreign trade, 53% of 
Azerbaijan'S foreign trade, and 32% of Georgia's foreign trade. 
Trade data available at http://ec.europa.eultrade/creating-opportunitieslbilateral-
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The political considerations behind the ENP most certainly heralded a major 
shift in the EU's attitude, which will be discussed below. 
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CHAPTER III 
The ENP in the South Caucasus 
1. Introduction 
While scholars of European studies continue the debate on the EU's nature as 
an emerging foreign policy actor, the ENP presents an opportunity to challenge the 
widely-held perception of the EU as a weak foreign policy actor,262 and to 
demonstrate potential 'to act beyond the dichotomy of accession/non-accession, 
drawing on a range of tools to promote its interests. ,263 The ENP is a regional 
manifestation of the EU's willingness to 'assert its identity on the international 
stage, ,264 whereby geographical proximity requires the EU to define its interests in 
neighbouring regions and choose instruments to pursue those interests. 
The importance of these interests was officially acknowledged in relation to 
the 2004 accession often new member states to the EU. Thus, the ENP emerged as a 
policy with a clear geographical dimension, in which the main criterion for countries' 
involvement with the ENP is their vicinity. The ENP covers Eastern Europe, the 
South Caucasus and the Mediterranean, each of which had previously fallen under 
separate framework of cooperation.265 
While the countries of the South Caucasus were initially not included in the 
policy, as noted in the Introductory Chapter, certain political developments and the 
maritime border shared between Georgia, Romania and Bulgaria, which was expected 
to become an EU border after the accession of both the latter countries, influenced the 
subsequent inclusion of the region in the ENP. Hence, while attempting to 'fuse 
262 Emerson, 'The Wider Europe as the European Union's Friendly Monroe Doctrine', Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Policy Brief No. 27, October 2002, at 2. 
263 Lynch, 'The Security Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy', (2005) 40 International 
Spectator 33, at 33-34. 
264 Article 2 EU, OJ C 321 Ell, 29.12.2006. 
265 Countries involved in ENP are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon , Libya, Morocco, 
Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia as comprising Mediterranean region, Countries of Eastern Europe 
which are Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and South Caucasian states, that is Armenia, Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. 
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together policy towards a number of regions hitherto separately treated', the ENP also 
tried to establish what the European Parliament has called 'a complex geopolitical 
area stretching from Russia to Morocco, which, for historical and cultural reasons and 
the fact of its geographical proximity, may be defined as a 'pan-European and 
Mediterranean region. ,266 Though the Wider Europe Communication identified 
Russia as one of the target countries despite Council's 2002 conclusions referring to 
Russia as a 'key partner,' Russia refused to negotiate an Action Plan due to its 
'asymmetrical and conditional' nature.267 The relations with Russia are currently 
pursued within a strategic partnership framework based on 'positive 
interdependence. ,268 
The interests of the EU in each of the three regions included in the ENP are 
different. The importance of the South Caucasus is highlighted by its strategic 
location in the midst of world powers, whose agenda does not always coincide with 
the EU's. Thus, the wider geopolitical picture of the region can be considered a key 
determinant of the policy's implementation. 
It should be noted that the 'geographic rationale' is not exclusive, but 
accompanies another 'rationale based on the need to create secure borders and the 
need to create an alternative to enlargement. ,269 This is identified as an objective in 
ENP policy papers. Security is behind the rationale for integrating the neighbours to a 
266 Cremona, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: Legal and Institutional Issues·, Centre on 
Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford Institute for International Studies, Working 
Papers, No 25, 2 November 2004, at 4. 
267 Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
11.04.2003 COM (2003) 104 final, (hereinafter Wider Europe Communication), at 4, 5; General 
Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 18 November 2002, 14183/02, at 13; 
Van Elsuwege, 'The Four Common Spaces: New Impetus to the E U ~ R u s s i a a Strategic Partnership?, in 
Dashwood and Maresceau, (eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a 
Changing Landscape, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 334-359, at 355. 
268 Commission Communication on Relations with Russia, COM (2004) 106,9 February 2004. 
269 Cremona, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: More than a Partnership?' in Cremona, (ed.), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 244-299, at 
251. 
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certain extent without promising them membership. This, in tum, requires 
identification of the primacy of democratisation within the policy and the normative 
image the EU exploits within the ENP. 
In this context, the Chapter will initially consider the shift of attitude towards 
the South Caucasus. The interests of the EU in the South Caucasus in general and 
towards each of the countries in particular, will be discussed in this regard. Moreover, 
the wider geopolitical picture will be considered in order to assess the prospects for 
democracy promotion through the ENP. The next part of the Chapter will consider 
the objectives of the ENP, including a section on democracy promotion as a policy 
objective. The Chapter will also identify foreign policy motifs defining the ENP in 
relation to the concept of Europeanisation. Finally, conclusions on the political 
constituents of the policy will be presented. 
2. Interests of the EU in the South Caucasus 
Since the beginning of this decade the EU's attitude towards the South 
Caucasian region has shifted. The General Affairs Council of February 2001 
acknowledged the EU's eagerness to engage with the region more actively, in 
particular with a view to contributing towards conflict prevention and post-conflict 
rehabilitation.27o 
The initial engagement with the region appeared not as a part of general 
approach, but more as ad hoc initiatives in Georgia, such as border control initiatives 
for Georgian borders with North Caucasian Russian Republics,271 as well as certain 
civilian contribution to the conflict settlement in South Ossetia.272 The appointment 
270 General Affairs Council, Brussels, 26-27 February 2001. 
271 The North Caucasian Republics of Russian Federation which share borders with Georgia include 
Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia. 
m Joint Action 2000/456/CFSP regarding a contribution of the European Union towards reinforcing 
the capacity of the Georgian authorities to support and protect the OSeE observer mission on the 
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of the Special Representative to the South Caucasus in 2003 was aimed at 
coordinating the Union's activities in the region and developing a comprehensive 
pOlicy.273 
The mandate of the Special Representative has gradually changed since the 
first appointment. Initially it included activities contributing to the prevention of 
conflicts, and preparing for the return of peace to the region. Although the Special 
Representative was meant to assist in conflict resolution, this did not provide for a 
separate role for the Union. Rather, it was aimed at supporting the UN Secretary 
General and his Special Representative for Georgia, the Group of Friends of the UN 
Secretary General for Georgia, the OSCE Minsk Group, and the conflict resolution 
mechanism for South Ossetia under aegis of the OSCE.274 The more proactive 
attitude of the Union to the region led to subsequent amendments to the Special 
Representative's mandate. Currently it includes assisting in creating the conditions 
for progress on settlement of conflicts, as well as facilitating the implementation of 
such settlement in close coordination with the existing frameworks. 275 
The major development in this trend has been the inclusion of the three 
countries within the ENP in the ENP Strategy Paper as noted earlier. Following 
border of the Republic of Georgia with the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, OJ 200 L 
183/3, amended on 26 July 2001, OJ 2001 L 2002/2; Joint Action 2002/373/CFSP regarding a 
contribution of the European Union towards reinforcing the capacity of the Georgian authorities to 
support and protect the OSCE observer mission on the border of Georgia with the Ingush and Chechen 
Republics of the Russian Federation, OJ 2002 L 13411; Council Joint Action 200\1759/CFSP of29 
October 2001 regarding a contribution from the European Union to the conflict settlement process in 
South Ossetia, OJ 2001 L 28614; Council Joint Action 2003/473/CFSP of 25 June 2003 regarding a 
contribution of the EU to the conflict settlement in Georgia/South Ossetia, OJ 2003 L 157/72. 
273 Article 18 TEU empowers the Council with the right to appoint a special representative with a 
mandate for particular policy issues. Mr Helkki Talvitie was appointed as a Special Representative for 
the Southern Caucasus in 2003 by Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP of7 July 2003 concerning the 
appointment of an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, OJ 2003 L \69174. 
274 Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP of 7 July 2003 concerning the appointment of an EU Special 
Representative for the South Caucasus, OJ 2003 L 169174; Council Joint Action 2003/872/CFSP of8 
December 2003, OJ 2003 L 326/44. 
275 Council Joint Action 2006/1211CFSP of20 February 2006 appointing the European Union Special 
Representative for the South Caucasus, OJ 2006 L 49/14. 
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inclusion of Georgia, Annenin nnd AlerholJon in the policy, ActIon P l o n ~ ~ were 
signed with each of the countries on 14 November 200() on the bmus of respecllve 
Country Reports prepared by the Commission,1'" tnking the hilaternl rcJntillns 
between the parties to a substantially new level. The necessity of developing closer 
ties with the neighbours in the South Caucasus is hoscd on the polillcnlond stnttegic 
interests the EU is pursuing in its neighbourhood. 
Most notably, the ENP is e"plicitly framed in terms of the Ell's interests. The 
Wider Europe Communication stresses the strengthened Interest of the Ell tn 
establish closer relations with neighbours after the enlargement and tackle the 
'common challenges: z77 The ENP Strategy Paper, to partkular, stressed the Ell's 
'strong interest in the stability and development of the Suuth ( ' a u c a s u s . ' : · ~ ~ The 
interest in stability and development of the region should be cnnsldeR'C.t to the context 
of the strategic importance of the latter. 
2.1. Pur.\·j"g i,,/(n's's ill Cl crmn/,'c/ g'·OI'Olilictll.\(·,,",· 
One of the tributaries of the ancient Silk Routel:msses the Slluth Caucasus. 
The importance of this route is currently connected with the supply of notuntl 
resources from the East to the West. A strong dcpcndem:e on Russinn gas lind MIddle 
Eastern oil supply forces the Ell tu s e ~ , r c h h for lllternallve solutions. :-Y The 
Commission's forecasts predicted energ) dependence rising to a level of 70%, or 
90% in the case of oil in the next two or three decades. rendertng the Ell susccpllhlc 
not only in tenus of its dependence on natural resources. but most Importantly un 
:" ENP Action Plan!! with Gt'Oraia, A r ~ n t a a and A/r,"al,an 
Auilahle al b t U t ; . ~ , r . \ . \ { ~ : Q r J d ~ f U l ! i l l X . U m e . n " _ ( ' O . h l m m
] •• Wider Europe Communication. al :\. II 
ra CommilJion Communication. ENP Slratell}' Paper, nru',el,. 12 ~ ~ 201M (,OM(2IK)4I.n , linal. 
(hereinafter t:NP Slrlleay Paper), at 1(1. 
: .. In 2000, 45% or lhe 1'1 "5 oil i m p m 1 ~ ~ \:lime frum Ihe MiJJlc h."t and ",,41,. III nalU'III11'" Itllm 
RU!!llia; CommilJion G,,"" Paper on a European Slratcll)' for the SC'Cunly of I· nnll) Supply. ( '()M 
(2000) 769 final 
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exporting partners such as Russia and Middle Eastern oil-producing states.280 In this 
respect the South Caucasus has major potential, and EU willingness to engage with 
the region comes without surprise. 
While Azerbaijan is a significant exporter of oil from the Caspian basin, 
Georgia and Armenia are important in particular as an alternative transit route for 
energy supply from the East to the Western market. The importance of the region has 
been stressed in the Commission Communication on energy policy for the enlarged 
EU and its neighbours.281 The Caspian basin on its own can be considered to be 
significant in diversifying energy sources.282 In view of Georgia's shared border with 
Romania and Bulgaria, Turkey's potential accession and the evolving Black Sea 
Economic Coopemtion Organisation (BSECO), the wider Black Sea region has also 
required the EU's focus. 283 
The EU should be attractive to these countries in order to forge political 
partnerships. Thus, the inclusion of these three states and three different regions in 
geneml within a single policy framework can be considered an opportunity for the EU 
to create an economically interlinked neighbourhood, providing it with an opportunity 
to demonstmte its strengths vis-a-vis the US, Russia with its increasing power, and 
the emerging Asian hegemonies, China and India. 
It should be pointed out, that despite the fact the that South Caucasus is 
referred to as a 'region' in relations with foreign protagonists, nevertheless none of 
280 Lavenex, 'EU External Governance in 'Wider Europe', (2004) 11 Journal of European Public 
Policy 680, at 692. 
281 Development of Energy Policy for the Enlarged European Union, its Neighbours and Partner 
Countries, Commission Communication, Brussels, 13.05.2003, COM(2003) 262 final. 
282 MacFarlane. 'The Caucasus and Central Asia: Towards a Non-Strategy' in Dannreuther, (ed.), 
European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, (London: Routledge, 
2004),118-134, at 126. 
283 The organisation was founded in 1992 after the Istanbul Declaration on Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation was signed by Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Moldova, 
Georgia, Ukraine. Russia and Turkey; Lynch. 'Why Georgia Matters" Chaillot Paper No. 86, February 
2006, Institute for Security Studies, at 84. 
www.bsec.gov.tr 
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the major political actors cooperates with the three states as a region. On the contrary, 
each of the international players, including the EU, has different relations and levels 
of cooperation with each of them. 
The EU has established closer political cooperation with Georgia since the 
Rose Revolution in 2003. The new Georgian government has sought closer 
cooperation with the US, NATO and the EU. In particular, the EU launched a Rule of 
Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST Themis), established with the request of the 
Georgian Prime-Minister.284 Also the Commission's Rapid Reaction mechanisms 
were deployed to support the post-revolution democratic processes and the assistance 
issued to Georgia was substantially increased in comparison with its neighbours. 285 
The Commission developed close cooperation with other actors in the region, namely 
the OSCE and the UN, and financed a number of projects aimed at confidence-
building and economic development in Georgia and its breakaway regions. 286 
Relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia have been developing with a major 
focus on trade cooperation with the EU becoming a significant trade partner for both 
countries. Azerbaijan is the EU's largest trade partner in the region. 287 Its willingness 
to trade natural resources has renewed EU focus on the country. A dialogue on energy 
and transport in the Black and Caspian Seas was launched at the Commission's 
284 Smith and Webber, 'Political Dialogue and Security in the European Neighbourhood Policy: The 
Virtues and Limits of 'New Partnership Perspective,' (2008) 13 European Foreign Affairs Review 73, 
at 91; Council Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP of28 June 2004 on the European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS, OJ 2004 L 228/21; Council Decision 2004/924/CFSP of22 
November 2004 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and 
Georgia on the status and activities of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Georgia, EUJUST 
THEMIS, OJ 2004 L 389141; Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on status and 
activities of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS, OJ 2004 L 
389/42. 
285 €2 milIion has been issued in support of the January 2003 presidential election and March 2003 
parliamentary elections. 
http://www.delgeo.ec.europa.eulen/programmes/rapidreact.html 
286 For the list of projects in Abkhazia and South Ossetia see Popescu, 'Europe's Unrecognised 
Neighbours: The EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia', Centre for European Policy Studies, Working 
Document No 2601 March 2007. 
287 Nuriyev, 'EU Policy in the South Caucasus: A View from Azerbaijan', Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Working Document No. 272lJuly 2007, at 13. 
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initiative in November 2004 in Baku, with the aim of developing a regional energy 
and transport market and progressively integrating it within the EU market. 288 
Consequently, a Memorandum of Understanding in 2006 on the strategic energy 
partnership has been signed between the EU and Azerbaijan. In addition, the EU also 
expressed its interest in the so called 'Trans-Caspian gas project' aimed at 
exploitation of gas sources of the Caspian region involving Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan.289 It can be suggested that the chances for positive outcomes of the 
political conditionality of the ENP will be different with each of the countries. As 
noted by Balfour, the importance of any country to the EU and its interests therein is 
one of the factors capable of 'trumping' human rights aims/90 and by analogy also 
democracy promotion. Thus, it can be suggested the strongest leverage seems to be 
present in case of Georgia, for which the EU's importance appears to be expressed 
the most, bearing in mind Georgia's external agenda. 
On the other hand, the importance of Azerbaijan as an exporter of natural 
resources and, therefore, the EU's interests in the country suggest that these two 
factors might 'trump' the democracy promotion by the EU. The most peculiar will be 
the case of Armenia. Its role as a transit country to this date was not of great benefit 
to the EU due to Armenia's economic isolation, which suggests that the ENP will 
largely start from a neutral stance in this sense. As to the importance of the EU to 
Armenia, it is not straightforward. Even though EU integration is constantly present 
on Armenia's political agenda, its strong dependence on Russia might hold the 
country back from making stronger political commitments to Europe. 
288 Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), at 122. 
289 'EU bets on Turkmenistan for Trans-Caspian pipeline', New Europe, The European Weekly, 2 June 
2008; Nuriyev, supra note 26, at 9, 13. ' 
290 Balfour, 'Promoting Human Rights and Democracy in the EU's Neighbourhood: Tools, Strategies 
and Dilemmas' in Balfour and Missiroli, Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy, EPC Issue 
Paper No. 54, June 2007. at 14. 
73 
2.2. Interests of other international actors 
The above mentioned interests of the EU in South Caucasus are not easy to 
pursue since this region is influenced by other political protagonists on the regional 
scene, such as Russia and the United States, Turkey and Iran. The 200 1 General 
Affairs Council acknowledged the necessity to intensify the political dialogue about 
the region with the mentioned actors in relations to its willingness to play a more 
active role therein.291 
It is mainly the Russian presence in the region which is 't'iewed as a 'fault-
line' potentially capable of both undermining the ENP in its Eastern front and 
distressing the relations between the EU and Russia. 292 The EU has been considered 
to be pursuing a 'Russia first' policy with cautious engagement with the Eastern 
neighbours: Russia's presence is one of the reasons why the EU has avoided 
cooperating with the neighbours on the East on regional perspective. 293 Though the 
initiation of the ENP and the subsequent signing of the Action Plans has been 
291 General Affairs Council, Brussels, 26-27 February 2001. 
292 Haukkala and Moshes, 'Beyond 'Bing Bang': The Challenges of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy in 
the East', The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Report 9/2004, at 5 -6, 19; Dannreuther, 
'Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy', (2006) II 
European Foreign Affairs Review 183, at 185; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of 
the European Union, (Basingstoke: Pal grave Macmillan, 2008), at 274; Smith and Webber, supra note 
23, at 83-84; Smith, 'The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy' (2005) 81 International 
Affairs 757, at 759-760; Meloni, 'Is the Same Toolkit Used during Enlargement Still Applicable to the 
Countries of the New Neighbourhood? A Problem of Mismatching between Objectives and 
Instruments' in Cremona and Meloni. (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy: A New Framework 
for Modernisation? EUI Working Papers, LAW 2007/21,97-111, at 98; Popescu, supra note 25, at 6; 
Aliboni, 'The Geopolitical Implications of the ENP', (2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review I, at 
14; Lynch, supra note 2, at 35, 40; Tassinari, 'A Riddle Inside an Enigma: Unwrapping the EU-Russia 
Strategic Partnership', (2005) 40 The International Spectator 45, at 51. 
293 Longhurst and Nies, 'Recasting Relations with the Neighbours-Prospects for the Eastern 
Partnership', Institut Franr,:ais des Relations Internationales, February 2009. 
Available at http://www.ifri.org/fiIes/Europe visions/Europe Visions 4.pdf. 
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considered as a retreat from 'Russia first' policy,294 the EU will nevertheless advance 
its interests in a 'Russia-aware' manner.295 
Reasons for the Russian influence lie in geography and history. In this 
context, the EU's engagement with the region will be perceived by Russia as 
encroachment on its regional position.296 Secondly, legal aspects of the EU's foreign 
policy action complicate the unitary position towards its powerful neighbour. The 
EU's position can be undermined with the distinct agendas of the Commission's 
Directorate Generals and the Council, which is the High Representative for CFSP. 297 
However, most importantly, the absence of EU legal personality and the competence 
of the Member States over CFSP matters will likely exert discrepancies in the unified 
policy. Not only will the positions of the Member States differ, but in view of 
Russia's importance, they may fail to give the EU the lead role.298 In this context, the 
EU will have to find a common denominator with Russia to create a 'shared 
neighbourhood,' otherwise both the EU-Russia strategic partnership and the ENP in 
Russian neighbourhood might fail. 299 
The relations between Russia and each of the countries in the South Caucasus 
will create different conditions for the EU's involvement. Most likely the Russian 
294 Vahl, 'EU-Russia Relations in EU Neighbourhood Policies' in Malfliet, Verpoest and Vinokurov, 
(eds.), The CIS, the EU and Russia, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 121-141, at 130. 
295 Popescu, supra note 25, at 6, 21. 
296 Averre, 'The EU-Russian Relationship in the Context of European Security' in Johnson and 
Robinson, (eds.), Perspectives on EU-Russia Relations, (London: Routledge, 2005), 73-92, at 78; 
Freire and Simao, 'The Armenian Road to Democracy: Dimensions ofa Tortuous Process', Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Working Document No, 267/May 2007, at 16; Kratochvil, 'The European 
Neighbourhood Policy: A Clash ofIncompatible Interpretations' in Kratochvil, (ed.), The European 
Union and Its Neighbourhood: Policies, Problems and Priorities, (Institute of International Relations, 
Prague, 2006), 13-28, at 19-20. 
297 Tassinari, 'A Riddle Inside an Enigma: Unwrapping the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership', (2005) 
40 The International Spectator 45, at 54. 
298 Ibid, at 54; Smith, 'Enlargement and European Order', in Hill and Smith, (eds.), International 
Relations and the EU, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 270-291, at 286. 
299 Lynch, supra note 22, at 70. 
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reliance on 'coercive means' in the relations with its neighbours might undennine the 
possibility of a 'shared neighbourhood. ,300 
Russia is Armenia's most important ally, especially in the field of military 
cooperation. Two Russian military bases are located in the country, and a Treaty on 
Friendship and Cooperation was signed in 1997 securing the military bond. 301 
Annenia perceived Russia as its main security guarantor due to constant threats from 
Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and past economic isolation 
stemming from the close ties and cooperation between Georgia, Azerbaijan and 
Turkey. Moreover, the country has a strong dependence on energy supplies from 
Russia. The opening of a gas pipeline from Iran on 19 March 2007 was expected to 
lessen the country's dependence on Russia. The expectations were dealt a blow when 
a large share in the project was sold to the Russian Gazprom. 302 Moreover, Russian 
investment is present in sectors as important as banking, telecommunications and 
electricity, including the Hrazdan power plant. 303 
The cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan has intensified since the first 
state visit in 2001 by President Putin, with the joint exploitation of energy resources 
in the Caspian Sea, as well as military cooperation, Azerbaijan participating in 
Russian-organised naval exercises in the Caspian in 2002.304 However, in comparison 
with Annenia, Azerbaijan seems to seek more recognition as an independent political 
300 Casier, 'The Clash of Integration Processes? The Shadow Effect of the Enlargement EU on its 
Eastern Neighbours' in Malfliet, Verpoest and Vinokurov. (eds.), The CIS, the EU and Russia, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 73-94, at 88. 
301 The parties commit to close cooperation for the purposes of guaranteeing the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and security of Armenia and the Russian Federation, Article 2. 
The Treaty is available in Armenian and Russian languages at 
http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com!doc/conventions/1997.html. 
302 'Shadow dancing: Armenia's courtship with independence', Armenian Diaspora, 15 December 
2006. Available at http://www.arrnenianow.com!?action=view Article&AI D= 1903 . 
303. Armenia selling more infrastructure, industry to Russia'. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 November 
2006; 'Russia steps up economic presence in Armenia', Armenian Diaspora, 17 November 2006. 
304 Lynch, 'A Regional Insecurity Dynamic' in 'The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU', 
Chaillot Papers No 65, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003, at 18. 
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entity in the region by relying on its natural resources. The call from the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan to the EU in the beginning of 2007 to seek an 
alternative route for energy supplies through Azerbaijan is evidence of this policy. 305 
Rather different are Russia's relations with Georgia since the Rose 
Revolution, when the new leadership made clear its ambition to seek a Western-
oriented external policy. This was followed by strong rhetoric from the leaders of 
both states leading to an open confrontation on the diplomatic level. In order to 
restrain Georgia, Russia relied heavily on economic sanctions, banning Georgian 
agricultural products, wine and mineral water imports. 306 In addition, arbitrary 
deportations of Georgians took place in Russia together with tightening of the visa 
regime and blocking of transportation links.307 While Georgian President Saakashvili, 
who came to power after the Revolution, made the unification of Georgian territories 
one of the main goals to be achieved during his tenure,30g the worsening of relations 
with Russia reverberated in Georgia'S relations with its two breakaway regions. 
The proclamation of independence by Kosovo in February 2008, and its 
subsequent recognition by the US and the majority of the Member States of the EU 
also contributed to the worsening of relations, Moscow perceiving Kosovo as a 
dangerous precedent and willing to use it to further its own interests with regards to 
Georgia.309 In March 2008, Russia officially withdrew from the 1996 CIS pact 'On 
Measures to Regulate the Conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia' imposing various sanctions 
305 'A3ep6aH.ll)({aH npH3BaJI EBpony nOKynaTb raJ y TypKMeHHH, a He y POCCHH" HHcpOp.WGlIUOHHOe 
AzeHmcm60 floRumco6em 22.03. 2007. 
Available at http://news.politsovet.ruln news.asp?article=17689 . 
306 'Russia restricts imports of agricultural products from Georgia' Civil Georgia, 20 December 2005; 
'PM: Russia's ban on Georgian wine unfair", Civil Georgia, 30 March 2006. 
307 'Georgia: Sliding Towards AuthoritarianismT, International Crisis Group. Europe Report No. 189, 
19 December 2007, at 8. 
308 'Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia', International Crisis Group, Europe Repo11 No 193. 
5 June 2008, at 7. 
309 'Putin warns Kosovo will come back to knock the West, as NATO envoys lashes out'. Associated 
Press, International Herald Tribune, 22 February, 2008; available at 
www.iht.comlarticles/ap/2008/02/22/europe/EU-GEN-Russia-Kosovo.php. 
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on Abkhazia, though in fact the sanctions had long been ignored before. 31 0 Moreover, 
after the NATO Bucharest summit in April 2008 promising Ukraine and Georgia 
membership of NATO though without giving them a Membership Action Plan,311 
Russia increased its military presence in Abkhazia, though within the limits for 
peacekeepers set by the CIS agreements. 312 
Several incidents in both breakaway regions in the following months heated 
the situation to an explosive state. 313 Close to midnight on 7 August 2008, a senior 
Georgian military official announced that Tbilisi had decided to restore 
'constitutional order' in South Ossetia. 314 After a night of massive offensive 
supported by artillery attacks Georgian forces promptly advanced into the territory of 
South Ossetia, in response to which Russian forces entered the conflict. 315 Russia 
justified its intervention by accusing Georgia of 'genocide' against Ossetian people 
and upholding its right to protect its own citizens.316 
The military activities escalated subsequently with Abkhaz forces heading to 
the Kodori gorge, the only part of their territory still under Georgian control, forcing 
the escape of Georgians and with Russians troops crossing the Georgian border, 
310 It should be noted that Abkhazia is strategically, economically and politically much more important 
than South Ossetia due to its sea border and its attempts to create functioning institutions, develop an 
economy based on tourism and production of corps; 'Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia·. 
International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 193, 5 June 2008, at 2. 
311 Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, NATO Press Release (2008)049. 
312 www.mil.rulinfo/l069/details/indexlshtml?id=42520. 
313Georgian unmanned aircrafts spying over Abkhazia were downed by Abkhaz and Russian MIG-29 
as claimed by the Georgian side. Georgian soldiers from Joint Peacekeepers have been detained by 
South Ossetian forces, which have been released after an ultimatum by President Saakashvili. This was 
followed by Russian military planes present in Georgian airspace. Both sides have been accumulating 
their military power in the conflict area. In the beginning of August five personnel from Georgian 
police were injured in a car bombing in South Ossetia and heavy fighting broke out between Georgians 
and Ossetians leaving several dead and injured; International Crisis Group, supra note 47. at 4; "Russia 
v Georgia: The Fallout', International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 195, 22 August 2008, at 2 
314 'Heavy fighting in South Ossetia'. BBe News, 8 August 2008. 
315 'Georgia conflict escalates as Russian tanks enter South Ossetia' Telegraph News, 8 August 2008. 
316 Though Russia claimed that over 2.000 civilians have been killed in South Ossetia, the Human 
Rights Watch expressed its concerns over the lack of accurate information; 'Russia exaggerating South 
Ossetian death toll, says human rights group', The Guardian, August 13,2008. 
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occupying Georgian military bases and destroying infrastructure. 317 Also several 
Georgian naval vessels in the port of Poti were sunk in the following days followed 
by the blowing up of a vital railway bridge linking Tbilisi with the west of the 
country.318 Mediation by the EU Council President Nicolas Sarkozy produced a six-
point ceasefire document on 12 August. As part of the ceasefire agreement, Georgia 
undertook signing a non-resumption of hostilities agreement, which South Ossetians 
and Abkhazians had been demanding before the outbreak of fighting. 319 
The diplomatic intervention by the EU Presidency showed that with 'dynamic 
leadership' the EU can playa significant role in the regional politics. 320 The Member 
States subsequently approved the ceasefire during the Emergency Session of the 
Foreign Ministers Council.321 Nonetheless, the limited character of the actions at the 
EU's disposal was more than evident when the Council was deciding on the possible 
sanctions against Russia. The Member States were divided, with the Baltic and 
Eastern European states calling for a tough response to Russia and most of the old 
Member States calling for a more careful approach.322 The maximum response by the 
EU was the suspension of a new agreement with Russia until the complete 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory.323 In this context the secondary 
317'A6xa3CKHe BoopY)I(eHHble CHJIbl Ha'laJIH onepaUHlo B KO.llOPCKOM ymeJIbe', POCCWl6 r706anbHOU 
fl O.7umUKe, 12.08.2008, available at http://www.globalaffairs.rulnews/l 0 1 06.html; 'PoccHiicKHe 
BOHcKa YXO.llJlT H3 rpY3HHcKoro ropo.lla fOpH', Reuters POCCUR u CmpaHbl CHr, 19.08.2008, 
available at 
http://ru.reuters.com!articIe/topNews/idRUZV E94087020080819?pageN umber- I &virtualBrandChann 
el=O; 'Russian jets attack Georgian town', BBC News, 09.08.2008, available at 
http://news. bbc.co. uklllhil7 550804 .stm. 
318 'Russia v Georgia: The Fallout', International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 195, 22 August 
2008, at 3. 
319 Ibid, at 9. 
320 Ibid, at 21. 
321 Council Conclusions on the situation in Georgia, 13 August 2008. 
322 'EU shies away from strong action against Russia', EU Observer, 01.09.2008, available at 
http://euobserver.com!?aid=26667; 'EU diplomats keen to avoid Russia controversy', EU Observer, 
13.08.2008, available at http://euobserver.coml?aid=26605. 
323 'EU suspends talks on Russia pact', 1 September 2008, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/word/europeI7592541.stm 'EU secures deal on Russia withdrawal', EU 
Observer, 09.09.2008, http://euobserver.coml?aid=26708 . 
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dimension of Russian involvement in the region becomes apparent. Not only can 
Russian presence undennine the ENP, but the problematic relations of her neighbours 
will require the EU to arbitrate. The EU, and in particular its Member States, would 
not be interested in risking their relations with their powerful neighbour. In this sense, 
Georgia is expected not to create more problems and demonstrate flexibility in its 
own foreign policy.324 
Russia's readiness to prove to the West its assertive role in the international 
arena went so far as to recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on 
26 August 2008. 325 In December 2008 an Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia was established by the Council of the EU in order 
to investigate the causes of the conflict. 326 In its subsequent report the Mission found 
that neither the use of force by Georgia in South Ossetia, nor the Russian invasion 
into Georgia following the initial defensive stage against use of force by Georgia was 
justifiable under international law.327 It appears that the findings of the Mission 
further contributed to the EU's role of an arbiter in relations between its neighbours. 
The fallout between Russia and Georgia has been considered to be a 
consequence of close cooperation between the US and Georgia, where unprecedented 
military assistance has been issued to Georgia in terms of financing and reforming its 
military.328 One of the main reasons for the US to engage with the region has been its 
geopolitical concerns in preventing Russia from regaining its 'hegemonic 
324 Peter Semneby, EUSR to the South Caucasus, to the European Parliament, Foreign Affairs 
Committee, reported in RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 6 October 2006; RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 20 
October 2006. Available at www.rferl.orglreports. 
325 'Russia recognises Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence'. Russia Today, August 27, 2008, 
available at http://www.russiatoday.com!news/news/29521 . 
326 Council Decision 2008/901lCFSP of2 December 2008 concerning an independent international 
fact-finding mission on the conflict in Georgia, OJ L 323166, 03.12.2008. 
327 Report of the Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia. September 
2009, at 22-24. Available at http://www.ceiig.ch/. 
328 See note 69, Chapter II. 
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influence' .329 The region attracted the US attention after the 11 September terrorist 
attacks.330 They are most notably interested in the region's energy resources, its 
geographic position and the bearing of the moderate Muslim state of Azerbaijan.33 ) 
This is significant in the context of US foreign policy in the broader region during 
recent years with respect to arms control and the anti-terror campaign. 332 
According to Harasimowicz, despite the US' friendly attitude towards the EU, 
its goals in the region are not fully corresponding to those of the EU and are capable 
of undermining or weakening the implementation of the ENP.333 The US and 
European approaches to crisis management and conflict resolution can differ 
significantly.334 It is in contrast with the US that the EU has been identified as 'soft 
power. ,335 
The military dimension to US involvement in the region IS apparent in 
Georgia and Azerbaijani cases. In 2002, a US national security waiver on the 
prohibition of aid to Azerbaijan was annulled, allowing it to implement military 
cooperation between the latter and Armenia in the fight against terror. 336 Azerbaijan 
proved to be an important strategic partner in the 'war on terror' sending troops to 
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as granting permission to use its territory to US military 
forces. The operation of two American radars near the Russo-Iranian border and a 
329 Haukkala and Moshes, supra note 31, at 19. 
330 Smith and Webber, supra note 23, at 90. 
331 Lynch, supra note 43, at 16. 
m Haukkala and Moshes, supra note 31, at 20. 
m Harasimowicz. 'The European Neighbourhood Policy of the EU after Enlargement 2004: 
Empire with a Human FaceT in Sadurski, Ziller and Urek, (eds.), Apres Enlargement: 
Legal and Political Responses in Central and Eastern Europe, European University Institute, R. 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Florence 2006, 81-94, at 344. 
334 Smith and Webber, supra note 23, at 83. 
m Tulmets. ' C ~ n n the Discourse on 'Soft Power' Help the EU to Bridge its Capability-Expectations 
GapT (2007) 7 European Political Economy Review 195, at 207. 
336 Freire and Simao, supra note 35, at 11. 
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military centre in Baku to monitor shipping and air travel across the Caspian Sea 
firmly established US military activity in the country. 337 
As a part of the strategy to counterbalance Russian assertion, the US assisted 
In restructuring Georgian military training as mentioned earlier. It has been 
considered that the military and energy interests of the US created a solid and 
credible basis for EU engagement in the region. 338 However, this is not always the 
case. For instance, Georgia's focus on military reform after the Rose Revolution with 
the assistance of the US has delayed and distracted the democratic reforms promised 
by the new leadership. While the US does not have similar strong links with Armenia, 
its relations are conditioned by the strong Armenian lobby through the Congress of 
the US. As a result, the aid received by Armenia from the US was the highest per 
capita among all the former Soviet Republics. 339 This was perhaps the reason for the 
financial assistance granted to Armenia under the Millennium Challenge Account 
'against the assurances by the Foreign Minister to address democratic shortfalls. ,340 
Certain peculiarities should be noted in relation to the Turkish and Iranian 
presence in the region. Turkey's active cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia 
resulted in construction of two major pipelines. The BTC pipeline was launched in 
May 2005 transporting oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean port of 
Ceyhan. 341 The BTE natural gas pipeline was launched in 2006. Both pipelines 
bypass Armenia, isolating it economically. Besides strained Armenian-Azerbaijani 
relations, a reason for the economic isolation of Armenia stemmed from the absence 
of diplomatic relations with Turkey. The latter closed its border with Armenia 
337 Nuriyev, supra note 26, at 19. 
338 Freire and Simao, supra note 35, at 20. 
339 Shaffer. 'US Policy in the South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU', Chaillot Papers No 65, EU 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003, at 59. 
340 'Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for US interests', 
Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 23 February 2006, at 12. 
341 The pipeline was built by a consortium under BP. 
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following Armenian advances in the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1993. However, 
Turkey is willing to undertake a leading role in the regional cooperation. The BSECO 
initiated by Turkey is currently considered to be the most significant regional 
organisation.342 Another regional organisation is GUAM, whose aims are to 
encourage cooperation and development of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia Transport 
Corridor. 343 
The isolated position of Armenia prompts closer political and economic ties 
with its southern neighbour, Iran. First, of all Iran serves as an alternative to 
Armenia's main export route through Georgia. Secondly, Iranian cooperation is 
crucial for Armenia in terms of diversifying energy supplies. However, as noted 
above, Russia has a tight grip on such economic prospects. 344 Armenia's close 
cooperation with Iran is not without risks not only from the Russian perspective, but 
also bearing in mind the relationship of Iran with the US. For instance, in 2002, 
sanctions were imposed by the Bush administration on certain Armenian companies 
based on accusations of helping Iran to acquire necessary materials for the production 
of weapons of mass destruction.345 Close cooperation between Iran and Armenia 
comes as a continuation of the initial engagement of Iran in establishing economic 
ties, assisting in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh war and preventing its spread into 
its own territory, and cooperating with Russia. 346 Iran's relations with Azerbaijan are 
342 Simao and Freire, 'The EU's Neighbourhood Policy and the South Caucasus; Unfolding New 
Patterns of Cooperation,' (2008) 2 Caucasian Review of International Affairs 225, at 231. 
343 Members of the organisation include Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Uzbekistan 
withdrew from the organisation in 2005; Labedzka, 'The Southern Caucasus' in Blockmans and 
Lazowski, (eds.), The European Union and Its Neighbours: A Legal Appraisal of the EU's Policies of 
Stabilisation, Partnership and Integration, (Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2006), 575-612, at 587. 
344 'Hospitality with caution?: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to visit Yerevan', ArmenjaNow, October 5, 
2007. 
345 'Political and Economic Situation in Armenia and its Relations with the European Union', 
European Parliament, 20 January 2005. 
346 Harutyunyan, 'Neighbourhood Relations between the EU and Armenia', Centre for EU 
Enlargement Studies, Central European University, Budapest, June 2006, at 16-17. 
Available, at http://193.225.200.73/cens/assets/files/armenia. 
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complicated by the separatist activities of several million Azerbaijanis living in Iran, 
as well as Iran's alleged influence on Islamist powers in Azerbaijan.347 
It may be argued that two non-official alliances compete within the Caucasian 
region.348 On one side, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey are backed by the US in 
support of exploration and transportation of Caspian oil avoiding Russia. On the 
other, Armenia has sided with Russia and Iran, in an attempt to guarantee its security 
and avoid economic blockade. However, the balance of power has shifted in 2007 and 
2008. Increased trends of cooperation have been noted between Iran and Turkey 
recently.349 Besides, the Georgian-Russian war in August 2008 urged the regional 
actors to reconsider previous relations leading to certain steps towards normalisation 
of relations between Turkey and Armenia, and the prospects of deeper economic 
cooperation between Russia and Turkey.350 Accordingly, the region is not only 
crowded with different interested parties, but the relations with Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan reflect geopolitical realities that often depend on the relations between 
such powers as Russia and the US. 
In this complicated scenario of international engagement, the outcome of ENP 
implementation will be influenced not only by the EU's interests and its leverage with 
347 Stritecky, 'The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the ENP' in Kratochvil, (ed.), The European 
Union and Its Neighbourhood: Policies, Problems and Priorities, (Institute oflntemational Relations, 
Prague, 2006), 59-76, at 71; Labedzka, see above, at 581. 
348 Sabanadze, 'International Involvement in the South Caucasus', ECMI Working Paper No. 15 
(Flensburg, European Centre for Minority Issues 2002), at 23. 
Available at http://www.einiras.org/pub/details.cfm?lng=en&id=19647 
349 The countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on oil and gas transit and joint investment 
in 2007 followed by another Memorandum of Understanding on transportation in 2009; 'Turkey, Iran 
sign memorandum of understanding on transportation', Turkey Daily News, 02.03.2009, available at 
http://www.turkeydailynews.comlnews/118/ARTICLE/1635/2009-03-02.html. 
350 A 'Road Map' has been agreed between Turkey and Armenia to establish diplomatic relations 
between the countries and open the border. A new natural gas pipeline project has been offered by 
Russia to build new cooperation with Turkey; 'Turkey-Armenia road map sets timetable for ties', 
Reuters, April 23, 2009, available at http://uk.reuters.comlarticle/idUKLN96485220090423; 'Russia 
offers Turkey cooperation in South Stream,' Hurriyet Daily, July 2,2009, available at 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.comln.php?n-russia-offers-turkey-cooperation-in-south-stream-2009-
07-02 
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each of the South Caucasian countries, but by general geopolitical circumstances 
dictated by other significant powers and developments in regional conflicts. This 
augurs a shaky start for the ENP implementation rooted in politics, where the legal 
instruments incorporated in the policy, including the political conditionality, will 
have to co-exist with political elements. Skilful diplomacy will be required by the EU 
in order to ensure the achievement of its objectives. 
3. ENP objectives: democracy promotion within a security framework? 
The strategic interests behind the determination to include the South Caucasus 
m the ENP are not the only factor affecting the EU's decision. The ENP's 
geopolitical dimension partly derives from 'politics with a view of enhancing the 
EU's security.'351 To understand the wider political rationale behind the ENP, one 
should tum to the policy objectives. 
The objectives of the EU foreign policy action are scattered around various 
Treaties reflecting pillar division. Articles 133, 177 and 181 EC respectively reflect 
the Community's objectives on common commercial policy, development 
cooperation and economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries. 
Article 11 EU sets out objectives for the CFSP action. The Lisbon Treaty aims at 
codification of the foreign policy objectives. Article 21 EU as amended and 
consolidated by the Lisbon Treaty provides for the following objectives: (1) 
safeguarding ofthe Union's values, fundamental interests, security, independence and 
integrity; (2) consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and the principles of international law; (3) prevention of conflicts and strengthening 
international security; (4) and fostering the sustainable economic, social and 
351 Aliboni, 'The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy', (2005) lO 
European Foreign Affairs Review I, at 3. 
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environmental development of developing countries to eradicate poverty.352 These 
objectives in various forms are also spelled out in the ENP goals, but with different 
strength and intensity. 
3.1. The ENP and the EU's security agenda 
The changing language ofthe'policy documents on the ENP has caused some 
confusion as to the general aims of the ENP and the appropriateness of the 
instruments chosen to reach them. Is the ENP about preventing the emergence of new 
dividing lines in the European neighbourhood or is this a secondary objective?353 Or 
is it about creating good neighbours who share the EU's values as well as its 
standards and laws in specific economic and social areas which would promote 
prosperity and security in the neighbourhood? 
Suggestions have been raised that, in addition to more traditional concerns in 
international relations, the ENP has shifted towards a transformationist agenda. 354 
Others view the ENP as 'an attempt by the EU to transform its external border from 
areas of demarcation and division to areas of exchange and interaction' and consider 
two 'border-related' objectives to be central: development and exchange within 
border regions, and fostering a 'ring of well-governed countries to the East of the EU 
and the borders of the Mediterranean with whom [the EU] can enjoy close and 
352The full list of objectives also include encouraging the integration of all countries into the world 
economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; assisting to 
deVelop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the 
sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development; 
assisting populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; promoting an 
international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance. 
353 Smith, 'The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy' (2005) 81 International Affairs 757, 
at 763; Milcher, 'The Economic Rationale of the European Neighbourhood Policy' Paper prepared for 
EUI Workshop, December 1-2, 2006. 
354 Dannreuther, 'Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy', 
(2006) 11 European Foreign Affairs Review 183, at 184, 194, 195-196. 
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cooperative relations.'355 Alternatively, if the EU is viewed as a 'gravity centre' f()f 
stabilisation, then the latter objective will be given a central role. 356 However, taking 
into account how the ENP was formulated and the actual language of the policy 
documents no doubt is left as to the central role of security within its objectives. 
The security rationale has been always high on the agenda of the Union and 
has motivated the economic and social integration in Europe. 357 The E lJ' s security 
agenda acquired an outwards orientation following its internal transformation with 
the introduction of the CFSP and ESDP, giving the EU a new international role 
outside its traditional economic spectrum. 358 A renewed emphasis on EU security 
surfaced at the beginning of the new millennium, marked by anticipation of its most 
extensive enlargement, transforming the borders of the EU and bringing it closer to 
new neighbours. 359 
When the idea of the ENP was officially circulated for the first time by the 
joint Solana/Patten letter of 7 August 2002, special attention was devoted to the 
problem of security, reflected in the following statement: 
'there are a number of overriding objectives for our neighbourhood policy: 
stability, prosperity, shared values and the rule of law along our borders are all 
fundamental for our own security. Failure in any of these areas will lead to increased 
risks of negative spill-over on the Union.'360 
355 Comelli, Greco, Tocci, 'From Boundary to Borderland: Transforming the Meaning of Borders 
through the European Neighbourhood Policy', (2007) 12 European Foreign Affairs Review 203, at 
203,208. 
356 Meloni in Cremona and Meloni, supra note 31, at 99. 
357 Tassinari, 'Security and Integration in the EU neighbourhood: The Case for Regionalism', Brussels: 
Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005, at 2. 
358 Marchetti, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU's Periphery'. 
Discussion Paper C158, Centre for European Integration Studies 2006, at 5. 
359 Delcour, 'Does the European Neighbourhood Policy Make a Difference? Policy Patterns and 
Reception in Ukraine and Russia,' (2007) 7 European Political Economy Review 118, at 121. 
360 Joint letter by EU Commissioner Chris Patten and the EU High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy on Wider Europe. 7 August 2002. Available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/commlworldJenp/pdf/ 0130163334 001 en. pdf 
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Thus, the interdependent nature of EU security, and the developments in 
neighbouring countries, are recognised by the EU and require the action to start from 
abroad. 361 
One of the first references to the objectives of the ENP is found in the Wider 
Europe Communication, in which the Commission referred to the December 2002 
Copenhagen European Council's affirmation of the 'Union's determination to avoid 
drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within 
and beyond the new borders of the Union. ,362 As noted by Commissioner Ferrero-
Waldner, the question of borders is not merely a matter of definition, but of 
upholding them as 'key to many of our citizens' urgent concerns - security, migration 
and economic growth. ,363 Such a fonnulation of objectives makes clear that this EU 
initiative is more concerned with the changes occurring in the Union due to its new 
geographical location,364 and therefore the main objective of the policy is not 
primarily the prosperity of the neighbours and their 'socio-economic development,' 
but rather the security and stability of the Union itself. 
The logic of protection of the Union through the ENP from any 'negative 
spillover' in the neighbourhood is apparent also in the language of the Wider Europe 
Communication, which acknowledged that within the current and future decades the 
Union's task to ensure 'security. stability and sustainable development to its citizens 
will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the 
neighbours. ,365 In reference to the goals of the policy in June 2003 the Council 
seemed to take similar approach, establishing that new policies should have two 
361 Lynch, supra note 2, at 34-35. 
362 Wider Europe Communication, at 3-4. 
363 Ferrero-Waldner, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU's Newest Foreign Policy 
Instrument', (2006) 11 European Foreign Affairs Review 139. 
364 Del Sarto and Schumacher, 'From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood 
Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean? (2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review 17, at 25-26. 
365 W'd E C ., 3 1 er urope ommumcatlOn, at . 
overall goals. The first goal is '[t]o work with the partners to reduce poverty and 
create an area of shared prosperity and values', and the second one is '[t]o anchor the 
EU's offer of concrete benefits and preferential relations within a differentiated 
framework which responds to progress made by the partner countries' in the areas of 
political and economic reform, Justice and Home Affairs. 366 However, taking a closer 
look at the areas of cooperation emphasised by the Council, it is apparent that 
preventing and combating security threats is accorded a central place. 367 It has been 
suggested that by asserting its presence in the policy Council brings out 'a 
securitarian outlook' of the ENP and pushes the Commission towards reorientation. 368 
Such reorientation is apparent in the ENP Strategy Paper, where the 
Commission explicitly shifted emphasis to stressing such ideas as security and 
stability in the ENP Strategy Paper. Two main objectives are highlighted, including 
strengthening stability, security and well-being for EU Member States and 
neighbouring countries and, secondly, preventing the emergence of new dividing 
lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. 369 In June 2004, the Council stated 
that the objective of the ENP was 'to share the benefits of an enlarged EU with 
neighbouring countries in order to contribute to increased stability, security and 
prosperity of the European Union and its neighbours.'37o 
The centrality of security issues for the ENP is also apparent taking into 
account that the launch and development of the ENP was taking place in parallel with 
the European Security Strategy launched in 2003 partly as a response to the events of 
9/11 and in the absence of a common position among the Members States over the 
366 General Affairs and External Relations Council, Conclusions on Wider Europe - New 
Neighbourhood, 16 June 2003. 
367 Ibid. 
368 Zaiotti, 'Of Friends and Fences: Europe's Neighbourhood Policy and the 'Gated Community 
Syndrome', (2007) 29 European Integration 143, at 157. 
369 ENP Strategy Paper, at 3. 
370 General Affair and External Relations Council, 14 June 2004. 
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issue of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 371 The ENP has been even considered to 
embody the 'regional implementation of the European Security Strategy.,372 These 
two policies should be considered as interlinked and developed in parallel. The ENP 
Strategy Paper, in its introduction, explicitly provides that the new policy 'will also 
support efforts to realise the objectives of the European Security Strategy.,373 The 
European Security Strategy in turn gave important meaning to the idea of 'building 
security in the neighbourhood' when declaring that 'we need to extend the benefits of 
economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling 
political problems there. ,374 The ENP Strategy Paper follows the same logic, 
establishing a task for the EU to make a particular contribution to stability and good 
governance in the immediate neighbourhood and 'to promote a ring of well governed 
countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean 
with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.,375 In addition to the cross-
references in both documents, the terminology used for both the ENP and the 
Security Strategy seems to be interchangeable. 
Therefore, the security aspects should be considered to be fundamental to the 
entire policy, with security as the central objective, while the objectives of stability 
and prosperity are designed to lead through political and economic development to 
371 This Strategy intends to express the role of the Union as a global player able to respond to the 
global challenges to security generally in the world and its neighbourhood in particular; A Secure 
Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy Paper, Brussels, 12 December 2003 (hereinafter 
the European Security Strategy Paper); Missiroli and Quille, 'European Security in Flux' in Cameron, 
(ed.), The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement. (London: Routledge, 2004), 114-134, at 
118-119; Lynch, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy,' Institute for Security Studies, Paper presented 
at the workshop "European Neighbourhood Policy: Concepts and Instruments", Prague. June 2004, 
organised by the European Commission with DGAP, CEFRES and HR, at 2; Aliboni, supra note 90, at 
1. 
372 Hillion, 'The EU's Neighbourhood Policy towards Eastern Europe' in Dashwood and Maresceau, 
(eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
309-333, at 314. 
313 ENP Strategy Paper, at 2, 6. 
374 European Security Strategy Paper, at 8. 
375 ENP Strategy Paper, at 6. 
90 
security.376 Security on the EU borders will be increased if stability is spread 'both 
within and between the neighbouring states' and their prosperity is increased through 
social and economic development. 377 It has been suggested that the ENP is a 'logical 
extension of CFSP concerns,' where the CFSP which 'did not have at its core a 
coherent strategy towards the EU's immediate neighbours would be a contradiction in 
terms.,378 
In this sense the role of the neighbourhood as regards the EU's security is 
two-fold. First, the neighbourhood is a threat on its own, the conflicts in the South 
Caucasus, Transnistria and in the Middle East presenting direct risks for the EU 
whether in the fonn of migration, trafficking, or suspension in energy flow. The 
integration of neighbours as a 'potential security menace' will eventually contribute 
to achieving the security goal. 379 Second, transfonning its neighbours into politically 
and economically stable countries will help the EU to create a necessary 'buffer zone' 
or 'functioning semi-periphery' between the EU and the troubled areas further in the 
East and South.380 Thus, one can conclude that security as a strategic objective is the 
main catalyst behind the ENP and the EU's involvement in the neighbourhood. 
376 Cremona and Hillion, 'L'Union fait la force? Potential and Limitations of the ENP as an Integrated 
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318 Wallace, 'Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25', Policy Papers No.4, 
Notre Europe 2003, at 27; Smith and Webber, supra note 23, at 81. 
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Despite the presence of security on the ENP agenda, it has been considered 
that the ENP is 'the example par excellence of civilian power in Europe,' where the 
security element is 'devoid of military component.,38I The instruments of the policy 
are clearly civilian, that is focused on 'persuasion and negotiation' and based on the 
EU's economic power and without a threat of using force,382 which will be discussed 
in the next chapter. However, one can hardly reject the rationalist presumption that 
stabilising the neighbours will serve the aim of the EU's security and allow it to 
pursue its own political interests. What is the role for democracy promotion then? 
3.2. Democracy promotion within the ENP 
Although the central place accorded to the security issues within the ENP 
objectives raises scepticism regarding democracy promotion, the latter does appear 
within the ENP, in two ways. 
While there is an opinion that together with stability democracy appears as 
one of the overarching goals of the entire policy,383 the analysis of the policy 
documents reveal no precise role for democracy per se within the objectives of the 
policy, but also some of the documents are rather silent on this matter. Rather, one 
can assume that democracy promotion is present within the objectives of the policy as 
an element of stability. As noted by Cremona, 'stability is closely linked to 
democratisation, political reform and good governance. ,384 In this perspective, 
promotion of democracy also contributes to the security interests of the EU, where 
381 Khasson, Vasilyan, Vos, 'Everybody Needs Good Neighbours': The EU and its Neighbourhood' in 
Orbie, (ed.), Europe's Global Role: £'Cternal Policies o/the EU, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 217-237, 
at 220, 223. 
382 Smith, 'The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?' (2000) 35 The 
International Spectator 11, at 13. 
383 Schimmelfennig, 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Political Conditionality and its Impact on 
Democracy in Non-Candidate Neighbouring Countries', Paper prepared for the EUSA Ninth Biennial 
International Conference Austin, March 3 I-April 2, 2005. 
384 Cremona in Maiani, Petrov, Mouliarova, supra note 116, at 7. 
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promotion of democracy within the ENP is vital 'if the deeper roots of insecurity are 
to be resolved effectively:385 However, there is a fear that stability might be 
interpreted narrowly as 'an instrument to achieve an overarching security goal' 
risking exclusion of democracy promotion, since strictly speaking it is not necessary 
for the purposes of EU security.386 This seeming contradiction derives from security 
as an objective in long-tenn and short-tenn perspectives. While in the short-tenn 
democracy as an objective can be compromised for pursuing security interests, in the 
long tenn efficient security cannot be achieved without stable democracies 
functioning in neighbouring countries. 
However, democracy p ~ o m o t i o n n appears also in a more clearly spelled out 
way within the ENP, which is the reference to 'shared values' as a basis for the 
policy. In this sense, promotion of democracy has been present on the ENP agenda 
since the launch of the project. In December 2002 the European Council declared that 
the new circumstances brought by enlargement 'presents an important opportunity to 
take forward relations with neighbouring countries based on shared political and 
economic values.'387 It is the detennination of the Union to uphold its values in 
international relations as specified in the ENP Strategy Paper,388 which according to 
Article 6 EU include liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law. Thus, the EU does not have to designate the promotion 
of democracy as a separate objective: it should be assumed everywhere, since these 
principles should be applied to the entire framework of international relations of the 
385 Dannreuther, supra note 93, at 201. 
386 Meloni in Cremona and Meloni, supra note 31, at 102. 
387 Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 December 2002, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph. 22. 
388 ENP Strategy Paper, at 12. 
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Union. 389 It is, therefore, the self-representation of the EU which brings democracy 
forward. 
Therefore, while the EU is not concealing its real interests, it nevertheless 
formulated the ENP to express 'the aim of exporting the EO's values to its immediate 
periphery. ,390 In this sense, commitment to 'shared values' including democracy, is 
considered to be one of the main aims of the policy.391 Using the terms of Manners, it 
can be suggested that through the rhetoric of shared values, the EU is 'diffusing' its 
unique normative basis, including democracy as a norm, in its relations with 
neighbours. 392 It is this 'value dimension' which is often referred to as a significant 
development in comparison with previous EU policies.393 
Although legitimate concerns have been expressed as to whether the EU in 
fact questions the 'sharedness' of its values on behalf of its neighbours,394 this aspect 
of the policy has another dimension to it, which is the fact that commitment to 
'shared values' will serve a reference point for closer economic integration. Thus, 
even if the policy is not directly aimed at democratisation of the neighbouring 
countries, it is an inherent part of the ENP's methodology, in its conditionality 
element. Therefore, 'each of the aspects of the neighbourhood cooperation will be 
389 Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, (Oxford: Hart, 2006), at 484. 
390 Del Sarto and Schumacher, 'From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European 
Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?' (2005) \0 European Foreign Affairs 
Review 17, at 23. 
391 Tocci, 'Can the EU Promote Democracy and Human Rights Through the ENP? The Case for 
Refocusing on the Rule of Law' in Cremona and Meloni, (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy: 
A New Framework/or Modernisation?, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2007/21, 23-35, at 27. 
392 Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms', (2002) 40 Journal o/Common 
Market Studies 235, at 236, 244. 
393 Bosse, 'Values in the EU's Neighbourhood Policy: Political Rhetoric or Retlection ofa Coherent 
Policy?' (2007) 7 European Political Economy Review 38, at 39. 
394 Tocci, in Cremona and Meloni, see above, at 28. 
94 
connected to the question of ownership of shared values' making the relationship to 
take place. 395 
Turning to the countries of the South Caucasus, one can assume that they 
officially share the EU's values, including democracy and human rights, since they 
all are members of the Council of Europe and submit to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights. 396 However, as discussed in Chapter II, genuine 
commitment to these values in all three countries is still to be instigated. As a matter 
of fact, this has been realised on behalf of the Commission, which when including 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the policy in the Strategy Paper, stressed 'the 
desire of the EU to see reinforced a credible and sustained commitment towards 
democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and progress towards the 
development of a market economy' .397 
Consequently, one can conclude that democracy promotion found its place 
both within the ENP objectives and its methodology. However, certain concerns 
should be raised in this respect. There is a general presumption of the EU being 
inconsistent in its method of promoting democracy outside the enlargement 
framework. 398 Such inconsistency can be explained in the difference between the 
objectives of enlargement and the EU's foreign policy outside the enlargement 
framework. This suggests that the EU's identity objectives will not be as compelling 
as in the enlargement case, in particular when there are clearly identifiable 
395 Cremona, 'Values in the EU Constitution: the External Dimension, Centre on Democracy, 
Development and the Rule of Law', Stanford Institute for International Studies, Working Papers, No 
26,2 November 2004, at 10. 
396 Emerson, 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy of Placebo?" Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Working Document No 215INovember 2004, at 10. 
397 ENP Strategy Paper, at 11. 
398 Schimmelfennig, 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Political Conditionality and its Impact on 
Democracy in Non-Candidate Neighbouring Countries', Paper prepared for the EUSA Ninth Biennial 
International Conference Austin, March 31-April 2, 2005; Raik, 'Promoting Democracy through Civil 
Society: How to Step up the EU's Policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood', Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Working Document No 237/February 2006, at 18. 
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rationalistic considerations to the cooperation offered. This potentially takes a form of 
contradiction in the objectives of the ENP. A distinction has been made by Tocci 
between the ENP's milieu and possession goals. 399 The milieu goals include the 
promotion of democracy and human rights, as well as the rule of law, international 
law, conflict resolution and good neighbourly relations.40o In contrast, the possession 
goals (alternatively they can be called strategic objectives) include advancing 
narrower EU interests in commercial relations, migration, border management and 
energy security,401 which can be summarised in the broader concept of security. 
Though it might seem that achievement of normative goals is necessary for the 
strategic objectives which have a long-term perspective, an intrinsic controversy is 
apparent in their nature. While milieu objectives are value-based, the possession or 
strategic objectives seem to be rooted in the EU's political interests. In addition, the 
means of engagement are different in order to pursue the two groups of objectives. 
'Conditional engagement' is required to promote the milieu goals, while the strategic 
objectives will be achieved by means of cooperation with de facto actors, whether it 
is an authoritarian government or not.402 This requires clear identification of the 'the 
real point of EU engagement,' where the democratisation agenda can even become a 
complication for pursuit of such interests as energy resources or the fight against 
terrorism requiring strong, if not authoritarian, leadership, 'a la Aliev. ,403 
What matters is that the EU already has a record of undermining normative 
goals' at the expense of strategic ones, such as security, energy supply, diplomacy and 
399 Tocci, in Cremona and Meloni, at 29-30. 
40Q lbid, at 29. Arguably conflict resolution can be located in the second group of objectives. 
401 Ibid, at 29-30. 
402 Ibid, at 30. 
403 MacFarlane, supra note 21, at 131. 
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other political factors. 404 Thus, even though most of the time the EU stems in its 
external relations with nonnative rhetoric, it ultimately acts in a realist, imperialist or 
status quo-oriented way.405 Such an example has been noted in relation to Azerbaijan 
in Chapter II as regards the conclusion of the PCA.406 In relation to other neighbours, 
a clear example of compromise of milieu goals serves the EU's reaction to Russia's 
human rights violations in Chechnya, where the PCA's 'essential element' 
conditionality has been avoided.407 
The trend seems to continue with the ENP. The EU has been noted as not 
taking a role of active promoter of democracy in Action Plans signed with 
Azerbaijan, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan.408 Moreover, certain instances of 
'imperialist' and 'status-quo' EU action within the ENP have been observed.409 The 
EU can also engage in realpolitik within the ENP. For instance, the decision to 
facilitate a visa regime for Georgian citizens in 2008 was hardly based on Georgian 
achievements on a nonnative basis advocated through the ENP.410 Rather it can be 
considered to be a consolation step after the war with Russia in order to assert the 
EU's its presence in the region and demonstrate a positive attitude towards Georgia. 
Thus, credit should be paid to the view according to which, at least in the ENP 
domain, the EU is nothing but a 'normal' political force, whose external actions are 
404 Emerson, Aydin, Noutcheva, Tocci, Yahl and Youngs, 'The Reluctant Debutante: The European 
Union as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood', Centre for European Policy Studies, Working 
Document No 223/July 2005, at 3. 
405 Tocci, 'The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor.' Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Working Document No. 281/January 2008. 
406 See page 34, Chapter II. 
407 Smith, 'The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How 
Effective?' (1998) 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 253, at 273; Billion. 'Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements between the European Union and the New Independent States of the Ex-
Soviet Union', (1998) 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 399. at 417; Petrov, 'The Partnership and 
Coopertion Agreements with the Newly Independent States' in Ott and Inglis. (eds.), Handbook on 
European Enlargement: A Commentary on the Enlargement Process, (Hague: T.M.C Asser Press, 
2002),175-194, at 179. 
4 ~ E E 3 merson and other, see supra note 4 ,at 15. 
409 Tocci, supra note 144, at 19-22, at 25-28. 
410 Conclusions of Extraordinary European Council, Brussels, 1 September 2008. 
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'an organic whole with mUltiple dimensions and in which competing vIsIons of 
different intervening actors co-habit. ,411 
Therefore, there is an apparent complication between the rationalist and 
constructivist conceptualisation of the EU's foreign policy in its proximity, or simply 
speaking the EU's interests in its neighbourhood and its determination to uphold its 
identity internationally. Despite ostensibly being committed to EU values, the 
objectives of the ENP will at points undennine the nonnative stance of the EU, which 
will most certainly preserve the rhetoric, but not necessarily be faithful to it. These 
complications will be apparent in the ENP methodology. 
4. ENP as a fonn of Europeanisation 
The concept of Europeanisation is used for the purposes of conceptualising 
the patterns of European transfonnation in tenns of institutional or policy 
developments. The definitions of Europeanisation vary depending on 'inwards' or 
'outwards' approaches. The 'inwards' looking approach considers patterns of 
European transfonnation between the EU and its Member States in various scenarios: 
a 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches, a comparative perspective of the changes 
taking place in different Member States, or Europeanisation of Member States 
policies in one particular policy field, or a more general institution building at the EU 
level. 412 
411 lohansson-Nogues, 'The (Non-) Normative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An 
Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor?' (2007) 7 European Political Economy Review 181, at 
187. 
412 Olsen, 'The Many Faces of Europeanization', (2002) 40 Journal o/Common Market Studies 921; 
923-924; Quaglia, Neuvonen, Miyakoshi, Cini, 'Europeanization' in Cini, (ed.), European Union 
Politics, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 405-419, at 406-408: Wong, 'The 
Europeanisation of Foreign Policy'. in Hi11 and Smith, (eds.), International Relations and the EU, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 135-153, at 136-138. 
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The concept of Europeanisation in outwards terms encompasses the idea of 
'exporting forms of political organisation' by the EU.413 Though Olsen classifies the 
case of enlargement as Europeanisation through 'changes in external boundaries,'414 
the enlargement policy can also be brought with the previous concept, that is the 
'exporting forms of political organisation.' Understood within the narrative, the 
concept of Europeanisation can be defined as the extension of the EU rules beyond its 
borders and their adoption by the countries which are not member countries of the 
Union.415 'Europeanisation' is a consequence of the transfer of the policies of the 
Union into surrounding countries or the EU projecting its governance beyond its 
borders. The EU's internal model as a 'normative' one serves as a basis for policy 
transfer to addressee countries. 416 
Integration and stabilisation are two types of outwards understanding of the 
Europeanisation.417 Though both types of policies develop a relationship with the 
neighbours of the EU, they have substantively different aims. The integrationist 
approach is aimed at transforming the neighbouring countries into 'European' 
countries and bringing them within the EU based on the conditionality approach, 
while the policy of stabilisation draws on regional cooperation and partnership on 
widely ranging matters.418 The latter has been also called 'regionality. ,419 
413 Olsen, see above, at 924. 
414 Ibid, at 923. 
415 Magen, 'The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy Achieve 
Compliance?', Centre on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford Institute for 
International Studies, Working Papers, No 68, August 2006, p. 386. 
416 Youngs, (ed.), New Terms of Engagement: Global Europe, The Foreign Policy Centre and British 
Council, Brussels, 2005, at 3. 
417 Tassinari, supra note 96, at 5. 
418 Moschella, 'European Union's Regional Approach towards its Neighbours: The European 
Neighbourhood Policy vis-a-vis Euro- Mediterranean Partnership' in Attina and Rossi, (eds.), 
European Neighbourhood Policy: Political. Economic and Social Issues, The Jean Monnet Centre 
"Euro-Med", Department of Political Studies: 2004, 58-66, at 58. 
419 Missiroli, 'The EU and its Changing Neighbourhood' in Dannreuther, (ed.). European Union 
Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, (London: Routledge, 2004), 12-26, 
at 12. 
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An example of the integrationist type of Europeanisation is the enlargement 
policy can be cited which is based on 'internal incentives model' and follows the 
'logic of consequentialism. ,420 This type of Europeanisation based on conditionality 
largely proved to be successful in transformation of relevant countries through 
adoption of the EU's model of governance. Conversely, the stabilisation patterns 
established with the Eastern and Southern neighbours before their inclusion in the 
ENP, in the absence of a strong motivation, did not boost any changes in the countries 
involved judging by the experience ofthe last decade.42 1 
As noted earlier, the ENP tries to solve the 'inclusion-exclusion' dilemma and 
minimise the importance of the border between the enlarging EU and its 
neighbours.422 In this context this dilemma has another dimension to it, which is the 
choice between the integration and stabilisation patterns. The ENP can be considered 
to be a type of Europeanisation combining elements of both models, where the EU 
attempts at transposing its model of governance into its vicinity. Preserving the 
previous stabilisation pattern, the ENP is aimed also at integration with promises 
made to neighbours of a 'stake in the internal market' or 'sharing everything with the 
Union but institutions. ,423 In this sense, the ENP can be considered as a new type of 
Europeanisation fusing in a single framework the traditional models of stabilisation 
and integration. 
420 Meloni, nevertheless, cites four different models of Europeanisation, including the conditionality 
and the lesson drawing model following a 'logic of consequentialism' and the social and the model 
learning schemes focusing on persuasion and socialisation; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
'Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe', (2004) II Journal of European Public Policy 661, at 663-664; Meloni, supra note 31, at 103. 
421 Haukkala and Moshes, supra note 31, at 14. 
422 Smith 'Engagement and Conditionality: Incompatible or Mutually Reinforcing'?' in Youngs, (ed.), 
Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement, The Foreign Policy Centre, UK, 2005, 23-29, at 28. 
423 Prodi 'A Wider Europe-A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability', Speech to the Sixth ECSA-
World Conference, 2002, Brussels 5-6 December, Speech/02/619; for further discussion of the ENP 
incentives see section 3.2.1 of Chapter IV. 
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The ENP as a type of Europeanisation will entail transformation of the EU's 
policies to the neighbourhood legal order. The calls for aligning the legislation of 
neighbours with the acquis for extension of internal market, for instance, can be 
considered as an expression of Europeanisation. 424 Most importantly. the ENP's 
rhetoric on 'shared values' should be build into the bigger picture of Europeanisation, 
where democratic transformation is part of 'becoming like the EU.' 
5. Conclusion 
The major developments of the beginning of the millennium, such as new 
threats to international order after 9/11, the energy policies, and the Rose Revolution 
in Georgia, caused a shift in the attitude of the EU towards the South Caucasus. The 
strategic location of the region as an alternative transit route for natural resources and 
Azerbaijan being an exporter itself urged more attention from the EU towards the 
region, more correctly towards each of the countries. 
Indeed, the relations between the EU and each of the three countries vary 
depending on the expectations and interests of the parties. Azerbaijan, being the 
biggest trading partner of the EU in the region, is expected to deliver on energy 
cooperation. Relations with Georgia can be described as reactive. Georgia's European 
aspirations are paying out in the form of more intense cooperation and enhanced 
assistance, and where the ENP has real potential to boost reforms. Armenia, on the 
other hand, is in a position of 'wait and see.' While not having much to offer to the 
EU, the potential of the ENP in this case will depend on the country's internal 
motivation and orientation in its external policy. Thus, different relations with each of 
the countries suggest that the EU will have different leverage to influence reforms 
through the ENP. 
424 Wider Europe Communication, at 4, 10. 
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The potential of the ENP will also depend on the relations of the countries 
with other major international players who might potentially see the EU as creeping 
into their 'natural zone' of influence or whose foreign policy agenda is not always 
conforming the EU's. After the initial reluctance to engage with the region, through 
the inclusion of the South Caucasus in the ENP, the EU stepped into a region tom by 
conflicts and interlinked and very often contradicting interests of such powers as 
Russia, the US, Iran and Turkey. In contrast with its enlargement policy, the ENP has 
had a shaky start rooted in complex politics, where the international, regional and 
national rivalries make it even more difficult for the EU to assert its presence, which 
would allow it to pursue its objectives and to implement the ENP. In this sense, the 
promotion of democracy in the South Caucasus through the ENP bears the burden of 
not only EU's interests in the three countries, but also the geopolitical situation in the 
region. 
In addition to strategic interests of the EU in the South Caucasus, the 2004 
enlargement and at the time anticipated accession of Romania and Bulgaria turned 
Georgia into an immediate neighbour. Therefore, the political instability and 
insecurity in all three states are accompanied with such threats for the EU as illegal 
migration, trafficking etc. Though various objectives and aims have been articulated 
within different policy documents, the major objective the Union is pursuing through 
the ENP is ensuring its security through stability and prosperity being spread to the 
neighbourhood. The stability and prosperity of neighbours will not only ensure the 
EU's security from threats in the neighbourhood, but will also create a 'buffer zone' 
around it. 
The ENP is clearly built around strategic objectives, where normative 
objectives, such as promotion of democracy should be either implied within the 
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concept of stability or considered to be present within the policy objectives as a 
'shared value' of the Union to be upholding in its vicinity. The clear focus on the 
strategic objectives within the ENP which might lead the EU to act in a 'much more 
conservative and status quo-orientated approach' will be a reality check for the claims 
of the EU as a 'normative power' in the neighbourhood. 
Possible conceptualisation of the ENP as a type of Europeanisation also 
reflects the idea ofthe 'shared values'. The ENP can be defined as Europeanisation in 
its 'outwards' understanding, where the EU transposes its model of governance to its 
vicinity. The ENP is significantly distinct from the usual stabilisation patterns, since 
in this case the EU has stronger incentives for the neighbouring countries. Despite 
similar institutional setup, similar instruments and mechanisms, and the conditionality 
principle, the ENP is also substantially different from the integrationist model of 
enlargement due to the absence of the membership perspective. However, at the same 
time it fits the integrationist model since it gives neighbours possibilities to integrate 
to EU. Thus, the ENP encompasses both stabilisation and integration patterns and 
presents a new model of Europeanisation, where the EU is attempting to export its 
'normative model.' 
Europeanisation in the neighbourhood will take place through the application 
of certain instruments and methods, which requires consideration of legal aspects of 
the ENP. Given, the complications inherent in the political nature of the policy, the 
coherence of its legal positions should be considered as vital for the implementation 
of the policy, in particular for democracy promotion. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The European Neighbourhood Policy: Constitutional Aspects 
1. Introduction 
In order to pursue its interests and objectives in the neighbourhood the EU 
designed the ENP as a comprehensive policy instrument • integrating related 
components from all three 'pillars' of [EU's] present structure:425 The inclusion of 
the elements of the policy from different pillars is required for the integration of 
neighbours in different areas to allow the matters of cooperation to flow into each 
other. However, it is precisely this feature of the policy which presents the long-
standing weakness of the EU's foreign policy action: the differentiated nature of 
decision-making procedure.426 The ENP, before the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty,427 raised the issue of the EU's lack of legal personality which required a 
fallback position on the established legal personality of the Community, as 
recognised in Article 281 EC, and the Member States. Within this context the role of 
EU institutions will be particularly important for the policy fonnulation. 
The ENP was drafted within a period of almost one year, following the EU 
acknowledgment of the necessity of establishing new relations with its neighbours 
after the expected 2004 enlargement. 428 One year is a rather short period of time for 
elaborating a policy including sixteen countries and cutting across all the three pillars 
of the EU legal order. The haste with drafting the idea of a 'Wider Europe' explains 
the automatic reliance on existing strategies which more or less proved to be 
successful, which is the enlargement policy. Therefore, different features of the 
425 Commission Communication, ENP Strategy Paper, Brussels, 12.5.2004, COM (2004) 373 final, 
(hereinafter ENP Strategy Paper), at 6. 
426 Hill and Smith, (eds.), International Relations and the EU, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), at 401. 
427 Article 47 of consolidated and amended EU Treaty states that 'the Union shall have legal 
personality', OJC 115,09.05.2008. 
428 The General Affairs European Council of 15 April 2002 welcomed the intention of the Commission 
and the High Representative for the CFSP to prepare contributions for development of the relations 
with the neighbours. The Commission's Wider Europe Initiative has been presented in March 2003. 
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enlargement policy, such as the institutional setup, the mechanisms and the 
instruments, have been transferred to the ENP, allowing some commentators 
considering it as 'mechanical borrowing. ,429 Nevertheless, the different objectives of 
the two policies necessarily entail major differences between the two, such as 
different incentives, or new elements of methodology. These in tum pose a question 
mark over the ultimate success of borrowing instruments and methods from previous 
policies. Therefore, the major similarities between the ENP and pre-accession 
strategy should be found in the ENP substantive or internal aspects, while its external 
aspects will be the ones marking the difference between the two policies. 
The Eastern Partnership is the most recent development in the ENP 
establishing an Eastern front for the policy. Not only does it nominally separate the 
Eastern neighbours from the Southern ones, but also attempts to accord the Eastern 
dimension of the ENP with features promising to take cooperation between the 
parties to a higher level. 
In this light, this Chapter will explore the legal aspects of the policy. The first 
part of the Chapter will address the composition of the ENP as it follows from the 
EU's multi-pillar constitutional structure. The role of the EU institutions and the 
Member States will be also considered within this part in order to define their 
function in the ENP formulation and subsequent implementation. The instruments 
and methodology of the ENP will be discussed further to picture the legal framework 
for democracy promotion. The discussion will be constructed with reference to the 
legal aspects of the enlargement policy. Finally, the Eastern Partnership, as the latest 
development of the ENP, will be addressed to reveal its potential of altering the 
democracy promotion pattern of the ENP. The Chapter will be summarised with 
429 Kelley, 'New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Learning and Adaptation in the New European 
Neighbourhood Policy', (2006) 44 Journal o/Common Market Studies 29, at 32. 
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conclusions on the ENP and its nature, and the prospects of democracy promotion 
within its legal framework. 
2. The ENP within the EU's constitutional and institutional setup 
In addition to its policy dimension, the ENP is a legal tool combining 
elements of the EU's constitutional structure and raising the matters of competence. 
This is one of the prominent questions of the EU's foreign policy action. 
2.1. The ENP and EU constitutional law: Treaty structure 
The scope of the ENP as a policy is very broad comprising issues of economic 
development, cooperation on environmental issues, justice and home affairs, border 
management, etc. As noted in the Introduction, it was the intention of the 
Commission to make the ENP a 'comprehensive policy' to include issues cutting 
across the EU's legal order. The multi-pillar structure of the Union's legal order was 
created by the Treaty of Maastricht and developed further by the Amsterdam 
Treaty.43o Thus, the legal order of the Union includes the first pillar made up of the 
three founding Communities.43I The other two pillars identified by the EU Treaty 
were the CFSP and Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs, which was 
divided soon after to create a revised third pillar. 432 
The Union is rather ambitious to integrate its neighbours in various areas from 
trade related issues to border management through the ENP. For instance, the Action 
Plans with the South Caucasian states envisage cooperation on foreign and security 
430 Article lofthe TEU, 1991, provided that the Union shall be founded on the European Communities, 
supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by the Treaty, OJ C 321 Ell, 
29.12.2006. 
431 The European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic 
Energy Community. 
432 The Amsterdam Treaty separated asylum, immigration by nationals of non-Member States, and 
judicial cooperation in civil matters from the third pillar and formed a new Title IV in the EC Treaty, 
while the third pillar was renamed Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters; Denza, The 
Intergovernmental Pillars a/the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 2. 
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policy, economic development, poverty reduction, cooperation on trade related issues, 
development of the energy sector, cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and 
security, conflict resolution, the fight against terrorism and others. 433 All of these 
issues are combined from all three pillars of the Union. The ENP's cross-pillar 
dimension is an important aspect of its security basis and separate objectives which 
might be related to the first pillar, second or the third pillars, are aimed at contributing 
to the overall security objective.434 It is the complexity of the security issues 
challenging the EU in the neighbourhood which require diffusion of elements from 
different pillars.435 Therefore, it is not only the aims of the policy, but also its very 
content that are assembled around the security concerns of the EU. 436 
While this aspect of the ENP is considered to be 'a clear innovation' of the 
new policy,437 it nevertheless, raises the old issues of legal basis and competence. 
The Lisbon Treaty contains a new provision setting the legal basis for the 
actions of the EU in its neighbourhood. According to Article 8 EU, the Union shall 
develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an 
area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and 
characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation. Paragraph 2 of the 
same article provides for an opportunity to conclude specific international agreements 
with neighbouring countries. However, the complications with the ratification of 
433 Eu/ Armenia Action Plan, EU/Georgia Action Plan, EUI Azerbaijan Action Plan. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eulworldlenp/documentsen.htm#2. 
434 Cremona and Hillion, 'L 'Union fait la force? Potential and Limitations of the ENP as an Integrated 
EU Foreign and Security Ppolicy', in Copsey and Mayhew ,(eds.). European Neighbourhood Policy: 
The Case o/Europe, Sussex European Institute, SEI Seminar Papers Series Number 1,2006,20-44, at 
24. 
435 Lynch, 'The Security Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy', (2005) 40 International 
Spectator 33, at 35. 
436 Zaiotti, 'Of Friends and Fences: Europe's Neighbourhood Policy and the 'Gated Community 
Syndrome', (2007) 29 European Integration 143, at 148. 
437 ComelIi, 'The Challenges of the European Neighbourhood Policy', (2004) 3 The International 
Spectator 97, at 105-106. 
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Lisbon Treaty left the position uncertain.438 Thus, the ENP, as a part of the external 
policy of the Union, may be considered to be a joint product of the interaction 
between the Member States, the European Community for the issues under the first 
pillar and the broader European Union for the second and third pillars.439 
One way to bypass the complex matters of competence and legal basis has 
been found through 'soft law' framework. Senden defines soft law as 'rules of 
conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally 
binding force as such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, and 
that are aimed at and may produce practical effects. ,440 
Among the instruments through which the EU institutions undertake their 
tasks Article 249 of the EC Treaty mentions also recommendations and opinions, 
which have no binding force. The ENP added to this list of soft law instruments. 
Currently the instrumental framework of the ENP comprises a wide range of tools 
with no binding force. Thus, the main ideas of the ENP were circulated through the 
conclusions of the Council and communications and other policy documents from the 
Commission. The Action Plans with neighbouring states are legally binding neither 
on the Union nor on the relevant countries. In this scenario the Council and 
Commission are not bound to certain legal bases to establish conclusions or strategy 
papers. 44 I It means that by referring to soft law instruments, the Union manages to 
avoid 'long competence discussions and 'pillar politics' from stalling and 
undermining policy development and coherence. ,442 The soft law framework as a 
438 The Lisbon Treaty will enter into force in December 2009 after the ratification from the last 
Member State, the Czech RepUblic. The possible consequences of this event for the development of the 
ENP will be referred to in Chapter VIII. 
439 Cremona and Hillion, supra note 10, at 20. 
440 Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), at 112. 
441 Cremona, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: More than a Partnership?' in Cremona, (ed.), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 244-299, at 
264. 
442 Cremona and Hillion, supra note 10, at 30-31. 
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policy characteristic will likely remain SO,443 even when the Treaty of Lisbon enters 
into effect. 
In addition to complex matters of competence, considerations on the 
complexities of a binding treaty with the neighbouring countries, not yet desirable 
due to the EU's indecisiveness as to the level of integration, the flexibility of the 
Action Plans and avoiding that the document becomes part of Community legal order 
have also influenced the adoption of soft law framework for the ENP. 444 
Even the hard law instruments such as the ENPI Regulation include soft law 
tools for programming of assistance issued to neighbours within the so called 'policy 
framework. ,445 While more detailed discussion of the ENPI will proceed in Chapter 
VII, it is suffice to note that its soft law framework aims at elevating the status of the 
Action Plans, when indicating that the Action Plans will serve as a point of reference 
for establishing assistance priorities.446 
Another group of hard law instruments within the ENP are the PCAs and the 
Association Agreements with the Southern neighbours. As noted earlier, the PCAs 
with the South Caucasian countries had their legal basis in Articles 300 and 308 EC. 
All three Action Plans with South Caucasian states envisage that the progress in 
implementing the Action Plans will serve as a basis for further development of 
cooperation, including conclusion of a new agreement. The delays with the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty have not allowed for the conclusion of a 
443 Cremona, supra note 17, at 264; Cremona, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Framework 
for Modernisation' in Maiani, Petrov, Mouliarova, (eds.), European Integration without EU 
Membership: Models. Experiences. Perspectives. EUJ Working Papers, MWP 2009/10,5-15, at 6. 
444 For instance, the Action Plans with South Caucasian states provide for the possibility to review the 
content of the documents and their renewal; Van Vooren, 'The Hybrid Legal Nature of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy' in Maiani, Petrov, Mouliarova, (eds.), European Integration without EU 
Membership: Models. Experiences. Perspectives, EUI Working Papers, MWP 200912010,17-27, at 
22-23. 
445 Regulation No 163812006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of24 October 2006 laying 
down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI 
Regulation), OJ L31O/1, 09.11.2006, Article 3. 
446 Article 3, ENPI Regulation. 
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neighbourhood agreement. However, the policy documents from the Commission 
refer to the possible conclusion of a new bilateral agreement aimed at establishing a 
deep and comprehensive free trade area. 447 It has been suggested that such an 
agreement will be likely concluded as an Association Agreement based on Article 
310 EC with the Community becoming a signatory together with the Member 
States.448 It is the very 'mixed' nature of such agreements which will require the 
participation of both the Community and the Member States.449 
Conclusion of such an agreement through other legal bases, such as Article 
300 EC, Article 308 EC or 181a EC will not mark a step forward in relations between 
the parties.45o Signing an agreement falling short of 'privileged partnership,' as 
defined by the ECl, will not prove a major development as it is no longer necessary to 
make political distinction, as in the case of the EAs and the PCAs, and as it will 
undermine the importance of the cooperation as opposed to the Southern 
neighbours.451 
Moreover, once the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, Article 8(2) L TEU will 
likely be a new legal basis for any potential agreement. Since to date, the negotiations 
on conclusion of a new agreement have been taking place only with Ukraine, it can be 
447 Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
11.04.2003 COM (2003) 104 final, (hereinafter Wider Europe Communication), at 17; ENP Strategy 
Paper, at 3; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Strengthening the ENP, 4 December 2006 COM (2006) 726 final, (hereinafter Communication on 
Strengthening the ENP), at 4-5. 
448 Hillion 'A New Framework for the Relations between the Union and its East-European Neighbours' 
in Cremona and Meloni, (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy: A New Frameworkfor 
Modernisation?, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2007/21,147-154, at 149,151; Cremona, supra note 17, 
at 290. 
449 Smith defines mixed agreements to incJude 'areas within the Community's competence and within 
the competence of the Member States'; Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern 
Europe, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), at 7. 
450 Cremona, supra note 17, at 290. 
451 HiIJion, 'Mapping-Out the New Contractual Relations between the European Union and its 
Neighbours: Learning from the EU-Ukraine 'Enhanced Agreement', (2007) 12 European Foreign 
Affairs Review 169, at 175-176, 
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suggested that the possible agreements with the South Caucasian Republics will be 
negotiated based on the new Article 8(2) EU. 
2.2. EU institutions and Member States 
At first sight, the activities of the Community institutions within the ENP can 
be generally assessed as fitting into the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. The 
first initiative of the activity appears on the intergovernmental meeting and is passed 
to the Commission which follows the issue up and then the Council, as an agent of 
the Member States, makes a decision.452 The Member States are acting as the 
principals, where the Commission and the Council's High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy are the agents.453 
However, this integrationist theory does not solely explain the evolution of the 
ENP, since the Commission is a serious actor which has active participation in 
elaborating on the scope and content of the policy. As was noted by one of the 
Brussels officials, 'with its plethora of rhetorical devices, the Council of Ministers 
may have appeared as the most influential arbitrator of EU foreign policy, however 
when we are talking about 'real' foreign policy impact of the Union in the last 
decade, the power vests with the Commission. ,454 Such a salient role of the 
Commission can be generally explained with the institutional set up for the 
elaboration of the ENP drawn from the enlargement experience. The latter was noted 
to be 'characterized by a high level of integration,' which involves a special 
452 Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
Approach', (1993) 31 Journalo/Common Market Studies 473, at 480. 
45 Emerson, Aydin, Noutcheva, Tocci, Vahl and Youngs, 'The Reluctant Debutante: The European 
Union as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood', Centre for European Policy Studies, Working 
Document No 223/July 2005, at 32. 
454 Kelley, supra note 5, at 31. 
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arrangement between the institutions and the Member States, with a central role for 
the Commission.455 
The Commission has followed the December 2002 Copenhagen European 
Council's initiative to enhance relations with Union's neighbours. It brought forward 
the Wider Europe Communication setting out the main ideas for future policy.456 In 
June 2003, the Thessaloniki European Council welcomed this Communication as a 
basis for developing a new range of policies towards the neighbours and defined the 
overall goals and principles. The Council's conclusions looked forward to the work to 
be undertaken by the Council and ~ o m m i s s i o n n in elaborating the essential features 
these policies.457 The decision-making during the period from the launch of the ENP 
initiative was undertaken by the Council. At the beginning of the process the 
Commission prepared Country Reports assessing the political and economic situation 
of relevant countries. The reports were submitted to the Council which decided 
whether to proceed with the next stage of relations.458 The next stage included the 
elaboration and signing of the ENP Action Plans with the partner countries. As a 
'watchdog' of the implementation of all Community policies, also here the 
Commission is responsible for monitoring the process of the Action Plan 
implementation. 459 
As noted above, the ENP is projected on the basis of successful experience 
with the enlargement policy of the EU. Since the Commission played a major role in 
the transfonnation of acceding countries, subsequently in the case of ENP it 
continued to play the same role. Also, the Commission itself was eager to retain its 
leading role in the foreign policy of the Union, and therefore by adapting the pre-
455 Cremona and Hillion, supra note 10, at 28. 
456 COM (2003) 104 final. 
457 COM (2004) 373 final. 
458 http://ec.europa.eulworldlenplhowitworksen.htm . 
459 ENP Strategy Paper, at 10. 
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accession process to the ENP, it has extended the significant foreign policy role it 
acquired previously.46o Consequently, the reliance on the pre-accession strategy in 
developing the ENP by the Commission is considered to be an important institutional 
'mission creep. ,461 Since the Commission is traditionally considered to be a strong 
internal actor as opposed to its place in foreign relations domain, the role played by 
the Commission within the ENP is not happily accepted by the Member States, which 
went into shadows since the initiation of the policy.462 Such a leading role for the 
Commission in the policy elaboration and monitoring process has been evaluated 
with positive connotations: it will pursue the Union's interests impartially therefore, 
avoiding different interests of the Member States.463 Nevertheless, despite the 
Commission's central role, one cannot dismiss the roles of the Council and the 
Member States. 
The Council is the ultimate decision-making body.464 It seemed that the 
Council wished to limit the role of the Commission and to ensure its presence in the 
process of policy formation. For, instance after approval from the Council, the ENP 
Strategy Paper prescribed participation of the High Representative on the issues of 
political cooperation and CFSP matters during the Action Plans preparation. 465 
Accordingly, while drafting national reports, the Commission worked in close 
cooperation with the Council's CFSP High Representative. In particular, for the 
Action Plans with South Caucasian Republics, the Council instructed the Commission 
460 Magen, 'The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy Achieve 
Compliance?', Centre on Democracy. Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford Institute for 
International Studies, Working Papers, No 68, August 2006, at 396. 
461 Emerson et ai, supra note 29, at. 5. 
462 Ibid. 
463 Ott and Wessel, 'The EU's External Relations Regime: Multilevel Complexity in an Expanding 
Union' in Blockmans and Lazowski, (eds.), The European Union and its Neighbours: A Legal 
Appraisal of/he EU's Policies o/Stabilisation. Partnership and Integration, (Hague: TMC Asser 
Press, 2006), 19-59, at 51. 
464 Balfour and Missiroli. 'Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy', European Policy Issue 
Paper No 54, June 2007, at 21. 
465 ENP Strategy Paper, at 4. 
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to undertake joint discussions in close cooperation, for questions connected with 
political cooperation and the CFSP, with the Presidency and the High Representative 
and, where appropriate with the Special Representative for the South Caucasus.466 
Close cooperation with the High Representative for CFSP will be required for 
drafting periodic reports on the implementation of the Action Plans on the issues 
related to political dialogue and cooperation, as well as CFSp.467 This cooperation 
between the Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP is considered to 
. 
be the contrasting point with the institutional practice of the enlargement policy 
demonstrating the first steps towards the 'dual-hatting' system proposed by the 
Constitutional Treaty and later on incorporated in the Lisbon Treaty. 468 The 
cooperation between the Commission and the High Representative should ensure that 
there is a common position between the Commission and the Council, in particular 
that there is a coordinated action on behalf of the External Relations Commissioner 
and the High Representative for CFSP. 
Second, the Council significantly influenced the pragmatic and rationalist tum 
the policy took after the Commission's Wider Europe Communication as noted 
earlier. The promise of 'everything but institutions' in the initial speeches and Wider 
Europe Communication was substantially abandoned since the ENP Strategy Paper. 
Not only the Council 'shuffled priorities' shifting the focus to the security challenges 
of the neighbourhood, but it also limited the incentives, where the freedom of 
466 Council Conclusions of25 April 2005. 
467 On 13 December 2004, the GAER Council recalled its intention to undertake a first review of the 
implementation of the action plans at the latest two years from their adoption, on the basis of 
assessment reports to be prepared by the Commission, in close co-operation with the Presidency and 
the SG/HR on issues related to political cooperation and the CFSP, and with the contribution of ENP 
partners. At its meeting on 16/17 December 2004, the European Council also invited the Commission 
and the High Representative to report regularly on progress accomplished. 
468 New Article 17 of the EU Treaty as amended and consolidated by Lisbon provides that the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall at the same time occupy a 
position ofa Vice-President of the Commission, OJC 115/13,09.05.2008; Cremona and Hillion, 
supra note 10, at 33. 
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movement of persons was noted to be 'the first victim of the Council's 
intervention. ,469 
As to the role of the European Parliament, parliaments are traditionally 
considered to be weak foreign policy actors. The European Parliament in its tum was 
excluded from being an actor in the foreign policy of the Union at all, and the general 
feature of the EU's policy action assumed a weak role for the European Parliament.47o 
However, the Parliament has gained considerable weight through its partial powers 
over the budget, where it has made common cause with the Court of Auditors over 
matters of financial contro1.471 
In the case of the ENP, the Parliament has adopted certain soft law 
instruments, such as the European Parliament resolution on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy.472 It expressed its solidarity with other Community 
institutions in elaboration and further promotion of the ENP, and invited 
Commission's attention on certain aspects of the process of developing the ENP.473 
Rather significant was the Parliament's role in lobbying for the inclusion Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan into the ENP to support political and economic reforms 
therein and to ensure greater involvement in conflict zones.474 Parliament adopted a 
469 Balfour and Rotta, 'Beyond Enlargement. The European Neighbourhood Policy and its Tools', 
(2005) 40 International Spectator 7, at 9, 12-13. 
470 Steter, 'Cross-pillar Politics: Functional Unity and Institutional Fragmentation of EU Foreign 
Policies', (2004) 11 Journalo/European Public Policy 720, at 733. 
471 E I merson et a, supra note 29, at 34. 
412 European Parliament Resolution on the European Neighbourhood Policy, P6 _ T A(2006 )0028. 
473 Other documents by Parliament include European Parliament Resolution of 15 November 2007 on 
Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy (2007/208S(lNI)); European Parliament Report on 
the Review of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, (200S/2236(INI)). 
474 Bosse, 'Values in the EU's Neighbourhood Policy: Political Rhetoric or Reflection of a Coherent 
Policy?' (2007) 7 European Political Economy Review 38, at 43. 
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resolution with a recommendation to the Council inviting more attention to the EU 
policy towards the South Caucasus.475 
Parliament's role is particularly important in relation to the issues of 
democracy and human rights on the external agenda of the EU. An early example of 
the Parliament upholding these values took place before the conclusion of the PCAs 
with South Caucasian states. The Parliament threatened to block the agreements if the 
Council did not include Title VIII on the Democratic clauses, discussed in Chapter 
11.476 It appears, the European Parliament adopted similar stance for the ENP. In its 
2006 Resolution the Parliament emphasised the need to establish an effective 
monitoring mechanism and demonstrated readiness to restrict or suspend aid and even 
to cancel agreements with countries violating European and international standards of 
democracy.477 In its 2008 Resolution on South Caucasus the Parliament stressed that 
the 'ENP reviews and funding must be used to promote institution-building, respect 
for human rights, the rule of law, democratisation. ,478 
Such institutional interactions support the standpoint that the role of the 
Community institutions within the ENP stepped over the ordinary constitutional set 
up envisaged by the EC Treaty replicating institutional arrangements of the pre-
accession experience.479 The Commission's activity is more than a mere guardian of 
the Treaty vis-iI-vis the Member States. These institutional aspects of the ENP 
475 European Parliament Resolution on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament on The European Union's Relations with the South Caucasus under the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, P5 _ T A (2002) 0085, OJ C 293 E/96, 28.11.2002. 
476 European Parliament, The European Parliament and the Defence of Human Rights, Sanctions, EP 
Report, Brussels, 2006. 
477 European Parliament Resolution on the European Neighbourhood Policy, 19.01.2006, 
200412166(1NI). 
478 European Parliament Resolution of 17 January 2008 on a more Effective EU Policy for the South 
Caucasus: from Promises to Actions, (2007/2076(INI», paragraph 6. 
479 HiIlion, 'The EU's Neighbourhood Policy towards Eastern Europe' in Dashwood and Maresceau, 
(eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
309-333, at 317; Cremona and Hillion, supra note 10, at 28. 
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evolution bring out institutionalism as a theory of integration. In particular, it explains 
the role of the Commission in impacting the political outcomes within the so called 
• neo-institutionalist' approach.48o 
However, there is a more sceptical view from Kochenov as to the precise role 
of all the institutions together with 27 Member States in the implementation of the 
ENP, according to which the institutional rivalry affects the direction of the ENP. 481 
Although it is possible to disagree on qualifying the relations between the institutions 
as 'rivalry,' one can agree with the rationale that the sensitivities of the Member 
States will likely affect the progress of the ENP.482 These remind us that the 
intergovernmentalist aspects ofthe EU's foreign policy cannot be abandoned. 
Most importantly, the concerns of the Member States are reflected through the 
Council's participation in the policy. An example is noted above: the ENP objectives 
received a more 'securitarian outlook' with the Council's push. In addition, the 
European Council, heads of governments or states, serves as an alternative arena for 
Member States to influence the elaboration and subsequent development of the 
policy. Most importantly, the 2002 Copenhagen Summit acknowledged the 
opportunity brought by the enlargement 'to take forWard relations with neighbouring 
countries based on shared political and economic values' setting the ground for the 
subsequent policy development.483 Consequently, the role of the European Council 
seemed to be marginal leaving the tasks of policy formation to the Commission and 
the Counci1.484 However, it is without a doubt that where a serious political decision 
480 Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), at 11 ~ - 1 2 2 . .
481 Kochenov, 'The ENP Conditionality: Pre-Accession Mistakes Repeated' to appear In Delcour and 
Tulmets, (eds.), Pioneer Europe? Testing EU Foreign Policy in the Neighbourhood, (Baden Baden: 
Nomos, 2008), available at http://ssm.comlabstract=1310780,atI2. 
482 Ibid. 
483 Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 December 2002, Presidency Conclusions, at 6. 
484 Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003, Presidency Conclusions, at 13; Brussels 
European Council, 16 and 17 October 2003, Presidency Conclusions, at 13. 
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is to be made, the European Council will be the platfonn for such decision-making. 
The inability to implement a coherent policy towards all neighbours in the East and 
South led to the necessary split in the policy according to its regional dimension, as 
predicted by Missiroli.485 
The historical links of Southern European Member States with the 
Mediterranean region influenced their initiative of launching a Mediterranean Union 
within the ENP during the French Presidency in July 2008. On the other hand, 
Sweden together with Poland brought up an initiative of Eastern Partnership endorsed 
at the European Council in June 2008. The Eastern Partnership will include Ukraine, 
Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and possibly Belarus.486 Most importantly, 
the dissenting opinions of the Member States will be apparent in the instances of 
reacting to international developments, which was apparent in the EU's reaction to 
Russia after the Georgian-Russian war. 
3. Instruments and methods of the ENP: 
Quasi-enlargement integration? 
The resemblance of the ENP instruments and methods with the enlargement 
policy is striking. It stems from the twofold connection the ENP has with the 
enlargement policy. The first dimension to this connection is that the ENP is not only 
the result of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds, but it is also designed to be an 
alternative to the enlargement. The ENP was launched twelve days after the 
enlargement of 1 May 2004.487 The second dimension of this two-fold connection 
reflects the fact the ENP is largely based on the pre-accession strategy. One of the 
485 Missiroli, 'The ENP Three Years on: Where From-and Where Next?', European Policy Centre, 
Policy Brief, March 2007. 
486 See Section 4 below. 
487 Harasimowicz. 'European Neighbourhood Policy, 2004-2006: the Growing Need for Strategy' in 
Cremona and Meloni, (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy: A New Framework/or 
Modernisation?, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2007121,81-94, at 81. 
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reasons behind this is the perceived success of the enlargement experience. 
Enlargement is generally considered to be one of the most successful 
instruments of EU policy both by the EU institutions and academia.488 The 
outstanding success of this policy should be seen in its unique ability to increase 
political stability and prosperity, to boost radical economic refonns based on adoption 
of a new transparent and stable legislative and regulatory framework in the candidate 
countries by a sole promise of membership of the Union. One of the unique features 
of the success of enlargement is that the stability of acceding countries is rooted in 
common European values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and the protection of minorities: the elements of EU nonnative basis.489 The 
importance of this political stability is in being a precondition for peace and 
neighbourly co-existence, as well as for a successfully functioning economy. 
As of today there have been six rounds of enlargement in the Union.49o For the 
purposes of the ENP, the most important phases of enlargement are the recent rounds 
of enlargement in May 2004 and January 2007.491 These enlargements welcomed the 
488 Wider Europe Communication, at 5; Cremona, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: Legal and 
Institutional Issues', Centre on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford Institute for 
International Studies, Working Papers, No 25, 2 November 2004, at 6-7: Cremona, 'Enlargement: A 
Successful Instrument ofEU Foreign Policy?' in Tridimas and Nebbia, (eds.), European Union Law 
for the Twenty-First Century, (Oxford: Hart, 2004),317-414, at 397; Hillion in Dashwood and 
Maresceau, supra note 55, at 311; Kok, Enlarging the European Union: Achievements and Challenges, 
Report to the European Commission, EUI, 19 March 2003; Comelli, Greco, Tocci, 'From Boundary to 
Borderland: Transforming the Meaning of Borders through the European Neighbourhood Policy,' 
(2007) 12 European Foreign Affairs Review 203, at 210; Smith, 'Enlargement and European Order', in 
Hill and Smith, (eds.), International Relations and the EU, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
270-291, at 271. 
489 Towards the Enlarged Union, Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the 
progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries, 9 October 2002, COM (2002) 700, at 
5. 
490 The first three countries to join the European Community in 1973 were Britain, Denmark and 
Ireland. Eight years later Greece acceded to the Community. Spain and Portugal obtained the status of 
Member States of the Community in 1986 after the fall of their dictatorships. The fourth phase of 
enlargement included Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 within the Union. 
491 The countries acceded to the European Union in May 2004 are Malta, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Slovenia. In January 2007 Romania 
and Bulgaria have successfully acceded to the European Union. 
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Central and Eastern European (hereinafter CEE) countries previously part of the 
Warsaw Pact and three Baltic republics of the fonner Soviet Union, as well as Malta 
and Cyprus. They were substantially different from the previous phases since they 
were based on unprecedented use of conditionality, the so called 'Copenhagen 
criteria. ,492 
There is another side to the rationale of relying on the enlargement 
experience. It derives from the presumption, that in times of crisis, the EU has a 
tendency of drawing on its previous policy 'even if it is clearly no longer 
appropriate. ,493 The urgency to respond to new challenges and formulate a new policy 
addressed to neighbours compelled the EU institutions to rely on the existing 
d · . 494 resources an prevIous expenence. 
Although it has been noted that nearly all official ENP related documents are 
silent on the obvious similarities of the ENP and enlargement process,495 from the 
very early stages of the circulation of the Wider Europe idea, it was clear that the 
Union would heavily rely on its experience with the enlargement process. In a speech 
in 2002 the then President of the Commission, Romano Prodi explicitly noted that 
many of the elements of the new policy would be accepted from the enlargement 
process due to the success of the latter.496 
Thus, it is not surprising that the DO Enlargement of the Commission was 
entrusted with the task of elaborating the ENP. A Wider Europe Task Force was 
492 See section 3.2.1 below: Inotai, 'The CEECs: From the Association Agreements to Full 
Membership?' in Redmond and Rosenthal. (eds.), The Expanding European Union: Past, Present, 
Future, (Linne Rienner Publishers: London, 1997), 157-176, at 159. 
493 Magen, supra note 36, at 401. 
494 Delcour, 'Does the European Neighbourhood Policy Make a Difference? Policy Patterns and 
Reception in Ukraine and Russia', (2007) 7 European Political Economy Review 118, at 122. 
495 Kratochvil, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Clash of Incompatible Interpretations' in 
Kratochvil, (ed.), The European Union and Its Neighbourhood: Policies, Problems and Priorities, 
(Institute ofInternational Relations, Prague, 2006), 13-28, at 15. 
496 Prodi 'A Wider Europe-A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability', Speech to the Sixth ECSA-
World Conference, 2002, Brussels 5-6 December, Speech/02/619. 
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created by the Commission which was supposed to frame the political concepts and 
methodologies of the ENP. This task force was acting under the direction of the 
Enlargement Commissioner, GUnter Verheugen. However, at the end of 2004 the 
ENP together with the experts of the Task Force were transferred to the DG External 
Relations inheriting the functions previously carried out by the Task Force, and the 
new head of the Directorate General, Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, was 
called Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood Policy.497 
Nevertheless, even after these developments, the DO Enlargement did not retreat in 
its struggle with DO Relex to influence the policy shaping.498 It should be mentioned 
that the central place of security on the agenda of the ENP was also due to the 
influence ofDG Justice, Liberty and Security. It claimed more participation over time 
and eventually succeeded in centralising the issues of asylum, illegal immigration and 
trafficking within the policy. 499 
Hence, most commentators agree that resources accrued by the Commission 
for elaboration of the enlargement policy, leading of negotiations and monitoring the 
process of implementation have been used for the ENP elaboration and affected the 
choice of rationale and instruments of the neighbourhood policy.500 
497 Official website http://ec.europa.eulcommlextemalrelations/index.htm; ComeIIi, Greco, Tocci 
'From Boundary to Borderland: Transforming the Meaning of Borders through the European 
Neighbourhood Policy,' (2007) 12 European Foreign Affairs Review 203, at 213; Tulmets, 'Adapting 
the Experience of Enlargement to the Neighbourhood Policy: the ENP as a Substitute to Enlargement?' 
in Kratochvil, (ed.), The European Union and Its Neighbourhood: Policies. Problems and Priorities, 
(Institute ofIntemational Relations, Prague, 2006), 29-57, at 30. 
498 Zaiotti, supra note 12, at 156. 
499 Ibid, at 156-157. 
500 Ott and Wessel in Blockmans and Lazowski, supra note 39, at48-49; Kelley, supra note 5; HiIIion 
in Dashwood and Maresceau, supra note 55, at 310; Meloni, 'Is the Same Toolkit Used during 
Enlargement Still Applicable to the Countries of the New Neighbourhood? A Problem of Mismatching 
between Objectives and Instruments' in Cremona and Meloni, (eds.), The European Neighbourhood 
Policy: A New Framework/or Modernisation?, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2007/21,97-111, at 105. 
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3.1. ENP instruments: borrowingfrom enlargement 
The similarities with the pre-accession strategy are particularly striking as 
regards the instruments, such as legal and policy documents, and mechanisms of the 
ENP, such as monitoring and reporting of the process. The ENP's mainly soft law 
framework is symptomatic of the tendency to rely on instruments 'not explicitly 
envisaged by the EU Treaty, ,501 according the policy with certain flexibility around 
the EU's multi-pillar structure. References have been made to numerous Commission 
documents, Council and European Council Conclusions, as well as letters and 
speeches of Commission officials, all being soft law instruments of the ENP. 
This soft law framework includes Country Reports modelled after the 
Opinions and Progress Reports with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
during the pre-accession process. The Country Reports accompanying the ENP 
Strategy Paper presented the state of relations between the EU and each of its 
neighbours at the time.502 Magen highlights that political principles defined as EU 
values are prioritised at the head of the reform agenda and the classification of the 
sections follows the broad structure of the Copenhagen criteria. 503 
Based on the Country Reports, the first policy documents of the ENP, that is 
the Action Plans, were elaborated establishing the main priorities for cooperation for 
a period of five years for the South Caucasian countries. In general, the Action Plans 
correspond to the Accession Partnerships with candidate countries during the pre-
accession process. However, the Action Plans are more infonnal political documents 
negotiated by the parties and endorsed at the Cooperation Councils established by the 
PCAs as noted above. In contrast with the Action Plans, the Accession Partnerships 
501 HiJIion in Dashwood and Maresceau, supra note 55, at 309. 
502 Bosse, supra note 50, at 48. 
503 Magen, supra note 36, at 407-408. 
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were adopted by the Council in the fonn of a Decision based on an Article 308 EC 
Council Regulation. 504 Further on, the Commission reports on progress achieved by 
each relevant country. The Action Plans envisage that the Commission, in close 
cooperation with the Secretary-GeneraVHigh Representative will at regular intervals 
produce reports on the Action Plan's implementation. 505 The Commission issued 
Progress Reports annually fixing the progress made by the parties in 2007 and 
2008.506 This mechanism is also adapted from the pre-accession process, where every 
year the Commission reports on progress accomplished by candidates. Based on the 
results of the revision of the progress, the EU will decide on the adaptation and 
renewal of the Action Plan, whereas in the case of the enlargement process the Union 
updates the priorities contained in the Accession Partnerships almost every year. 507 
The Action Plans, in particular their focus on political refonns, will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter VI. 
504 Hillion, 'Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis' in Amull and Wincott, (eds.), 
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 401-
41S, at416-417. 
505 For instance, EU/Armenia Action Plan, section 5. 
506 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament, 'Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 
2007', Progress Rep0l1 Azerbaijan, Brussels, 3 April 200S, SEC(2008) 39 I; Commission Staff 
Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, 'Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008', Progress 
Report Azerbaijan, Brussels, 23 April 2009, SEC(2009) 512/2; Commission Staff Working Document 
Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
'Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2001', Progress Report Armenia, Brussels, 
3 Apri1200S, SEC(200S) 392; Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 'Implementation 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008', Progress Report Armenia, Brussels, 23 April 2009, 
SEC(2009) 511/2; Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 'Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2001', Progress Report Georgia, Brussels, 3 April 2008, SEC(2008) 393; 
Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament, 'Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 
2008', Progress Report Georgia, Brussels, 23 April 2009, SEC(2009) 513/2. 
507 Baracani, 'The EU and Democracy Promotion: A Strategy of Democratization in the Framework of 
Neighbourhood Policy?, in Attina and Rossi, (eds.), European Neighbourhood Policy: Political. 
Economic and Social Issues, The Jean Monnet Centre "Euro-Med", Department of Political Studies: 
2004,37-57, at 55. 
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Besides these instruments and mechanisms following the pre-accession 
strategy examples, certain other new legal instruments have been adopted for the 
ENP.508 A new assistance instrument, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI) has been introduced to replace the previous financial instruments, 
T ACIS . and MEDA operating in the neighbourhood including Russia. 509 The 
assistance policy is complemented by other instruments like cross-border 
cooperation, Twinning, T AlEX: also a result of policy transfer from enlargement. 510 
They also complement the soft law instruments and are examples of 'cooperation and 
education/training/learning strategies.' 511 
Apart from the ENPI Regulation, the PCAs are the only other hard law 
instruments within the ENP legal framework to this date. As noted earlier these 
bilateral agreements have been incorporated within the ENP,512 and the ENPI is 
envisaged to continue their fmancing. 513 
This is rather interesting, since the ENP, as a primarily security driven policy, 
is being built upon the PCA framework which is primarily concerned with trade and 
economic related issues. Hillion considers that the inclusion of the PCAs within the 
ENP will cause 'political reorientation' for the agreements. 514 Indeed, the ENP 
documents are attempting to revive the contractual obligations between the parties. 
The Wider Europe Communication stressed that full implementation of the provisions 
508 Cremona, supra note 17, at 263. 
509 MEDA was the equivalent ofT ACIS for Southern neighbours; ENPI Regulation. 
510 T AlEX is Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Unit of DG Enlargement. The twinning 
programme allows bilateral relations between governmental institutions in the neighbouring countries 
and the EU Member States enables transfer of expertise; Tulmets, supra note 73, at 30; Cremona, 
supra note 17, at 265. 
511 Cremona, supra note 17, at 265. 
512 Wider Europe Communication, at 15; Council Conclusions on Wider Europe-New Neighbourhood, 
Thessaloniki European Council, 19-20 June 2003. 
513 Article 2, ENPI Regulation. 
514 Hillion in Dashwood and Maresceau, supra note 55, at 319. 
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of already existing agreements IS a necessary precondition for any new 
development. 515 
The continuation of the PCAs in the ENP is also apparent from the fact that 
the development and implementation of the Action Plans would start from analysing 
the achievements and failures of the PCAs. The Strategy Paper stressed the link 
between the ENP and the PCAs more accurately. First, the Action Plans will be 
aimed at the implementation of the provisions of the PCAS.516 For instance, the 
Action Plans with the three South Caucasian countries make references to the PCA in 
certain areas.517 In fact, while including the countries of the South Caucasus in the 
ENP, the Commission inter alia stressed the need for partner countries to make 
further progress in implementing their respective PCAs.518 Second, the parties will 
benefit from the institutional structures of the PCA which are already in place for the 
purposes of political dialogue and monitoring.519 Together with such 'political 
reorientation' new features of the ENP such as the new system of monitoring and new 
incentives might 'instil dynamism in the relationship.'52o 
However, the enhanced focus on the PCAs within the Action Plans per se 
cannot bring dynamism to the entire spectrum of relations between the parties. First, 
the trade oriented core of the PCAs will be relevant for the issues of economic 
integration without having a major impact on other areas of cooperation, including 
political reform. Second, domestic elites might not always be enthusiastic about the 
515 Wider Europe Communication, at 17. 
516 ENP Strategy Paper, at 15. 
Also in 2005 Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner in one of her speeches has stated that the ENP (which in 
practice means the Action Plans) will bring into sharper focus the established the PCAs and 
Association Agreements; Ferrero-Waldner, ;Europe's Neighbours-Towards Closer Integration; 
Speech given at the Brussels Economic Forum, 22 April 205. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eulextemalrelations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05253.htm. 
517 Priority Area 5 ofEU/Armenia Action Plan; EU/Georgia Action Plan, General Actions 4.3,4.5; 
EU/Azerbaijan Action Plan, Priority Area 7. 
518 ENP Strategy Paper, at 11. 
519 ENP Strategy Paper, at 7. 
520 Hillion in Dashwood and Maresceau, supra note 55, at 321. 
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peA implementation.521 The wide spectrum of cooperation issues within the ENP and 
the new incentives require a new agreement. 
3. 2. ENP methodology 
The ENP has been noted to contain 'diluted versions of enlargement 
methodologies.,522 The 'diluted' presence of conditionality is most certainly apparent. 
Besides, the ENP methodology is further weakened with the contradictions present 
between the principles of conditionality, joint ownership and differentiation, all 
comprising elements of the ENP methodology. 
3.2.1 Conditionality principle 
As mentioned earlier, the major reason behind using enlargement's rationale 
for the ENP was the perceived success of the last two rounds of enlargement. This 
success was linked to the idea of conditionality. As described by Smith, 
conditionality is the linking by an international organisation or a state of perceived 
benefits to another state to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. 523 
In the EU context, most commonly conditionality is understood to describe the 
positive conditions the candidate countries must satisfy to become members of the 
Union. Thus, conditionality is the mechanism which allows the EU to use its 'power 
of attraction' to 'try to effect change, to shape the surrounding environment.' 524 They 
are the changes linked to the foreign policy objectives that enlargement is supposed to 
521 For instance, in Georgia it has been noted that the current authorities are not willing to implement 
the PCA, since the latter has been concluded by the previous Government. In Armenia, the efforts to 
implement the PCAs through a National Programme encompassing major legislative and institutional 
reforms have been mainly left on paper, which serves as a point of reference for ad hoc reforms within 
the Action Plans. 
522 Magen, supra note 36, at 386. 
523 Smith 'Engagement and Conditionality: Incompatible or Mutually Reinforcing?, in Youngs, (ed.), 
G/oba/ Europe: New Terms of Engagement. The Foreign Policy Centre, UK, 2005, at 28. 
524 Smith, 'The Evolution and Application ofEU Membership Conditionality' in Cremona, (ed.), The 
Enlargement of the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2003,23-29, at 136. 
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achieve, such as good neighbourliness, settlement of border disputes, economic 
reforms and the strengthening of democracy. 525 
The conditionality mechanism applied during the last two rounds of 
enlargement particularly stands out. The political and economic conditions and the 
requirement to adopt the acquis were also present within the previous rounds of 
accession to the EC or EU. However, the major significance of the last two rounds of 
enlargement is influenced with the way the conditions of accession have been 
'defined and applied'; that is 'in a predictable manner.'526 Not only was it spelled out 
what is required from the candidate countries, but also the Commission undertook a 
rigorous role of monitoring their progress. The definition of the accession criteria 
took place at the 1993 European Council in Copenhagen opening the prospect of 
enlargement for the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. The re-defined 
accession criteria, which came to be caIled 'Copenhagen criteria,' are: 
1. stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, 
and respect for human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 
2. a functioning market economy with the capacity to cope with competitive 
pressures and market forces within the EU; 
3. ability to adopt the acquis and accept the aims of economic and political 
union. 527 
Following the European Council in Copenhagen certain other requirements 
were added to these main three membership conditions.528 One of these new 
525 Cremona, 'Enlargement: A Successful Instrument of EU Foreign Policy?, in Tridimas and Nebbia. 
(eds.), European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century, (Oxford: Hart, 2004), 317-414, at 400. 
526 Hillion in Amull and Wincott, supra note 80, at 405-407; Hillion. ·The Copenhagen Criteria and 
their Progeny' in Hillion. (ed.), EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach, (Oxford: Hart, 2004), 1-22. at 3-
4. 
527 Conclusions of the Presidency. European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993. SN 180/93, 12. 
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conditions was the so called 'good neighbourliness,' also referred to as the Essen 
condition,529 which assumes that applicant countries must cooperate with each other 
with an accent on peaceful resolution of any possible conflicts. In December 1995 the 
European Council in Madrid stated that the membership criteria also require that the 
candidate country must have created the conditions for its integration through the 
adjustment of its administrative structures to ensure not only the adoption but also the 
implementation of the acquis.530 The aim of this criterion is to assess a country's 
'ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adhering to the aim of 
political, economic and monetary union. ,531 
There is another distinct condition for membership: it is directed not to the 
candidates but to the Union itself, sometimes cited as the fourth Copenhagen 
criterion. 532 It is the Union's own ability of absorbing new member states without 
overstretching its institutional and other capacities.533 
It has been noted that the Copenhagen criteria demonstrate the civilian power 
of the EU, where it influenced the transformation of the candidate countries through 
adding a 'coercive', though still civilian element to its soft power. 534 Adopting 
enlargement-like conditionality was supposed to accord the ENP with a similar 
528 Smith, 'The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality' in Cremona, (ed.), The 
Enlargement 0/ the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 105-139, at 118; 
Cremona, 'EU Enlargement: Solidarity and Conditionality' (2005) 30 European Law Review 3, at 16. 
529 Inglis. 'EU Enlargement: Membership Conditions Applied to Future and Potential Member States' 
in Blockmans and Lazowski, (eds.), The European Union and its Neighbours: a Legal Appraisal o/the 
EU's Policies o/Stabilisation, Partnership and Integration, (Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), 61-92, 
at 74. 
530 Tulmets in Kratochvil, supra note 73, at 31. 
531 Madrid European Council, 1995, Presidency Conclusions. 
532 Inglis in Blockmans and Lazowski, supra note 105, at 65-67. 
533 Copenhagen European Councils, 21-22 June 1993, Presidency Conclusions, p. 13. 
534 Smith in Hill and Smith, supra note 64, at 271; Ridder, Schrijvers. Vos, 'Civilian Power Europe and 
Eastern Enlargement: The More the Merrier' in Orb ie, (ed.>, Europe's Global Role: External Policies 
o/the EU, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 240-257, at 244. 
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'transfonnationist rationale.,535 In his speech of 2002, Prodi proposed 'to set 
benchmarks to measure what we expect our neighbours to do ... , we might even 
consider some kind of Copenhagen proximity criteria.,536 Since then, it has been 
obvious that the ENP is to be based on the same kind of positive conditionality that 
underpins the enlargement process.537 
However, borrowing the conditionality principle from enlargement is not 
straightforward and it has its peculiarities. First of all, the accession criteria seem to 
be replaced with 'the discourse on common values. ,538 Undeniably, most of the ENP 
policy documents are built around the language of 'shared values.' For instance, the 
Wider Europe Communication provides that in return for concrete progress 
demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and 
institutional refonns, the neighbouring countries should benefit from the prospect of 
closer economic integration with the Union.539 This has been considered to be 'a quid 
pro quo' approach similar to the one used in the accession process. 540 
Similarly, in the ENP Strategy Paper, the Commission stressed that 'the 
ambition and the pace of development of the EU's relationship with each partner 
country will depend on its degree of commitment to common values, as well as its 
will and capacity to implement agreed priorities. ,541 Tulmets notes that the 
Commission civil servants admit that the 'common values,' identified in the ENP 
Strategy Paper as respect for human rights, including minority rights, the rule of law, 
good governance, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of 
535 Comelli et ai, supra note 64, at 210. 
536 Prodi, supra note 72. 
537 Hillion, 'The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny' in Hillion, (ed.), EU Enlargement: A Legal 
Approach. (Oxford: Hart, 2004), 1-22, at 14; Ferrero-Waldner, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: 
The EU's Newest Foreign Policy Instrument', (2006) 11 European Foreign Affairs Review 139. 
538 Tulmets, supra note 73, at 30. 
539 Wider Europe Communication, at 4. 
540 Kelley, supra note 5, at 35. 
541 ENP Strategy Paper, at 8. 
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a market economy and sustainable development, have been defined based on the 
. .. 542 
accession cntena. Even the ENPI places a stronger emphasis on the commitment to 
common values and principles than the previous T ACIS, which will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter VII.543 
The Action Plans with the countries of the South Caucasus also follow the 
language of 'shared values,' where they state that the ENP sets ambitious objectives 
based on commitments to shared values and effective implementation of political, 
economic and institutional reforms.544 This seems to replicate the Copenhagen criteria 
for the accession to the Union which, as was mentioned above, can be generally 
divided into political, economic and administrative criteria. 
In addition, the cooperation with neighbours based on the Union's values will 
be the imperative for the policy under Article 8 EU after the Lisbon Treaty enters into 
force. 
Some commentators consider that the conditionality in the ENP case is 
different, since 'the way to pursue this policy is not anymore political conditionality 
but rather benchmarks: clear and public definitions of the actions that the EU expects 
the partners to implement. ,545 Nevertheless, setting up 'clear and public definitions of 
the actions' does not change the nature of conditionality per se, rather it might make 
the conditions more specific and detailed, which is still to be doubted. 
It has been also noted, that the ENP is founded on negative conditionality 
based on the ENPI Regulation.546 The Regulation stipulates that the Council may 
take appropriate measures in respect of any Community assistance if a partner 
542 Tulmets, supra note 73, at 32. 
543 Bosse, supra note 50, at 57. 
544 Introduction to the EU/Armenia, EU/Georgia, EU/Azerbaijan Action Plan. 
545 Rossi, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy' in Attina and Rossi, (eds.), European Neighbourhood 
Policy: Political. Economic and Social Issues, The Jean Monnet Centre "Euro-Med". Department of 
Political Studies: 2004, 8-14, at 11. 
546 See section 3 of Chapter VII below; Cremona, supra note 17, at 284. 
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country fails to observe the principles of democracy, liberty, respect for human rights, 
etc.
547 In difference with positive conditionality, where the fulfilment of conditions 
takes cooperation to the next level, negative conditionality assumes the negative 
impact on the relations between the parties that can occur, once the pre-conditions are 
breached. The negative impact can take a fonn of suspension of aid, imposing 
sanctions or even suspension of the relations between the parties. 548 Thus, the ENP 
conditionality can be described both in positive and negative tenns. 
Conditionality is also classified as 'ex-ante' and 'ex-post,' where the fonner 
refers to fulfilment of some conditions before establishing certain relations, and the 
latter assumes appearance of conditions after the establishment of relations. 549 The 
ENP should be considered to include both the elements of ex-post and ex-ante 
conditionality. The above mentioned provision of the ENPI regulations has been 
considered to be an element of ex-post conditionality.550 Although it can be noted that 
for establishing relations within the ENP the neighbours did not have to satisfy any 
conditions, ex-ante conditionality is present in the policy as the further development 
of relations will depend on fulfilling certain criteria. 
However, the major peculiarity of borrowing the conditionality principle from 
enlargement is linked to the question of incentives. There is an almost unanimous 
scepticism among the commentators as to the ability of conditionality to provide a 
boost for similar to enlargement refonns in the neighbourhood without the 
547 Article 28, ENPI Regulation. 
548 Fierro, The EU's Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, (The Hague, London: M. 
Nijhoff, 2003), at 100-101; Baracani, 'The ENP-A New Anchor for Conflict Settlement?", Paper 
presented at workshop 'The Study of the European Neighbourhood Policy: Methodological, 
Theoretical and Empirical Challenges'. University of Nottingham, 25th-26th October 2007, UACES/ 
The British Academy, at 20. 
549 Fierro, ibid, at 98. 
550 Cremona, supra note 17, at 284. 
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membership promise at stake.55I The Wider Europe Communication made it clear 
that the development of a new relationship through the ENP will not include the 
membership perspective.552 It also failed to establish what exactly the EU is offering 
to its neighbours instead. In this context, the policy has been rather ambiguous from 
the outset. There even might be a rationale behind Prodi's 'why should a less 
ambitious goal not have some effect?,553 However, it would work only if this 'less 
ambitious' goal is defined precisely. 
The urgency to establish new relations with neighbours and to decide what to 
offer to all sixteen of them without disappointing the willing neighbours compelled 
the Commission to turn 'to the well-known delaying strategy of constructive 
ambiguity. ,554 Indeed, ambiguity has been following ENP incentives since the 
initiation of the policy. Initially, grand promises have been voiced by the then 
Commission President Prodi in the form of 'more than partnership and less than 
membership' and 'sharing everything, but institutions.,555 The subsequent Wider 
Europe Communication referred to 'a stake in the EU's internal market and further 
integration and liberalisation to promote the four freedoms.' 556 Although, the ENP 
Strategy Paper preserved the language on 'stake in the internal market,'557 the 
incentives of cooperation, in particular with Council involvement, were 'gradually 
watered down. ,558 
551 Hill and Smith, (eds.), International Relations and the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), at 287-288; Cremona and Hillion, supra note 10, at 39; Missiroli, 'The EU 
and its Changing Neighbourhood' in Dannreuther. (ed.) European Union Foreign and Security Policy: 
Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, (London: Routledge, 2004), 12-26, at 19. 
552 Wider Europe Communication, at 5. 
553 Prodi, supra note 72. 
554 Comelli, Greco, Tocci, supra note 64, at 213. 
SS5 Prodi, supra note 72. 
556 Wider Europe Communication, at 4. 
557 ENP Strategy Paper, at 8, 14. 
558 Kochenov in Delcour and Tulmets, supra note 57, at 15; Kelley, supra note 5, at 29,39; Magen, 
supra note 36, at 413. 
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The language of the policy significantly changed with the Council 
Conclusions of 16 June 2003, where the initial extension of the internal market was 
replaced by the 'perspective for participating progressively in the EU's internal 
market and its regulatory structures, including those pertaining to sustainable 
development, based on legislative approximation.' The perspectives for movement of 
persons were exchanged to enhanced cooperation on matters related to legal 
migration and, in general, the shift to security concerns has been apparent in different 
areas of cooperation.559 As noted earlier, the security dimension of the ENP is 
obvious also in the discourse on the four freedoms, where the free movement of 
persons, in terms of economic integration, is no longer articulated, and it is mostly 
migration issues which are at stake. 560 
The 2006 Communication on Strengthening the ENP in its tum recognised the 
necessity of enhancing the incentives of cooperation: 'deeper economic integration 
with our ENP partners will be central to the success and credibility of the policy' with 
a possibility of concluding a free trade agreement. 561 Thus, instead of the internal 
market, the focus currently is on deeper economic integration. Cremona considers 
that such integration will go significantly beyond a model free trade area not 
necessarily with all four freedoms, but most importantly it will allow for certain 
scope of 'flexibility in the level of integration in different sectors. ,562 
Unless, the 'carrot' at stake is made clear to the neighbours, the ENP casts a 
shadow on the ultimate success of the policy implementation. It also risks 
undermining the efforts of the neighbours to integrate to the EU as a result of poor 
559 General Affairs and External Relations Council, Conclusions on Wider Europe - New 
Neighbourhood, 16 June 2003, endorsed at the Thessaloniki European Council 
19- 20 June 2003; a detailed comparison is undertaken by Balfour and Rotta, supra note 45, at 12-14. 
560 Cremona in Maiani et aI, supra note 19, at 13; Cremona, supra note 17, at 292. 
561 Communication on Strengthening the ENP, at 3-4. 
562 Cremona in Maiani et ai, supra note 19, at 12; Cremona, supra note 17, at 290. 
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1" 1 b k 563 pO lhca ac -UP from top level leaderships. Absence of a well-defined 'common 
overarching goal' even questions the appropriateness of using conditionality at all, 
thus giving ground for certain commentators to consider other models of 
Europeanisation as more suitable for the neighbourhood. 564 
However, the lack' of precise incentive is not the only factor undermining 
conditionality within the ENP. Other principles in the policy methodology might 
cause complications. It has been noted, that the language of conditionality has faded 
from the Wider Europe Communication to the ENP Strategy Paper in favour of an 
emphasis on partnership and differentiation. 565 
3.2.2 Principles of joint ownership and differentiation 
The rationale behind the ENP rooted in the security concerns of the EU could 
not rest solely on the conditionality mechanism. In order to secure its interests and 
achieve the cooperation of the neighbours, conditionality was complemented by 
'more compromising measures. ,566 
The Strategy Paper on the ENP has introduced a new principle of joint 
ownership.567 Following the language of the Strategy Paper, this principle entails that 
the EU will not impose priorities or conditions on its partners and Action Plans will 
take into account a clear recognition of mutual interests in addressing a set of priority 
issues. While it is intended to reflect also the interests of the neighbouring countries, 
563 Helly, "EU's Influence in its Eastern Neighbourhood: The Case of Crisis Management in the 
Southern Caucasus', (2007) 7 European Political Economy Review 102, at 108. 
564 Meloni in Cremona and Meloni, supra note 76, at 107. 
565 Tocci, 'Does the ENP Respond to the EU's Post-Enlargement Challenges?' (2005) 40 International 
Spectator 21,a t 27. 
566 T I u mets, supra note 73, at 35. 
567 ENP Strategy Paper, at 8. 
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the principle of joint ownership in this sense gives the ENP a certain degree of 
flexibility.568 
It should be noted that the Wider Europe Communication also touched upon 
the principle of joint ownership. The Commission stressed that the ENP has 'a 
differentiated, progressive and benchmarked approach' and the 'benchmarks should 
be developed in close cooperation with the partner countries themselves, in order to 
ensure national ownership and commitment.' 569 In the Commission's view 
benchmarks are supposed to be more predictable and precise in comparison with 
traditional conditionality.570 In this sense the joint ownership principle should be 
viewed to supplement conditionality and bring more credit to the policy. 
Indeed, the 2006 Commission Communication on Strengthening the ENP 
mentioned joint ownership as one of the strengths of the policy, where the Action 
Plans present a result of negotiation and political consensus between the parties.57I 
The parties would be expected to be more committed to the priorities of cooperation 
which are the result of a joint negotiation process. 
However, there are apparent contradictions within the ENP methodology. On 
the one hand, it seems that joint ownership does not sit well with the unequal 
conditions implied by conditionality.572 The conditionality principle assumes that 
there are certain requirements set up from the very beginning, where the party 
establishing the requirements is strictly monitoring the fulfilment of the obligation by 
the other party eager to achieve what was promised. In addition, imposing certain 
requirements from the very start of the partnership process by one cooperating party 
to another, without considering the internal readiness of the neighbouring country, 
568 Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, (Oxford: Hart, 2006), at 377. 
569 Wider Europe Communication, at 15, 16. 
570 Ibid, at 16. 
571 Communication on Strengthening the ENP, at 3. 
512 Cremona and Hillion, supra note 10, at 40. 
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outlines the ownership of the process and raises doubts as to its joint nature. It can be 
assumed that joint ownership will be only possible within the limits created by the 
requirements imposed by unequal conditionality. 
It has been also noted that the principle of joint ownership is not followed 
during the whole process of policy formulation. The neighbours do not affect the 
process of setting the agenda. The objectives and means of the policy are the same for 
all partners, and the partner countries can have a vote only where the partners are 
consulted in the elaboration of Action Plans. 573 One can agree with this view while 
taking a closer look at the wording of the Commission's Communication. 
Accordingly, the Council should establish the Action Plans and accompanying 
benchmarks based on proposals from the Commission, and wherever possible with 
prior discussion with the cooperating countries. 574 
On the other hand, different intentions behind the conditionality and joint 
ownership,575 together with the principle of differentiation, are capable of 
undermining the conditionality itself. 
The principle of differentiation is another element of the ENP's methodology 
which intends to adapt the pre-accession strategy to new tasks. Although the principle 
of differentiation has been present during the enlargement policy, within the ENP it 
acquired an official status. 576 The application of this principle will likely have 
different implications for the ENP. If differentiation within the enlargement entailed 
that membership is a matter of time which might be different for different candidates, 
for the ENP it will lead to different levels of integration with the ED. 
573 Haukkala, 'A Hole in the Wall? Dimensionalism and EU's New Neighbourhood Policy', The 
Finnish Institute ofIntemational Affairs, UPI Working Papers NA1, 2003, at 18-19. 
574 Emphasis added; Wider Europe Communication, at 16. 
575 II Ke ey, supra note 5, at 36. 
576 Ridder et aI, supra note 110, at 246. 
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Embodying a 'tailor-made' approach, differentiation assumes that, based on 
the common set of issues corresponding to the objectives of the ENP, the drafting of 
Action Plans and the priorities agreed with each partner will depend on the particular 
circumstances of that country.577 On its own it seems to be a promising basis for 
cooperation since, depending on the motivation and commitment of a certain country, 
the latter can achieve a higher level of integration in the absence of a single goal 
established for all the countries involved in the policy.578 Its significance was already 
apparent during the process of developing the ENP. Already at that stage, it was 
possible to classify neighbours involved depending on their ambitions within the 
policy.579 At the same time, it is exactly this aspect of differentiation which, instead 
of supporting the principle of joint ownership is more likely to 'create new dividing 
lines and undermining rather than supporting the principle of joint ownership, ,580 
since, together with conditionality, it will lead the level of integration to differ from 
country to country as noted above. 
Among the positive aspects of the introduction of the principle of 
differentiation to the ENP would make the use of conditionality 'less arbitrary by 
negotiating a set of realistic objectives with the partners, and by giving the process 
greater transparency and predictability. ,581 On the other hand, it could also predict the 
outcomes of conditionality with countries where the EU's leverage is not strong 
enough, either due to its own interests or the neighbouring country's unwiIlingness to 
integrate to the internal market. In addition, revising the different intentions behind 
577 ENP Strategy Paper, at 8, 14. 
578 Haukkala and Moshes. 'Beyond 'Big Bang': The Challenges of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy in 
the East', Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2004, at 52. 
579 These countries are classified as willing, passive, reluctant and excluded partners in Emerson, 
Noutcheva, Popescu, 'European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years on: Time indeed for an 'ENP Plus', 
Centre for European Policy Studies, Policy Briefs, No 126, 21 March 2007. 
580 Cremona and Hillion, supra note 10, at 40-41. 
581 Balfour and Rotta, supra note 45, at 13. 
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these principles, it should be noted that the conditionality mechanism is the one 
which allows the EU to act as a 'gravity centre' and transpose its normative model to 
the neighbourhood. On the opposite, the joint ownership and differentiation principles 
accord the ENP with flexibility for securing the EU's interests via responding to 
neighbours interests. It is these principles which, depending on the EU's interests in 
each neighbour country, will potentially undermine the EU's normative power, in 
particular 'trump' democracy promotion. Therefore, while conditionality assumes 
values embedded in law, joint ownership and differentiation assume interests deriving 
from political considerations. 
One can conclude that initially relying on the enlargement experience seems 
to offer a credible start for the new policy. However, the absence of a membership 
perspective and the lack of precision as to the new incentives, together with the 
apparent contradictions implanted in the ENP methodology leave much scope for 
scepticism regarding the success of political reform within the latter. In addition, the 
new Eastern Partnership initiative seems to bring more confusion than ever. 
4. Eastern Partnership: is it a new European Economic Area? 
Application of similar set of instruments and mechanisms within the ENP to 
the Eastern and Southern neighbours was not justified due to the differences that 
existed in the relations between the parties, different political rationale pursued in 
both regions and the fact that Southern neighbours had a multilateral framework of 
cooperation with the EU. Against this background the regional split in the ENP 
between the Mediterranean and Eastern neighbours did not come with a surprise. 
The idea of the Union for the Mediterranean was first articulated in 2007, and 
the Eastern Partnership was officially initiated by Poland and Sweden at the European 
Council in June 2008. The Conclusions of the European Council in June 2008 
139 
referred to the Eastern Partnership as an 'Eastern dimension' to the ENP and was 
addressed to Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 582 
Whether this implied solely a regional split in the policy or accorded the cooperation 
between the EU and its 'European' neighbours with new nature was left for 
elaboration by the European Commission by spring of 2009. Due to the Georgian-
Russian war in August 2008 the Extraordinary European Council of 1 September 
instructed the Commission to present a proposal earlier. The Commission drafted a 
Communication for the Eastern Partnership published on 3 December 2008. 
Accordingly, from bringing a new Eastern dimension to the ENP, the Eastern 
Partnership will 'make a step change in relations with these partners' in comparison 
with the ENP. 583 This is embedded in the prospect of signing Association Agreements 
with each of the partners aimed at establishing a comprehensive and deep free trade 
area. The Commission's Communication went further to envisage the possibility of 
creating a Neighbourhood Economic Area based on the model of the European 
Economic Area 'where appropriate. ,584 
One could suggest that grouping the Eastern partners in a separate multilateral 
framework amounts to recognising the 'Europeanness' of Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus 
and the states of the South Caucasus as opposed to Southern Mediterranean states. 
However, the official documents on the Eastern Partnership are careful to avoid 
stressing this.585 Instead, the Eastern Partnership Communication solely mentions that 
the Eastern Partnership is 'without prejudice to individual countries aspirations for 
582 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council 19/20 June 2008, at 19. 
583 Eastern Partnership, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, COM (2008) 823 final, Brussels, 03.12.2008, at 2. 
584 Ibid, at 10. 
585 'Brussels to recognise 'European aspirations' of post-Soviet states', EU Observer, 24.11.2008. 
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their future relationship with the EU, ,586 further heating the debates on the perspective 
of membership of the Eastern neighbours. 
Apart from political and practical reasons requiring a special focus on the 
Eastern neighbours,587 the initiation of the Eastern Partnership can be linked to the 
incentives of cooperation. What the ENP lacked the most, in particular in this region 
where different countries had different aspirations towards the EU, was the clear 
incentives for cooperation, as discussed above. 588 One would expect the Eastern 
Partnership to offer the neighbours in the East a precise 'carrot' to intensify the 
refonns, as the general aim of the Partnership is creating 'the necessary conditions to 
accelerated political association and further economic integration between the EU and 
interested partner countries. ,589 
The new initiative seems to offer promising incentives. According to the 
Commission's Communication, the Eastern Partnership will go so far to aim at 
establishing a single deep and comprehensive free trade area in the longer-term.59o It 
has been noted that the Eastern Partnership takes cooperation to the stage the ENP did 
not reach, suggesting liberalisation of more protectionist areas in agricultural and 
industrial goodS. 591 In the long term the Eastern Partnership will be aimed at creating 
a visa free travel regime. Moreover, the Commission went so far to consider labour 
586 Eastern Partnership Communication, at 2. 
587 Among such reasons can be cited the Russian presence in the region discussed in Chapter II. Also 
the difference of Eastern Partners together with the objectives the Union is pursuing in its Eastern 
Neighbourhood justified a differentiated focus as opposed to the Southern neighbours. 
588 While the authoritarian regime established in Belarus in 1990s is still ruling, the Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine has officially turned the political path of the countries towards democratisation bringing 
European integration to political agenda. The official orientation of Ukraine has attracted special 
attention to them by the EU. European aspirations of Moldova are close to those of Ukraine, where 
without making equivalent to Ukrainian political statements, it is expected that similar cooperation 
similar to the one offered to Ukraine would be available also for Moldova. 
589 Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 7 May 2009,8435/09, at 6. 
590 Eastern Partnership Communication, at 3, 10. 
591 Balfour and Missiroli, 'Dealing with Troubled Neighbourhoods', Commentary, European Policy 
Centre, 12.02.2009. 
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mobility and opening up of the EU labour markets for the citizens of neighbours. 592 
The Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit followed the 
Commission's Communication and focused on three priority areas of cooperation, 
which are trade, mobility and energy cooperation.593 Much will depend on the 
financial assistance the EU will provide to neighbouring countries to reach these 
incentives. A budget of €600 million is promised for the Eastern Partnership in 
addition to the ENP.594 Nevertheless, the assistance should come along with real 
promises for real commitments. 
In instrumental terms the Eastern Partnership provides for the conclusion of 
Association Agreements with each of the six partners. Although, as noted above, the 
perspective of new agreements within the ENP would have most likely be concluded 
in the form of Association Agreements, the novelty of the Eastern Partnership is that 
it acknowledges that "a step change in relations with these partners' should not affect 
each country's aspirations for their relations with the Union. 595 This brings even more 
confusion to the incentives of the ENP. 
If the ENP was drafted to exclude membership and the future agreements 
would have likely been concluded as an alternative to membership, the Eastern 
Partnership brings out the issue of membership again. 596 This means that if the 
conclusion of Association Agreements is without prejudice to individual countries' 
aspirations,597 then, given necessary political context, the agreements can serve as a 
592 Eastern Partnership Communication, at 6. 
593 Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, at 7-8. 
594 'Eastern Summit to strengthen EU links with Eastern Europe and South Caucasus', Rapid-Press 
Release, 6 May 2009, available at 
http://europa.eulrapidipressReleasesAction.do?reference-I P /091700&format= HTM L&aged=O&langua 
ge=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
595 Eastern Partnership Communication, at 2. 
596 Fierro distinguishes three types of association agreements: as a special form of development 
assistance, as preliminary to membership and as a substitute for membership; Fierro, supra note 124, at 
27-28. 
597 Eastern Partnership Communication, at 2, 4. 
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basis for future membership. Moreover, according to the Eastern Partnership 
Communication, the cooperation through the Association Agreements has been 
envisaged to lead to the creation of a network of Free Trade Areas that can eventually 
evolve into a Neighbourhood Economic Community 'taking inspiration from the 
European Economic Area where appropriate.' There have been certain discussions on 
prospect of EEA-like integration within the ENP,598 and the idea of creating a 
Neighbourhood Economic Community was even articulated in the Communication on 
Strengthening the ENP. 599 
Nevertheless, the official reference to the EEA model within the Eastern 
Partnership is rather significant. Initially created as an alternative to membership of 
the Community in 1994, the EEA included European Free Trade Association 
countries who were not members of the Community.600 The main purpose of the EEA 
was to create a 'dynamic and homogeneous European Economic Area, based on 
common rules and equal conditions of competition.'601 The Commission envisaged 
the homogeneous economic area to embrace law which is substantially identical to 
the EC law and which should be enforced as unifonnly as possible. 602 As in case of 
EEA countries, the Eastern Partners will have to adopt the entire acquis 
communautaire, as well as to accept the rulings of the ECJ on references from 
national courts.603 
598 Pardo, 'Europe of Many Circles: European Neighbourhood Policy,' (2004) 9 Geopolitics 731, at 
733; Gould, 'The European Economic Area: A Model for the EU's Neighbourhood Policy?' (2004) 5 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 171, at 177-184. 
599 Communication on Strengthening the ENP, at 5. 
600 Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ Ll, 03, 01.1994; Cremona. 'The "Dynamic and 
Homogeneous" EEA: Byzantine Structures and Various Geometry,' (1994) 19 European Law Review 
508, at 508. 
601 Fourth Recital, Preamble to EEA Agreement, OJ 1994 L 111, Art. I. 
602 The submissions of the Commission in Opinion 1191, The Draft Treaty on a European Economic 
Area (No 1) (1991) 1 CMLR 245, at 259. 
603 Cremona, see above, at 516,518. 
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However, establishing a single neighbourhood area based on the model of the 
EEA will once again raise the issue of membership. This can be the possible 
significant difference between the ENP and the Eastern Partnership, since one of the 
principal distinctions between the ENP and the EEA was the fact that the latter did 
not exclude the membership of EFT A countries to the EU. Sweden, Finland and 
Austria were members of the EEA prior to their accession to the EO. Non-
membership of the EU by Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein is not the consequence 
of exclusion by the EU, but the choice of the citizens of these countries. In addition it 
should be noted, that the EEA is considered to bring a 'difficulty of managing deep 
integration in the absence of shared law-making institutions. ,604 Thus, the EEA has 
been an alternative type of integration to accession without at the same time 
excluding the possibility of the latter. 605 
Nevertheless, the subsequent Council Declaration and the Joint Declaration of 
the Eastern Partnership Summit are both silent on the perspective of creating a 
Neighbourhood Economic Area. In addition, it should be pointed out that the success 
of this venture would have been questionable in any case due the preservation of the 
ENP methods under the Eastern Partnership. The Communication on the Eastern 
Partnership noted that the progress in the evolution of the relationship will depend on 
the commitments to the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, 
minorities and the principles of the market economy and sustainable development, 
therefore retaining the principle of conditionality. 606 
The Communication also stresses the essential nature of the principle of joint 
ownership and the interaction with the six partners based on 'tailor-made' approach. 
604 Cremona in Tridimas and Nebbia, supra note 101, at 410. 
605 The Preamble to the EEA Agreement states that it 'shall not prejudge in any way the possibility of 
any EFT A State to accede to the European Communities', OJ 1994 L 111. 
606 Eastern Partnership Communication, at 4. 
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The Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit again referred to the 
principle of differentiation.607 The combination of the three principles depending on 
the political orientation and ambitions of each of the partners will dictate the speed of 
Europeanisation. One can assume that eagerness of Ukraine to join the 'European 
family' will lead to the establishment of the free trade area with the EU much earlier 
than Azerbaijan, for instance, which does not have equivalent motivation and 
objective necessity to join international organisations and therefore establish a free 
trade area with the EU in the short term. 
Hence, the principles the Eastern Partnership inherits from the ENP could 
prove to be counterproductive for solving the task of bringing all the six partners to 
the same level of cooperation with the EU within the bilateral framework of 
cooperation. The Eastern Partnership, in addition to the bilateral framework of 
cooperation, introduces a new multilateral framework of political cooperation for 
Eastern neighbours. Such a framework can serve as an arena for linking the reforms 
within the neighbours. 608 
The Eastern Partnership not only brings more confusion as to what the EU is 
offering to its Eastern neighbours, but it also risks seriously undermining its 
credibility and the seriousness of its intentions due to the absence of a common 
position among the Member States. The Eastern Partnership Summit, where the 
607 Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership, at 5. 
608 This dimension of the cooperation will be based on a new operational structure on different levels, 
including meetings of the heads of the states or governments of Eastern partners held every two years 
and annual spring meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The next operational level will include 
meetings twice a year at the level of senior officials in four thematic platforms, including democracy 
and good governance; economic integration and convergence with EU policies; energy security; and 
contacts between people. Perhaps the constant interaction of Eastern Partners on matters of EU 
integration within this multilateral framework will provide a basis for the exchange of practice and will 
create motivation for healthy competition as to the speed of reforms and therefore integration, thus 
making a creation of single neighbourhood area possible in the future. 
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leaders of certain Member States did not consider the event important enough to 
attend,609 did not send promising signals to the neighbours. 
5. Conclusion 
The perceived success of the enlargement policy and the urgency of dealing 
with different neighbours at the EU's periphery influenced the hasty formulation of 
the ENP. 
To ensure all-encompassing security, the ENP has been drafted ambitiously in 
substantive terms, where the areas of cooperation cut across all three pillars of the 
EU's constitutional order. The delay in ratifying the Lisbon Treaty did not allow the 
EU to rely on new legal basis for its initial actions with the neighbours. The solution 
to avoid competence issues, was framing the policy in terms of soft law instruments. 
Very few binding instruments have been envisaged, including the possibility to sign 
new bilateral agreements, which most probably will take a form of an Association 
Agreement based on Article 310 EC and will be concluded as a mixed agreement. 
The agreements to be signed with neighbours under Article 8 E U as amended by 
Lisbon will be of 'specific' nature, which is yet to be defined. What's important is 
that Article 8 provides that the agreements may provide mutual rights and obligations 
for the parties, and prospects for undertaking joint activities. 
The ENP's institutional pattern largely reminds us of the enlargement 
experience with a distinctive role for the Commission as a policy drafter and its 
guardian. However, the prominent role of the Council, expressed in its decision-
making powers, had a major effect on the securitarian shift the policy took with the 
ENP Strategy Paper. An increased role should be noted for the Parliament, which not 
only makes use of its budgetary power, but also plays an important role in upholding 
609 'Big names to stay away from Prague summit", EU Observer, 4 May 2009. 
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the nonnative image of the EU. As to the Member States, the split in the regional 
dimension of the ENP demonstrates that wherever there is an important political 
decision to make, the Member States will be the primary actors. In difference with the 
enlargement, where it has been considered that the Member States' ultimate decision 
to enlarge was to a great extent motivated by identity considerations,610 the 27 
Member States will be more likely to be guided by rationalist considerations in 
relation to the Eastern neighbours. 
The resemblance to the enlargement practices is rather striking as regards 
policy instruments and methodology. The Country Reports used for evaluating the 
development of the neighbours and for elaboration of the ENP are based on Progress 
Reports and Opinions issued during the pre-accession. The main policy documents of 
the ENP, the Action Plans, are drafted after the Accession Partnerships with the 
candidate countries. Apart from these soft law instruments, the ENPI Regulation and 
the acting bilateral agreements with the parties are the only hard law instruments 
available. 
The conditionality principle, as part of the EU's methodology, is the main 
borrowing from the enlargement experience. The Copenhagen conditionality has been 
used to shape the ENP's stance on shared or common values. The progress of the 
parties in coming closer to the EU will be evaluated based on these shared values. 
However, the borrowing of conditionality is accompanied with a credibility problem 
of using similar conditionality without a membership perspective. Not only is the 
membership perspective absent, but also the EU fails to offer the neighbours a precise 
'carrot' at stake. The incentives changed from document to document limiting the 
scope of initial great promises. It seems that 'deeper economic integration' IS 
610 Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), at 180-181; Sedelmeier, Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement, 
(Manohester: Manchester University Press 2005), at 9. 
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currently the reward for neighbours for undertaking economic and political reforms. 
Though the Eastern Partnership seems to bring more focus on incentives, it, 
nevertheless, confuses the partners even more by declaring that the prospect of 
signing new Association Agreement is without prejudice to the European aspirations 
of neighbouring countries. 
Moreover, other elements of the ENP methodology, the principles of joint 
ownership and differentiation, also cause concern regarding the ultimate efficiency of 
the policy. While there is a view that the ENP is a unilateral policy towards the 
neighbours, rather than with them,611 of which conditionality is symptomatic, the 
flexibility offered by the principle of joint ownership and differentiation is vital for 
the EU to achieve the strategic objectives of the policy. The latter can be secured 
better with cooperative means. Despite the EU's determination to uphold its values 
through the conditionality mechanism, joint ownership and differentiation will give 
way to the EU's interests in certain neighbouring countries and in particular those 
who have their own leverage on the relationship. This gives away the tension in 'the 
balance between engaging partners in a cooperative relationship and the 
transformative content of the ENP.'612 
The Eastern Partnership, which attempts to inject a new boost to the Eastern 
dimension of the policy, preserves the methodological complications of the ENP. 
Despite its intention to clarify the incentives of the policy and to bring the conclusion 
of new agreements to the immediate agenda, its potential was undermined by the 
changing presidency of the Council and dissenting ambitions of the Member States 
towards their Eastern neighbours. The position of the President of the Council to be 
611 Tassinari. 'Security and Integration in the EU Neighbourhood: the Case for Regionalism', Brussels: 
Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005, at 9. 
612 Balfour and Rotta, supra note 45, at 19. 
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introduced by the Lisbon Treaty perhaps will ensure continuity of the initiative as it 
will not depend on rotating presidency of the Council. 613 
Thus, this leaves one with scepticism as to the EU's normative image, of 
which democracy promotion is a constituent. This raises the questions of how should 
one understand the concept of the EU's democracy and whether the same concept is 
promoted in its foreign relations. 
613 Article 15 EU as amended and consolidated by Lisbon Treaty, OJ C 115/13,09.05.2008. 
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CHAPrERV 
Democratic Values of the EU and their Promotion in the 
Neighbourhood 
1. Introduction 
As once noted by Romano Prodi, 'Europe needs to project its model of society 
into the wider world,' a model which is based on 'the principles of democracy, 
freedom and solidarity - and it is a model that works. ,614 After several years this idea 
was embodied in the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe615 and is 
currently included in the Lisbon Treaty.616 
The improvement of democratic governance has been a central feature of the 
EU's attempt to enhance its legitimacy. The Laeken Declaration calling for a 'more 
democratic, more transparent and more efficient' EU has paved the way for further 
development of the EU governance system.617 The orientation taken at Laeken 
materialised in the draft Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe which 
provided for a separate title on the Democratic Life of the Union. 618 Most of the 
provisions of the Title are currently included within the Lisbon Treaty signed on 3 
December 2007. A new Article 2 would be included in the amended and consolidated 
EU Treaty establishing the founding vales of the Union which are 'respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.' In addition, a new Article 
3(5) provides that, in its relations with the wider world, the Union 'shall uphold and 
promote its values and interests.' This provision is specified in particular as regards 
614 President of the European Commission, (2000) '2000-2005: Shaping the New Europe' Speech to 
European Parliament, Strasbourg 15 February 2000, SpeechlOO/41. 
615 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 16 December 2004, OJ C 310. 
616 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, 17 December 2007, OJ C306. 
617 Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union of 15 December 2001, section 11, 
paragraph I. 
618 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 16 December 2004, OJ C 310, Title VI. 
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the neighbours of the EU in the new legal basis for developing the Union's relations 
with its neighbours. According to the new Article 8 EU, 'the Union shall develop a 
special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of 
prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and 
characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation. ,619 Therefore, the 
Lisbon Treaty, once ratified, would directly oblige the EU to promote democracy 
through the ENP, as the current framework for developing relations with the Eastern 
neighbours. In addition, Title II of the EU Treaty, as agreed at Lisbon, on 'Provisions 
on democratic principles' is instructive as to the democratic values of the EU.620 
According to the Commission, the EU's substantial political and moral weight 
to promote democracy derives from the fact that all the Member States 'are 
democracies espousing the same Treaty-based principles in their internal and external 
policies.' 62 1 According to Balfour this implies that the EU can promote its principles 
in its external policy by 'virtue of what it is,,622 i.e. a normative power. It is the 
constructivist understanding of the EU which justifies the projection of its normative 
identity in its external relations. However, a series of questions arise as to the aptness 
of the EU to promote democracy when it is much criticised because of its own 
democratic deficit. 
619 Emphasis added. 
620 Though Articles 8a and 8b repeat similar Articles in the Constitutional Treaty, Title VI on the 
Democratic Life of the Union had a wider scope. In particular, it included provisions on the role of 
social partners and autonomous social dialogue, the European Ombudsman and transparency of 
proceedings of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union. Though the Protocol on the 
Role of National Parliaments in the EU was provided also in the Constitutional Treaty, the role of the 
national parliaments was not highlighted within the provisions on the democratic life of the Union. 
Title II of the Lisbon Treaty would introduce one important article which was not foreseen by the 
Constitutional Treaty, which is Article 8c on the contribution of national parliaments in the good 
functioning of the Union; OJ CJ 15, 09.05.2008. 
621 The European Union's Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 8 May 2001, COM 
(2001) 252 final. 
622 Balfour, 'Principles of Democracy and Human Rights. A Review of the European Union's 
Strategies Towards its Neighbours' in Lucarelli and Manners, (eds.), Values and Principles in 
European Union Foreign Policy. (London: Routledge, 2006), 114-129, at 114. 
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First, in light of long and numerous debates on the nature of democracy in the 
EU and its deficiencies certain apposite questions arise: is there a genuine 
commitment to democracy in the Union? Second, what model or models of 
democracy most adequately describe the democratic values of the EU? Third, is it the 
same democratic values that the Union transposes in its external relations and how do 
they relate in particular to the ENP? 
Several sections of this Chapter will be aimed at answering these questions. 
The first part of the Chapter will be devoted to the definition of democratic values of 
the EU. In order to assess these values, brief reference will be made to the discussion 
of the democratic deficit of the EU. Within the next sections of the same part 
democratic features of the EU governance will be revealed with reference to the 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty as an indication of the direction towards which the 
EU's democracy is developing. A section on the democratic deficit transposed to 
national democracies and their possible recovery will be included in this part. The 
latter will also serve the purpose of answering the question whether democracy is an 
element of the EU's normative identity, and whether the EU is in a position of 
transposing its democratic values outside its geographic scope. Part 3 of this Chapter 
will focus on the transposition of EU's democratic values in the last two rounds of 
enlargement. The Chapter will be summarised with conclusions on democracy within 
the EU's normative identity and the way it was transposed within the enlargement as 
a precedent for the ENP. 
2. Democratic values of the EU 
One might get an impression that the debate on democratic issues, namely 
popular consent and legitimacy of the Union, is a matter of the last two decades. 
Nevertheless, these issues were subject of consideration at the time of the signing of 
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the Rome Treaty with challenges presented by President de Gaulle of France.623 
There was a belief on behalf of Jean Monnet, the first President of the European 
Commission, that the problem of popular consent should be postponed until the 
effective administration at European level would result in improvements in economic 
welfare of members of society, which would ultimately ensure public support. 624 
Therefore, it had been viewed that the delivery of economic benefits due to 
the action on EC level would ensure output democracy of the organisation as defined 
by Scharpf.625 He considers democracy as a two-dimensional concept related to 
inputs and outputs of governance aimed at collective self-determination. Input 
democracy requires the citizens to be the source of political choices for which the 
governments should be held accountable. 626 Output democracy implies 'effective fate 
control."627 which means that the government is able to provide the most effective 
solution to the problems which citizens might be concerned with. 
Nonetheless, the 'problem of popular consent' could not stay in the shadows 
for long time due to the gradual transformation of the EC and the establishment of the 
EU with competence creeping into more and more spheres of national and 
international affairs of the Member States. Economic improvements did not ensure 
public support for the Union as demonstrated by the complications with the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty,628 and the debate on enhancing the democratic 
features of EU governance persisted throughout the last two decades. 
623 Wallace and Smith, 'Democracy or Technocracy? European Integration and the Problem of Popular 
Consent: (1995) 18 West European Politics 137. at 143-144. 
624 Ibid. 
625 Scharpf, 'Economic Integration. Democracy and the Welfare State', (1997) 4 Journal of European 
Public Policy 18, at 19. 
626 Ibid. 
627 Ibid. 
628 The Danish voters rejected the Maastricht Treaty with 52% No votes in 1992. In France the Treaty 
was ratified with only 51.05% Yes vote with a turnout of69.69%. 
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Together with the previous developments, which will be discussed in more 
detail below, the creation of the European Union with its multipillar structure and the 
introduction of the EU citizenship concept have radically transformed the 
Community. From a mere economic entity it became a more substantial political actor 
which has assumed new internal and external obligations. At the beginning of the 
1990s democracy and related issues were brought to the direct attention of 
Community institutions. Previously democracy was not per se considered as an EU 
value. The Community did not have its own values and was merely incorporating the 
values of its Member States.629 It was identified with democratic values due to the 
fact that its Member States were 'pluralistic democracies. ,630 The Maastricht Treaty 
was not explicit on the EU's democracy as such and in its preamble merely confirmed 
that the Member States were attached to the principles of liberty, democracy, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule oflaw. 631 
It was the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 which highlighted democracy to be the 
EU's own feature, as a founding principle, therefore according it with a European 
statuS.632 Through the Amsterdam Treaty the EU accepted this value of its Member 
States as its own, but also assumed an obligation of calling a Member State to 
responsibility through suspension of certain rights in case of serious or persistent 
violation of the principle of democracy as mentioned above. 633 Therefore, the EU 
assumed an obligation of preserving the democratic models of its Member States, 
629 Hoskyns and Newman, (eds.), Democratising the European Union. Issues/or the Twenty-first 
Century. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), at 185. 
630 Pinder, 'The European Community and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe' in Pridham, 
Herring and Sanford, (eds.), Building Democracy? The International Dimension 0/ Democratisation in 
Eastern Europe, (London: Leicester University Press, 1994), 110-132, at 120. 
631 Preamble ofTEU, OJ C 191.29 July 1992. 
632 Article 6 EU. 
633 Article 7 EU. 
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adding 'another layer to their protection. ,634 The Lisbon Treaty with its new 
provisions on the democratic life of the Union is a further stage in the normative 
understanding of democracy. Further discussion of the EU's democratic life with 
reference to the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty demonstrates that the general 
assumption that the nature of democracy has been changing over time, 'evolving from 
a rather elitist and restrictive form to a more open and participatory system of 
government'635 is applicable also to the EU. 
2.1. Democratic theories and the democratic deficit of the EU 
Democracy has been one of the most discussed concepts in political theory 
present from the times of Aristotle till now. Scholars can hardly agree on its content 
and elements, rendering it a highly contested notion. Therefore, the initial problem to 
encounter while studying democracy is that 'there is no democratic theory- there are 
only democratic theories. ,636 Various democratic theories have been referred to in 
order to identify different models of democracy: direct and indirect or representative 
democracy, majoritarian, pluralistic, consensus, liberal democracy, parliamentary 
democracy, participatory and deliberative democracy etc. While some of these 
models will be discussed further below in relation to democratic values of the EU, it 
should be noted that political equality, popular sovereignty and rule by majority have 
been running through various concepts of democracy.637 The variety of democratic 
theories results in diverse definitions of democracy with the three concepts noted 
above appearing in various forms. The most accepted conceptualisation of democracy 
634 Latlim, 'Democracy and the European Union' in Cram, Dinan and Nugent, (eds.), Developments in 
the European Union, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999),330-349, at 341. 
635 Meny, 'De la Democratie in Europe: Old Concepts and New Challenges', (2002) 41 lournalof 
Common Market Studies 1, at 10. 
636 Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1956), at 1. 
637 Ibid, at 34. 
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has been Dahl's definition of institutions of large-scale democracy or polyarchy. 
These institutions include: 
• elected officials 
• free, fair and frequent elections 
• freedom of expression 
• alternative sources of information 
• associational autonomy 
• inclusive suffrage 
• right to run for office.638 
Alternatively, Weale defines democracy in contrast with non-democratic 
forms of government with a focus on minimum conditions, where vital for public 
decisions are made based on the public opinion 'formally expressed by citizens of the 
community, the vast bulk of whom have equal political rights. ,639 
Various approaches have been adopted in the context of conceptualising EU's 
democracy comparing it to the republican model of separation of powers,640 viewing 
it as consensual democracy, 64 I a pluralist one,642 or 'a Schumpeterian competitive 
elite' democracy.643 Some scholars consider democracy as a system of governance. 
According to Meny, democracy constitutes two pillars: popular and constitutional, 
638 Dahl, On Democracy, (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2000), at 85-86,90; Dahl, 
Democracy and Its Critics, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), at 221. 
639 Weale, Democracy, (Basingstoke: Pal grave MacmiJIan, 2007), at 18. 
640 Moravcsik, 'In Defence of the 'Democratic Deficit": Reassessing Legitimacy in the European 
Union', (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 603, at 610. 
641 Manners, 'The Constitutive Nature of Values, Images and Principles in the EU' in LucareJli and 
Manners, (eds.), Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, (London: Routledge, 
2006), 19-41, at 34. 
642 Coultrap. 'From ParJiamentarism to Pluralism. Models of Democracy and the European Union's 
'Democratic Deficit', (1999) 11 Journal of Theoretical Politics 107, at 124. 
643 The Schumpeterian competitive elite model is based on rejection ofthe classic eighteenth century 
model of democracy and is described as a decision-making system where the power to decide is 
acquired by individuals through 'a competitive struggle for the people's vote'; Weiler, Haltem and 
Mayer, 'European Democracy and its Critique'. (1995) 18 West European Politics 4, at 32; Craig, 
'Democracy and Rule-making Within the EC: An Empirical and Normative Assessment'. (1997) 3 
European Law Journal 105, at 126-127. 
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which present the expression of popular will and choice and constitutional 
mechanisms of checks and balances. 644 Lord refers to a specific political meaning of 
democracy where the 'irreducible core' of the concept would seem to be 'responsive 
rule' according to 'the related principles of popular control and political equality. ,645 
Others highlight the importance of democracy as a necessary prerequisite for 
the acceptance of EU governance by the public, therefore bringing forward the issue 
of legitimacy. For instance, Weiler describes it as 'a condition for the long-term 
stability and acceptability of European governance. ,646 For Lenaerts and Smijter 
democracy is 'a means to increase legitimacy and thus the effectiveness of the polity 
in exercising public authority. ,647 Combining these different approaches to define 
democracy of the EU, one can describe the democracy in the EU as a system of 
governance, which represents the will of the European populace to be governed at the 
European level in such a way that will ensure the acceptance of that governance. Such 
a definition is a manifestation of the intertwined nature of democracy and legitimacy 
of EU governance, which in tum can be linked to the legitimacy of expectations of 
neighbours. Promotion of democracy by the EU in its neighbourhood can be 
legitimate if European governance is accepted as democratic by its own people. 
Nevertheless, the simplicity of this definition cannot reveal or explain all 
elements of the EU governance. What is notable from the literature on democracy is 
the choice of different models of democracy in order to illustrate that it does not fully 
exist in the EU, or to judge the deficiencies of democratic life of the Union within 
644 Meny, supra note 22, at 4. 
645 Lord, Democracy in the European Union, (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), at 12. 
646 From political theory he draws on such notions as autonomy, dignity and self-determination of the 
individual and in similar societal notions of freedom, justice and equality. From social sciences he 
links the democratic imperative to the social legitimacy of European governance; Weiler, 'Amsterdam 
and the Quest for Constitutional Democracy' in O'Keeffe and Twomey, (eds.), Legalisslies of 
Amsterdam Treaty, (Oxford: Hart, 1999), 1-21, at 5. 
647 Lenaerts and Smijter, 'The Question of Democratic Representation' in Winter, Curtin, Kellermann 
and de Witte, (eds.), Reforming the T r e a ~ v v on European Union: The Legal Debate, (London: Kluwer 
Law International, 1996), 173-197, at 175. 
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such a nonnative framework. For this purpose various models of democracy have 
been used by different commentators in order to define a nonnative framework for 
considering democratic problems of the Union, not evaluating the present features, 
but mostly pointing out those that are absent or not well suited. Consequently, a vast 
amount of literature has evolved during the last two decades on so called 'democratic 
deficit of the EU.' 
While there is no clear definition of democratic deficit which would provide 
an exhaustive content of its features, in the words of Meny, it is a 'powerful 
catchword,' which allows manipulating its meaning by everyone who in any respect 
is not satisfied with the operation of the EU institutions.648 Though, different critics 
can imply different content for this concept,649 Lord highlights the 'classical 
democratic deficit theory' brought forward by Dehousse as a 'dispossession' of 
national representative institutions that is only 'partly compensated' at the European 
level.65o This is in accordance with the European Parliament's vision of the 
democratic deficit notion in 1988, in the Toussaint Report, as a concept embracing 
two elements which are the transfer of the sovereign power from the Member States 
to the EU level, and the exercise of such powers by institutions other than the 
European Parliament. 651 Such an approach shows that ideally the central place within 
Community institutions should have been awarded to the Parliament deriving from 
648 Meny, supra note 22, at 8. 
649 Weiler et ai, supra note 30, at 7-9; Andersen and Eliassen. (eds.). The European Union: How 
Democratic Is It? (London: Sage, 1996), at 3; Schmidt, Democracy in Europe: The EU and National 
Polities, (Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007), at 21, 28, 29, 39. 
650 Lord, 'Assessing Democracy in a Contested Polity', (2001) 39 Journal o/Common Market Studies 
641, at 642. 
651 European Parliament, Committee on Institutional Affairs, 1 Feb. 1988 PE 11 !.236/fin. (Toussaint 
Report), at 10-11. 
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the theory of parliamentary democracy with the focus on the notions of 'popular 
sovereignty' and 'party government' within the EU.652 
The criticism is focused on the fact that the European Parliament still does not 
occupy a central place within the institutions of the Union even after the expansion of 
its competences through the co-decision procedure, since the ultimate decision-
making power within the Union in many policy areas is still the non-elected Council. 
In the main, the legislative initiative belongs to the appointed Commission. Although 
the Parliament has been directly elected since 1979, the elections are considered to be 
'second-order,' where turnout is low and there is no strong party governance at Union 
level. 653 This is mainly explained by the fact that European elections are dominated 
by national politics,654 and the remoteness of this institution from the citizens of the 
Union. 
The electorate cannot hold the main decision-makers, that is the Council at the 
Union level directly accountable. Only national governments can be held accountable 
at national level, which is rather limited due to diverse and complex nature of 
decision-making at Union level, as well as qualified majority voting in the Council, 
where it becomes unreasonable to hold national governments responsible for 
positions they did not take.655 
Thus, despite the constitutional developments transforming the European 
Parliament, the chances of the EU constitutional arrangement satisfying the 
conditions of normative understanding of parliamentary or Westminster systems are 
652 The main elements of the first feature is the presence of an elected parliament as the centre of the 
political system, which highlights the importance of free and fair elections through which voters can 
express their will. Party government implies that elected officials are in charge of all major decisions, 
the policy proposals are formulated within the parties and the elected officials are called to 
accountability through their respective parties; Katz, 'Models of Democracy: Elite Attitudes and the 
Democratic Deficit in the European Union', (2001) 2 European Union Politics 53, at 55. 
653 Laffan, supra note 21, at 337; Schmidt, supra note 36, at 21. 
654 Crum, 'Legislative-Executive Relations in the EU', (2003) 41 Journal a/Common Market Studies 
375, at 380; Weiler et aI, supra note 30, at 8. 
655 Wallace and Smith, supra note 10, at 147; Weiler et aI, supra note 30, at 7; Crum, ibid, at 379-380. 
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minimal. 656 A fallback position was taken by other commentators, which used the 
liberal understanding of democracy or 'liberal constitutionalism' to consider the 
features ofEU's governance. 
However, there are also those arguing against the democratic deficit of the 
EU. While the vast critique of the democratic deficit mainly focuses on the 
deficiencies of the 'input democracy,' very few commentators, other than Moravscik 
and Majone, argue in defence of the democratic deficit. According to Schmidt their 
argument is based on the standpoint of 'output democracy' linked to the effectiveness 
of governance at EU level. 657 Moravcsik justifies positioning of the EU as regards the 
issues of social welfare and redistribution, at the same time he develops a substantial 
argument on the institutional functioning of the EU. 658 Considering the EU as a 
system of separation of powers where the power is vertically divided between the EU 
institutions and horizontally among local, national and transnational level, Moravscik 
finds that there is an effectively functioning system of checks and balances, indirect 
democratic control is exercised through national governments and that the increasing 
powers of the European Parliament can ensure the representation of the popular 
Will.659 Majone, viewing the EU as a 'regulatory state,' considers as its main task 
undertaking 'Pareto-efficient' policies, which does necessarily have to be democratic 
in its traditional understanding. 660 
In response to Majone and Moravcsik, Follesdal and Hix contend that while 
there is increased democratic contestation both in Parliament and in the Council 
656 Westminster system is a form of parliamentary democracy, for the definition see Weale, supra note 
26, at 43. 
657 Schmidt, supra note 36, at 47-48. 
658 Moravcsik, supra note 27, at 618. 
659 Ibid, at 605, 610. 
660 The concept of Pareto efficiency occupies a significant place in economics. It refers to situation 
where arrangements to make one person better off cannot be made without making someone else 
worse off; Majone. 'The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe', (1994) 17 West European Politics 
78; Majone, Regulating Europe, (London: Rutledge. 1996); Majone. 'The Credibility Crisis of 
Community Regulation', (2000) 38 Journal a/Common Market Studies 273. 
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through 'transnational alignments and coalitions along left-right lines,' the link 
between these developments and the EU's society preferences cannot be justified by 
'large distributive consequences, rendering a purely unique Pareto-improvement 
argument insufficient. ,661 Therefore, they dismiss the opportunity of qualifying the 
EU's governing practices as democratic based solely on 'output democracy,' because 
it cannot be viewed separately from 'input' elements, one of which is the formation of 
citizens' preferences. 
A major drawback noted by various commentators as regards the EU 
democratic debate is the application of the theories of democracy developed for 
states.662 Instead, the Union should be compared not to the state model, but to the 
practice of the institutions which are established 'in order to deal with problems of 
global interdependence in a globalised world, that is intergovernmental decision-
making bodies. ,663 Nevertheless, it is hardly possible to find any other 
intergovernmental entity which has a similar transfer of powers from the national 
level and the same diffusion of supranational governance into democratic, political 
and economic life of the Member States. In this respect, Meny, acknowledging that 
comparing the EU to a state is problematic because of the different levels of 
governance, nevertheless, accepts that the sui generis nature of the EU does not give 
an alternative of comparison with any other similar entity and that the statal model of 
democracy allows for 'fallback positions.'664 
661 Follesdal and Hix, 'Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and 
Moravcsik', (2006) 44 Journal o/Common Market Studies 533, at 551-557. 
662 Heriter, 'Elements for Democratic Legitimation in Europe: an Alternative Perspective' (1999) 6 
Journal o/European Public Policy 269, at 280; Craig and de Burca, EU Law: Text. Cases and 
Materials, (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2008), at 136; Jachtenfuchs, 'Democracy and 
Governance in the EU', (1997) 1 European Integration Online Papers, at 40. 
663 Heriter, ibid, at 280. 
664 Meny, supra note 22, at 10. 
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Accepting such a fallback position should be accompanied with certain 
conditions. First of all, we should bear in mind that 'a substantial gap exists between 
actual and ideal democracy.,665 Second, as noted by Weale, normative concepts of 
democratic institutions as functioning at the national level can hardly be transferred to 
the international level without substantial modifications in their operation and 
effect. 666 This is particularly true in the context of the EU as a supranational 
institution with its distinctive mode of operation. Instead of specifying 'different ideal 
types of Euro-democracy' and according them with relevant criteria,667 it should be 
accepted that the EU is 'a system of complex governance, consisting of multi-tiered, 
geographically overlapping structures of government and non-government elites' 
which assumes a new type of not-ideal democracy derived from that very 
combination. 668 
The constitutional evolution of the EU into such a polity itself requires a 
specific-evolutionary model of democracy. The mere comparison of provisions of the 
Rome Treaty of 1957, where democracy as a separate principle or value was not 
articulated at all, and the provisions of the recent Lisbon Treaty, stipulating the 
principles of representative and participatory democracy in the Union, demonstrates 
the evolution of democracy in the political life of the Union. Therefore, it is not the 
institutions we should start with, but rather the values, which might be conceptualised 
in a different way once transferred to the supranational level. 669 
If considered in an evolutionary perspective the provisions of the Title VI on 
Democratic' Life of the Union of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
665 Dahl, On Democracy, supra note 25, at 31. 
666 Weale, supra note 26, at 239. 
667 Lord, supra note 37, at 656. 
668 Wessels, 'The Modem West European State and the European Union: Democratic Erosion or a 
New Kind of Polity' in Andersen and Eliassen, (eds.), The European Union: How Democratic Is It? 
(London: Sage, 1996),57-69, at 63-64. 
669 While Weale was referring to international organisations, his argument should be accepted also for 
the EU which he views as an example of an international organisation; Weale, supra note 26, at 245. 
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European Union on representative, participatory and deliberative democracy, as well 
as provisions on social partners and autonomous social dialogue670 were the first 
normative indications as to the EU's democratic values, which are currently reflected 
in the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.671 Considering the EU's democracy as an 
evolutionary concept, it is at this particular period, when democracy promotion by the 
EU can be considered most justified. 
2.2. Representation as a democratic value 
While majority rule is behind each notion of democracy, it is the mechanism 
of representation that is used in the modem democracies to ensure popular 
governance. In particular in large-scale systems direct democracy can hardly seem 
possible for the solution of daily issues. Thus, through free and fair elections people 
choose those who will represent them in parliament.672 
Article 8a EU, as agreed at Lisbon acknowledges that the functioning of the 
Union shall be founded on representative democracy and establishes the principle of 
dual representativeness of the Union. The latter assumes that the citizens of the Union 
are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament, while the Member 
States are represented in the European Council and in the Council by their 
governments, which are democratically accountable either to their national 
parliaments or to their citizens. Lenaerts and Smijter call this 'double capacity 
representation': citizens are represented directly in the 'supranational' integration 
structure and indirectly as citizens of a Member State. They argue that transfer of 
power from national level to European level does not harm overall democracy since 
670 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 310/11, 16.12.2004. 
671 Title II of the EU Treaty as amended and consolidated by the Lisbon Treaty, OJ C 115/18, 
09.05.2008. 
672 Laffan, supra note 21, at 331. 
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the role of each of the institutions primarily reflects the level of integration of the 
EU.673 
In this sense the transformation of European Parliament from a mere formal 
institution to the one which comes close to fulfilling the conditions of an ordinary 
parliament, is evidence of the level ofEU integration and at the same time of the most 
important processes in legitimising EU governance. The transformation was 
influenced by several developments, including introduction of direct elections to the 
Parliament, the cooperation procedure, subsequent invention of the co-decision 
procedure, which gave the Parliament a real 'say' in the Community decision-making 
process. 674 In connection with the consultation procedure the ECl in Roquette Freres 
ruled that participation of the Parliament: 
'represents an essential factor in the institutional balance intended by the 
treaty. Although limited, [such powers] reflects at Community level the 
fundamental democratic principle that the peoples should take part in the 
exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative 
assembly. ,675 
The institutional perception of the European Parliament has changed over 
time as well and already in relation to the co-decision procedure, the Commission has 
acknowledged the role of the latter in enhancing the 'two-fold legitimacy' of the 
EU.676 It is considered that due to the gradual changes, which have taken place as 
regards Parliament's competences and its relations with the Commission and Council, 
673 Lenaerts and Smijter, supra note 34, at 176. 
674 The first direct elections to the European Parliament took place in 1979. The cooperation procedure 
was introduced by Single European Act to be found in Article 252 EC. The co-decision procedure, 
introduced by the EU, Article 251 EC, allows for Parliament to feature as a joint legislator together 
with the Council. This legislative procedure was further extended to more policy areas by Amsterdam 
and Nice Treaties. 
675 Case 138179, SA Roquette Freres v Council of the European Communities, [1980] ECR-03333, at 
para 33. 
676 Scope of the Codecision Procedure. SEC(96) 1225/4, July 1996, Pt. IIA, para. I. 
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there is 'a classic two chamber legislature: in which the Council represents the states 
and the European Parliament represents the citizens. ,677 
In addition, Article 10(3) LTEU recognises the right of every citizen to 
participate in the democratic life of the Union and provides that decisions shall be 
taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen. Political parties at 
supranational level should contribute to fonning political awareness on European 
matters and to expressing the will of EU citizens. 678 This provision might support 
Craig's view according to which participation is important not only to the issues of 
input and output democracy, but also to other important questions of decision-making 
at European level, such as subsidiarity.679 Thus, citizens' participation in the decision-
making will lead to the acceptance of the outcomes of the governance, and will secure 
that decisions are made at the necessary level in accordance with the subsidiarity 
principle. Enhancing such classical mechanism of representation in the Union would 
justify the EU's stance on conduct of free and fair elections in the neighbourhood. 
While the role of the European Parliament does not have to be defended 
within the representation narrative due to the fact that it is the only institution at EU 
level directly elected by citizens of the Union, the role of the Council as a main 
decision making institution has been a matter of concern. 
The Council's role as a representative institution can be defended on several 
grounds. First of all, before transfonning into a Union of its peoples or citizens, the 
EU as an entity has been and continues to be the Union of its peoples through the 
Member States. The Council in this sense should be considered as having a direct 
mandate from the Member States. This reveals the second element of the EU's 
'twofold legitimacy' which derives also from the Member States. In addition, the 
677 Hix, The Political System of the European Union, (Basingtoke: Macmillan, 1999), at 56. 
678 Article 10(4) LTEU, OJe 115,09.05.2008. 
679 Craig, supra note 30, at 122-123. 
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Council does have an indirect democratic mandate, since those who sit on the Council 
will normally be elected members of their own national executives.68o 
Weiler, nevertheless, is rather critical regarding the absence of a basic 
condition of representative democracy that at election time the citizens 'can throw the 
scoundrels OUt.,681 However, if it was felt that the EU could be properly democratic 
only ifthe citizens were able to vote out the Council directly, then this would entail 'a 
radical restructuring of the institutions. ,682 In addition, this would question the 
general legitimacy of the Union. 
According to Weale, for the type of issues that are best solved at international 
level, the supranational level in the case of the EU, 'a degree of mutual assurance 
among decision makers that can only be given when credible commitments can be 
made by those who are party to the agreements' is required and 'states are in the best 
position to be able to make such commitments credible. ,683 
Another justification for the role of the Council has been highlighted by 
Lenaerts and Smijter. The fact that the EU budget comes from the Member States 
requires the national parliaments to exercise control over one of the institutions 
entrusted with power at EU leve1.684 While the participation of a European 'demos' 
through the concept of citizenship is necessary for democratic decision-making and 
ultimate acceptance of the latter, nevertheless it is not sufficient for comprehensive 
input and output democracy in the EU, which is based also on the Member States. 
Participation in the decision-making of the Member States on behalf of their 
governments is a composite element of the 'twofold legitimacy' of the EU. This 
should be considered the significant modification of the element of representation 
680 Craig and de Burca, supra note 49, at 137. 
681 Weiler in O'Keeffe and Twomey, supra note 33, at 6. 
682 Craig and de Burca, supra note 49, at 138. 
683 Weale, supra note 26, at 240-241. 
684 Lenaerts and Smijter, supra note 34, at 182-183. 
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once transposed to the supranational level, which nevertheless should not question the 
role of representation as a value. Therefore, one would expect the EU to direct 
significant attention to the role of parliaments in neighbouring countries, as a central 
element of representative democracy. 
Despite the increasing role of the European Parliament there are still grounds 
to question 'whether the European Parliament offers potential solutions to problems 
of democratic accountability and legitimacy. ,685 Among contributing factors to such 
scepticism the low turnout at elections, and the fact that the citizens vote for domestic 
issues articulated at national level were noted above.686 This requires us to tum to 
national parliaments in terms of another dimension of representation valued by the 
EU. 
2.3. National parliaments 
As mentioned earlier, the European Commission bases the EU's authority to 
promote democracy in its external relations on the ground that all its Member States 
are democratic countries. The EU currently comprises 27 states, each with a different 
history of democracy both in respect of its formation and time frame. While one can 
debate the credentials of democratic practices in some old and new Member States, 
the centrality of parliament in the political life of the countries with varying models 
of democracy is not a matter of debate. However, it is the national parliaments who 
685 Hix. Raunio, Scully, 'Fifty Years On: Research on the European Parliament', (2003) 41 Journal 0/ 
Common Market Studies 191, at 192. 
686 Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 'The European Parliament at Fifty: A View from the Inside', 
(2003) 41 Journal a/Common Market Studies 353, at 359; Amtenbrink, 'Towards a More Democratic 
Union? Comments on Treaty Etablishing a Constitution for Europe' in Inglis and Ott, (eds.), The 
Constitution/or Europe and an Enlarging Union: Unity in Diversity?' (Groningen: Europa Law 
Publishing, 2005),31-55, at 50; Latfan, supra note 21, at 337. 
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are perceived as the 'biggest losers in Europeanisation' and the national governance 
level is even noted to be 'the real locus ofthe 'democratic deficit. ,,687 
There is a distinction drawn between the Member States for whom 
membership of the Union is a way to protect democracy and those for whom 
membership itself is a threat to their established and effectively operating democratic 
system.688 Probably, the Members States, which joined the EU in the last two rounds 
of enlargement, are being implied in the first group of countries. However, as will be 
discussed in the following part of this Chapter, the EU has come under a strain of 
criticism for transferring its democratic deficit also to the candidate countries. 
The main criticism derives from the fact that the role of national parliaments 
is undermined both at the EU level and inside the Member States. First of all, national 
parliaments lost power when competence was transferred to supranational level in the 
most important spheres of national politics, lacking efficient instruments to call the 
Council to accountability through national governments.689 Not many parliaments of 
the Member States can control or veto the position of their government in the 
Council. 690 The control by national parliaments diminishes even further with the 
transfer of competence in more fields of national affairs to the EU level. 
In addition, when decision-making in the Council is subjected to qualified 
majority voting, it renders national control by parliaments not very efficient as the 
governments cannot be held accountable for the positions they did not take at the EU 
level. Also it is considered that the lack of information and competence in national 
parliaments in addition to the limited capacity of the parliamentarians to control the 
687 Schmidt, supra note 36, at 54, 223. 
688 Laffan, supra note 21, at 342. 
689 Lenaerts and Smijter, supra note 34, at 185. 
690 Sadurski, 'EU Enlargement and Democracy in New Member States' in Sadurski, Czamota and 
Krygie, (eds.), Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law: The Impact of EV Enlargement on the Rule 
of Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism in Post-communist Legal Orders, (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2006),27-49, at 35. 
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Issues to be decided in the Council, results in the inability of the parliaments to 
safeguard the principle of subsidiarity.691 
Contrary to these arguments, it is considered that the cause of the trouble is 
not the democratic deficit of the EU, but the democratic deficit in Europe. Though it 
is the democratic deficiencies of the EU that are often being justified on the ground of 
the effectiveness of the governance, it has been noted by Andersen and Eliassen, that 
the tendency to prioritise effectiveness over parliamentary control is common also in 
national political systems in Western Europe, as a result of 'post-parliamentary or 
organic democracy. ,692 They see the reason for the absence of criticism of national 
democracies in the fact that national parliaments formally embody the main 
requirement of democratic theory: they are able to control national decision-making. 
From this perspective, the EU, with its democratic deficiencies, can be 
considered not as the cause of the governance problems in the Member States, but 
rather a consequence of it. It can be explained as a calculation of Member States to 
give up their autonomy in order to ensure effective problem-solving on other levels of 
governance whether subnational or transnationa1.693 However, the problems with 
legitimacy and accountability will continue to persist. It is perhaps, these problems 
within the general constitutional trend of 1990s to enhance the EU's legitimacy that 
has undermined the role of national parliaments. This in turn carries a risk of 
threatening not only the EU's, but also the legitimacy of national democracies. 
691 Sajo, 'Becoming 'Europeans': The Impact ofEU 'Constitutionalism' on Post-Communist Pre-
Modernity' in Sadurski, Czarnota and Krygie, (eds.), Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law: The 
Impact of EU Enlargement on the Rule of Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism in Post-communist 
Legal Orders. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 175-192, at 183. 
692 Andersen and Burns, 'The EU and the Erosion of Parliamentary Democracy: A Study of Post-
parliamentary Governance' in Andersen and Eliassen, (eds.), The European Union: How Democratic 
Is It? (London: Sage, 1996),227-251, at 229-230. 
693 Wessels, supra note 55, at 62. 
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This danger was taken into account in the Amsterdam Treaty, 1999, where a 
Protocol on the role of national parliaments was attached. The provisions of the 
Lisbon Treaty, once ratified, should be considered as the most important development 
in this trend introducing a separate article on the role of national parliaments under 
Title II on Democratic Principles and establishing a Protocol on the role of national 
Parliaments in the European Union. 
Article 12 of the amended' and consolidated EU Treaty endorses several 
methods of participation of national parliaments in the decision-making process in the 
Union. One way is enabling the national parliaments to safeguard the principle of 
subsidiarity, where the annual legislative programme of the Commission and draft 
legislative acts which are presented to the European Parliament and the Council 
should be forwarded to national parliaments. 694 
Another method demonstrating the importance of the control of executives by 
their national parliaments is the introduction of a provision obliging the Council to 
send the agendas for, and the outcome of, its meetings, including the minutes of 
meetings where draft legislative acts have been discussed, directly to national 
Parliaments together with the governments of the Member States.695 The new 
provisions not only aim at increasing national parliaments role in day-to-day 
legislation making, but also in such aspects of the functioning of Union which 
previously were considered to be purely intergovernmental. Thus, the participation of 
the national parliaments should be ensured in the revision procedures of Union 
Treaties, as well as their right to be notified of applications for accession to the EO. 
694 Article I and 2 of the Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union. 
In this connection Article 3 of the Protocol entitles national parliaments to send to the Presidents of the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission a reasoned opinion on the compliance of a draft 
legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity. 
695 Article 5 of the Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union. 
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The last feature of the new Article 12 EU is the clause setting inter-
parliamentary cooperation not only between national Parliaments, but also with the 
European Parliament in accordance with the Protocol on the role of national 
Parliaments in the European Union. This, perhaps, should be considered as a means 
to counterbalance the dominance of the executive branch at European level, but most 
importantly at national level as regards European issues.696 
In addition to Article 12 EU, an important provision is included in the Lisbon 
Treaty which obliges the Council to meet in public when considering and voting on a 
draft legislative act. 697 This will increase the accountability of the national 
governments vis-a-vis the national parliaments and electorates. 698 
It might be possible to get an impression that the role of national parliaments 
within the internal decision-making process of the Union is not very important for 
determining the democratic values of the latter. However, the inclusion of the 
mentioned provisions in the Lisbon Treaty is an evidence of what the EU values as a 
democratic principle: the representation of the citizens through their national 
parliaments not only at national level, but also at European level. In addition, this 
provision should be considered as an attempt on behalf of the EU to preserve the 
democratic values of the Member States with their respective parliamentary or liberal 
democracies, where a parliament with its central position is a precondition for proper 
functioning democracy. In other words, the importance of parliaments, whether at 
European or national level, is a shared value of the EU and its Member States. In this 
context, it would be expected from the EU to demonstrate similar keenness on the 
role of parliaments in the neighbouring states it is eager to share its values with. 
696 [n addition, Article 12 EU provides for participation of national parliaments in the evaluation of 
mechanisms for the implementation of policies in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
697 New Artic[e 16 LTEU. 
698 Amtenbrik in Inglis and Ott, supra note 73, at 40. 
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Apart from the element of representation expressing the majority rule or 
popular governance of the traditional understanding of democracy, in order to prevent 
the tyranny of the minority there should be restrictions on the exercise of power as 
developed in the liberal democratic approach. In this context, Meny considers that the 
EU rather suffers from 'democratic overload': 'checks and balances are too many 
rather than too few,' and the 'constitutional' pillar of the EU governance expands at 
the expense of the 'popular' one.699 
2. 4. Features of liberal constitutionalism 
Liberal democracy is one of the foundations of 'legitimate statehood' in the 
EU.700 Liberal democracy, or liberal constitutionalism, as described by Weale, is 
characterised by accountability of the executive branch of power to the parliament, a 
clear division of power between legislative, executive and judicial branches and the 
'judicial and other counter-majoritarian devices' primarily through the system of 
checks and balances.701 One of the main elements of liberal democracies is the 
protection of rights and freedoms of the citizens, which are granted political, social 
and legal rights because of their belonging to the respective polity. 702 
It is the idea of 'institutional balance' of the Union as established in Article 7 
Ee that serves as a reference point for drawing parallels with the republican 
understanding of democracy based on separation of powers. 703 The notion of 
699 Meny, supra note 22, at 4,9. 
700 Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 'The Impact ofEU Political Conditionality' in 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, (eds.), The Europeanization a/Central and Eastern Europe, 
(London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 29-50, at 29. 
701 Weale, supra note 26, at 331-332. 
702 Laffan, supra note 21, at 331-332. 
703 Van Elsuwege and Vermeersch, 'Institutional Reform in the European Union: A Difficult Balancing 
Act' in Inglis and Ott. (eds.), The Constitution/or Europe and an Enlarging Union: Unity in 
Diversity? (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2005),57-84, at 80; Craig, supra note 30, at 113; 
Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 'The European Parliament at Fifty: A View from the Inside' (2003) 41 
Journal of Common Market Studies 353, at 368. 
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institutional balance assumes that various institutions, representing different interests 
within the society, can ensure the balance between them and therefore serve the 
public good. 704 Accordingly, each of the EU institutions has its role 'in relation to 
questions of democracy, legitimacy and also institutional efficiency. ,705 Most 
importantly, each of the institutions plays an important role in balancing the others. 
For instance, the role of the ECJ has its significance since it does not only embody the 
idea of independent judicial authority, but also has a central role in the matters of 
competence of other institutions within the system of separation of powers as 
provided in Article 7 EC.706 
It should be noted that the idea of the institutional balance, in particular the 
Parliament-Council and the Parliament-Commission relations has a rather dynamic 
nature. 707 The balance of powers between the Parliament and the Council has been 
discussed in section 2.2 above, where one of the important elements of the system of 
checks and balances lies in the Parliament's power to veto legislation in the co-
decision procedure. 70S The Lisbon Treaty, once ratified, will further extend 
Parliament's powers, since the co-decision will become the ordinary legislative 
procedure and will be extended to certain new areas of policy making. 709 
It should be mentioned in relation to the Parliament-Commission relations that 
the EU does not strictly satisfy the conditions of the accountability of the executive to 
the parliament. However, the post-Amsterdam right of the European Parliament to 
veto the choices of the Member States for the President and the members of the 
704 Craig, supra note 30, at 115-116. 
705 Shaw, Law o/the European Union, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), at 238-239. 
706 Ibid, at 239. 
707 Van Elsuwege and Vermeersch, supra note 90, at 81. 
708 Amtenbrink in Inglis and Ott, supra note 73, at 37. 
709 Article 251 as amended by Lisbon Treaty, new Articles 16b and 16e, amended Articles 18,45. 
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Commission substantially increases the role of the Parliament in the area. 7lO In 
addition, the Commission is currently more accountable to the Parliament than in the 
past. The latter has an informal right to scrutinise the Commission's activities through 
the appearance of individual Commissioners in Parliament's specialised 
committees.7!! 
Moreover, there is a view that introduction of the co-decision procedure not 
only has enhanced Parliament's role in the general institutional structure, but also this 
feature developed to the detriment of the Commission's position.712 Also it has been 
noted in relation to the Commission that the Parliament shows willingness to 'throw 
the scoundrels out.' 713 A recent example of this trend was Parliament's readiness to 
remove the controversial Italian Commissioner Rocco Buttiglione.7 !4 
In addition, Parliament's exercise of budgetary powers allows it to control the 
Commission through stressing the need 'to devote more attention to the resources 
required for policies and to better implementation and management,' as well as 
through ensuring greater access to relevant documents and information by the 
Commission.715 
The Lisbon Treaty with Article 14(1) EU will further enhance Parliament's 
powers against the Commission, where the Parliament will be entitled with a right to 
elect the President of the Commission. 716 
710 Article 214 EC. 
71 I Peterson, 'The College of Commissioners' in Peterson and Shackleton, (eds.), The Institutions of 
the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 71-93, at 88. 
712 Ibid, at 88. 
713 The EU Treaty entitled the Parliament to allow the Commission to take office through a vote of 
confidence; Eriksen and Fossum, 'Democracy through Strong Publics in the European Union', (2002) 
40 Journal of Common Market Studies 401, at 412. 
714 'European Parliament comes of age' EU Observer, 27.10.2004. 
Available at http://euobserver.coml?aid=17644. 
715 The Parliament was granted with limited budgetary powers with the Treaty of Luxembourg in 1970; 
Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, supra note 73, at 366. 
716 Article 9a EU as introduced by Lisbon Treaty. 
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As noted above, citizens and their rights is an inalienable feature of the liberal 
democracy model. This feature of liberal democratic governance can be considered as 
theoretically present only after the creation of the concept of EU citizenship.717 
However, one would argue that the operation of the EU institutions is not primarily 
aimed at the safeguarding the rights of individuals. Besides, it is a widely debated 
issue whether the EU has its own people with the concept of 'demos' elaborated by 
Weiler.718 As an alternative to statal 'demos', this concept can be understood also as a 
demos 'coming together on the basis of shared values, shared understanding of rights 
and societal duties and shared rational, intellectual culture which transcend ethno-
national differences' which is not intended to replace the national ethno-cultural 
view.719 This possible view of demos can be awarded with a title of Habermas's 
'nation of citizens' which should be understood as 'an intersubjectively shared 
context of possible understanding' 720 and is capable of reflecting the reality of the 
EU. 
Such an understanding of the concept of demos allows proceeding with a 
discussion of the issues on Union citizenship.721 Even those with a rather sceptical 
approach to the concept of citizenship, acknowledge its potential if an extension of 
political rights is paralleled with certain social underpinning to make citizens' 
political rights a reality.722 In addition to the EC] longstanding practice on 
fundamental rights, the adoption of the Declaration of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in 2000 demonstrated a gradual creation of this missing element of a liberal 
717 The EU Treaty introduced the concept of citizenship in Article 17-22. 
718 Weiler et ai, supra note 30, at 12-15. 
719 Ibid, 19, 23. 
720 Habennas as cited in Kuper, 'Democratization: a Constitutionalising Process' in Hoskyns and 
Newman, (eds.), Democratising the European Union: Issues/or the Twenty-first Century, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 156-173, at 165. 
721 Article 2 EU. 
722 Kuper, see above, at 168-172. 
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regime. The binding nature of the Charter once the Lisbon Treaty enters into force 
will add further to the protection of citizens' rights in the EU. 
The introduction of citizenship has been considered to enhance democratic 
decision making by concretising the link between the people and the European 
system.723 This feature of governance is a necessary attribute of liberal democratic 
regimes. However, one can hardly argue that the creation of EU citizenship led to 
immediate participation of Member State's nationals to the political life ofthe Union. 
Indeed the lack of citizens' participation and deliberation has been another 
reason for the criticism of the governance at the EU level. 724 More generally, the 
representative democracy has been widely criticised in Western Europe where a 'non-
democratic process-bargaining among political and bureaucratic elites' is taking place 
in parallel with democratic processes.725 This is more obvious at European level 
where the system enables 'a cartel of elites to exert tight control over the policy 
agenda. ,726 It is at this point where the legitimacy of the Union should be 
supplemented by a 'process-oriented' approach which enables citizens to have a say 
in the post-legislative phase.727 
2.5. Participation and deliberation 
It is noted that in 'large-scale political systems,' an example of which the EU 
represents, it is more difficult to ensure the effective participation of citizens in the 
political process which is reflecting the opinion of those affected by the decision-
723 Hoskyns and Newman, (eds.), Democratising the European Union. Issues/or the Twentv-first 
Century, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), at 196. 
724 Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, European Union Law: Text and Materials 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 167. 
72S hi Da ,On Democracy, supra note 25, at 113. 
726 Dehousse, 'Beyond Representative Democracy: Constitutionalism in a Polycentric Polity" in Weiler 
and Wind, (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 135-156, at 156. 
127 Ibid, at 149. 
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making.728 While large political organisations potentially provide effectiveness in 
decision-making in comparison with national level of governance, the dilemma 
between effectiveness and participation is closely linked to the input and output 
democracy as noted above. It has been noted that the EU's legitimacy suffers from 
the fact that the governance targets only groups of people, where citizens have 
minimal access to EU decision-making. 729 In the light of the E U' s efforts to enhance 
its legitimacy the issue of citizens' participation could not have passed unnoticed. 
As a matter of fact democratic theory has been filled with debates on 
enhancement of citizens' participation. Within the normative understanding of 
participatory democracy, with its focus on the central place of citizens' participation 
in the democratic process, different approaches have been elaborated. These include 
discursive democracy as developed by Habermas, strong democracy of Barber, and 
the directly-deliberative model developed by Cohen and Sobel. 730 Fuchs notices two 
common features of these approaches, which are the direct nature of citizens' 
participation in governance and the central place of deliberation in political will 
formation. 73 I According to Habermas, deliberative politics exists within two spheres, 
including democratically institutionalised will formation and informal opinion 
formation, where the communication taking place among those who are potentially 
affected, develops into solution to relevant problem in the political public sphere.732 
Deliberation or discourse among those who will be affected by the decision-making is 
728 Dahl, On Democracy, supra note 25, at 110, 125-231; Laffan, supra note 21, at 339. 
729 Petitioning through the European Parliament was the only available way for citizens' direct 
involvement, and only after the institution of Ombudsman was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, 
the citizens acquired another possibility to bring complaints at the EU level; Schmidt, supra note 36, at 
28. 
730 Fuchs, 'Participatory, Liberal and Electronic Democracy' in Zittel and Fuchs, (eds.), Participatory 
Democracy and Political Participation: Can Participatory Engineering Bring Citizens Back in? 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), at 39. 
731 Ibid. 
732 Habermas, Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, (Cambridge: Polity, 
1996), at 308, 365. 
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the necessary element in the chain of that very process. 733 It should be noted that the 
quest for participation through deliberation does not require replacement of 
traditional representative institutions, rather it 'supplements the processes. ,734 
Fuchs notices also another shared feature of different approaches within the 
notion of participatory democracy, which is the 'attempt to adapt the model to the 
conditions of modem societies.' 735 It will be legitimate to expect the EU to adapt 
certain features of these models to its decision-making process. 
Public participation was a matter of focus since the early 1990s, though 
mainly linking participation to the issue of transparency. 736 
The most notable development in functional term as regards public 
participation on the EU level was the conventional method of elaboration of the 
Declaration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 737 The Charter and the way it was 
drafted should be considered to be directed at the citizen in order to acknowledge the 
EU's 'commitments in a public process' which will enhance its troubled 
legitimacy.738 The significance of the process of drafting the Charter lies in the 
composition of the drafting Convention, its participative and deliberative nature 
which served as a relatively 'open forum for constitutional debate. ,739 The 
733 8arber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), at 136; Dryzek, 'Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy', 
(2001) 29 Political Theory 651, at 651; Cohen, as cited in Weale, supra note 26, at 78; Verhoeven, The 
European Union in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory, (London: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002), at 39. 
734 Weale, supra note 26, at 81. 
735 Fuchs, supra note 117, at 39. 
736 Chryssochoou, Democracy and the European Polity, in Cini, (ed.), European Union Politics, 2nd 
edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 359-373, at 363; Scope of the Co-Decision 
Procedure, Commission Report under Article 189b (8), SEC(96) 1225/4, July 1996, para 23, 39; Inter-
Institutional Declaration on Democracy, Transparency and Subsidiarity, adopted by the Commission, 
Council and the European Parliament at the Brussels European Council in October 1993. 
737 The Charter was proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 7 
December, 2000; OJ C 3634, 18.12.2000. 
738 De 8urca, 'The Drafting of the European Union Charter of Human Rights,' (2001) 26 European 
Law Review 126, at 130. 
739 The Convention had European and national level institutional representatives of the Member States, 
European Parliament, national parliaments and one representative of the Commission; ibid, at 138; 
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Convention was also unprecedented due to availability of infonnation on the 
procedure and content of the drafting process, and due to limited involvement of civil 
society through hearings. 74o The Charter stipulating political rights of the Union 
citizens alongside a separate provision on participative democracy is included in the 
Lisbon Treaty.74J 
Subsequently, similar approach was undertaken as regards the Convention on 
the Future of Europe responsible for drafting the Treaty establishing Constitution for 
Europe. 742 Despite certain criticism as to President's excessive power, the secretive 
nature of deliberation of the Presidium, 'hearing' and 'consultation' instead of a 
'dialogue' with the civil society, the Convention has been considered to be a success 
in tenns of deliberation and consensus making and openness of the proceedings. 743 
These trends in EU legislation-making will be institutionalised with the new 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Along new Article 10 EU, as amended by Lisbon Treaty, recognising the right 
of every citizen to participate in the democratic life of the Union, Article 11 EU 
Maduro, 'The Double Constitutional Life of the Chatter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union' in Hervey and Kenner, (eds.), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter 0/ 
Fundamental Rights-A Legal Perspective, (Oxford: Hart, 2003), 269-299, at 271. 
740 Eriksen and Fossum, 'Democracy through Strong Publics in the European Union', (2002) 40 
Journal a/Common Market Studies 401, at 417-418. 
741 Article 12 of Charter provides that everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to 
freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters. It also 
stipulates that political parties at Union level should contribute to expressing the political will of the 
citizens of the Union. Article 6 EU as amended by Lisbon Treaty provides that the Charter shall have 
the same legal value as the Treaties. 
742 The Convention was comprised of representatives of the Member States and candidate state 
governments, members of national parliaments and European Parliament, two representatives of the 
Commission, and representatives of other Community institutions with a status of an observer. 
743 Schonlau, 'The Convention Method' in Castiglione, Schonlau, Longman, Lombardo, Pierez-
Solorzano Borragan, Aziz, Constitutional Politics in the European Union: The Convention Moment 
and its Aftermath (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 90-11, at 90, 95, 96, 98; Lombardo. 'The 
Participation of the Civil Society' Castiglione. Schonlau, Longman, Lombardo, Pierez-Solorzano 
Borragan, Aziz, Constitutional Politics in the European Union: The Convention Moment and its 
Aftermath (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 153-169, at 154, 155. 
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regulates the participation of citizens in governance at Union level. 744 The Article 
stipulates the obligations of the EU institutions to safeguard the participation of 
citizens, thus institutional ising the infonnal opinion fonnation. It includes provisions 
on the obligation of the institutions to give citizens and representative associations the 
opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union 
action, as well as to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with 
representative associations and civil society. In addition, in order to provide the 
coherence and transparency of the Union's actions, the Commission shall hold broad 
consultations with interested parties. 
One can conclude that these provisions are an attempt to ensure that 
deliberation and discourse resulting in infonnal will fonnation in the EU is a 
necessary part of the decision-making at supranational level. It can be assumed, that 
the drafters of the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty accepted deliberative 
politics as central to understanding of participatory democracy in the EU context. 
Adopting participatory modes in its constitutional practice and obliging the 
institutions to ensure citizens' participation can entail that the EU will require its 
neighbours to share this value. 
Another major feature of the new Article is the opportunity of legislative 
initiative for citizens of the Union. Paragraph 4 of Article 11 EU provides that not 
less than one million citizens may take the initiative of inviting the European 
Commission to submit any proposal on the issues where citizens consider that a legal 
act is required. This feature potentially represents the idea of 'outside initiative 
model' where the initiative stems from the outside of the political system.745 
744 The earlier Article 1-47 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution tor Europe had a Title 'The 
~ r i n c i p l e e of participatory democracy.' 
45 Habermas, supra note 119, at 379-380. 
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To summarise the discussion on democratic values of the EU, one should note 
that despite all the shortcomings and drawbacks, the EU has its own evolutionary and 
dynamic democratic model. Democracy as a value is shared between the EU and its 
Members States, since the EU has been attempting not only to enhance its democratic 
credentials, but also to preserve the democratic models of its Member States as 
demonstrated by the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. The specific characteristics of 
the EU as a multi-level polity explain the difference of its democratic model from the 
models of democracy existing in the Member States. However, it can be noted that 
the democratic values of representation, liberal constitutional features and 
participation are values shared between the EU and its Member States. It is based on 
these values that the neighbours should expect the EU to promote in its external 
action. Whether these values are reflected in the notion of democracy that the EU is 
promoting in its foreign policy is discussed further with particular focus on the last 
two rounds of enlargement. 
3. Transposition of democratic values in the EU foreign policy: the 2004 and 2007 
accession rounds 
The fIrst comprehensive approach to the promotion of democracy has been 
undertaken during the last two rounds of enlargement as a matter of 'retaining the 
EU's essential identity.' 746 
3.1. Creating democracies in accession countries 
While there is an opinion that European integration positively affected 
democratic consolidation even in some of its old Member States 'with less than 
746 Youngs, 'Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's Extemalldentity" (2004) 42 
Journal o/Common Market Studies 415, at 416. 
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perfect historical democratic credentials,' 747 it is the last two rounds of enlargement 
which is widely considered to be successful and the experience of which the EU tries 
to replicate in the case of the ENP. 
The accession process of CEE is considered to be an exception to the rule 
according to which external factors are secondary for regime change, which is 
primarily motivated by domestic developments. 748 The success of democratisation of 
CEE states, nevertheless, cannot be awarded to the integration process only. The 
latter has coincided with a number of other factors. Among such factors is the timing 
of the accession process, where the 'EU models are being presented at the same time 
as CEE policymakers are seeking institutional models to replace or to create new 
structures. ,749 In addition, the enlargement process was taking place in parallel with 
integration of relevant countries to other organisations of the 'western community of 
states' such as NATO, OSCE, and the Council of Europe advocating the principles of 
liberal democracy. 750 
The accession of the 1990s and early 2000s processes was primarily 
concerned with the conditionality mechanism established at the Copenhagen 
European Council, discussed in Chapter IV. The condition for being a democratic 
state in order to qualify as an EU Member State has been articulated since the 
creation of the EEC through Article 237 of the Rome Treaty which required the 
member countries to be liberal democracies. According to Hillion, it is within the 
747 Weiler, 'Europe 2004- Le Grand Debat: Setting the Agenda and Outlining the Options' (Brussels, 
Conference Paper 15 and 16 October 2001), note 42 of Conclusion. 
748 Pridham, 'The International Dimension of Democratisation: Theory, Practice, and Inter-regional 
Comparisons' in Pridham, Herring and Sanford, (eds.). Building Democracy? The International 
Dimension o/Democratisation in Eastern Europe, (London: Leicester University Press, 1994),7-31, at 
9. 
749 Grabbe, 'How Does Europeanization Affects CEE Governance? Conditionality. Diffusion and 
Diversity,' (2001) 8 Journal o/European Public Policy 1013, at 1014. 
750 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 'Conclusions: The Impact of the EU on the Accession Counties' 
in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, (eds.), The Europeanization o/Central and Eastern Europe. 
(London: CorneJl University Press, 2005), 210-228, at 212. 
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relations of the Community with fonner dictatorships in Greece, Spain and Portugal 
that the political conditionality 'first materialised.,75I 
The European Council of 1978 established that 'respect for and maintenance 
of representative democracy and human rights in each Member State are essential 
elements of membership in the European Communities.'752 The Commission made 
references to 'pluralist democracy' as an element essential for pre-accession.753 
Ultimately when Spain and other Southern European countries joined the EC, they 
satisfied fonnal conditions of liberal democracies. 754 This and subsequent 
'institutional acknowledgement of political conditionality,' 755 embodying the existing 
practice, were given a stronger recognition in the accession process in Eastern 
Europe, where the political conditionality was the 'most prominent and finnly 
stated.'756 It was after the Copenhagen European Council officially established the 
fonnal accession criteria. However, certain issues in relation to the prominence of 
political conditions should be emphasised. 
The first point of concern in relation to political conditionality has to do with 
the content of political criteria. While, the Copenhagen criteria indicated the elements 
of political conditionality, including democracy, the specific criteria were left 
undefined and vague without clear indications as to a model of democracy the 
751 Hillion, 'The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny' in Hillion, (ed.), EU Enlargement: A Legal 
Approach. (Oxford: Hart, 2004), 1-22, at 4. 
752 Copenhagen European Council, 7-8 April 1978, 'Declaration on Democracy'. EC Bulletin. No.3 
(1978), at 6. 
753 OJ 1979 L29113; OJ 1985 L302/3. 
754 Pridham. 'The European Union's Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia: the 
Meciar and Dzurinda Governments Compared' (2002) 54 Europe-Asia Studies 203, at 205-206. 
755 Hillion, see above, at 5-6. 
756 Youngs, 'European Union Democracy Promotion Policies: Ten Years On', (2001) 6 European 
Foreign Affairs Review 355, at 358. 
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candidate countries were expected to establish, rendering the implementation of 
democratic conditionality' disaggregated' without full awareness of its meaning.757 
Starting from 1997, the Commission initiated the evaluation of the progress of 
candidate countries in annual reports where political conditionality obtained a 'real 
bite.'758 It was the necessity to assess the progress that urged the EU to specify the 
content of democracy within the political conditionality.759 Thus, it was first the 
Council which referred to the democratic principles, including: 
• Representative government, accountable executive; 
• Government and public authorities to act in a manner consistent with the 
constitution and the law; 
• Separation of powers; 
• Free and fair elections at reasonably intervals by secret ballot. 760 
While these conditions did not bring much specificity to the concept of 
democracy, some ideas could be found in certain other EU documents. The 
Guidelines for the Phare and T ACIS programmes aimed at contributing to 'the 
consolidation of pluralist democratic procedures and practice' including support for 
'acquisition and application of knowledge and technique of parliamentary practice 
and organisation. ,761 Also, strengthening of non-governmental institutions with their 
potential to contribute to development of a pluralist society was included. 762 
757 Pridham, 'EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-Communist States-Formality and 
Reality', (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 953, at 958. 
758 Sadurski in Sadurski, Czamota and Krygie, supra note 77, at 29. 
759 Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-Accession Conditionality in the 
Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law, (Austin: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2008), at 86. 
760 Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997 on the application of conditionality with a view to 
developing a coherent EU strategy for its relations with the countries in the region, Bull. EU 4-1997, 
ft0int 1.4.67. 
61 Olsen, 'Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign Policy Instrument of'Europe': Limits to 
International Idealism' (2000) 7 Democratization 142, at 148. 
762 Ibid. 
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The most detailed reference to the substance of democracy as an element of 
Copenhagen political criteria was provided in the Commission's 'Agenda 2000: 763 
The specification provided in the Agenda was intended at evaluating whether 
accession negotiations with relevant countries should be opened. 764 The Commission 
referred to formal criteria of democracy under the heading of 'Democracy and Rule 
of Law,' thus mixing these concepts together. The conditions include the constitution 
of applicant countries, which should guarantee democratic freedoms, including 
political pluralism, the freedom of expression and the freedom of religion, 
establishment of democratic institutions and independent judicial and constitutional 
authorities permitting different state authorities to function normally. Another feature 
the Commission paid attention to is free and fair elections, allowing the alternation of 
different political parties in power, and a greater role for opposition.765 
After referring to the above mentioned prerequisites, the Commission then 
considered the political practice of democracy in different applicant countries. This 
relates to how is the power distributed in practice, whether there is a political culture 
of participation, whether protection of constitutional freedoms is guaranteed in 
practice and others.766 In this connection, Kaldor and Vejvoda differentiated between 
formal and substantive conditions for democracy. The formal conditions imply 
inclusive citizenship, the rule of law, separation of powers, elected power-holders, 
free and fair elections, freedom of expression, associational autonomy, and civilian 
control over the security forces; and substantive democracy assumes political 
763 European Commission, 'Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union'. EU Bulletin Supplement 
5/97. 
764 Smith, 'The Evolution and Application ofEU Membership Conditionality' in Cremona, (ed.), The 
Enlargement a/the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 105-139, at 115. 
765 Agenda 2000, at 40. 
766 Ibid, at 40-41. 
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equality, power distribution and a political culture of democratic participation. 767 
Perhaps based on these developments, it has been suggested that the Union has 
'moved beyond conditions of formal democracy to those pertaining to substantive 
democracy.,768 Making a similar distinction between procedure and process, it has 
been noted that processes cannot be easily imported from abroad. 769 
Nevertheless, the conditions were still perceived to be vague and ambiguous. 
On the one hand, this could be considered as a way out from the challenge that the 
Commission was facing with a choice of a particular model to impose on candidate 
countries allowing for national variations. 77o It has been noted that the lack of 
precision and clarity regarding the criteria and also the benchmarks of compliance 
eventually resulted in lower threshold of meeting the criteria, difficulty in assessment 
of progress, 'poor analysis quality provided by the Commission, including random 
choice of issues, unreliable conclusions, numerous contradictions and a curious 
approach to democracy.' 771 Moreover, a closer look at the Commission's Reports and 
Opinions brings out the elements that the Commission was considering in assessing 
progress, which are the executive, parliament, judiciary and their functioning. 772 
Sadurski also mentions anti-corruption measures.773 Such important elements of 
democratic transformation for the purposes of ensuring proper representation as 
767 Kaldor, 'Eastern Enlargement and Democracy', in Hoskyns and Newman, (eds.), Democratising the 
European Union. Issues for the Twenty-first Century, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2000), 139-155, at 140-141; Kaldor and Vejvoda, (eds.), Democratisation in Central and Eastern 
Europe, (London; New-York: Continuum, 2002), at 4-5. 
768 Pridham, 'The European Union's Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia: the 
Meciar and Dzurinda Governments Compared', (2002) 54 Europe-Asia Studies 203. 
769 Light, 'Exporting Democracy' in Smith and Light, (eds.), Ethics and Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 75-92, at 90. 
770 Kochenov, supra note 146, at 94. 
771 Ibid, at 300-301. 
772 Ibid, at 88. 
773 Sadurski in Sadurski, Czamota and Krygie, supra note 77, at 29. 
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functioning of political parties and the electoral process have been noted as 'the 
forgotten elements of transformation. ,774 
Apart from these problems inherent in the democratic conditionality and its 
assessment consistency, the application of the latter was overshadowed by a greater 
focus on compliance with the acquis, in particular its economic part. 775 Perhaps the 
reason behind this is the detennination that the political criteria of conditionality 
mostly serve to establish a new reform-oriented leadership able to undertake 
necessary economic reforms. 716 In this respect, the phases before and after opening 
the accession negotiations have been distinguished. While democratic conditionality 
was a prominent 'feature in the first phase, in the second phase the emphasis on 
democratic conditionality was much weaker due to the absence of the direct link with 
the accession, since the membership negotiations had been already started.717 
Thus, while it can be said that with the invention of Copenhagen political 
conditionality a legal framework has been created in order to transform the acceding 
countries, the political bargaining left scope for uncertainty and did not allow 
revealing the real potential of the conditionality mechanism. 778 
One can agree with the view that the EU's political conditionality enjoyed 
high credibility in terms of 'neither of the elements was disputed and was not a 
subject for manipulation by the candidate countries. ,779 However, the above 
774 Pridham notices that political parties did not feature in EU programmes for democracy assistance in 
general; Pridham, supra note 144, at 959; Kochenov, supra note 146, at 162. 
775 Olsen, supra note 14S, at 149; Kochenov, supra note 146, at 301. 
776 Henderson, 'Reforming the Post-Communist States: Meeting the Political Conditions for 
Membership' in Jenkins, (ed.), The Unification a/Europe? An Analysis o/EU Enlargement, (Centre 
for Reform, London, 2000), 27-35, at 29. 
777 Smith in Cremona, supra note 51, at 114; Ridder, Schrijvers, Vos, 'Civilian Power Europe and 
Eastern Enlargement: The More the Merrier' in Orbie, (ed.), Europe's Global Role: External Policies 
o/the EU, (Alders hot: Ashgate, 200S), 240-257, at 250-251. 
778 Hillion, 'Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis' in Arnull and Wincott, (eds.), 
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 401-
41S, at 418; Kochenov, supra note 146, at 312. 
779 Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, supra note 87, at 33. 
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discussion suggests that the pre-accession process largely affected the formal 
prerequisites of democracy at the stage before opening the accession negotiations, 
while substantive prerequisites of democracy were not significantly influenced.no 
Nonetheless, new Member States which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 qualified for 
the status of liberal democracies at least formally. The democratic conditionality 
seemed to be less efficient than the acquis conditionality which in its tum undermined 
the democratic processes in the CEE countries.781 
3.2. Transposing democratic deficit to candidate countries 
Along the general discussion on the democratic deficit of the EU, there was a 
concern that within the last two rounds of enlargement much criticised features of the 
EU governance would have potentially widened the gap between ruling elites and 
masses in CEE countries with their Communist heritage.782 
Such concerns were based on the structural aspects of the accession process, 
where national governments played the most important role in the transformation 
process. The necessity created by the EU in having a compact team ensuring efficient 
and coordinated management of the pre-accession process has resulted in 
establishment of a 'core executive.'783 The institutional set up of the accession 
process reflects this statement. As discussed in Chapter II, the EAs established the 
Association Councils composed of the EU representative and the representatives of 
respective countries, mostly members of the governments. 784 
780 Kaldor in Hoskyns and Newman, supra note 154, at 141. 
781 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier. 'Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the 
Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', (2004) II Journalo.fEuropean Public Policy 
661, at 675-676. 
782 Pridham, supra note 144, at 954 
783 Grabbe, supra note 136, at 1018. 
784 Sadurski, supra note 77, at 34. 
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The Association Councils were endowed with a competence to adopt legally 
binding decisions which would take precedence over national law, therefore passing 
by the national legislator. Thus, national parliaments had a minimum role and 
awareness in the adoption of legislation as opposed to what the EU officially required 
from the candidate countries, that is 'stable democratic institutions and the 
development of capable law-makers.' 785 Also negotiations for accession were taking 
place in a secret atmosphere, where national parliaments had limited opportunity to 
ensure a counterweight to the role of the executive.786 Legislative-executive relations 
are not the only relations distorted during the accession process. Certain weakening of 
checks and balances may well occur also as regards the guarding role of 
constitutional courts which could not revise the executive regulations implementing 
Community legislation. 787 
The problem was aggravated with the EU favouring the political consensus in 
former applicant countries,· which ultimately resulted in discouraging serious debate 
about accession. 788 What was more disappointing is the fact that the entire process 
concerned only the top governing circles in candidate countries, where the general 
public had restricted participation in the process of integration. 789 Similar to their 
Communist past, citizens of these countries should have considered politics as 
'external, instrumental and manipUlative: as an act of distant institutions,' where 
democracy loses its credibility. 790 
785 Grabbe, supra note 136, at 1017. 
786 Sadurski, supra note 77, at 34. 
787 Sajo, 'Accession's Impact on Constitutionalism in the New Member States' in Bermann and Pistor, 
(eds.), Law and Governance in an Enlarged European Union, (Oxford: Hart, 2004), 415-435, at 432. 
788 Pridham, supra note 155, at 207. 
789 Saj 0, see above, at 415. 
790 Kaldor and Vejvoda, Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, (London; New-York: 
Continuum, 2002), at 164. 
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Therefore, the enlargement process, while arguably having a positive 
influence on fonnal prerequisites of democracy, may have also had an adverse effect 
on the substantive aspects of democracy in these particular countries. Will this be the 
case also in neighbouring countries? 
4. Conclusion 
Throughout the democratisation process of Central and Eastern European 
countries there was an irony that 'a democratically deficient body is telling them how 
to become functioning democracies. ,791 Would this irony be appropriate in the case of 
the ENP? Is the EU democratic enough to tell its neighbours how democratic they 
should be? This brings us back to the questions posed in the introductory part to this 
Chapter. Is there a genuine commitment to democracy in the Union? Second, what 
model or models of democracy most adequately describe the democratic values of the 
EU? Third, is it the same concept of democratic values that the Union transposes in 
its external relations and how, in particular in the enlargement process upon which 
the ENP is largely based? 
Taking a retrospective look at different parts of this Chapter the answer to 
these questions can be summarised as follows. 
Considering the EU's past and present democratic reality at the supranational 
level against models of democracy functioning in its Member States, one thing is 
clear: statal models of democracy solely cannot reflect the democratic reality of the 
Union. While addressing the question on the genuine commitment to democracy in 
the Union, it is impossible to dismiss the fact of its multi-level governance and 
specific legitimacy. It cannot be equalised to the idea of legitimacy of the state. 
791 Grabbe, 'How Does the EU Measure when the CEECs are Ready to loin?' in Jenkins, (ed.), The 
Unification of Europe? An Analysis ofEU Enlargement, (Centre for Reform, London, 2000), 37-46, at 
45. 
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However, this statement does not entail that the EU should not attempt to adopt those 
features of democratic governance functioning in its Member States, which are 
potentially operative also at the supranational European level. Accordingly, an 
observer should notice the evolutionary, dynamic nature of the EU's democratic 
model. 
New provisions introduced by the Lisbon Treaty should be considered as a 
further step in the deepening of the European democracy. This should be understood 
in several forms. First, of all, it establishes the EU's two-fold legitimacy based on the 
representation of citizens of the Union and its Member States. Representation as the 
EU's democratic value is, furthermore, demonstrated through the importance 
attributed to the role of national parliaments in the EU decision making process. 
Second, the Lisbon Treaty enhances the institutional balance of the EU governance. 
In addition, it contributes to creating the link between the governing circles and the 
demos through the mechanism of participation and deliberation giving 'a say' to the 
European citizens. Therefore, the analysis of the democratic evolution of the EU 
culminating in the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty is an illustration of the EU's 
unique democratic system with its specific features justifying the multi-level structure 
of the Union and its dynamic evolving nature. 
Hence, in spite of the much criticised drawbacks of the governance at the EU 
level as opposed to idealised national democracies, it should be concluded that the 
role allocated to the democracy of the Union and its Member States on the agenda of 
the Union proves it as a concept 'valued' by the EU, and thus expresses the EU's 
constitutional commitment to democracy. In this context, the transposition of 
democracy by the EU in its external relations as an element of its normative identity 
can be considered as justified. 
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Despite acknowledged success of the last two rounds of the EU enlargement 
as an example of such transposition, serious inconsistencies in the application of the 
political conditionality should be noticed. While the membership perspective has 
been considered to be a strong catalyst for national transfonnation and the EU has 
been seen to move beyond fonnal criteria at least officially, in practice the 
implementation of the latter did not make the best use of the available legal 
framework. The countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds 
have been considered to satisfy the criteria of modern democracies in general. 
However, the EU largely failed to put specific meaning to this concept. Even those 
features of its own democratic model that can be qualified as democratic values have 
been in the main omitted or not equally paid attention to in the accession documents. 
This allowed for an inadequate approach in evaluating the progress of candidate 
countries, where consistency was often compromised resulting in differentiated 
treatment of candidates, criticism or its absence on certain chosen issues etc. 
Moreover, the political conditionality mattered mainly before opening the accession 
negotiations with candidate countries. 
This conclusion casts another shadow over the potential of the ENP to 
positively influence democratic development of the Southern Caucasian countries. 
While the political conditionality is one of the elements transposed to the ENP from 
the enlargement process, it should be expected to be further compromised due to the 
political nature of the ENP and the new elements of the ENP methodology. 
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c __ VI 
Transposition of Democratic Values to the South Caucasus I: 
Action Plans and their Implementation 
1. Introduction 
From the moment when the states of the South Caucasus were included in the 
ENP, the EU took on the challenge of supporting the democratisation processes of 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. All three states had taken the path of building 
democratic states since gaining independence and had been engaged in a tortuous 
process undermined by external and internal problems. In contrast to the enlargement 
of CEE countries, where the offering of institutional and legislative models by the EU 
coincided with the post-independence identity search,792 in the ENP the EU has had 
to face already established models of governance. The question now is not one of 
establishing a new system, but of improving the system already in place. 
As discussed in previous chapters, despite certain complications, promotion of 
democracy is reflected within both the objectives and the methodology of the ENP. 
The identification of the democratic values of the EU serves as guidance in 
considering the extent to which the ENP promotes these values in the countries of the 
South Caucasus. Therefore, we need to identify those instruments and mechanisms in 
the ENP by which the EU attempts to transform the governance of these states. The 
Action Plans with respect to each of them, the monitoring of their implementation, 
and the assistance programmes will serve as a ground for analysing the extent to 
which the EU upholds its democratic values.793 This will be aimed at revealing 
whether the EU is loyal to its democratic rhetoric and whether the ENP methodology 
792 Grabbe, 'How Does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and 
Diversity,' (2001) 8 Journal of European Public Policy 1013, at 1014. 
793 Baracani identifies these elements as the constituents of the 'ENP method'; Baracani. 'The 
European Neighbourhood Policy: A New Anchor for Contlict Settlement?". Paper presented at 
workshop 'The Study of the European Neighbourhood Policy: Methodological. Theoretical and 
Empirical Challenges', University of Nottingham, 25th-26th October 2007, UACES/ The British 
Academy, at 22. 
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is suitable for democratising the countries of the South Caucasus. This Chapter will 
aim to discuss the Action Plans as the main instrumental basis for the ENP 
implementation in the three countries. 
The PCAs should be largely dismissed as the instrumental basis for political 
conditionality, even though the Action Plans with the three Caucasian states make 
reference to them with respect to the states' priority in strengthening respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Even with their political reorientation with 
the ENP, the PCAs do not largely feature in the ENP's conditionality mechanism and, 
most certainly, the Action Plans should be considered as 'the central point of 
reference' for the application of the ENP conditionality.794 Also the fact that the 
implementation of the Action Plans will be monitored accords them with practical 
importance as opposed to the PCAs.795 Therefore, the Action Plans and their 
implementation will be relied upon to analyse the conditionality in terms of 
credibility of the conditions for compliance as an indicator of values promoted. The 
discussion will proceed in a comparative perspective with reference to democratic 
values ofthe EU as identified in Chapter V. 
The consideration of the process of the Action Plan implementation in the 
three states is instructive in two ways. Firstly, it refers to the institutional and 
operational developments that the implementation of the Action Plan brought about in 
the three countries, therefore questioning the democratic credentials of the ENP 
implementation process in general. This will reveal whether the EU is transposing its 
'democratic deficit' onto its neighbours. The second aspect refers to the place of 
794 Van Vooren, "The Hybrid Legal Nature of the European Neighbourhood Policy' in Maiani. Petro\'. 
Mouliarova, (eds.), European Integration without EU Membership: Models. Experiences. 
Perspectives, EUI Working Papers, MWP 200912010, 17-27, at 17. 
795 Interview with Anonymous Commission official II, DG RELEX, European Commission, 28 April, 
2009, Brussels. For interview transcript see Annex A. 
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issues on the democratic life of each country within the measures on implementation 
of the respective Action Plans. 
As mentioned in the Introductory Chapter, the following part of the thesis is 
partly based on empirical research. Interviews were conducted with European 
Commission officials and representatives of national governments, parliament as well 
as NGOs involved in activities related to the democratisation of the states in question. 
The interviews were conducted in Brussels on January 28th, in Tbilisi on April 6-7th 
and in Yerevan on April 20-21th, 2009. Due to practical reasons, as an Armenian 
citizen from Nagorno-Karabakh, I could not visit Azerbaijan, and therefore no 
interviews have been conducted on ENP implementation in Azerbaijan.796 
The interviews in Brussels were aimed at revealing the role of political reform 
within the ENP, negotiation, implementation and monitoring of the Action Plans. The 
interviews in Georgia and Armenia explored certain issues with respect to the role of 
each institution in the process of the Action Plan implementation and the place the 
issues of democratisation are accorded within the latter. General questions in 
connection to the ENP's leverage with respect to its incentives and future prospects 
connected to the Eastern Partnership have been also addressed. The empirical data 
obtained will be used within this and the next Chapter to test whether the ENP with 
its instruments and mechanisms delivers on promoting democratic values identified in 
Chapter V. 
Within this background, the Chapter will be aimed at analysing the role of the 
Action Plans and their implementation on the potential of the ENP to influence 
political reform in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Thus, the first part of the 
Chapter will focus on the Action Plans as the main instrument for cooperation 
796 Despite these obstacles, contacts have been established with the representatives of ANCEl. Special 
gratitude is expressed to Arzu Abdullayeva for her assistance. 
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between the parties. The main advantages and disadvantages of these instruments will 
be highlighted. Next, comparative analysis of the Action Plans for Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia will be undertaken in order to reveal their consistency with 
the EU's normative image. The democratic aspects of the Action Plan 
implementation in all three countries will then be discussed. The last substantive part 
of the Chapter will reveal the measures undertaken in the three states for the 
implementation of the Action Plans, including their components on democratic 
reform. The Chapter will then conclude on the potential of the Action Plans and their 
implementation to influence democratic reform in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
2. Action Plans: General observations 
In order to consider the Action Plans on the countries of the South Caucasus, a 
brief reference should be made to the Commission Country Reports which served as a 
basis for the preparation of the Action Plans. The Country Reports contained sections 
on political issues, including democracy and the rule of law, human rights and 
freedoms. It has been noted that the South Caucasian Country Reports appeared 
'fairly direct and concrete,' including criticism of the deficiencies of the democratic 
practices.797 The evaluation of democratic issues within the 'Democracy and the rule 
of law' section has been fairly consistent in all three Country Reports as regards the 
details and the issues of concern. The criticism of the Commission in all three Reports 
has revolved around the issues of separation of powers, elections, reform of the 
judiciary, reform of the executive, including the functioning of local authorities and 
the civil service reform. 798 It should be noted that such issues as freedom of the 
797 Bosse, 'Values in the EU's Neighbourhood Policy: Political Rhetoric or Reflection of a Coherent 
Policy?' (2007) 7 European Political Economy Review 38, at 49. 
798 Country Report Georgia, European Neighbourhood Policy, Commission Staff Working Paper, 
SEC(2005) 288/3, section 2.1; Country Report Armenia, European Neighbourhood Policy, 
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media, freedom of expression, participation through NGOs are included within the 
section on 'Human rights and fundamental freedoms.'799 This demonstrates that there 
is no single approach towards the definition of democracy in the external policy of 
the EU, since, for instance, in the definition of democracy in the Agenda 2000, 
freedom of expression and freedom of religion are considered to be elements of the 
democracy element of the political criteria. 800 One would expect the Action Plans to 
adopt a similar stance on the issues to focus on and the detail with which the reforms 
should be undertaken. 
The conditionality principle in all three Action Plans is built up around the 
'shared values' concept, as discussed in Chapter IV. The progress in the development 
of the relationship between parties will depend on the degree of the countries' 
'commitment to common values, as well as [their] capacity to implement jointly 
agreed priorities.' 80 1 The blurred nature of the incentives of the policy, as discussed in 
Chapter IV, are reflected in the South Caucasian Action Plans, casting the first 
shadow on the success of conditionality, already undermined by the absence of a 
membership perspective. According to the Action Plans, an opportunity of an 
'increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation, to involve a significant 
measure of economic integration and a deepening of political cooperation' which 
assumes 'a stake in the EU's Internal Market' and a possibility 'to participate 
progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes' is offered to Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. 802 The Georgian Action Plan goes so far as offering 
Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005) 285/3, section 2.1; Country Report Azerbaijan, 
European Neighbourhood Policy, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005) 286/3, section 2.1. 
799 Section 2.2 of the Country Reports. 
800 See Chapter V, section 3.1. 
801 Introduction, EU/ Armenia Action Plan, EU/Georgia Action Plan, EUI Azerbaijan Action Plan. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eulworldlenp/documentsen.htm#2. 
802 Action Plans, sections 1 and 2. 
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'gradual extension of four freedoms. ,803 Thus, one can say that the EU is being 
responsive to Georgia's European aspirations and is prepared to take the cooperation 
further in comparison with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Also, the more indicative nature 
of incentives in the Georgian Action Plan can suggest that Georgia will be more eager 
to undertake reforms within the ENP. 
Against such incentives the Action Plans in general, and the South Caucasian 
Action Plans in particular, follow the broad Copenhagen criteria stipulating 
conditions of democracy, a market economy and the ability to take on the EU's acquis 
communautaire. 804 The elements of political conditionality, which are democracy, 
human rights, minority rights and the rule of law, have been elevated to priority areas 
in all the three Action Plans. Such prominence of political objectives within the 
Action Plans has been considered to be one of their 'striking' features. 805 Indeed, 
democracy promotion in the South Caucasus was not largely on the agenda before the 
ENP due to the trade and business related core of the PCA. Elevating it to a priority 
area within the ENP can be considered as 'added value' to the normative side of the 
policy. 
Nevertheless, the Action Plans cannot be solely viewed in light of 'weak' 
conditionality. The principles of joint ownership and differentiation most certainly 
played their role in drafting and negotiating of the Action Plans. In this sense, certain 
major distinctions should be noticed in comparison with the Accession Partnership of 
803 EU/Georgia Action Plan, section 2. 
804 EU/ Azerbaijan Action Plan, section 3, priority areas 2, 3, 4, 6, 7; EUiGeorgia Action Plan, section 
3, priority areas 1,2,3: EU/Armenia Action Plan, section 3, priority areas 1,2,3,4,5; Sasse, 'The 
ENP Process and the EU's Eastern Neighbours: 'Conditionality-lite', Socialisation and 'Procedural 
Entrapment', Paper presented at workshop 'The Study of the European Neighbourhood Policy: 
Methodological. Theoretical and Empirical Challenges', University of Nottingham. 25th-26th October 
2007, UACES/ The British Academy, at 12. 
805 Smith, 'The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy,' (2005) 81 International Affairs 757, 
at 765. 
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the pre-accession strategy as their instrumental prototype. 806 The first major 
distinction is apparent in the use of methodology. While the Accession Partnerships 
'were almost written by the Commission officials themselves,' the Action Plans 
should be considered to be the outcome of the negotiations between the Commission 
and the neighbouring countries. 807 
The Accession Partnerships have been noted to strengthen 'the system of the 
quasi-legaVsoft law nature of the Copenhagen criteria' making the latter to look like 
'primary law,'808 the Action Plans are clearly political documents leaving their 
implementation to the good will of neighbours. 809 Thus, as an example of the EU's 
'power of persuasion,' the Action Plans are non-binding documents setting out the 
expectations on behalf of the EU.8\O In other words, the Action Plans contain a 'wish 
list' of the reforms the EU would like the states to implement through the incentives 
offered within the policy.811 For the states involved, this suggests that the EU merely 
indicates the direction for development. 812 
Most importantly, if the Accession Partnerships were drafted to emphasise the 
priorities and intermediate objectives necessary for meeting the Copenhagen 
806 As noted in Chapter IV, the Action Plans generally resemble the Accession Partnerships used 
during the enlargement. 
807 Tulmets, 'Adapting the Experience of Enlargement to the Neighbourhood Policy: the ENP as a 
Substitute to Enlargement?' in Kratochvil, (ed.), The European Union and Its Neighbourhood: 
Policies, Problems and Priorities, (Institute ofIntemational Relations, Prague, 2006), 29-57, at 44; 
Tocci, 'Can the EU Promote Democracy and Human Rights Through the ENP? The Case for 
Refocusing on the Rule of Law' in Cremona and Meloni, (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy: 
A New Frameworkfor Modernisation?, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2007/21, 23-35, at 25. 
808 Hillion, . Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis' in Amull and Wincott. (cds.), 
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 401-
418, at417. 
809 Action Plans, see Introduction. 
810 Cremona, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: More than a Partnership?' in Cremona, (ed.), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 244-299, at 
277. 
811 Interview with Anonymous Commission official I, DG RELEX, European Commission, 28 April, 
2009, Brussels. For interview transcript see Annex A. 
812 Interview with Anonymous Official, State Ministry for European Integration of the Republic of 
Georgia, 7 April 2009, Tbilisi. For interview transcript see Annex B. 
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· . 813 h d . . 
cntena t e raftmg of the ActIon Plans has been a major disappointment in this 
respect. While it has been considered that the Action Plans generally suffer from clear 
vision of the overall picture of the reforms the neighbours should be undertaking,814 
the conditionality is even more undermined in the way the conditions for progress are 
spelled out or, more precisely, are not spelled out. Whereas, it is well known that the 
success of the conditionality will depend on the precision and clarity with which the 
conditions, benchmarks and timeframes are defined. 815 
Not only can the actions be called 'clear benchmarks,' but also most of the 
time they lack precision due to the general nature of the priorities established in the 
absence of specific deadlines, turning the priorities into summarised objectives. 816 
The discrepancy between the initial language on 'shared values' and the final 
outcome in the Action Plans' measures on democracy and human rights is 
particularly obvious, The Action Plans contain rather general and weak language on 
'shared values' in comparison with the ENP Strategy Paper and the accompanying 
Country Reports,8I7 A possible explanation can be is that the EU has shifted its 
priorities in the process of ENP evolution from the logic of political conditionality to 
813 Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure o/Conditionality: Pre-Accession Conditionality in the 
Fields o/Democracy and the Rule of Law, (Austin: Wolters Kluwer law & Business, 2008), at 74. 
814 Kochenov, 'The ENP Conditionality: Pre-Accession Mistakes Repeated' to appear in Pioneer 
Europe? Testing EU Foreign Policy in The Neighbourhood, Delcour and Tulmets, (eds.), (Baden 
Baden: Nomos, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1310780, at 14; Magen. 'The Shadow of 
Enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy Achieve Compliance?', Centre on Democracy, 
Development and the Rule of law, Stanford Institute for International Studies, Working Papers, No 
68, August 2006, at 415. 
815 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 'Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the 
Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', (2004) II Journal 0/ European Public Policy 
661, at 664; Magen, 'The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy Achieve 
Compliance?', Centre on Democracy, Development and the Rule of la\\', Stanford Institute for 
International Studies, Working Papers, No 68, August 2006, at 411; lynch, 'The European 
Neighbourhood Policy,' Institute for Security Studies, June 2004, at 6. 
816 Smith, supra note 17, at 757, 765; Kochenov, supra note 23, at 13; Tocci, supra note 16, at 31; 
Emerson, 'Is there to be a Real European Neighbourhood Policy?' in Youngs, (ed.), Global Europe: 
New Terms of Engagement, Foreign Policy Centre, UK, 2005, 15-22, at 20. 
817 Johansson-Nogues, 'The (Non-) Normative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An 
Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor?' (2007) 7 European Political Economy Review 181, at 
188-189; Bosse, supra note 6, at 50-52. 
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'cooperation with its neighbours aimed at jointly tackling problems of migration and 
border management, securing reliable energy supplies. ,818 
The Action Plans with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are symbolic of this 
trend. The three documents have been noted to have a more general nature in 
comparison with the Ukrainian and Moldovan Action Plans, which are much more 
, 
detailed and focused, and concerns have been expressed by the representatives of 
civil society that the benchmarks of the Action Plans are not as strict as the 
commitments the South Caucasian countries have made to the Council of Europe. 819 
Nevertheless, the Action Plans with the South Caucasian countries include 
priorities and general actions on democratisation. In an interview, a Commission 
official explained that the EU's position that democracy is a necessary precondition 
for cooperation makes it distinct from other international actors. 820 However, the 
mere fact of prioritising measures on democratic development is not sufficient, and 
the way the conditions for adherence to democratic values are established in the 
Action Plan brings into doubt the distinct position of the EU. 
3. Democratic values in the Action Plans with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan 
There is a presumption that short term interests in energy security, crisis 
management and the fight against international crime and corruption in relations 
between the EU and the countries of the South Caucasus take precedence over 
democracy promotion, which is considered to have 'secondary' importance in all 
three countries. 82 I A closer look at the Action Plans with each of the countries is 
required to identify the place of democracy promotion. 
818 Tocci, supra note 16, at 31. 
819 'Contlict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The Eli's Role', International Crisis Group, Europe 
Report No 173, 20 March 2006, at 13. 
820 Anonymous Commission official I, Annex A. 
821 Bosse, supra note 6, at 57. 
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3.1. EUIArmenia Action Plan 
While political refonns are envisaged within the first two priority areas, it 
should be noted that the major focuses of the Action Plan with Annenia can be 
considered to be on economic liberalisation, legislative refonn in line with the 
economic acquis, and energy strategy.822 The actions on political refonn reflect the 
substance of the Copenhagen political criteria, including democracy, the rule of law, 
protection of human rights, and rights of minorities. Both priority areas contain rather 
long lists of actions, the negotiation of which did not cause any opposition by the 
Annenian side. 823 It is assumed that the principle of joint ownership should not have 
significantly affected the negotiation process of the document, since the country does 
not have any effective leverage with the EU. 
The specific actions in priority area 1 are devoted to strengthening of 
democratic structures and the rule of law, thus mixing these two concepts in one. A 
deviation from the Country Report should be noted at the outset in respect to the 
issues the parties decided to prioritise within the Action Plan. Similar to the Country 
Report, the Action Plan requires actions on proper implementation of the 
constitutional refonn, ensuring better separation of powers. However, as regards the 
operation of the three branches of power, the main focus is on the independence and 
functioning of the judiciary and refonn of the executive, including the functioning of 
local self-government and refonn of the civil service. Refonn of the judiciary is 
particularly prominent with the necessity of undertaking legislative and institutional 
822 Actions for encouraging further economic development, further improvement of investment climate 
and strengthening of private sector-led growth, further convergence of economic legislation and 
administrative practices, development of energy strategy are the main priority areas; EU/ Armenia 
Action Plan, section 3, priority areas 3, 4, 5, 6. 
823 Interview with Anonymous Commission official III, DG RELEX, European Commission, 28 April, 
2009, Brussels. For interview transcript see Annex A. 
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refonn. 824 The operation of the Parliament or political parties is a largely neglected 
area. Consistent with the Country Report, a full compliance of the electoral 
framework with OSCE commitments and recommendations of the Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe is required by amending the Electoral Code 
and improving electoral administration. 
Thus, within a general trend to make references to international instruments 
rather than to specific EU values,825 in the area of democratisation, references are 
commonly made to the international obligations of the states, meaning that the EU 
does not create additional obligations and merely calls the neighbouring countries' 
attention to the commitments they had previously undertaken. This justifies the 
reliance on behalf of the Commission during the assessment of the progress on 
reports from relevant international organisations. Such 'multilateralism' 826 is a shared 
feature of all the three Action Plans. 
Also in line with the Country Report, issues such as ensuring the 
independence of the media through strengthening the independent regulatory body for 
public and private broadcasters which are responsible for awarding broadcasting 
licenses and supervision, is included in the Human Rights section. 827 These priority 
actions are to be implemented again in compliance with the international obligations 
824 Special attention in relation to the principle of separation of powers is paid to the independence of 
judiciary, as well as on laws for the procuracy in order to enhance procedures aimed at independence, 
impartiality, appointment and promotion of prosecutors, and the scope of their powers. Another action 
directly refers to the status of the Council of Justice (the Council of Justice is responsible for drafting 
the annual list of judges, based on which the President of the country appoints the judges.), 
independence of which should be guaranteed from the legislative and the executive branches. It should 
be ensured that the Council is able to guarantee the independence of the judiciary and is the only and 
final instance with regard to issues related to the activities of judges and magistrates. 
825 Cremona. 'Values in the EU Constitution: the External Dimension'. Centre on Democracy. 
Development and the Rule of Law'. Stanford Institute for International Studies, Working Papers. No 
26, 2 November 2004, at 11. 
826 Khasson, Vasilyan, Vos. 'Everybody Needs Good Neighbours': The Ell and its Neighbourhood' in 
Orbie, (ed.), Europe's Global Role: External Policies o/the EU, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 240-257, 
at 225. 
827 Priority area 2 of EU/ Armenia Action Plan. 
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of the country, including under PCA, Council of Europe, OSCE and UN. However, 
the operation of NGOs and public participation, noted in the Country Report, did not 
find any place in the list of priorities. 
It should be noted, that, with the exception of the priority of developing the 
Ombudsman institution and the electoral framework with a clear reference to an 
international standard,828 the rest of the priorities appear to be a general call to 
develop and adopt laws without any specific reference to their content. What these 
actions do is rather generally state the ultimate objective. In addition, the actions not 
only lack precision in substance, but also, most of the time, no concrete deadlines are 
envisaged for their implementation. In the view of the Action Plan being adopted for 
five years timeframe, it is unfortunate that only four actions have a deadline, which 
was 2006. Such allocation of reform time-wise is particularly at odds with the fact 
that the Action Plans with South Caucasian countries were endorsed in late 2006. In 
this context, the Armenian Action Plan is a standing proof of the criticism voiced in 
the previous section. 
The inadequate approach to democracy promotion as opposed to the rhetoric 
ofthe ENP on 'shared values' is not confined to priority areas solely. Besides priority 
areas, the Action Plan contains section 4 on General Objectives and Actions which 
are noted to complement the prioritised actions. It is rather odd that the document is 
drafted from the specific to the general, where the specific actions are presented first 
and mostly without precision and detail. Similar observation can be noted as regards 
the Action Plans with Georgia and Azerbaijan. While from a legal perspective, such 
composition of the document can be viewed as demonstrating lack of precision, it 
828 In relation to the development of the Human Rights Ombudsman's institution "Paris Principles" 
based on UN General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of December 1993 have been emphasised. The 
development of the electoral framework shall take place in line with OSCE/ODIHR and CoE Venice 
Commission recommendations. 
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nevertheless should be kept in mind that the Action Plans are political documents, 
non-binding in nature, and not even signed by any of the EU institutions. M29 In this 
respect, the actions included in the different sections of the Action Plan are 
considered to be a 'wish list' the EU would like the partner country to implement and 
the allocation of sections is purely 'a matter of presentation.'83o While this might 
entail that there is no major difference between the actions within the prioritised areas 
and those under section 4.1.1, according to the Action Plans the progress of the 
relationship inter alia will depend on the partner's capacity to implement jointly 
agreed priorities. This suggests that the priorities should overweigh the general 
actions in section 4.1.1. 
An even longer list of actions of democratic reforms is contained in section 
4.1.1. Certain vital issues for Armenian political life which were disregarded or paid 
little attention in the priority areas have been included on this list. Therefore, greater 
attention is paid to local self-governance, in particular strengthening capacities of 
local communities and civil service institutions are among these actions. 831 This is 
more detailed than the brief action on development of local self-governance 
mentioned in priority area 1 in relation to constitutional reform without any specific 
indicators or particular components highlighted. Another issue as regards the reform 
of the executive is civil service reform, with wide-ranging actions on the agenda. 
The general actions include the functioning of the political parties in Armenia 
and strengthening of political pluralism by encouraging co-operation between 
Armenian and EU political parties and legislative bodies, as well as the establishment 
of clear and transparent rules on party financing. As noted in Chapter II the 
829 Anonymous Commission official I, Annex B. 
830 Ibid. 
831 This reform shall take place in line with European standards and the implementation of the 
European Charter of Local SelfGovemment. 
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functioning of political parties is a vital issue for the functioning of the Annenian 
Parliament. On the one hand, considering its omission from priority areas, the 
inclusion of this activity within the general actions should be welcomed. On the other 
hand, taking into account the importance the EU attributes to the role of the 
Parliament and to the issue of citizens' participation, omitting this action in 
combination with a general silence on the activity of the Parliament in the priority 
areas is a clear retreat from the EU's democratic values. 
Another major issue omitted from the priority areas and included in the 
general actions is the development of civil society which is important in the context 
of citizens' participation in the political life of the country. However, no details as to 
how or in which direction civil society should develop are identified, thus turning it 
into another general call for action without much substance to it. 
Hence, it can be noted that most of the actions are general in nature and lack 
specificity as regards particular measures or dates of implementation. As noted by a 
Commission official, lack of specificity should not necessarily be considered 
negatively, since restricting actions to certain measures and deadlines will 'bind the 
hands' of the parties. 832 From this perspective the imprecision inherent in the Action 
Plan allows the partner country to choose measures of implementation flexibly and 
decide its own timetable. On the other hand, this not only undennines conditionality 
by blurring the conditions in addition to incentives, but also potentially creates a loop 
hole to avoid implementation of this or that action for an indefinite tenn. Moreover, 
this throws into question the basis on which the Commission is supposed to evaluate 
the progress of the ENP partners. 
832 Anonymous Commission official III, Annex A. 
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3.2. EU/Georgia Action Plan 
It has been suggested that among the three South Caucasian countries, 
Georgia is the one which puts 'the strongest emphasis on political reform and human 
rights standards.,833 At the start of the ENP, Georgia was viewed as a country with a 
credible potential for making major progress in the short term and one of the most 
suitable countries for the implementation of the ENP. 834 Political commitments made 
by the Georgian government seemed to coincide with the EU's position on 
democracy promotion through the ENP and its enthusiasm to support Georgia by 
changing the direction of the 'leader based' reforms to a more 'programme or 
ideology' oriented reforms.835 
Therefore, it is in the case of Georgia that one would expect to encounter a 
clearly expressed commitment to democratic reform in the main document that sets 
out the conditions for cooperation between the parties. The Georgian Action Plan is a 
disappointment in this sense. Although it has been noted that despite Georgia's main 
emphasis on conflict resolution during the Action Plan negotiations, the EU was 
pushing for democratic and economic reform,836 the actions on democratic reform 
prioritised in the document do not manifest evidence of a concerted effort. 
It is striking that the Georgian Action Plan merges together not only 
democracy and the rule of law, but also protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms within one priority area combining a short list of actions to be implemented 
833 Balfour, 'Promoting Human Rights and Democracy in the EU's Neighbourhood: Tools, Strategies 
and Dilemmas' in Balfour and Missiroli, Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy. EPC Issue 
Paper No. 54, June 2007, at 20. 
834 Anonymous Commission Official I, Annex A.. 
835 Ibid; Interview with Anonymous Official, State Ministry for European Integration of the Republic 
of Georgia, 7 April 2009, Tbilisi. For interview transcript see Annex B. 
836 Popescu, 'Europe's Unrecognised Neighbours: The EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia', Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Working Document No 260/March 2007, at 8-9. 
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in compliance with Georgia's international obligations under PCA, Council of 
Europe, OSCE and UN. 837 
Within this priority area the major focus is on the refonn of the judiciary by 
continuing the criminal justice refonn which was taking place within the EUJUST 
Rule of Law Mission. 838 The prioritised measures primarily relate to the refonn of the 
judiciary according to European standards in order to ensure proper separation of 
powers, independence of the judiciary, prosecution, as well as the police and law 
enforcement agencies.839 These generally framed actions come without any 
intennediary deadlines. 
The only more or less detailed actions are required regarding the conduct of 
local (2006), parliamentary (2008) and presidential (2009) elections in Georgia in 
accordance with international standards, through the implementation of 
OSCE/ODIHR and Council of Europe recommendations. In particular, the need for a 
reliable voter registry and a functioning and transparent electoral commission has 
been noted. In addition to this, Georgia is required to develop a functioning civil 
register by the end of 2009. Inclusion of these measures indicates the emphasis the 
EU puts on the representative element of Georgia's unstable post-revolutionary 
democracy. 
Calls for action as regards civil service refonn and the finalisation and 
implementation of a strategy and programme for local government refonn in 
837 EU/Georgia Action Plan, section 3, priority are 3.1. 
838 Adoption of a new Criminal Procedural Code by 2007 is envisaged. Some actions are provided for 
the prohibition of torture, such as implementation of the recommendation of the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (notably to improve 
detention conditions) and implementation of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against 
Torture. 
839 These measures include improvement of training of judges, prosecutors, and officials in judiciary, 
Ministry of Justice administration, police and prisons, in particular with regard to the human rights 
issues and judicial internal cooperation; improved access to justice notably through the establishment 
of an effective legal aid system; penitentiary and probation service; system of execution of Court 
decisions. 
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accordance with Council of Europe recommendations, are included within the same 
priority area. 840 While this is particularly important to ensure bottom-up decision 
making through decentralisation of governance, 84 1 the absence of deadlines and 
concrete benchmarks do not take account of political conditionality. These are the 
only actions prioritised in the document, where such important issues as the 
separation of powers, checks and balances, the role of the Parliament are excluded. 
Accordingly, one can conclude that such elements of democratic governance that the 
EU has been so keen to develop itself and protect in its Member States, such as 
representation of citizens in the Parliament and elements of liberal democratic 
governance, are not being highlighted. 
Certain assumptions can be made in relation to such a permissive approach 
towards democratic reform in comparison with the Armenian Action Plan. One 
reason stems from the consideration that Georgia was already committed to 
democratic values. Nevertheless, it has been acknowledged by the Commission that, 
despite the short-term reforms which were considered to be a start of a promising 
process, democracy building requires long-term commitment. 842 Therefore, the 
serious problems with the functioning of democratic institutions and the factual 
failures in the democratic practices of Georgia after the Rose Revolution should not 
have been ignored by the EU. In addition, taking into account Georgia's orientation 
towards European integration, the EU's failure to put a stronger emphasis on 
democratic reform should be considered as a major omission by the Commission, 
840 It also includes actions related to the rule of law, such as adoption of a public service reform 
strategy and legislation for the civil service in order to improve good governance and transparency; 
EU/Georgia Action Plan, Priority Area 1. 
841 It has been noted that despite certain legislative reforms, power significantly rests with regional and 
Tbilisi-based officials and further decentralisation of power is required with clarification of powers and 
competencies between central and local levels; Georgia Country Programme Action Plan 2006-2010, 
UNDP Georgia, section 2.5; 'Georgia's Armenian and Azeri Minorities'. International Crisis Group. 
Europe Report No. 178, 22 November 2006, at 12. 
842 Anonymous Commission official I, Annex A. 
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especially taking into account that Georgia is considered to be a country, where, 
according to a Commission official, the ENP is perceived to have the potential to 
deliver. 843 
In addition to the priority actions, like the Action Plan on Annenia, section 
4.1.1 on democracy and the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
the Georgian Action Plan provides for general actions complementing the priorities. 
The actions aimed at democratisation in this section can be summarised around the 
reform of the judiciary, civil service and the strengthening of Parliament. 
Strengthening Parliament is required particularly so that it can fulfil its oversight role 
(including in the security and defence sector) and establishing clear rules regarding 
lobbying and conflicts of interests. Also, encouraging greater political pluralism by 
strengthening the role and functioning of political parties is required. However, 
including these important actions within general actions will not necessarily lead to 
the Georgian authorities' giving urgent attention to matters of political pluralism and 
strengthening of the Parliament. The mere inclusion of such vital issues in the section 
on general actions is symptomatic of the importance they were accorded at the time. 
An action on raising the level of legal expertise and law-screening in the 
processes of harmonisation of Georgian legislation with the European standards is 
also included in the part on strengthening democratic institutions. This potentially 
suggests a differentiated approach to Georgia, which nevertheless is not urgent as it is 
not prioritised. It should be noted that the issues of citizens' participation, including 
through development of civil society, have been generally disregarded in the 
Georgian Action Plan. 
843 Anonymous Commission official I, Annex A. 
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Thus, the few priority and general actions mainly constructed around the 
reform of the judiciary without any precision and mostly without deadlines are rather 
strong indicators as to the actual position of the EU on democracy promotion within 
the ENP. Such a soft approach towards democratic reform with a country which has 
strong commitment to EU integration should be considered as an omission on behalf 
of the Commission. In addition, the country does not have strong leverage on the EU 
to suggest that as a result of joint ownership and differentiation the EU had to retreat 
from its normative approach in contrast with Azerbaijan, discussed below. 
3.3. EUIAzerbai.jan Action Plan 
It has been noted that due to EU's interests in closer energy relations with 
Azerbaijan, its concern for political reforms has been 'low key. ,844 The Action Plan is 
instructive in terms of the place accorded to democratic reform, taking into account 
Azerbaijan's democratic record. In this sense the Azerbaijan's Action Plan is 
outstanding in respect to the democratic priorities. There are four very generally 
fonnulated actions in the priority area 2 on strengthening democracy in the country. 
Balfour's observation that, as a result of the principle of joint ownership, the 
Action Plans can be 'less incisive in identifying political and human rights priorities' 
in comparison with the Country Strategy Papers,845 is particularly apt in Azerbaijan's 
case. It has been noted that the principle of joint ownership comes down to the 
negotiation process, where in order to reach out to the opposite party to accept the 
document, it is necessary to take into account actions the party is not willing to 
undertake or to impose no deadlines. 846 Another factor affecting the composition of 
844 Emerson, Noutcheva, Popescu, 'European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years on: Time indeed for 
an 'ENP Plus", Centre for European Policy Studies, Policy Briefs, No 126, 21 March 2007, Annex: 
Perceptions of the ENP Partner States. 
845 Balfour, supra note 42, at 19. 
846 Anonymous Commission official II. Annex A. 
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the Action Plan is the subjectivity inherent in the nature of the negotiation process, 
where different desk officers from the Commission deal with different countries and 
their negotiating position might reflect their own views. 847 These views can be 
affected by either nonnative or rationalist considerations. 
It can be suggested that these views will be based on the EU's interests in a 
particular country. Therefore it was to be expected that in the Azerbaijani Action Plan 
the EU would engage more closely in the energy sector, and less in the areas of 
democratisation and conflict prevention.848 The fact that the priority area 1 is 
dedicated to the contribution to the peaceful resolution of Nagomo-Karabakh conflict 
also demonstrates the stronger leverage Azerbaijan has in relations with the EU in 
comparison with its neighbours. 
The actions within priority area 2 evolve around the issue of elections, 
including the continuous reform of the electoral process and the conduct of elections 
in line with general reference to the Council of Europe and OSCE standards without 
any precision or deadlines. Common reference to continue institutional reforms to 
ensure proper checks and balances between executive and legislative powers in 
conformity with the commitments to the Council of Europe is also among the priority 
actions. The last actions within priority area 2 are legislative and administrative 
refonns aimed at strengthening of local self-government. Despite the criticism 
addressed to the Action Plans with Armenia and Georgia, the Azerbaijan Action Plan 
is a more striking example of the EU preserving the normative rhetoric, but limiting 
its call for reform to a minimum without complementing it with substantive content. 
Taking into account Azerbaijan's democratic practice, the priorities seem to be 
847 Ibid. 
848 Nuriyev, 'EU Policy in the South Caucasus: A View from Azerbaijan', Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Working Document No. 272/July 2007, at 22. 
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rhetorical statements used in political dialogue, and merely fulfil a 'box ticking 
exercise.' 
Moreover, Azerbaijan's Action Plan also demonstrates inconsistency in 
comparison with the Armenian and Georgian Action Plans, where an action on the 
improvement of organisation of the judiciary is included in the priority area 3 on the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. As in the 
case of the Georgian and Armenian Action Plans reference is made to the compliance 
with the country's international obligations under PCA, Council of Europe, OSCE, 
VN. This priority area also contains an action on the development of civil society. 
The broad requirement to promote the growth of civil society and its organised forms 
is complemented with a more specific requirement to alleviate the complicated 
procedures required for NGO registration, though without any deadline. 
Similar to Action Plans with Armenia and Georgia, section 4 on general 
objectives and actions provides for further actions complementing the priorities. 
Section 4.1.1 on democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
also provides for a shorter list than those in the Armenian and Georgian Action Plans. 
References formulated similar to priority actions are made to the reform of electoral 
process and local governance. Reform of the judicial system, together with civil 
service reform and administrative capacity building are envisaged, merely indicating 
the ultimate objectives. 
3.4. Analysis of the Action Plans 
To summarise the review of the Action Plans with the three countries, it 
should be emphasised that a major retreat is noted on behalf of the EU in comparison 
with the initial focus on democratic values. The focus on political reforms has been 
largely decreased to rhetorical actions framed in the most general possible terms. 
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The application of the principle of differentiation is rather noticeable, since 
despite certain common features in all three countries, such as elections and proper 
functioning of the judiciary, certain differences are apparent in relation to the varying 
focus of action. However, the principle of differentiation is not applied to highlight 
those features of governances which are particularly problematic in this or that 
country. In this context the principle of differentiation as an element of the ENP 
methodology was not used where it was needed the most ~ o o highlight the obstacles 
the three states face, such as the patronage networks in Azerbaijan or some particular 
post Revolutionary reforms in Georgia. The Action Plans do not demonstrate a 
consistent approach as regards the elements of the democratic governance valued in 
the ED. 
Thus, a rather weak approach is apparent in relation to such important issues 
for all three countries, as the activity of the Parliament, separation of powers, and 
efficient functioning of checks and balances system. The absence of citizens' 
participation issues and the development of civil society is another manifestation of 
the fallback position the EU undertook in promoting participation and deliberation as 
an element of democratic governance. It appears that mostly the formal prerequisites 
of democracy as entailed by the obligations of the countries in various international 
organisations will be the ones requiring attention. 
In this respect, the overview of the Action Plans suggests that the EU does not 
offer its democratic values to the countries of the South Caucasus. It rather relies on 
the obligations of the countries in other international organisations, such as the 
Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN. One of the possible explanations for this 
position might be found in the soft law nature of the Action Plans, where the EU is 
aware that the states ultimately are not bound by these documents. Therefore, in order 
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to achieve at least a certain level of compliance, reference is made to the obligations 
of the neighbouring countries in the organisations, they may have obligations under 
international treaties or potentially risk losing membership, as in the case of the 
Council of Europe. This also explains the reliance on the PCAs as a source for 
international obligations of the three countries, which despite its economic core, 
nevertheless has binding legal force. 
From this perspective, the reliance on partners' obligations in other 
international organisations should be evaluated positively since the EU ultimately 
endeavours to ensure that democratic reforms are taking place in the three countries. 
However, this also suggests that the EU will not be taking a prominent role in 
democratising the South Caucasian states within the ENP. This might be dangerous in 
terms of the countries' perception of the EU's attitude towards democratic reform: the 
EU does not add anything to the requirements they already had to satisfy, therefore 
rendering its role in democratising the South Caucasian countries as supplementary or 
ancillary to other international organisations. 
Even within this supplementary attitude a serious retreat on the part of the EU 
is particularly notable in the case of Azerbaijan, where the drafting of the relevant 
priority areas suggests that as a part of general approach the EU appears to require 
democracy-building, but in fact limits it to calls of general character. While the case 
of Azerbaijan can be viewed as an outcome of joint ownership of the process, the 
Georgian case is also instructive in this sense. Despite the country's aspirations 
towards the EU, even in this case the EU did not use its leverage to push for 
democratic reforms. 
It is perceived in the European Commission that the implementation of the 
actions included will potentially tum the relevant countries into EU membership 
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candidates. 849 However, even in the case of Georgia, which has the most expressed 
European aspirations, the Action Plan's provisions on democratic reform do not seem 
to be of any assistance, where they fail to establish a clear and detailed set of actions 
that would address currently existing drawbacks in the governance and would in fact 
contribute to genuine democratic development. In this context, one can conclude, that 
whereas in the case of Azerbaijan the rationalist considerations have been prioritised, 
the example of Georgia generally calls into question the EU's adherence to its 
democratic values even in the case of a willing country, which is hardly affected by 
the element of joint ownership in the ENP's methodology. 
Not only do the priorities and general actions on democratic reforms lack 
substance, precision and time-frames, but they also fail to prioritise democratic 
reform over the other areas. This introduces a challenge in terms of prioritising 
among priorities fi·om both the Ell and the partner countries' perspectives. Two 
possible scenarios for partner countries might be envisaged. Under the first scenario, 
the country might be regarded as reluctant to undertake democratic reforms, and the 
fact of presence of various other priority areas serves as an escape point. Under the 
second scenario, there are other pressing matters for the country, such as economic 
development or poverty reduction, requiring shifting of efforts, thus distracting even a 
'willing' country's efforts. 
The second scenario seems to fit the Georgian reality where, despite Georgia's 
post-revolutionary democracy-oriented Government, pressing domestic or external 
factors have required urgent attention by the Government, thus postponing the 
democratic reform. The external environment of Russian embargos and military 
pressures has had a distracting effect on Georgia's political reforms, requiring the 
849 Anonymous Commission official III, Annex A. 
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Government to concentrate on short-tenn priorities.85o This is a clear example of the 
geopolitics of the region impeding the success of the ENP. Thus, after the August 
2008 war, the President announced a new wave of democratic refonns which were 
welcomed by the EU,85J 
In any case, the second scenario suggests that democratic refonns should be 
prioritised externally by the EU with a similar approach as to pre-accession, where 
the opening of accession negotiations depended on the fulfilment of political 
criteria. 852 Otherwise, urgent economic, social or other issues will distract not only 
the willing government's efforts but also its capability to concentrate on political 
refonn. The other side of the coin is the implementation of conditionality 
'under multiple criteria' by the EU. Should the EU advance relations with a party 
which, despite worsening democracy, makes progress in other areas of cooperation, 
such as energy or economic development?853 This potentially creates a major source 
for what Maier and Schimmelfennig have called 'goal conflict and inconsistency 
within the ENP.'854 This conflict within the ENP is particularly apparent when 
considering the importance of the democratic refonn in comparison with the 
enlargement experience. In the absence of a strong precondition such the opening of 
negotiations with candidate countries, democratic refonn as it is currently presented 
in the non-binding Action Plans will be unlikely to cause major developments. 
However, it can be suggested that the Eastern Partnership initiative provides 
for the possibility of creating an equivalent to opening the accession negotiations 
850 Popescu, supra note 45, at 20. 
851 Anonymous Commission official I, Annex A. 
852 Smith, 'The Evolution and Application ofEU Membership Conditionality' in Crcmona. (ed.), The 
EnlargementoJthe European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),105-139, at 114. 
853 Kelley, 'New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Learning and Adaptation in tlie New European 
Neighbourhood Policy', (2006) 44 Journal o/Common Market Stl/dies 29, at 51. 
854 Maier and Schimmelfennig. 'Shared Values: Democracy and Human Rights' in Weber. Smith and 
Baun, (eds.), Governing Europe's Neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2007), 39-57, at 43. 
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factor. First, the conclusion of new agreements can be used for requesting significant 
democratic reform from partners. Even if the new agreements are concluded without 
preconditions, strict compliance with democratic conditionality should be required 
within such a binding document for any further development of the relations. 
4. Action Plan implementation in the South Caucasus: 
Democratic credentials of the process 
As noted in the Introduction, the interviews conducted in Georgia and 
Armenia were partly directed at identifying the leading actors in the process of Action 
Plan implementation, the distribution of roles between the executive and the 
legislature, and the participation of civil society in Georgia and Armenia. These 
findings will be presented together with certain comments. 
It has been noted that the openness of national elites in post-communist 
countries is considered to be one of the major factors affecting the EU's influence.855 
The openness of national elites to influence from the EU, in particular through the 
ENP, should be judged according to whether the countries are willing to create a 
necessary framework for that influence, or in other words for the ENP Action Plans 
implementation. This first of all assumes assigning the task of policy programming 
and monitoring to certain institutions of the state. 
Within the enlargement experience there were two prominent approaches to 
the issue of institutional arrangements, including the assignment of relevant 
responsibilities to a certain ministry or the establishment of a separate institution 
responsible for the integrative processes. 856 All three South Caucasian Republics have 
distinct approaches to these matters which indirectly reflect the level of each 
8S5 Grabbe, supra note I, at 1015. 
856 Ibid, at 10 18. 
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country's political commitment and at the same time reflects on the ENP's 
methodology. 
4.1. Georgia 
Considering that Georgia has been classified as a 'willing' neighbour,857 it is 
not surprising to find a separate institution in Georgia entrusted with the task of EU 
integration. The State Ministry for European Integration is a permanent institution 
that deals with the process of EU integration that was established in 2004 after the 
Revolution.8s8 The Vice Prime-Minister holds the position of Minister for EU 
integration, thus ensuring a high level of political representation. In addition, a State 
Committee on Integration to the EU was established. It is chaired by the Prime 
Minister, and essentially repeats the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers. After 
establishment of this Committee, the State Ministry for EU and Euro-Atlantic 
integration started to serve as the Secretary to it. The main task of the Committee is to 
coordinate the activity of the Government in the area of European integration. 859 
Apart from these vertical institutions there is also a horizontal network involving 
officials responsible for the issues of EU integration in each ministry as experts and 
also a relevant Vice-Minister or vice head of other state institutions, such as agencies 
or others. 860 
In addition to this, a Committee on European Integration was established in 
2004 within the Georgian Parliament with the main task of assisting in the process of 
harmonisation of Georgian legislation to that of the EU. It introduced, inter alia, a 
legislative amendment obliging all initiators of legislation to ensure non-contradiction 
857 Tocci, supra note 16, at 27. 
858 Later on the task of the Ministry was widened to include also the Euro-Atlantic integration; 
Anonymous Official, State Ministry for European Integration of Georgia, Annex 8. 
859 Ibid. 
860 Ibid. 
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to EU rules. 861 It is interesting to note how the Committee perceives the role of the 
Parliament in the process of ENP implementation. 
Two possible scenarios for Parliament's involvement have been identified by 
the Chairman of the Committee, including initiation of the legislation and the 
monitoring of the process. 862 Taking into account the number of legislative acts to be 
adopted and the fact that the executive is better positioned for identifying the areas 
where priority action is required, involvement in the ENP implementation process by 
scrutinising Government's activity is considered to be more adequate for the 
Georgian Parliament. 863 This position suggests that the Parliament's participation in 
ENP implementation is limited to the general procedure of monitoring the 
Government's activity, where the Government will have the awareness and the 
leading role in the reforms being undertaken within the ENP. Thus, the already weak 
Georgian Parliament will be left out of the main process of undertaking reforms in the 
country. The Government will not be challenged as to the course of reforms, 
ultimately undermining the role of the Georgian Parliament. If this pattern of 
institutional functioning within the ENP continues, then the criticism that the 
democratic deficit has been transposed by the enlargement process864 will also be 
valid in the case of the ENP, and will be clearly against the EU's position on the role 
of Parliament in democratic governance. 
Therefore, it is the Government who decides the main directions for the 
Action Plan implementation which takes place on an annual basis. The State Ministry 
for EU Integration in cooperation with other Ministries prepares annual programmes 
established in the form of a matrix. The matrix provides for the main indicators for 
861 Interview with David Darchiashvili, Chairman of the Committee on EU Integration, Parliament of 
the Republic of Georgia, 7 April 2009, Tbilisi. For interview transcript see Annex B. 
862 Ibid. 
863 Ibid. 
864 See Chapter V, section 3.2. 
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the Action Plan implementation, which are the measures to be undertaken by 
responsible institutions, deadlines for various measures and the allocated financial 
assistance. 865 The Government's leading role in the Action Plan implementation is 
also strengthened by the fact that the latter is in charge of the assistance received from 
the EU. 866 
Apart from the role of the Government and the Parliament, one should note 
the role of civil society in the process of ENP implementation. Georgia's civil society 
appears to be very willing to undertake a serious role in programming and monitoring 
ENP implementation. At the state of elaboration of the Action Plan, in September 
2005, some 70 civil organisations forwarded recommendations to the Georgian 
Government. 867 The Government officials claimed many of these recommendations 
served as a basis for its activity.868 This suggests that the Government initially 
expressed a willingness to involve civil society. 
The same association ofNGOs established a monitoring group in 2006, which 
continues to function today, by organising the public debate around the issues of EU 
integration, as well as maintaining the dialogue with the representatives of the 
Commission and the European Parliament. 869 Despite its readiness and enthusiasm to 
become involved in the process and raise public awareness, civil society currently 
faces certain barriers. The absence of any fonnal or official arena for establishing 
contact between not only the Government and the civil society, but also the EU 
. If"l . 870 representatives, was noted to be an obstacle for the mvo vement 0 CIVI society. 
865 Anonymous Official, State Ministry for European Integration of Georgia. Annex B. 
866 See Chapter VII below, section 3.2. 
867 Interview with Ivane Chkhikvadze, Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 6 April, 2009, Tbilisi; Eurasia 
Partnership Foundation is a public organisation with a mandate to increase civic participation inter alia 
in the area of EU integration., for interview transcript see Annex B; Report. 'Civil Society on priorities 
of the ENP Action Plan for Georgia 2007-2009', available at www.enp.ge. 
868 Ibid. 
869 Ibid. 
870 Ivane Chkhikvadze, Annex B. 
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Therefore, the actual engagement is left to informal contacts and personal 
relationships.87l Examples of informal practice are the participation of the 
representatives of civil society in the meetings of the Parliament's Committee on 
European Integration, which in its tum forwards the recommendations made by civil 
society to the Government. 872 
Despite the informal practices, it has been reported in 2008 that the 
Government does not disclose relevant information to the public, and the 
representatives of the Government do not participate in meetings and discussions 
organised by the public sector. 873 One can conclude that although at the outset of the 
process the Government seemed to be responsive to the enthusiasm of civil society, 
lack of transparency and the absence of any formal framework obliging the parties to 
make contact with civil society undermines the ability of the civil society to playa 
serious role in the ENP implementation process. This not only makes the process of 
ENP implementation elite-driven, but also deprives the civil society of one of its main 
functions; ensuring the public discourse and deliberation, which could potentially 
have led to political participation valued by the EU. In its tum, public participation 
will not be possible without public awareness. Certain constraints are identified here 
as well. 
It has been noted that during a sociological survey undertaken in the country 
in 2006, the vast majority of the population supported Georgia's integration into the 
EU.874 However, the public lacks knowledge as to the EU itself and the process ofEU 
871 Civil Society and Monitoring Implementation ofENP AP. Civil Society Survey Results. Open 
Society Georgia Foundation and Eurasia Partnership Foundation. Tbilisi 2008. 
872 Ivane Chkhikvadze, Annex B. 
m Civil Society and Monitoring Implementation of ENP AP, Civil Society Survey Results, Open 
Society Georgia Foundation and Eurasia Partnership Foundation, Tbilisi 2008. 
874 David Darchiashvili, Annex B. 
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integration, including its 'costs and benefits.'875 According to the representatives of 
the Government and the Parliament, measures are undertaken to provide objective 
information on European integration, EU values and institutions.l!76 Nevertheless, 
these measures are considered to be insufficient, especially due to the passive attitude 
of the media to enlighten the public on the EU matters. 877 It has been noted that only 
18% of the population consider they have sufficient knowledge about the EU to make 
an informed decision about country's future integration.878 Moreover, any awareness 
is mostly restricted to the capital; the regions are even less knowledgeable of the 
process of European integration. 879 The weak system of local governance should be 
assumed to add to participative incapacity of the population in the regions. 
To sum up, the results of the interviews presented above, it can be noted that 
the unawareness of the public and restricted opportunities of the civil society leave 
the process of ENP implementation to political institutions. Here, the power 
distribution between the executive and the legislature brings us back to the criticism 
regarding the EU' s transposition of its democratic deficit to the pre-accession 
process. Major political and economic reforms undertaken in the country with the 
leadership of the executive and with minimal involvement by the Parliament, isolated 
efforts of the civil society and an unaware public, are factors that raise questions 
about the credibility of the process not only as regards formal representative 
875 Ivane Chkhikvadze, Annex B. 
876 According to the representative ofthe Parliament bulletins with information on the EU are 
published through the Parliament's Information Centre established as a result of an EU project on 
strengthening the Parliament; Anonymous Official, State Ministry for European Integration, Georgia; 
Mr. Darchiashvili, Annex B. 
877 Ivane Chkhikvadze, Annex B. 
878 'Georgian National Voter Study,' October-November 2005, JRI, US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Baltic Surveysffhe Gallup Organization, JPM. 
879 I vane Chkhikvadze, Annex B. 
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elements. They also undennine substantive elements of democracy, including 
political participation valued by the EU. 880 
4.2. Armenia 
Though Armenia has been classified as a 'hesitant' partner. 881 major 
institutional developments took place in the country manifesting its detennination to 
implement the Action Plan. 
In 2006 a National Council for cooperation with the EU chaired by the Prime 
Minister was established. It was assigned with the task of introducing a mechanism 
for coordinating relations and discussion between all interested parties, providing 
infonnation on the process of integration to the public and ensuring the participation 
of the civil society representatives in the process of EU integration. 882 The members 
of the Council include the Ministers, the Vice-Speaker of the Parliament and the 
representatives of civil society, whose meetings should take place at least once a 
year.883 Together with the National Council, a Committee for Coordinating the 
Cooperation with the EU was created with the same composition, excluding the 
representatives of the civil society. It had the task of elaborating the policy and 
strategy for EU integration.884 What is interesting is that both institutions have been 
established for the implementation of the National Programme for PCA 
implementation for 2006-2009, thus expressing a fragmented approach by the 
Government, where the ENP was not yet acknowledged. 
880 As identified in Chapter IV, the formal criteria for democracy refer to the institutional and 
procedural requirements, such as a constitution guaranteeing democratic freedoms, political pluralism, 
establishment of democratic institutions, free and fair elections, while the substantive criteria for 
democracy focus more on political culture of participation, distribution of power and equality. 
881 Tocci, supra note 16, at 27. 
882 Decree No. 1282-N, September 7,2006, Government of the Republic of Armenia. 
883 Ibid. 
884 Ibid. 
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This perhaps might be one of the reasons for further institutional 
developments. It appears that the main institution entrusted with the task of the 
coordination of policy preparation and implementation is the Ministry of Economy, in 
particular the EU and International Economic Cooperation Department, coordinating 
a working group established by a Presidential decree. 885 Entrusting the task of ENP 
implementation to the Ministry of Economy reflects the importance of economic 
integration aspects of the ENP for Armenia. 
In addition, in September 2008, a Council on Cooperation with European 
Institutions under the President of the National Security Council was established 
which involves all Vice-Ministers. One of the objectives of the Council is oversight 
of the Action Plan's implementation.886 On the one hand, it can be suggested that 
establishment of these high-level institutions, in addition to the Ministry of Economy 
responsible for the Action Plan implementation, demonstrates the seriousness of the 
Annenian authorities to relations with the EU. On the other hand, the existence of 
these various institutions causes confusion about their tasks and their role in the 
implementation of the ENP. 
Apparently it is the Ministry of Economy which is coordinating the process of 
actual preparation of the Action Plan implementation. After the adoption of the 
Action Plan, the Ministry, in cooperation with other ministries, initiated and drafted a 
programme for the measures to be implemented in 2007 based on the ENP Action 
Plan. The Programme was established by a Government Decree in July, which was 
much criticised by civil society, since only six months were left for its 
885 Interview with Varos Simonyan, Head of Department ofEU and International Economic Affairs, 
Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Armenia, 20 April, 2009, Yerevan. For interview transcript 
see Annex C. 
886 Ibid; Armenia Progress Report 2008, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 
23.04.2009, SEC (2009) 511/2, at 3. 
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implementation.887 The decision establishes measures based on Action Plan priorities 
and institutions responsible for their implementation which are required to submit a 
report on their progress. 888 The Government has been involved in preparation of a 
new document for the period of 2009-20 11, which will be referred to below. It should 
be noted that the programming of the implementation is left to the Government 
without any involvement from the Parliament. 
Similar to Georgia, a Committee on European Integration in the Parliament 
was established in 2008 and is responsible for the links with the European Union and 
the Council of Europe. 889 The Committee is currently undergoing a process of 
identifying its role and place and, therefore, cannot claim a strong presence for the 
Parliament in the process of the ENP implementation. A suggestion has been made by 
the civil society representatives for the Committee to review legislative drafts as 
regards their conformity with EU legislation.89o Nevertheless such a suggestion would 
have been ultimately unrealistic due to limited knowledge of EU legislation on the 
part of committee members and too small an administration comprising only three or 
four personnel. 891 
In a similar manner to Georgia, public awareness of the ENP and its 
implementation in Armenia is rather low. This is noted not only by the 
representatives of civil society, but also the state officials responsible for policy 
implementation.892 Likewise, the picture differs from the capital to the regions, 
887 Interview with Karen Bekaryan, Head ofNGO European Integration, 20 April, 2009, Yerevan. For 
interview transcript see Annex C. 
888 Yaros Simonyan, see Annex C; the Ministry also collects information from other ministries and 
agencies about the implementation ofENP Action Plan 2009-2011 and submits the results to the RA 
Government. 
889 http://www.parliament.amlcommittees.php?do=show&ID=111150&lang=eng. 
890 Karen Bekaryan, Annex C. 
891 Ibid. 
892 Yaros Simonyan; Karen Bekariyan; Interview with Artak Kirakosyan. NGO Civil Society Institute. 
April 21, 2009, Yerevan. The NGO aims to assist and promote the establishment ofa free and 
democratic society in Armenia. For interview transcripts see Annex C. 
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because the latter are less infonned on the matters of cooperation between Annenia 
and the EU. 893 The media fails to deliver infonnation to the public as well. Even 
events organised within the ENP framework are presented without highlighting their 
connection with the policy.894 As to the civil society, it expressed readiness to 
participate in the programming and subsequent implementation of the Action Plan by 
organising public events, discussions, and seeking foreign grants for undertaking 
monitoring activities.895 
However, according to the NGOs, it has been noticed that civil society IS 
generally excluded from the process of programming the ENP implementation. 
Government representatives are reluctant to attend events organised by civil society 
and there are no guarantees that the results of the monitoring will be taken into 
account. 896 For instance, the process of the preparation of the Government's 2007 
Decree on the ENP Action Plan Implementation Tools has been described as "closed 
and not accountable to the civil society and to the Annenian public.,897 It has been 
noted that the contacts between the Government and the representatives of the public 
sector seem to be those which are based on reputation or the status of the 
organisation.898 Thus, it would seem, that as in Georgia, the absence of an official 
framework within the ENP ensuring the contacts between the Government, the public 
and the EU, explains the exclusion of civil society from the implementation process. 
However, it is to be noted that, in the case of Annenia an institutional 
framework has existed from 2006 at least on paper: the National Council for the 
893 K C aren Bekaryan, Annex . 
894 Ibid. 
895 Karen Bekarya; Artak Kirakosyan, Annex C. 
896 Artak Kirakosyan, Annex C. 
897 'Analyses of the RA Government Decision on ENP Action Plan Implementation Tools for 2001'. 
Partnership for Open Society Armenia. 
898 For instance, the European Integration NGO is cooperating with Parliament's Committee on EU 
integration, EU department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Karen Bekaryan, Annex C. 
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cooperation with the EU mentioned above was designed to involve the 
representatives of civil society. Although the Council was established in 2006, none 
of the representatives of the civil society interviewed mentioned its existence. The 
representative of the Government, acknowledging the importance of the civil society, 
noted that a reform of the Council has been initiated to ensure the effective presence 
of the civil society in the process. 899 
Hence, it can be concluded that Armenia's approach generally follows a 
similar pattern to Georgia. The major role in the ENP implementation belongs to the 
Government and the Parliament is incapable of balancing the power of the latter. 
Furthermore, civil society has limited opportunities to participate. Such a method of 
organisation renders the Action Plan implementation an executive-driven and led 
process in both countries. Moreover, in comparison with the enlargement, where the 
accession process was a legally binding and ultimately retained democratic 
legitimacy through popular referenda, the ENP led reforms will fall short of such 
legitimacy.90o The estrangement of the general public and the civil society from the 
process of implementation is particularly disappointing in this sense. 
4.3. Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan has been classified as a 'passive' or 'hesitant' ENP partner.901 
Despite the fact that Annenia was also described as 'hesitant" partner. as discussed 
above, in its efforts to implement the Action Plan, the country is rather close to 
Georgia. It is interesting to note that the representatives of civil society in both 
899 Varos Simonyan, Annex C; During 2009 some measures were undertaken by the Government of 
RA to involve representatives of civil society in the process of implementation ENP Action Plan. With 
the assistance of EU Social and Economic Committee a workshop was organised in Yerevan with the 
~ a r t i c i p a t i o n n of representatives of Armenian civil society. 
o Tocci, ;Does the ENP Respond to the EU's Post-Enlargement Challenges?' (2005) 40 International 
Spectator 21, at 25. 
901 Emerson et ai, supra note 53, at 24; Tocci, supra note 16, at 27. 
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Georgia and Annenia perceive each of the three countries to have its own pace of 
integration with the EU, with Azerbaijan being far less active in the ENP 
implementation.902 
Perhaps one of the reasons for separating Azerbaijan from the other two 
Caucasian states in these tenns is to be found in the political commitments the 
country's leadership have been expressing from the commencement of the ENP. 
While Georgian and Annenian detennination to integrate with the EU has been 
reiterated on various occasions at the highest political level, it has been noted that the 
Government of Azerbaijan 'remains vague on the issue' of EU integration. 903 This 
assumption can be supported with the fact that since the commencement of the ENP, 
European integration has not been prioritised in the foreign policy of the country. 
Although in a statement made by President Aliev in Brussels in April 2009, 
the country is willing 'to bring all the criteria of .. , life close to the criteria of the 
European Union.' the ENP as such did not figure at all in this perspective.904 
Moreover, energy cooperation has been prominently positioned at the core of 
cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan. 905 
During the preparation of the Action Plan, it became clear that more ambitious 
prospects of integration would be emphasised less than energy cooperation,906 which 
offers real benefits for the country. It should be noted that though the provision of the 
Azerbaijani Action Plan on the country's 'European aspiration' is common to 
Georgia and Annenia, it nevertheless had not been included in the initial draft of the 
902 Karen Bekaryan, Annex C; Ivane Chkhikvadze, Annex B. 
903 Boonstra, 'Azerbaijan" in Youngs. (ed.). Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in its 
Neighbourhood? (Fride, 2008), at 136. 
904 Statements for media representatives by President IIham Aliyev and President of the European 
Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, Brussels, 28.04.2009. Available at 
http://www.president.az/articles.php?sec id=70&item id=20090430122621 1 12. 
90S Ibid. 
906 Alieva, 'EU and South Caucasus,' Discussion Paper, Bertesmann Group for Policy Research. 
Centre for Applied Policy Research, December 2006, at 18. 
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document and was included only under pressure by the Azerbaijan National 
Committee for European Integration (ANCEl), involving representatives from 
different segments of public life.907 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the EU is seen by the Azerbaijan 
government and its popUlation as an important economic partner. The Government is 
mostly interested in the EU's assistance and economic projects, and the population 
largely associates the EU with the economic interests of the country. 908 The 
implementation of the ENP is based on 'cost-benefif calculations,909 where the 
amount of assistance provided serves as stimuli for the Government to undertake 
reforms. And since the assistance promised by the EU is merely a drop in the ocean 
when compared to Azerbaijan's budget,910 little effort on behalf of the government 
has been undertaken to create an institutional and legislative framework for the 
implementation of the Action Plan. 
In this context, the focus on economic cooperation between partners explains 
the fact that the only institution dealing with the issues related to the EU integration is 
the National Coordinating Unit for EU technical assistance. This body is responsible 
for relations with the EU and for allocating assistance within the country. 9 1 1 There is 
no dedicated ministry or other executive institution in Azerbaijan which is entrusted 
with the task of coordination and implementation of issues defined in the Action Plan. 
There is a Euro-Integration division operating in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 
907 'European Neighbourhood Policy and Azerbaijan', Annual Report ofthe Azerbaijan National 
Committee for European Integration, at 10. Available at 
http://aamik.az/ts general/downloadl ANCEl report eng. pdf. 
908 Boonstra, supra note 112. at 131. 
909 'Institutional Convergence of CIS towards European Benchmarks: Report No. 82/2008, Centre for 
Social and Economic Research, Warsaw. 2008. 
910 Boonstra, supra note 112, at 135. 
911 Ibid, at 140. 
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Economic Cooperation and Development Department. 912 This is also indicative of the 
particular importance of the economic dimension of the ENP for the Government. 
The absence of an established institutional legislative process directed at the 
implementation of the Action Plan explains the evaluation made by the Commission 
as regards Azerbaijan's progress, Both in 2007 and 2008 the Commission concluded 
that Azerbaijan made 'none or limited progress' in overall implementation of the 
Action Plan,9J3 As a matter of fact, good progress is noted in the area of energy 
cooperation, 9 J 4 
Although the absence of coordinated and comprehensive efforts on the part of 
the country's authorities to implement the ENP Action Plan renders the discussion on 
the democratic credentials of such a process insubstantial, the position of civil society 
should be noted here, In contrast to the official policies, Azerbaijani civil society 
considers the integration to the EU as a priority for the country's future 
development. 915 Despite its enthusiasm as regards EU integration, representatives of 
civil society were excluded from participation in the only major stage of ENP 
developments in the country: the preparation of the Action Plan, The representatives 
of various segments of civil society had established the ANCEl in February 2006 and 
immediately claimed a serious role in preparing proposals for the Action Plan and 
912 'European Neighbourhood Policy and Azerbaijan', Annual Report of the Azerbaijan National 
Committee for European Integration, at 12. Available at 
http://aamik.az/ts general/download! ANCEl report eng. pdf. 
913 2008 Progress Report Azerbaijan, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 'Implementation 
ofthe European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008', Brussels, 23.04.2009, SEC(2009) 512(2). at 2. 
914 Ibid. 
915 'Azerbaijan National Committee for European Integration and Increase of Civil Society 
Participation in European Neighbourhood Policy', External Evaluation of the Project, at 2. Available at 
http://aamik.azits general/download/EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF THE PROJECT IN%20AZ 
ERBAIJAN eng.pdf; Boonstra, supra note 112, at 136. 
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expressing its eagerness to undertake monitoring activities. 916 However, the ANCEl 
was largely deprived of an opportunity to comment on the elaboration of the Action 
Plan because the Government refused to make the draft of the document available to 
Despite the efforts of civil society to engage in a dialogue with the authorities, 
it has been suggested that any contacts with the authorities that have occurred have 
been merely a 'box-ticking exercise: 918 It is also said that it is premature to expect 
stable cooperation between civil society and the Government. 919 Efforts to involve 
civil society in the ENP processes have been more noticeable on the part of the EU 
recently: Commission officials are prepared to hold discussions with its 
representatives. 920 
Also, the opening of the Commission Delegation in 2008 and the initiation of 
the EIDHR in the beginning of 2009 mark positive developments in this respect 
where they allow the Commission to engage directly with public organisations. 
Though the issues related to allocation of assistance will be addressed in the next part, 
it should be noted that due to the reluctance of the Government to implement the 
policy as such, and therefore also involve civil society, the eagerness of civil society 
to become engaged in EU integration processes should be supported by the EU within 
the ENP framework. This should occur in particular with funding opportunities 
through the ENPI and not through other projects. 
916 Alieva, supra note 115, at 10-11; 'European Neighbourhood Policy and Azerbaijan'. Annual Report 
of the Azerbaijan National Committee for European Integration, at 8-10; available at 
http://aamik.az/ts general/download/ANCEl report eng.pdf. 
917 Alieva, supra note 115, at 10. 
918 'Azerbaijan National Committee for European Integration and Increase of Civil Society 
Participation in European Neighbourhood Policy', External Evaluation of the Project, at II. Available 
at 
http://aamik.az/ts general/download/EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF THE PROJECT IN%20AZ 
ERBAIJAN eng.pdf. 
919 Ibid. 
920 Anonymous Commission official II, Annex A. 
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To summarise, while in case of Georgia and Armenia the eagerness to 
implement the ENP is noticed at both institutional and legislative level, Azerbaijan's 
lack of operational framework for the Action Plan implementation does not create a 
basis for policy implementation, which makes the discussion of its democratic 
credentials rather insubstantial. 
5. Implementation of the Action Plans and democratic reform 
While the aim of the previous section was to assess the democratic credibility 
of the ENP implementation process as regards its institutional and operational basis, 
at the same time it also reflected on the eagerness of each of the countries to engage 
with ENP implementation in general. Within this general framework the programmes 
on Action Plan implementation should be considered with the view of their relevance 
for the transposition of the EU's democratic values. 
An analogy can be drawn with the enlargement experience where it has been 
noted that the Commission is basing the evaluation of the progress of implementation 
not on what has been achieved but rather 'whether the country is moving in the right 
direction, and if so, how fast.' 921 The legislative initiatives and acts aimed at the 
implementation of the Action Plan should be considered for each of the states to 
identify whether they are 'moving in the right direction.' 
5.1. Georgia 
According to the Programme of the Georgian Government for 2008-2012, its 
main objectives for this period are poverty reduction, national security and territorial 
and civil integration. In addition to this, sustainable and transparent democratic 
921 Henderson, 'Reforming the Post-Communist States: Meeting the Political Conditionsfor 
Membership' in Jenkins, (ed.), The Unification of Europe? An Ana(ysis of EU Enlargement, (Centre 
for Reform, London, 2000), 27-35, at 30. 
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institutions, free mass media facilities, active dialogue with civil society and an 
independent and impartial judiciary are considered to be the preconditions of 
Georgia's future stable development. Relations with the European Union on the 
Government's agenda appear in connection with the achievement of the four 
freedoms of the internal market.922 Thus, while specific targets of EU integration 
focus on internal market integration, issues of democratisation are part of a wider 
governmental agenda. As noted by a representative of the Georgian Government, 
Georgia's orientation towards democratic reform coincides with the Ell's democracy 
promotion agenda. 923 The question is whether this wider agenda is also reflected in 
the measures on Action Plan implementation. 
As mentioned above, the Georgian Government establishes annual 
programmes for Action Plan implementation. Using a matrix, particular measures are 
allocated to certain institutions for implementation in an assigned time frame and 
within established assistance.924 The Government claims that when drafting the 
annual plans, the comments of the Commission based on its monitoring processes are 
taken into account to the extent that it is possible.925 According to a civil society 
representative, many of the Action Plan priorities on democracy-related issues are not 
implemented even though the Government intended to implement it in three years. 926 
On the one hand, it can be suggested that the democracy-related issues will 
not necessarily be implemented because of the non-binding nature of the Action Plan. 
On the other hand, although the PCA as an international agreement binds the country 
to the implementation of the obligations contained in it, the present Government is 
922 http://www.govemment.gov.ge/index.php?lang id=ENG&sec id=4. 
923 Anonymous Official, State Ministry for European Integration of Georgia, Annex B. 
924 Ibid. 
925 Ibid. 
926 Ivane Chkhikvadze, Annex B; 'Georgia and the European Neighbourhood Policy, Perspectives and 
Challenges,' Report, Open Society Georgia Foundations jointly with the NGO Coalition 'For 
Transparency of Public Finances,' at 11. 
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considered to be reluctant to implement it because it was the previous Government 
that concluded the PCA. 927 Although certain measures have been undertaken for the 
implementation of the PCA, it could hardly be suggested that they have had the effect 
of democratic reform in the country. 928 
It is interesting to note the way commitments to democracy in the Action Plan 
are perceived in Georgia. First of all, it is considered that the major discussions with 
EU representatives most prominently evolve around economic and social issues, 
while the discussion of issues concerning democratic development and protection of 
human rights are usually framed with reference to Georgia's obligations in the 
Council of Europe and OSCE as well as to the assessments of those organisations and 
international non-governmental organisations.929 In addition it is thought that the 
Council of Europe is better positioned and has weightier leverage in the country's 
democratisation process than the EU, since Georgia potentially risks losing its 
membership.930 This view ultimately corresponds to the EU's position of referring to 
commitments its neighbours have undertaken in other international organisations. 
However, at the same time, it may mean that the neighbours, in particular Georgia, do 
not consider democracy promotion to be the EU's priority. 
927 Ivane Chkhikvadze, Annex B. 
928 After conclusion of the PCA with Georgia, its Parliament adopted a resolution No. 828-IS of2 
September 1997, according to which all laws and other normative acts adopted by the Georgian 
Parliament from 1 September 1998 shall be compatible with the standards and rules established by the 
European Union. In 2001, a Strategy of Harmonisation of the Georgian Legislation with that of the 
European Communities, elaborated by the Georgian-European Policy and Legal Advice Centre 
(GEPLAC), was approved by Presidential enactment No. 613 of 14 June 2001, which assigned the 
Government to make the next step towards the alignment of the legislation - the elaboration of the 
National Programme of the Harmonisation of the Georgian Legislation with that of the EU. In 2003 the 
National Programme was elaborated with the assistance ofGEPLAC (Enactment of the Government 
No. 22 of 8 May 2004). Nevertheless, it is clear that legislative approximation was meant to be carried 
out in areas envisaged by Article 43 of the PCA with Georgia, that is trade and business related fields. 
Available at http://www.geplac.org/englharmonization.php. 
929 David Darchiashvili, Annex B. 
930 Ivane Chkhikvadze, Annex B. 
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In addition, supporting Henderson's view mentioned above,931 there is a 
perception that the EU side ultimately understands the complicated and time-
consuming nature of the process.932 What is ultimately required is to start the process 
and demonstrate that the country is moving in the right direction. 933 This might be the 
reason for adopting measures of a general nature for Action Plan implementation: to 
demonstrate that the reforms will proceed in the required direction.934 It is civil 
society which is not satisfied with the general direction the reform will be taking and 
which demands detail and precision. 935 
It has been noted that the reforms are ongoing due to the fact that they are 
included in the Government's own reform agenda. The various measures undertaken 
should be considered as part of the democratisation process, but are not necessarily 
within the ENP process. 936 Also while the Government can introduce legislative 
reforms in the short term, such as reform of the judiciary, other additional factors 
might affect its immediate efficiency, such as lack of resources and 
professionalism.937 Therefore, it appears that the state sees its primary role as 
establishing the formal criteria for democracy only. 
5.2. Armenia 
Though the Government of Armenia does not make such strong declarations 
on democratic reform as Georgia does, it is understood by some that the ENP offers 
931 Henderson in Jenkins, supra note 130, at 30. 
932 David Darchiashvili, Annex B. 
933 David Darchiashvili, Annex B. 
934 A the adoption of the Action Plan the Government of Georgia introduced an Implementation 
strategy for 2007, Decree No. 498, 20 October 2006, which identified certain priorities including 
support to democracy and'civil society development. 
935 'Georgia and the European Neighbourhood Policy.' Perspectives and Challenges. Report: Open 
Society Georgia Foundationsjointly with the NGO Coalition 'For Transparency ofPubhc Fmances, at 
16-17. 
936 Such an example is the reform of the Council of Justice which was a consultative body during the 
previous Government. From 2006 it is an independent institution, this supports the rule of law, it might 
not necessarily be indicated in the ENP reports; David Darchiashvili, Annex B. 
937 David DarchiashviJi, Annex B. 
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an outstanding opportunity for the country's economic development. The programme 
allows undertaking extensive economic and democratic reforms, necessary for 
establishing a free market.938 Thus, Armenian aspirations for integration with EU 
internal market will require democratic reform as a condition for successful 
performance.939 
It should be noted that the implementation of the Action Plan starts where the 
previous framework, the peA implementation, proved inefficient. 940 In that context 
the Annenian Government had to bring about new stimuli and motivation for its own 
institutions to undertake the Action Plan implementation.941 
A Governmental Decree on the Implementation Tools for ENP Action Plan 
for 2007 was adopted in August of that year. 942 Adoption of an annual measure as late 
as eight months into the year reduces the chances of its implementation. Furthermore, 
representatives of civil society have also criticised the Government's approach 
938 Yaros Simonyan, Annex C. 
939 Stritecky, 'The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the ENp· in Kratochvil, (ed.). The European 
Union and Its Neighbourhood: Policies. Problems and Priorities, (Institute of International Relations, 
Prague, 2006), 59-76, at 67. 
940 The implementation of the PCA in a single legislative framework was on the agenda of the 
Armenian Government from 2004. A National Programme for PCA implementation was approved by a 
Government Decree on 23 March 2006. The Programme could be described as a comprehensive 
agenda for the harmonisation of Armenian legislation with the acquis, where certain democracy related 
matters were envisaged such as the compliance of human rights, constitutional reforms, freedom of 
speech and thought, reform of the judiciary, the electoral system, and other measures relevant to EU 
standards. The implementation of the Programme required vast financial and technical resources, 
which were not provided by the EU. The Government would not have committed to its implementation 
requiring institutional and legislative harmonisation in numerous areas without strong incentives. 
These factors led to the stagnation of the process. Currently the latter merely serves the purpose of a 
reference document for institutions in certain areas of EU law, which will possibly remain so. 
Although the PCAs were concluded for initial period of 10 years. According to Article 94 of the PCA 
Armenia after the initial period of 10 years the agreement shall be automatically renewed year by year 
provided that neither party gives written notice of denunciation of the agreement 6 months before it 
expires. The PCA will likely remain in force until a new agreement is negotiated within the ENP; 
Yaros Simonyan, Annex C. 
94J While working on the preparation of the National Programme in AEPLAC, on numerous occasions 
I encountered reluctance on behalf of Government officials or experts to engage with the programme 
where they did not see any motivation for the efforts undertaken, requiring extra workload without any 
rewards. 
942 Decree No. 927, August 22,2008, Government of the Republic of Armenia. 
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because it did not bring much concreteness to the activities to be implemented or 
establish a timetable for doing so. It did not provide 'any deliverables resulting from 
implementation or any benchmarks towards which the implementation shall be 
measured.,943 In particular, out of the vast list of priorities and general actions on 
democratisation contained in the Action Plan with Armenia, only a few of them were 
addressed in the 2007 Programme and worded in more general terms than the Action 
Plan itself.944 Despite the fact that the measures did not bring much specificity to the 
Action Plan, limited progress was achieved in 2007, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Again, as in the case of Georgia, it appears that the general direction towards 
required reforms is present. 
Subsequently, a new approach to implementing the Action Plan has been 
adopted by the Government in order to avoid lengthy preparatory drafting process 
involving different ministries.945 Thus, a new document comprising almost 200 
measures for the Action Plan implementation for the period of 2009-2011 has been 
approved by the Armenian President in May 2009. 946 The document seems to have a 
similar approach to the one applied in the Georgian annual plans: it is based on 
'benchmarks' elaborated by the Ministry of Economy, and other institutions submit a 
list of measures and expected results for the period in their relevant field of 
competence.947 Through this document the Government intends to bring specificity to 
943 Partnership for Open Society, Armenia, Analyses of the RA Govemment Decision on ENP Action 
Plan Implementation Tools for 2007, July 2007. 
944 Thus, the measures for constitutional reforms provide for development in local governance by 
enhancing the capabilities oflocal communities and institutions of the civil service without specifying 
what this means or how and when the measures should be achieved. Among other generally worded 
measures were further development of the activity of the Ombudsman office, increasing judicial 
transparency by periodical publication of judicial acts, ensuring independence of the media through 
measures to enhance independence and pluralism of the public and private media. and ensure the 
freedom of organising public meetings and demonstrations; Decree No. 927. August 22, 2008, 
Government of the Republic of Armenia. 
945 Yaros Simonyan, Annex C. 
946 Presidential Decree No. NK-68-A, May 6, 2009. 
947 Yaros Simonyan, Annex C. 
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the Action Plan implementation by indicating the sub-measures for implementation, 
the results to be achieved annually, and the responsible institutions. 948 
As noted by a Government representative, the exclusive practices in relation 
to the Parliament and civil society within the initial implementation process are being 
tackled. For instance, the new programme of implementation has been published in 
order to enable civil society to monitor the process. 949 It should be noted that the 
document is one of the few pieces of Armenian legislation which is currently 
available on the website of the Ministry of Economy.950 The document includes a 
long list of measures to be undertaken in the area of political reform in form of sub-
measures with particular results for each year envisaged. Most of these measures are 
included in the document without being on the Government's own agenda. 95 I This 
means that the Government expresses its commitment at least at a legislative level to 
follow the Action Plan priorities. 
On the other hand, there are no immediate expectations attached to the 
implementation of the political reform within the ENP either at official or at public 
level. 952 Representatives of civil society consider that it is better to have the ENP than 
'nothing, ' where the Government in any case will engage in some sort of 
implementation. In this context two problems have been identified, the first being the 
slow speed of reforms. 953 In particular, in relation to the democracy related issues, the 
Government's discretion as to which reforms should be implemented or can be 
948 Ibid. 
949 Ibid. 
950 Available at http://www.mineconomy.amJenl13/. 
951 The 6th column of the table of measure indicates the conformity of a particular measure with 
Government's own programme. 
952 Yaros Simonyan; Karen Bekaryan, Annex C. 
953 Karen Bekaryan, Annex C. 
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postponed potentially affect its short-term delivery.954 Also, it is considered that the 
ENP creates institutional opportunities for democratisation in the future. '155 
The second problem has been identified as the slow operation of the heavy 
bureaucratic machinery of the EU, where the element of swift response is missing. 956 
The identification of the second problem potentially suggests that the EU's 
monitoring on the level of political dialogue or political demarches do not pass 
unnoticed in the country and that it has its own influence. The Government officials 
similarly do not deny the inability of the ENP to influence democratic reforms in the 
short-term. However it is considered that democratic reform will take place in parallel 
with economic reforms.957 The time factor and the Government's willingness to 
accept 'the best practice' will be an important consideration.958 
Thus, the 2007 programme for the Action Plan implementation can be 
described as a series of half-hearted efforts: measures were envisaged in more general 
terms than in the Action Plan and with very limited time for their implementation. 
Nevertheless, the programme for 2009-2011 demonstrates that the Government is 
ready to take democratic reform on its agenda. Committed implementation of its own 
current agenda can bring Armenia closer to Georgia once there are clear examples of 
following the political conditionality. 
5.3. Azerbaijan 
The situation with the Action Plan implementation in Azerbaijan in general is 
not promising without a particular institution responsible for the ENP 
implementation. As mentioned earlier the only institution responsible for the process 
954 Artak Kirakosyan, Annex C. 
955 Ibid. 
956 Karen Bekaryan, Annex C. 
957 Varos Simonyan, Annex C. 
958 Ibid. 
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of EU integration is the National Coordination Unit,959 which shows that essentially 
economic assistance plays the important role in the case of Azerbaijan. Another factor 
related to Azerbaijan's motivation adds to this affecting the effectiveness of the ENP 
in transforming the governance of this particular country. On the one hand, in the 
case of Georgia and Annenia, it has been noted that the initial focus of the ENP 
implementation was on economic development which entails democratic reform. In 
this ancillary way, the latter is continuously present on the agenda of both 
Governments. 
On the other hand, the EU's has more limited leverage as regards Azerbaijan 
due to the latter's stronger position conditioned by its natural resources. This appears 
to affect the entire process of the ENP implementation. It has been suggested that 
ENP incentives are not efficient in improving governance in Azerbaijan, which has 
the lowest level of institutions among Eastern ENP countries. Despite the fact that the 
economic institutions have improved, this was not preceded by similar development 
of political ones: on the contrary, they have even deteriorated. 960 
This is influenced not only by Azerbaijan'S reluctance to engage with the EU 
stemming from its relative economic independence, but also by the reluctance of the 
EU to push for domestic refonns. These are not viewed as necessary as long as the 
country provides stability which will not threaten economic cooperation, and most 
importantly in the energy sector.961 In addition, civil society feared that the deepening 
of energy cooperation by signing a memorandum on EU-Azerbaijan energy 
959 The Unit was established by Decree No 576 of the Cabinet of Ministers, October 22, 1992. 
960 Institutional Convergence of CIS Towards European Benchmarks, Report No. 82/2008, Centre for 
Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, 2008, at 34. 
961 Ibid, at 39. 
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cooperation in 2006 weakened the strength of the ENP. 962 This might have served as 
a clear indication for the domestic elites of what the EU values the most. 
Thus, the contradictions apparent in the ENP methodology, which comprises 
the principles of conditionality, joint ownership and differentiation, are apparent in 
the case of Azerbaijan. It appears that the principles of joint ownership and 
differentiation undermine the conditionality principle and are capable of stagnating 
the implementation of the ENP, or restricting its implementation to certain areas 
where the interests of the parties dominate, that is energy cooperation. 
Therefore, it will not be surprising to notice, in contrast to Georgia and 
Armenia, the absence of any comprehensive legislative measures intended to 
implement the priorities of the Action Plan, including those related to democratic 
development of Azerbaijan. The absence of an institutional and legislative framework 
makes it difficult for assistance issued by the EU to be directed at the implementation 
of different priority areas, including those on democratisation. Thus, from the two 
scenarios for overshadowing the democratic reforms within the ENP noted above, 
Azerbaijan seems to represent the first one. The national ruling elite is reluctant to 
change itself, especially when there is no pressure imposed by the EU. In addition, 
these factors were aggravated by a limited presence of the EU in the country. As 
noted earlier EU Delegation opened two years after the launch of the ENP and after 
initial delays in signing the ENPI National Indicative Programme. 963 One might 
suggest that these circumstances explain the overall failure to implement the priorities 
of the Action Plan on strengthening democracy. 964 
962 Alieva, supra note 115, at 16. 
963 Boonstra, supra note 112, at 132. 
964 'Progress Assessment on the Action Plan which Azerbaijan signed with the European Union'. 
January 2008, Azerbaijan National Committee for European Integration, at 9-15. 
Available at http://aamik.az/ts general/download/ANCEl Report on AP Azerbaijan-2007 eng.pdf. 
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Thus, it can be noted that while Georgia and Armenia shared much in their 
institutional and legislative approach to the ENP implementation process, in 
Azerbaijan it is not only the Action Plan's measures on democratisation, but the 
Action Plan in general that remains a paper commitment. 
6. Conclusion 
To summarize the findings of this Chapter, it should be noted that at the outset 
the ENP seems to take democracy promotion to a higher level in comparison with the 
PCA through prioritising political reforms. In terms of conditionality, the Action 
Plans are much weaker in comparison with their instrumental prototype: the 
Accession Partnership. The conditionality is weakened due to its framing within the 
'shared values' narrative. 
The drafting of priority actions on political reform merely amount to general 
political statements without any precise or detailed vision of comprehensive 
transformation. Not only are the priority actions far away from being called 
'benchmarks,' but also the Action Plans are drafted in an odd manner. For instance, 
the general actions in section 4 at times provide for more detailed measures of 
implementation than the priorities. The political nature of the documents largely 
explains the uncoordinated and scattered nature of the Action Plans undermining their 
legal characteristics. 
The major issues which are addressed in the priority actions in the three 
Action Plans mainly evolve around the separation of powers, reform of the judiciary, 
reform of the executive. There is also a focus on the civil service and local 
governance, and the development of electoral reform ensuring proper conduct of 
elections. However, most of the priorities lack substance, precision, detail and 
deadlines turning the actions into a rhetorical call for reform. Such vital issues as the 
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role of Parliament, political parties and the development of civil society are not even 
prioritised and are included among general actions. 
The EU's retreat from its normative stance is apparent in Azerbaijan and, 
surprisingly, Georgia's Action Plans. These are the result of the principles of joint 
ownership and differentiation. This is explicable in Azerbaijan's case, because of the 
EU's self-interest in the energy cooperation and the joint ownership of the process 
through which Azerbaijan could express its reluctance to democratic reform. 
However, it is striking in Georgia's case, where similarly it can be noted that very 
few priorities are on the agenda of democratic reform focusing on judiciary and 
elections mainly. In this light, the Armenian Action Plan appears to be the most loyal 
to the democratic rhetoric of the EU. 
The political nature of the Action Plans leaves the fortune of democratic 
reform to the neighbours depending on their ambitions. This is particularly the case 
where there is no specific pressure to implement political reforms, such as the one in 
the enlargement process for the opening of negotiations. This might be the reason 
why the EU relies on the countries' commitments in the Council of Europe and 
OSCE, where they have binding obligations to implement democratic reforms. In this 
way, despite the soft law nature of the Action Plans, the EU attempts to ensure that 
the countries will continue to make political reforms. At the same time the EU will 
contribute to the trend apparent in all three countries where the EU is viewed mostly 
as an economic partner, and where the democratic obligations seem to be real in the 
organisations where the countries risk losing membership. 
It might be suggested that the EU is capable of overcoming this stigma by 
'according the democratic reforms primary importance using the instruments at its 
disposal currently. Democratic reform could be given precedence over other priorities 
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by the ED, for instance, by a promise to sign a new agreement. Or even if the 
agreement is to be signed without preconditions, the enhanced cooperation and future 
integration into a single neighbourhood area should be made conditional upon 
genuine democratic development. 
The Action Plans notably fail to establish a strong requirement for political 
reform, and the initial process of implementation lacks democratic legitimacy. The 
executives are the ones responsible for negotiation and implementation of the Action 
Plans. The general public lacks knowledge of the processes taking place in all three 
countries, and the civil society, despite its eagerness for engagement, lacks relevant 
capacities. In addition, the central position of national governments, as opposed to the 
role of the national parliaments, repeats the enlargement experience which was 
criticised for creating strong executives dominating transformation of the candidate 
countries. Hopes were raised that the new institutional frameworks established within 
the Eastern Partnership will increase the role of the civil society in integrative 
processes.965 
As to the actual implementation of the Action Plans, it should be noted that 
the countries can be differentiated according to their efforts undertaken within the last 
two years. In the case of Georgia, serious efforts on behalf of the Government to 
deliver implementation of the Action Plan can be noted both on institutional and 
legislative levels. Although Armenia has been considered to be a 'hesitant' partner, it 
demonstrates, similar to Georgia, readiness to engage with the Action Plan 
implementation. This is demonstrated through establishing different institutions, 
though with confusing tasks, and programming the actual implementation, though 
with debatable efficiency. On the contrary, in Azerbaijan the ENP implementation is 
965 Artak Kirakosyan, Annex C. 
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diminished to the allocation of the assistance and the realisation of the central role of 
the energy cooperation in relations with the ED. 
However, for none of the countries is democratisation, as part of the ENP, 
considered to be a high priority. For both Armenia and Georgia democratic reforms 
are viewed as a precondition for necessary economic reform which is considered to 
be the core of cooperation with the ED. This at least suggests that for both countries 
political reform will be a necessary part of ENP implementation, increasing their 
chances of success in this area. However, at the current stage, only the formal 
prerequisites of democracy on the legislative level can be expected. In the case of 
Azerbaijan the importance of the democratic reforms is diminished together with the 
generally decreased meaning of the ENP as a policy requiring political and economic 
reform. However, it is a result of not only the national Government's reluctance to 
undertake political reforms, but also the EU's permissive attitude to democratic 
conditionality, where the stability of present energy agreements is the top issue on the 
agenda. 
Thus, the Action Plans prove their political nature, leaving their 
implementation to the ambitions of the countries concerned. The importance of 
economic reform for Georgia and Armenia could provide a good basis for 
implementing the Action Plans in both countries. However it has become apparent 
that, in the short-term, the most they can deliver is certain legislative developments 
that might affect the formal criteria of democracy. In Azerbaijan, the economic 
considerations of the EU and the country's perception of what the EU values the most 
in these particular relations, render the democratic reform within the ENP more of an 
illusion for the foreseeable future. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Transposition of Democratic Values in the South Caucasus II: 
Monitoring and Assistance 
1. Introduction 
It has been argued that the EU possesses sufficient tools to exercise ENP 
conditionality even without the membership incentive. 966 The monitoring of 
implementation, together with the assistance mechanisms, should be considered 
among those tools allowing the EU to exercise conditionality. 
Controlling the progress of political and economic reforms has been 
considered the best way to guarantee the ultimate success of candidate countries 
during the process of enlargement. 967 The role of monitoring in the implementation of 
the ENP is to ensure that the process is not merely one-sided, but that the presence of 
the EU is consistently guaranteed. 
As with enlargement, the ENP provides for monitoring of the progress of the 
partner countries through adopting the mechanism of joint evaluation, and progress 
reports issued unilaterally by the Commission.968 According to the Action Plans with 
the South Caucasian countries, the PCA joint institutions will advance and monitor 
the implementation of the Action Plan, while the Commission will produce reports on 
implementation in cooperation with the Secretary-General/High Representative. 969 
Monitoring of the Action Plan implementation is the element of the ENP mechanism 
966 Balfour and Rotta, 'Beyond Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy and its Tools', 
(2005) 40 International Spectator 7, at 10. 
967 Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-Accession C o n d i t i o n a l i ~ v v in the 
Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law, (Austin: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2008), at 51. 
968 Kelley, 'New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Learning and Adaptation in the New European 
Neighbourhood Policy', (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 29, at 33; Magen, 'The Shadow 
of Enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy Achieve Compliance', Centre on 
Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford Institute for International Studies, Working 
Papers, No 68, August 2006, at 409. 
969 See section 5 ofEU/Georgia, EUlArmenia, EUlAzerbaijan Action Plans. 
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which emphasises the deteImination on behalf of the EU to send a regular message to 
the partner countries on their potential to come closer to the EU. 97o 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the composition of the Action Plans 
lacks clarity and detail in terms of required action. This creates a weak ground for 
monitoring the implementation of these documents. The issue therefore is that, is it 
legitimate to expect the Commission to bring specificity and direction to the Action 
Plans? 
The assistance provided to the partner countries is another element through 
which the EU supports the conditionality mechanism. It is important for purposes of 
identifying two issues. First, it is necessary to consider whether the new ENPI 
framework prioritises assistance for democratic reform in general and, in particular, 
in the countries of the South Caucasus. Secondly, the actual allocation of assistance 
serves as another indication of the role of democratic reform in the process of ENP 
implementation in three states. 
Moreover, taking into account the weak conditionality of the Action Plans, the 
elements of monitoring and assistance should be considered even more important. 
Sufficient focus on democratic reform can still rehabilitate the EU's credibility as to 
its intention to promote democracy in the South Caucasus. 
As noted previously, this Chapter relies also on the infoImation obtained 
during interviews conducted in Brussels, Tbilisi and Yerevan. In particular, the 
information provided by the officials of the Commission contributed to framing the 
discussion on monitoring undertaken by the EU. 971 The interviewees in TbiIisi and 
970 Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
11.04.2003 COM (2003) 104 final, at 18. 
971 Specific questions have been addressed to the process of monitoring during the interviews. See 
interview transcripts, Annex A, B, C. 
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Armenia provided information on the process of assistance allocation in each of the 
countries. 
In this context, the Chapter will be aimed at analysing monitoring of the 
Action Plans via political dialogue and the regular reports issued by the Commission. 
The Progress Reports issued by the Commission will be discussed in order to reveal 
the focus and detail on democratic reform. This exercise will demonstrate how the 
Commission manages to evaluate the implementation on the basis of the Action 
Plans. The next part of the Chapter will focus on the ENPI as a new instrument for 
assistance to the South Caucasus and its focus on democratic reform. Within this part, 
a comparative analysis of the assistance to democratic reform in Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan will be undertaken. Ultimately, the Chapter will conclude with a 
summary of findings. 
2. Monitoring of political reform in the South Caucasus 
The Action Plans with the three countries mention the joint assessment and 
the reports issued by the Commission as two ways of monitoring. The joint 
assessment mentioned in the Action Plan can be included within a more general type 
of monitoring through political dialogue taking place in different formats. The second 
type of monitoring is the actual evaluation of the progress achieved in relation to 
specific actions by the Commission on an annual basis. These two types of 
monitoring as undertaken in the South Caucasus will each be addressed in tum. 
2.1. Monitoring through political dialogue 
Monitoring through political dialogue can be described as acknowledging the 
progress in the ENP implementation on behalf of the EU. It takes place either at high 
official level or within the institutional set-up of the PCAs. Hence, External Relations 
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Commissioner or Troika visits should be considered as high level monitoring, which 
guarantee that the issues of democracy promotion and human rights protection are 
constantly present on the dialogue agenda.972 
A lower level of political dialogue is recorded at the level of institutions 
established within the PCAs. According to the South Caucasian Action Plans, the 
PCA joint bodies 'will advance and monitor' the Action Plan implementation. 973 The 
most appropriate among these institutions for the Action Plan monitoring is the 
Cooperation Council which meets once a year at ministerial level. Since the adoption 
of the Action Plans the Cooperation Councils of the three countries held meetings in 
October 2007 and December 2008. A closer look at meetings of the Cooperation 
Councils indicates that, in fact, they do not engage in monitoring amounting to 
evaluation of the progress in Action Plan implementation. 
The 2007 Cooperation Council merely invited the attention of respective 
states to the challenges they have to face in building functioning democracy. 974 
Although as regards the 2007 Cooperation Councils it can be argued that the 
operation of the Action Plans within several months was not such to be assessed, the 
2008 Cooperation Council meetings made it clear that their role is confined to 
political dialogue, where the meetings of about half an hour are not intended to 
evaluate or assess the developments or their lack in detail. 975 The main task of the 
Cooperation Council is to reflect on the level of relations between the parties, which 
explains the discursive nature of its meetings. Thus, the EU-Georgia and EU-Annenia 
972 Anonymous Commission officials I and II, DG RELEX, European Commission, 28 April, 2009, 
Brussels. For interview transcripts see Annex A. 
973 Section 5 of the Actions Plans. 
974 EU-Georgia Cooperation Council Eighth meeting, Brussels, 16 October 2007, Press Release, 13969 
(Presse 243); EU-Armenia Cooperation Council Eighth meeting, Brussels, 16 October 2007, Press 
Release, 13967 (Presse 241); EU-Azerbaijan Cooperation Council Eighth meeting, Brussels, 16 
October 2008, Press Release, 13968 (Presse 242). 
975 Interview with Anonymous Commission official II and III, DG RELEX, European Commission, 28 
April, 2009, Brussels. For interview transcripts see Annex A. 
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Cooperation Councils noticed progress in certain areas of cooperation for both 
countries, although distinguishing Georgia with its strong commitment to the 
implementation of the Action Plan. 976 Conversely, the 2008 EU-Azerbaijan 
Cooperation Council did not mention any progress achieved, but stressed the 
necessity to implement the Action Plan. 977 All the Cooperation Council meetings with 
the three countries highlight the essential elements of political dialogue being the rule 
of law, democratic principles, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
political pluralism, freedom of expression and freedom of media. This ensures that at 
least on a declaratory level the EU is upholding its normative image. 
It should be noted that during all three Cooperation Councils of December 
2008, readiness on behalf of the Union was expressed to assist in the further process 
of democratisation in each of these countries 'including in the framework of the 
ENP.' This accordingly suggests that the ENP will not be the single framework for 
this purpose. 
In order to explain the role of the Cooperation Councils as a 'hand-shaking 
exercise,' it has been noted that the task of the Council is limited to summarising the 
developments taking place throughout the year, including the activities of other joint 
bodies under the PCAs.978 It is the lower levels of Cooperation Committees and 
subcommittees which advance and monitor the implementation. However, the 
importance of these bodies for the issues of democracy promotion should be largely 
dismissed as they are mainly technical in nature and are based on a presumption that 
976 EU-Georgia Cooperation Council Ninth meeting, Brussels, 9 December 2008, Press Release, 17028 
(Presse 368); EU-Armenia Cooperation Council Ninth meeting, Brussels, 9 December 2008, Press 
Release, 17028 (Presse 366). 
977 EU-Azerbaijan Cooperation Council Ninth meeting, Brussels, 9 December 2008, Press Release, 
17028 (Presse 367). 
978 Anonymous Commission officials I and Ill, DG RELEX, Annex A. 
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democracy related issues require high-level interaction.979 In any case, within the few 
subcommittees operating in the South Caucasian countries, none practically is of 
direct relevance to the democratisation process. The only subcommittee which comes 
close to the purpose of political refonns is the justice, liberty and security Committee 
operating in Georgia and focusing inter alia on the judiciary.980 In the case of 
Armenia one subcommittee is purposed at handling trade, economic and legal 
issues.98I There is however the possibility of establishing a second subcommittee of 
justice, liberty and security similar to Georgia once an agreement is reached with the 
Armenian Government. 982 Two subcommittees are functioning in Azerbaijan, one 
focusing on energy, environment and transport, and the other on trade and economic 
issues.983 
As a matter of fact, the European Parliament called on the Commission to 
negotiate the establishment of human rights sub-committees with all three 
countries.984 It is perhaps surprising to note, that it is the Commission which is 
reluctant to engage in comitology.985 Nonetheless, it was decided to establish 'a 
dialogue on human rights' for all the three states in 2008 and progress was expected 
on the issue in 2009. 986 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the role of the PCA joint bodies in the 
implementation of the Action Plans' priorities related to the promotion of democracy 
is rather weak, as their function of monitoring is confined to broad statements and 
expectations expressed once a year. The discursive nature of the Cooperation 
979 Anonymous Commission official I, Annex A. 
980 Ibid. 
981 Anonymous Commission official III, Annex A. 
982 Ibid. 
983 Anonymous Commission official I, Annex A. 
984 European Parliament Resolution of 17 January 2008 on a More Effective EU Policy for the South 
Caucasus: from Promises to Actions (2007/2076(INI», paragraph 21. 
985 Anonymous Commission official I, Annex A. 
986 Anonymous Commission officials I, II and III, Annex A. 
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Councils' meetings can be seen in the example of 2008 EU-Annenia Cooperation 
Council meeting. The EU side did not address its previous expectations as regards the 
conduct of presidential elections. Though considered to be fair in general, these 
nevertheless fell short of certain standards and were followed by political turbulence, 
resulting in the death of seven citizens. 987 Similarly, none of the deficiencies in the 
political life of Georgia and Azerbaijan within the considered timeframe have been 
addressed at the Cooperation Council. The factual evaluation of the progress achieved 
is left to the Commission, which issues reports once a year. This is more reasonable 
in tenns of the political weight accorded to an evaluation by the Commission, m 
comparison with the Cooperation Councils. 
2.2. Assessment of progress by the Commission 
As with enlargement, where the Commission's traditional role of 'guardian of 
the Treaty' extended to evaluating the progress of the candidate countries,988 the 
Commission continues to be the 'watchdog' of the policy implementation also in the 
case of the ENP. One might suggest that the Commission is the appropriate institution 
to meet the expectations on a strict approach towards the EU values that the 
neighbouring states are required to comply with. 
As noted in the Introduction, the Commission issues annual Progress Reports 
based on the model of the Progress and Annual Report used during pre-accession. 
Since the Commission's reports in the enlargement experience helped the candidate 
987 According to the results of 2008 Presidential Elections, Prime Minister Sargsyan won the election 
in the first round with 52.8 per cent of all votes cast, while ex-President Ter-Petrosian received 21.5 
per cent of votes. Before the official results were announced the opposition initiated peaceful protests 
and demonstrations in the capital Yerevan lasting almost 20 days and leading to the authorities' 
decision to disperse the masses. The decision resulted in the dramatic death of six civilians and one 
reresentative of the police. More than 100 people were injured according to official reports. 
98 Hillion, 'The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny' in HilIion, (ed.), EU Enlargement: A Legal 
Approach. (Oxford: Hart, 2004), 1-22, at 13. 
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t . h" . 989 coun nes to meet t e acceSSIOn cntena, one would expect the ENP Progress 
Reports to assist the neighbours in meeting the conditions for integration into the EU. 
Even in the case of the enlargement policy, it has been noted that the 
Commission's Reports should be understood 'as contextual assessments': in the 
absence of a specific model of evaluation the Reports have been based on agreements 
reached between governments and the Commission, influenced by the opinions of 
both EU and local experts.990 Combining this with the political element of the ENP, 
one should also expect the ENP Progress Reports to include a degree of politicisation 
which is capable of undermining the idea of evaluating the implementation 
objectively. 
In addition, it has been suggested that the composition of the Progress Report 
is a subjective exercise by a Commission official, who can influence the language of 
the document in terms of his or her particular vision of the progress. 991 It should also 
be mentioned that the assessment takes place on individual basis without any regional 
comparative perspective. It is only after the report is written that a horizontal unit on 
Neighbourhood Policy coordination in Directorate 0 compares the progress reports in 
order to ensure 'that the evaluation of Azerbaijan makes sense for example in 
comparison with Tunisia. ,992 Most importantly, in the absence of clear vision of 
democratic values the EU is transposing, it is logical to assume certain discretion on 
behalf of the Commission in evaluating the progress in the Action Plan 
implementation. 
989 Dunay, 'Strategy with Fast Moving Targets: East-Central Europe' in Dannreuther, (ed.), European 
Un on Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, (London: Routledge, 2004), 
27-47, at 32. 
990 Smilov as cited in Kochenov. supra note 2, at 311. 
991 Anonymous Commission official II, Annex A. 
992 Ibid. 
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According to the South Caucasian Action Plans, the actual progress in their 
implementation is measured based on jointly agreed benchmarks, followed by reports 
produced at regular intervals by the Commission in cooperation with the Secretary 
General/High Representative. 993 The reports should be submitted to the Council, 
which accordingly should make a decision on future prospects with relevant 
partners. 994 
What causes concern is the absence of clarity as to what constitutes 'jointly 
agreed benchmarks' for the evaluation. The priorities of the Action Plan lack 
specifics and particularities to constitute benchmarks. The evaluation of compliance 
will depend on the precision of the actions the partner countries are required to 
undertake.995 Precision and consistency can be hardly expected from the Commission, 
which has to judge the progress of the partner countries based on 'benchmarks' such 
as insuring 'proper separation of powers, ' whatever this means for each of the states. 
It should be noted that the reports are based on the information provided by 
the relevant countries, as well as close cooperation by the Commission with the 
Council of Europe, the OSCE, relevant UN bodies, and International Financial 
Institutions. The intention of the Commission to rely on cooperation with relevant 
international organisations, as regards the neighbours that have agreed Action Plans, 
has been reiterated in the Communication on the implementation of the ENP in 
2007.996 The Communication stresses that the fact of the membership of the partners 
to the OSCE and the Council of Europe 'contributes to a particular reform agenda 
993 Section 5 of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan Action Plans. 
994 General Affairs and External Relations Commission Conclusions, 22 January 2007. 
995 Kochenov, 'The ENP Conditionality: Pre-Accession Mistakes Repeated' to appear in Pioneer 
Europe? Testing EU Foreign Policy in the Neighbourhood, Delcour and Tulmets, (eds.), (Baden 
Baden: Nomos, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1310780, at 13. 
996 Communication from the Commission to the Parliament and the Council, Implementation of the 
ENP in 2007, Brussels, 3 April 2008, COM (2008) 164, at 3. 
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aiming at close approximation to the fundamental standards prevailing in the EU. ,997 
In this context, as an addition to the discussion in the previous chapter, it should be 
noted that the reliance by the Commission on general international obligations of the 
countries in the OSCE or the Council of Europe might undermine the EU's role in 
terms of highlighting its complementary nature. The EU's monitoring will serve as an 
additional instance for monitoring the obligations, which are already monitored by 
the OSCE or the Council of Europe. 
In addition, it has been suggested that the annual picture of progress is 
obtained in a continuous process of contacts between the EU delegation and the 
Government, interaction with the national Parliament and NGOs and communication 
between the EU embassies, aimed at elaboration of a comprehensive vision on 
political reform. 998 Having an EU Delegation in relevant countries is a major source 
of contact and point of reference for analysis for the Commission. The absence of an 
EU Delegation in Azerbaijan until 2008 was considered to have a restraining impact 
on the Commission's capacity for analysis. 999 Such an observation is valid also for 
Armenia, since the EU Delegations in both countries were opened at the same time. 
To date two Progress Reports evaluating the process of Action Plan 
implementation for each of the South Caucasian states have been issued for 2007 and 
2008 accordingly. Though the Action Plans can be regularly amended or updated to 
reflect progress in addressing the priorities, no revision has been undertaken so far in 
either of the South Caucasian states. 
997 Ibid. 
998 Anonymous Commission official I, Annex A. 
999 Ibid. 
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In the 2007 Georgian Progress Report, the Commission initially noted overall 
good progress. IOOO Before evaluating the actual progress on the priorities of the Action 
Plan, the Commission made a general reference to the dominance of executive power, 
a weak separation of institutional powers and an ineffective system of democratic 
checks and balances, calling on Georgia to follow the recommendations of the 
Council of Europe's Venice Commission. 1001 There is a further rather detailed 
evaluation of the priorities of the Action Plan. Although the Commission failed to 
address improvements in relation to such as a voter registry and a functioning and 
transparent electoral commission prioritised in the Action Plan, it paid major attention 
to the conduct of Presidential elections in January 2008 right after the reporting 
period. 
The reform of the judiciary has been considered in the most detail with a 
focus on independence of the jUdiciary. After a brief reference to the absence of 
comprehensive reform of the civil service, the Commission referred to the reform of 
local governance noticing major reforms undertaken on the legislative level. 
However, the Commission also emphasised that in practice the powers of the local 
authorities have not changed much, and that control over self-governing units is still 
exercised by the government. 1002 Overall, the 2007 Progress Report for Georgia 
evaluated the actions prioritised in the Action Plan without addressing such important 
1000 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament, 'Implementation ofthe European Neighbourhood Policy 
in 2001', Progress Report Georgia. Brussels, 3 April 2008, SEC(2008) 393. 
1001 2007 Progress Report Georgia, at 3. 
1002 In cooperation with the Council of Europe a draft national decentralisation strategy and a draft 
national work programme for better local self-government were elaborated in January 2007; the law 
on state supervision over activities of local authorities was adopted by the Parliament in June 2007; 
draft laws aimed at improving the institutional arrangement oflocal self-governing units, facilitation of 
citizens' participation in the implementation of local self-governance as well as modification of the 
equalizing transfer formula defined by the law on budget of local self-governing unit were elaborated 
in the second half of 2007; 2007 Progress Report Georgia, at 6. 
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issues as strengthening of the Parliament and enhancement of political pluralism in 
Georgia within the general actions under section 4.1.1. 
Similarly, the 2008 Progress Report was drafted around the priorities of the 
Action Plan with a focus on Presidential elections and new measures for judicial 
reform, as well as the failure to undertake civil service reforms and developments in 
local governance reform confined to the establishment of a new ministry.1003 In 
addition, the strengthening of Parliament, separation of powers and the role of 
political parties have also been an object of the Commission's consideration due to a 
'new wave of democratic reform' the President announced after the August 2008 war. 
Thus, rather positive language of the Commission is noted on reforms initiated and 
partially implemented in relation to Parliament's control over the executive, public 
funding of political parties and increase of its role in parliamentary committees. 
In addition, the President initiated reforms limiting his powers to dissolve the 
Parliament and to simplify the process by which Parliament can express a lack of 
confidence in the government. At the same time, the Commission went on to notice 
that the proposal of such amendments as such is not sufficient to guarantee an 
institutional balance between parliamentary and presidential powers. 1004 The detail of 
this evaluation demonstrates that the Commission is ready to engage in the 
assessment, especially via positive evaluation, where the country's leadership is 
undertaking reforms and seeks appreciation. This can be viewed as a part of a more 
general picture. This urgency on behalf of the Georgian Government to reassure the 
EU in its commitment to democratic values after the August 2008 war has been 
reciprocated by the EU. It made this commitment part of the new package of political 
1003 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament, 'Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
in 2008'. Progress Report Georgia, Brussels, 23 April 2009, SEC(2009) 513/2, at 3-5. 
1004 Ibid. 
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conditionality linked to increased EU post-conflict assistance agreed in January 
2009.1005 To sum up, both 2007 and 2008 Progress Reports for Georgia paid attention 
to the issues of representation and elements of liberal governance in general. 
However, the issues of participation as a necessary attribute of democracy, even in 
form of civil society development, have been omitted in both Progress Reports. 
In relation to political reforms in Armenia, the Commission's Progress Report 
for 2007 noted overall good progress. However, for the next year it noted the effects 
of the political crisis after the Presidential elections of February 2008. 1006 The 
overview of the progress in 2007 is rather extensive and balanced highlighting the 
achievements or omissions of the authorities. Among major developments, a package 
of legislative reforms has been undertaken which improves the legislation regulating 
the separation of powers, in particular increasing powers for the National Assembly 
and improving local self government, the independence of the judiciary, the 
Ombudsperson and freedom of the media. IOO? Within the priorities of the Action Plan 
major attention has been paid to the reform of the judiciary, conduct of elections, 
h . h b' f fi "1' fi 1008 toget er WIt a ne re erence to CIVI servIce re orm. 
Most importantly, in addition to the prioritised actions, the Commission 
considered the progress on certain general actions under section 4.1.1. These include 
local governance reform and ensuring political pluralism in the country. In relation to 
political pluralism, the Commission's willingness to proceed to evaluation of this 
general action can be explained by the fact that Armenia had undertaken certain 
1005 Ibid, at 4. 
1006 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament, 'Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
in 2001', Progress Report Armenia, Brussels, 3 April 2008, SEC(2008) 392. at 2. 
1007 The role of the Ombudsperson has been strengthened in terms of institutional immunity and 
authority to investigate claims of human rights violations. The Ombudsperson will be involved in the 
legislative process through reviewing legislative drafts relating to democracy and human rights before 
they are submitted to the government; Ibid, at 3. 
1008 2007 Progress Report Armenia, at 3-4. 
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relevant measures which should not have passed unnoticed. 1009 However, the 
reference by the Commission to the general action of undertaking local reform even 
without any measures undertaken by the country suggests that it is the discretion of 
the Commission whether or not to address the general actions in section 4.1.1 of the 
Action Plan. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the case of Armenia the 
Commission did not restrict its evaluation to the priorities only, which once again 
questions the rationale behind the Action Plan drafting. 
It is unfortunate to note a less strict approach taken by the Commission in the 
2008 Progress Report, where the section on democratic reform is limited to nearly a 
page. The main issues the Commission referred to have been the February 2008 
Presidential elections and the subsequent political crisis. IOID The only other issues, the 
Commission made a short reference to, were the reform of the judiciary and local 
governance without any details or guidelines for further action. 101 I No other 
prioritised or general measures of the Action Plan have been considered, thus 
revealing inconsistency on the part of the Commission in comparison with the 2007 
Report. On the other hand, within the section on human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, the Commission considered the issue of participation via engagement of 
the NGOs, the development of which was included in the Action Plan as a general 
measure. 1012 
In Azerbaijan's case in both the 2007 and 2008 Progress Report the 
Commission noted that the country did not exploit the opportunities offered to 
undertake reforms on democracy, the rule of law, protection of human rights and 
1009 New measures have been undertaken to enhance political pluralism in the country through 
legislative initiatives on establishing a body to monitor party financing and relevant drafts were 
submitted to the Council of Europe for opinion. 
1010 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament, 'Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
in 2008'. Progress Report Armenia. Brussels. 23 April 2009, SEC(2009) 511/2, at 3. 
1011 Ibid, at 3-4. 
1012 Ibid, at 5. 
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fundamental freedoms. This suggests that despite its position on Azerbaijan and the 
broadly formulated Action Plan on political priorities, the Commission has to 
evaluate the state's progress, at least fonnally. It is a different question whether, or 
how, the assessed progress will affect the relations between the parties. It is at this 
point that the 'goal conflict .IOl3 is particularly apparent. What is more important: the 
absence of progress on democratic reform, or 'good progress' made within the 2006 
Memorandum of Understanding on strategic partnership in the field of energy, and 
Azerbaijan's increasing role as an energy producer, as identified in the 2008 Progress 
Report? 1014 
The consideration of political refonn in 2007 has been presented in the Report 
without a clear separation of measures aimed at strengthening democracy, the rule of 
law or human rights. As noted in the previous chapter, the Action Plan with 
Azerbaijan similarly had a confusing structure providing for judicial reform among 
the measures on respect for human rights. The Commission evaluated the progress in 
relation to some prioritised areas, such as electoral reform, local governance, the 
judiciary, and the development of the civil society under the priority area 3 on human 
rights. lOIS However, it remained silent on such important prioritised issues as 
institutional reforms to ensure proper checks and balances. In this context, the 
Commission would hardly have been expected to address vital issues of the 
1013 Maier and Schimmelfennig, 'Shared Values: Democracy and Human Rights' in Weber, Smith and 
Baun, (eds.), Governing Europe's Neighbourhood: Partners or PeriphelY, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 2007), 39-57. at 43. 
1014 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament. 'Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
in 2008', Progress Report Azerbaijan. Brussels, 23 April 2009, SEC(2009) 512/2. at 2. 
lOIS Three national associations of municipalities were established in cooperation with the European 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. and a law on delegating additional powers to 
municipalities was signed in October 2007. Nevertheless. the legislative and institutional developments 
did not lead to short-term results and decentralisation of power is still very limited; Commission Staff 
Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, 'Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2007'. Progress 
Report Azerbaijan. Brussels, 3 April 2008. SEC(2008) 391. at 3-4. 
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strengthening of Parliament and guaranteeing political pluralism omitted in the 
Action Plan. This is rather unfortunate, since the Progress Reports could have been 
used on behalf of the Commission to address issues, which due to certain reasons, 
arguably including the principle of joint ownership, were not included in the Action 
Plan. In this way, the Commission would have upheld the importance the EU 
allocates to representation in a democratic state and to the issue of political 
participation. 
Even more unfortunate is that the evaluation of democratic reform in the 2008 
Progress Report is confined to almost half a page with a brief recall of the 
Presidential elections in October 2008, reference to the election code, the limited 
progress of judicial reform and local democracy.lol6 In the human rights section, 
development as regards civil society has been considered similar to the 2007 Progress 
Report. Similarly, no reference is made to the separation of powers or strengthening 
of the Azerbaijani Parliament. 
Based on these observations, it can be noted that inconsistency and 
incoherence is present in several dimensions. First of all, it is not clear whether the 
prioritised actions are the basis for evaluation due to the Commission's occasional 
tendency to visit the progress on general actions under section 4 of the Action Plans. 
Second, the Commission addresses the progress as regards prioritised action with 
varying detail and scrutiny, not only depending on the countries, but also the year. In 
addition, Progress Reports are not indicative as to further actions and as such do not 
serve as guidance for the country's future actions. Third, at times the Commission 
fails to address some priorities at all, such as the issue of separation of powers in 
1016 2008 Progress Report Azerbaijan. at 3-4. 
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Azerbaijan. In addition, the Commission does not address the general national 
measures aimed at the Action Plan implementation. 
3. Implementation: assistance under the ENPI 
Following the 2003 General Affairs and External Relations Council's 
invitation to present a Communication on a new Neighbourhood Instrument, the 
Commission presented its Communication 'Paving the Way for a New 
Neighbourhood Instrument' proposing a two-step approach. 1017 During the first 
phase, 2004-2006, coordination of the existing financial instruments was envisaged. 
The second phase covers the period after 2006 where a new instrument, the ENPI, 
was established. The conclusion of the Action Plans with South Caucasian Republics 
in 2006 makes the ENPI the only instrument through which these countries received 
assistance for the Action Plan implementation. 
3.1. Democracy within the ENP! 
The new instrument was officially established in October 2006 as a 
mechanism to provide assistance to countries involved in the ENP and Russia for the 
period of 2007-2013. 1018 The ENPI upholds the ENP rhetoric on common values 
incOIporating the commitment to promote EU values, including democracy, to 
neighbouring countries via dialogue and cooperation,1019 reiterating the EU's image 
as a 'normative' and 'soft' power. While the assistance under the ENPI will promote 
in particular the implementation of the PCAs or future agreements, the Action Plans 
1017 Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument, Commission Communication. COM( 2003) 
393 final, Brussels, 1 July 2003. 
1018 Regulation No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of24 October 2006 
laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI Regulation), OJ L31 011, 09.11.2006. 
1019 Article 1, EN PI Regulation, 
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will be used as a reference point for establishing the priorities for assistance. 1020 This 
suggests that if assistance under the T ACIS, aimed at PCA implementation, was not 
focused on democratisation issues, the prioritisation of the latter under the Action 
Plans should assume their prioritisation also under the ENPI assistance. Indeed, 
supporting democratisation, by enhancing the role of civil society and promoting 
media pluralism, as well as through electoral observation and assistance, is one of the 
areas envisaged for Community assistance. 1021 
A better use of funds has been identified as one of the strengths of this new 
instrument, where, in its relevant communication, the Commission highlighted that, 
under the ENPI, Community assistance will be 'explicitly policy-driven' and will 
bring a major development for the countries previously covered by T ACIS 'moving 
from technical assistance to fully-fledged cooperation.' 1022 Though it is not clear what 
the 'fully fledged cooperation' entails, a number of distinctions between these two 
instruments can be highlighted. 
The assistance under the ENPI is established in partnership between the 
Commission and the beneficiary, involving national, regional and local authorities, 
economic and social partners, civil society representatives etc. 1023 In comparison with 
T ACIS, engaging with respective governments only, the new regulations should mark 
a major shift towards a more inclusive approach allowing relevant stakeholders to 
engage with the establishment of the assistance. Moreover, Article 14 of the 
Regulation establishes the list of participants eligible for funding, including not only 
the state actors, but also decentralised bodies and non-state actors, thus incorporating 
the bottom-up approach in contrast to the top-down approach of T ACIS assistance. 
1020 Article 2.1 and Article 3.1, ENPI Regulation. 
1021, Article 2.2, ENPI Regulation. 
1022 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Strengthening the ENP, 4 December, 2006 COM (2006)726 final, at 3. 
1023 Article 4.2, ENPI Regulation. 
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Nevertheless, there is a common feature shared between T ACIS and ENPI 
which is the negative conditionality of assistance provided. As discussed in Chapter 
IV, positive and negative conditionality impact on the development of relations 
between the parties in a distinct way.1024 While positive conditionality dictates the 
development of cooperation, negative conditionality assumes that the cooperation can 
be interrupted if a party breaches certain established preconditions. Preconditions for 
negative conditionality are present in Article 28 of the ENPI Regulation which 
provides for suspension of Community assistance where a partner country fails to 
observe the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. 
Cremona considers that irrespective of this provlSlon, the positive 
conditionality embedded in the general policy should be considered as a 'real 
development' in the use of conditionality to neighbouring countries, where the future 
evolution of relations will depend on the achievements of mutually agreed goals. 1025 
Accordingly, one can suggest that negative conditionality will hold the parties back 
from deviating from the basis of relations, including the adherence to common 
values. Positive conditionality will motivate further progress in adherence to these 
values or achievement of the goals the parties have envisaged in the Action Plans. 
Another observation could be made in the context of the legal nature of the ENP 
instruments. The positive conditionality is embedded in the policy documents which 
have no binding force, and therefore cannot guarantee adherence to the shared values 
strictly speaking. The negative conditionality is established by the ENPI Regulation, a 
1024 See section 3.2.1 of Chapter IV. 
1025 Cremona, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: More than a Partnership?, in Cremona, (ed.), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 244-299, at 
284. 
268 
hard law instrument. Thus, one can consider that the ENPl's negative conditionality 
supports the positive conditionality in terms of highlighting its political element. 
Though the ENPI Regulation is one of the few hard law instruments within 
the ENP, its policy framework incorporates soft law instruments, where no legal basis 
is required allowing it to include components from all three pillars of the TEU as 
mentioned in Chapter IV. 1026 The ENPI Country Strategy Papers 2007-2013 and the 
ENPI National Indicative Programmes for 2007-2010 are examples of such soft law 
instruments. The Country Strategy Papers provide a general overview of the 
objectives of the cooperation, the political and economic situation and overview of 
past and future EU assistance. 1027 All three Strategy Papers with the South Caucasian 
states provide an evaluation of the previous instruments of assistance and the results 
achieved. It is evident that among the previous programmes and instruments 
operating in the South Caucasus only the EIDHR had been concerned with the issues 
of democracy promotion. 1028 The focus of the EIDHR solely on small-scale projects 
involving NGOs implied that there was a major gap in this area of funding. 
The National Indicative Programmes bring more focus to the Strategy Papers 
and establish details of the actions under the ENPI national allocations. All three 
Indicative Programmes establish certain Priority Areas for providing assistance under 
the ENPI including the support for democratic development in the first area with 
varying sub-priorities for each of the countries. 1029 They also allocate the budget for 
respective countries according to the priority areas. It should be noted that the 
financial envelope of the ENPI amounting to approximately €ll billion for 2007-
1026 Article 3, EN PI Regulation; Cremona, ibid, at 264. 
1027 ENPI, Armenia Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013; ENPI, Georgia Country Strategy Paper, 2007-
2013; EN PI, Azerbaijan Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. Available at 
httrllec.europa.eulworldleno/documents en.htm#2. 
102 Section 3.3, Chapter II. 
1029 Section 4 of Armenia EN PI National Indicative Programme 2007-2010, Georgia ENPI National 
Indicative Programme 2007-2010; Azerbaijan National Indicative Programme 2007-2010. 
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2013 has been considered as inadequate for financing refonns in all desired sectors 
similar to the pre-accession strategy. 1030 This observation should be supported by the 
fact that the cooperation with Russia will be financed from the same budget. 
Though the development of civil society did not occupy a central place within 
the Action Plans priorities, the ENPI documents accord a place to civil society both in 
tenns of its participation in the allocation of EU assistance and its development being 
one of the areas, to which EU assistance will be directed. 1031 The ENPI National 
Indicative Programmes for three states strongly emphasise the bottom-up approach to 
governance. Citizens should participate in the political life of the country through a 
stronger local self government, participation in the decision-making processes and 
control through civil society organisations. 1032 The focus on development of bottom-
up governance and also the eligibility of civil society to receive assistance under the 
ENPI, assumes that the development of civil society will be supported both under the 
ENPI and the EIDHR which is primarily directed at non-state organisations. 1033 
It should be noted that the new EIDHR (European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights) replaced the previous EIDHR initiative in 2006 and is supposed 
to bring more flexibility to support for democracy and human rights worldwide. 1034 
The distinctive feature of the EIDHR as an initiative and currently as an instrument is 
that the assistance does not depend on the governments of relevant countries. The 
ENPI seems to adopt a similar stance within its negative conditionality. It foresees 
1030 Tulmets, 'Adapting the Experience of Enlargement to the Neighbourhood Policy: the ENP as a 
Substitute to Enlargement?' in Kratochvil. (ed.), The European Union and Its Neighbourhood: 
Policies. Problems and Priorities, (Institute oflnternational Relations, Prague, 2006),29-57, at 46. 
1031 Article 2 and 4, ENPI Regulation. 
1032 Armenia ENPI National Indicative Programme, at 7-8; Georgia ENPI National Indicative 
Programme, at 6; Azerbaijan ENPI National Indicative Programme, at 6, 9. 
1033 According to Balfour due to pressure from the European Parliament the latter has not been fused 
with new regional or thematic assistance programmes; Balfour, 'Promoting Human Rights and 
Democracy in the EU's Neighbourhood: Tools, Strategies and Dilemmas' in Balfour and Missiroli, 
Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy, EPC Issue Paper No. 54, June 2007, at 20. 
1034 Regulation No. 1889/2006 concerning the financing instrument for the promotion of democracy 
and human rights worldwide, OJ L 386/1, 29.12.2006. 
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support to non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratisation processes in case of 
suspension of general assistance. 1035 It can be argued that the ENPI acknowledges the 
lessons learnt from TACIS, which lacked mechanisms to support political 
developments in case the assistance to the government was suspended due to their 
democratic record. As a matter of fact, the total budget of the EIDHR for the period 
2007-2013 is over € 1 billion, which is not huge for a worldwide instrument. The 
South Caucasus is included within a general group of ENPI and Middle Eastern 
addressee countries, whose shares in the assistance are modest. 1036 
At first sight it might seem that having two instruments aimed at supporting 
civil society might result in fragmentation of the overall assistance in the area, 
therefore undermining its general efficiency. It is nevertheless important to remember 
the nature of the EIDHR which focuses on small-scale projects and is even described 
as 'a drop in the ocean' as opposed to the enormous tasks on the agenda of 
democratisation of relevant states. 1037 From this perspective, the ENPI's attempt to 
engage with civil society should be considered as a step further to enhance citizens' 
participation on political life of the country, which will complement already existing 
instruments. Nevertheless, positive results will be achieved only when efficient 
coordination of relevant projects is guaranteed, where the ENPI keeps its focus on 
larger programmes in order to avoid overlaps on the agendas of these two 
programmes or a vast number of small-scale projects. 
It appears that annual Action Programmes based on the National Indicative 
Programmes will be adopted subject to a number of measures with 'inbuilt 
1035 Article 28, ENPI Regulation. 
1036 EIDHR Strategy Paper 2007-2010, (DG RELEX/B/I JVK 70618), Indicative EIDHR Financial 
Allocations 2007-2010, Annex 1. 
1037 Balfour, supra note 68, at 20. 
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flexibility,' implying that there are no fixed programmes. 103X According to a 
Commission official, instead of particular projects, a dialogue with the government is 
maintained through which particular goals to support are decided based on 
conditions, that certain achievements should be recorded, which represent a "more 
forward-looking, more structural approach.' 1039 Various forms of assistance, 
including sector or multi-sector programmes, through sectoral budget or geneml 
budget support, budgetary and non-budgetary support are envisaged. 104o New 
cooperation tools such as TAIEX and Twinning are introduced to contribute to areas 
of regulatory reform and administrative capacity building. 1041 The Country Strategy 
Papers outline the programmes within the ENPI. As a thematic programme, a new 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights is mentioned for Armenia and 
Azerbaijan in the ENPI National Indicative Programmes. 1042 Currently, there are no 
indications as to the operation of this instrument. 1043 
In contrast with Armenia and Azerbaijan, the National Indicative Programme 
for Georgia provided for an opportunity to increase allocation under the Governance 
facility announced by the Commission in its Communication on Strengthening the 
ENP. I 044 The governance facility intends to top up the country allocations based on 
the progress achieved in implementing the Action Plans with the focus on key 
governance issues: democratic practice, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law. 1045 Nevertheless, the Governance Facility has not been 
1038 Georgia ENPI National Indicative Programme 2007-2010, at 15. 
1039 Anonymous Commission official I, Annex A. 
1040 Georgia ENPI National Indicative Programme 2007-2010, at 16; Armenia ENPI National 
Indicative Programme 2007-2010, at 14. 
1041 Armenia ENPI National Indicative Programme 2007-2010, at 14. 
1042 Armenia ENPI Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013 at 23; ENPI Azerbaijan Country Strategy Paper 
2007-2013, at 27. 
1043 Interviewed Commission officials had no knowledge about such an instrument. 
1044 Georgia ENPI National Indicative Programme 2007-2010. 
1045 Communication on Strengthening the ENP; Principles for the Implementation of a Governance 
facility under ENPI. 
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articulated so far, perhaps, because the last two rounds of elections have raised doubts 
in the EU as regards Georgia's loyalty to its proclaimed commitments. 
3.2. Actual measuresjinanced 
As noted by Bosse, the greater emphasis the ENPI places on the commitment 
to shared values should be tested once the actual measures are financed. 1046 
30% of the general assistance of €98.4 million for Armenia for 2007-2010 is 
allocated to the support for strengthening of democratic structures and good 
governance. 1047 
Priority area 1: 29.52 m € 
Support for Strengthening of Democratic Structures and Good 30% 
Governance 
Priority area 2: 29.52 m € 
Support for Regulatory Reform and Administrative Capacity 30% 
Building 
Priority area 3: 39,36 m € 
Support for Poverty Reduction Efforts 40% 
In the case of Georgia support for democratic development, rule of law and 
governance will receive 26% of€120.4 million for the period of2007-201O. 1048 
Priority area 1: 31,5 m € 
Support for democratic development, rule of law and governance 26% 
Priority area 2: 31.5 m € 
Support for economic development and ENP AP implementation 26% 
Priority area 3: 38,4 m € 
Poverty reduction and social reform 32% 
Priority area 4: 19.0 m € 
Support for peaceful settlement of Georgia' internal conflicts 16% 
1046 Bosse. 'Values in the EU's Neighbourhood Policy: Political Rhetoric or Reflection of a Coherent 
Policy?' (2007) 7 European Political Economy Review 38, at 57. 
1047 Armenia EN PI National Indicative Programme, for 2007-2010, at 4. 
1048 Georgia ENPI National Indicative Programme, 2007-2010, at 4. 
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Support for Azerbaijan democratic development and good governance will 
receive €30 million out of€92 million for all priority areas for the same period. 
Priority area 1: 30 mE 
Support for Democratic Development and Good 32.6% 
Governance 
Priority area 2: 32 mE 
Support for socio-economic reform (with emphasis on regulatory 34.8% 
approximation with the EU acquis), fight against poverty and 
administrative capacity building 
Priority area 3: 30mE 
Support for legislative and economic reforms in the transport, energy 32.6% 
and environmental sectors 
If one calculates the common share allocated to South Caucasus out of the 
overall Ell billion for 2007-2013 as twice more what was allocated for 2007-2010, it 
will amount approximately to 600 million for the three countries, which is rather 
indicative of the region's priority, unless the financial envelope for the 2010-2013 
period is substantially increased. Nevertheless, the overall picture of financial 
assistance is promising in comparison with the previous assistance where 
strengthening of democracy has not been considered as a separate line for funding. 
The means and instruments through which these funds will be allocated are of the 
most importance. 
In the absence of fixed programmes on democracy, the assistance is allocated 
as a result of dialogue between parties, which, as noted earlier, should involve not 
only the Commission and the beneficiary, but also national, regional and local 
authorities, economic and social partners, civil society representatives. However, this 
does not appear to be the case in either of the countries. 
For instance in Georgia, taking into account the fact that the Government 
should make the decisions as to how to spend the financial assistance issued by the 
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EU, there are no fixed programmes to which the money will be issued. 1049 Thus, it is 
left to the Government to allocate the assistance which it is assumed will be 
monitored by the EU. 1050 Therefore, the civil society is not involved in the process of 
allocation of the assistance and the monitoring is left to the EU. 1051 In addition, the 
direct budgetary support cannot be issued to civil society, which is one of the 
addressees of the assistance according to the ENPI Regulation. According to a 
Georgian Government official, the assistance allocated to state institutions can be 
further redirected through certain established procedures to non-state organisations 
for implementation of relevant projects. 1052 Because allocating assistance to civil 
society by the government would contradict the very idea of civil society,1053 it 
should be done separately from the direct budgetary support. In addition, the 
prerogative of the Government to allocate budgetary assistance brings us back to the 
non-binding nature of the Action Plan and the political will of the country in question. 
According to the Ministry of the European Integration, within the budgetary 
support, one or two priority concentration areas are selected, whereas most of the 
assistance is provided in the form of direct support to the state budget. Of the 
budgetary support allocated annually, only the 2008 allocation included democracy-
related issues, where budgetary support was issued to the Ministry of Justice to 
undertake reform of the criminal justice system, whereas the assistance for 2007 was 
aimed at public finance management reform and, for 2009, at the reform of the 
1049 Anonymous Commission official II, Annex A. 
1050 Interview with Anonymous Official, State Ministry for European Integration of the Republic of 
Georgia, 7 April 2009, Tbilisi, Georgia. For interview transcript see Annex B. 
1051 Interview with Ivane Chkhikvadze, Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 6 April, 2009, Tbilisi. For 
interview transcript see Annex B. 
1052 Anonymous Official, State Ministry for European Integration of Georgia, Annex B. 
1053 Raik, 'Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step up the Ell's Policy towards the 
Eastern Neighbourhood', Centre for European Policy Studies, Working Document No 237/February 
2006, at 21. 
275 
vocational education and training system. 1054 Thus, within the two years of assistance 
under the ENPI, the reform of the judiciary has been the only area from the list of 
priority and general actions envisaged in the ENP Action Plan to which 
comprehensive assistance has been allocated. 
In addition, it should be noted that the Commission finances certain other 
projects related to democracy promotion on an ad hoc basis. For instance, the one-
year EUJUST THEMIS advisory mission has helped Georgia to draw up an extensive 
proposal for reforming the criminal justice system. 1055 Though the project was 
initiated before the adoption of the ENP, it appears it will be renewed also because 
the Action Plan makes reference to the latter. The Stability Instrument has been used 
in Georgia to support the electoral process in 2008 with a view of addressing the 
shortcomings of the most recent elections by the international observers. The 
possibility of using the Stability Instrument in Armenia and Azerbaijan is envisaged 
to be used primarily in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 1056 
Another project on the strengthening of the Parliament, financed by the EU, 
ended in April 2008 and resulted in creating a documentation centre, translation 
centre and translation of EUROVOC. 1057 It can be suggested that the project created 
institutional opportunities for the Parliament. However, its influence on strengthening 
Parliament's role or diminish its dependence on the executive has been doubted. lo58 
1054 Available at http://eu-integration.gov.gel?que=eng/AP/EU A liE N ENPIIN P; Progress Reports 
2007,2008. 
1055 Established by the Council Joint Action 2004!523!CFSP of28 June 2004, it has been the first Rule 
of Law mission launched by the EU in the context of the ESDP. 
1056 ENPI Strategy Paper Azerbaijan 2007-2013, ENPI Strategy Paper Armenia 2007-2013. 
1057 EUROVOC means European legal terminology; 'European Neighbourhood Policy and Georgia: 
Analyses of Independent Experts', Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 'Open Society-Georgia' Foundation and 
CORDAID Foundation, Tbilisi 2007, at 38. Available at http://www.enp.ge!?l=1&i=117. 
1058 Ivane Chkhikvadze, Annex B: A clear example is the Law on Food safety which was amended 
several times, this law a precondition for signing a free trade agreement, but it was the Parliament 
which made amendments and suspended the implementation of the law, so the Parliament is not 
independent, so it cannot be said that in the results of the project on Parliament the latter got 
empowered. 
276 
Moreover, the European Union provided support for Parliamentary elections in May 
2008 by issuing €2 million aimed at improving the administrative procedures and 
voter infonnation. 1059 
Apart from the envisaged ENPI budget for 2007-2012, after the Georgian-
Russian war, the Commission issued post-conflict assistance amounting to €500 
million for the period of 2008_2010. 1060 Within this assistance, € 181.9 million was 
provided for 2008 and distributed into several areas, including 'ongoing assistance' 
under various programmes among which were democracy, human rights and support 
for non-state actors. Though it has not been specified which particular issues this 
assistance will be directed at, what seems clear is that the EU is very responsive on 
the assistance level to even such signals as declaratory commitments. 
The responsiveness of the EU to the political declarations made by the 
Georgian leadership is reciprocated by some tangible results in the sphere of 
democratic refonns. Following the reinstatement of commitment to continuous 
democratic refonn by the Georgian Government after the August 2008 war, some of 
the proclaimed refonns were initiated and partially implemented by the end of the 
year, including strengthening of parliamentary opposition and involvement in the 
constitutional refonn process. 1061 The reinstated political commitments have been 
included in a package of political conditionality linked to increased EU post-conflict 
assistance which was eventually agreed in January 2009. 1062 
The general assistance allocation under the ENPI to Annenia follows the same 
pattern as in the case of Georgia, where the direct budgetary support is allocated with 
1059 http://www.delgeo.ec.europa.eulen/press/6may2008.html. 
1060 EU Assistance Fact Sheet, Website ofEC Delegation to Georgia; available at 
http://europa.eulrapidipressReJeasesAction.do?reference=M EM OIOS/645&format= HT M L&aged=O&J 
an¥uage=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
106 2008 Georgia Progress Report, at 4. 
1062 Ibid. 
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focus on the same issues. Thus, for the direct budgetary support for each year an 
annual financial agreement is concluded within the amount for 2007-2010 as 
established by the ENPI National Indicative Programme. This assumes approximately 
20 million for each year, where the assistance does not go to fixed programmes only 
but is mostly transferred to state budget where the Government is better positioned to 
decide which areas should be financed as priorities. I063 Although, it is left to the 
Government to decide the projects that should be financed through the budget, there 
are certain preconditions. 1064 As with Georgia, vocational educational training has 
been a priority for 2007 and 2008, and judicial reform for 2009, which is again the 
only area related to democratisation. 1065 Since budgetary assistance merges with the 
national budget, by merely looking at the Law on Budget it is hard to track whether 
particular measures on democratic reform, if there are any, are related to the 
assistance through the ENPI or not. 
The civil society representatives have been estranged from the process of 
allocation of assistance, and although they are mentioned as addressees of the 
assistance in the ENPI documents, for the initial two years no programmes can be 
noted to be financed through the ENPI to support civil society. Nonetheless, the 
representatives of civil society are hopeful that elements of civil society will emerge 
as professional service providers in certain areas on which the Government will rely 
more and more. 1066 
1063 Interview with Varos Simonyan, Head of Department ofEU and International Economic Affairs, 
Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Armenia, 20 April, 2009, Yerevan. For interview transcript 
see Annex C. 
1064 Ibid. 
1065 Ibid; Progress Report Armenia 2007 and 2008. 
Also see http://www.delarm.ec.europa.euleniprograrnmesactions/fulliistprojects.htm. 
1066 Interview with Karen Bekaryan, Head ofNGO European Integration, 20 Armenia, 2009, Yerevan. 
For interview transcript see Annex C. 
278 
Outside the framework of direct financial assistance only one project has 
been negotiated for Armenia which is related to the proper functioning of the 
Ombudsman office and is supposed to be initiated in the near future. 1067 
Similar gaps are identifiable in the case of Azerbaijan under the ENPI 
assistance. Allocating €24 million for 2007 under annual Action Programme under 
ENPI, the emphasis was put solely and entirely on the reform of the energy sector 
through a sector support programme. The 2008 annual action programme placed 
emphasis on support for justice reform, primarily relating to the rule of law, and 
twinning operations for the implementation of the Action Plan. 1068 No other projects 
have been noted to be undertaken in the country aimed at implementation of the 
Action Plan measures on democratisation. 1069 
The Progress Reports for the three countries make references to the assistance 
provided also through horizontal thematic programmes, such as the EIDHR and the 
Non-State Actors and A u t h o r i t i ~ s s in Development. 1070 It follows that while there are 
two programmes through which the EU engages with the development of public 
sector, it will hardly follow up the rhetoric of the ENPI regulation and other 
documents on the alleged support to civil society. 
Thus, it should be noted that while the ENPI appeared to put a greater 
emphasis on shared values and democratisation, the way the assistance is allocated in 
practice and the issues to which the assistance is allocated is yet another factor 
undermining the ENP conditionality. 
1067 Yaros Simonyan, Annex C. 
1068 Azerbaijan Progress Report 2008, at 18; Anonymous Commission official II, Annex A. 
1069 European Commission Delegation to Azerbaijan, see 
h t t ~ : / / w w w . d e l a z e . e c . e u r o p a . e u / i n d e x . p h p ? l = e n . .
107 2008 Armenia Progress Report, at 17; 2008 Azerbaijan Progress Report, at 18; 2008 Georgia 
Progress Report, at 6, 21. 
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4. Conclusion 
To conclude on the operative elements of the ENP methodology, it should be 
emphasised that the monitoring of the process and the assistance provided for the 
Action Plan implementation decrease the efficiency of the ENP in instigating 
democratic reform. 
Though the Action Plans envisage the joint PCA institutions to undertake 
monitoring of the Action Plans implementation, in the case of all the three countries 
these institutions merely uphold political dialogue. The Cooperation Council 
meetings can be described as 'hand-shaking exercise,' which together with the 
. political dialogue on higher levels, ensures that at least on declaratory level, the EU is 
upholding its values, including commitment to democracy. 
It is the Commission, which undertakes the actual evaluation of Action Plan 
implementation through issuing annual Progress Reports. Expectations for the 
Commission evaluation at the outset could not have been high. This follows from the 
drafting of the Action Plans, where the conditions for compliance were not spelled 
out in detail and sufficient precision. The analyses of the Progress Reports of the 
three countries manifest major inconsistencies. Not only does the Commission make 
general and brief recall to progress or absence of progress as regards certain priorities, 
but very often the evaluation lacks substance as to indications for further compliance. 
The Commission chooses to bypass or ignore certain vital issues, such as 
strengthening of the Parliament in Georgia or ensuring proper checks and balances 
between the executive and legislature in Azerbaijan. In addition, it is not clear 
whether there is any difference between the Action Plan prioritised measures and 
those provided under section 4 of the Action Plans as general complementary actions, 
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since the Commission occasionally evaluates the progress in implementing the 
general actions. 
Moreover, the determination of the Commission to evaluate political reform 
has softened judging by the Progress Reports on Armenia and Azerbaijan for 2008. 
What is more important is what are the consequences of the Commission monitoring 
and how does it affect the relations between the parties. To date the advancement or 
the stagnation in relations between the parties has not been made conditional upon the 
results of the Commission's evaluation of their progress. Nor have any of the Action 
Plans been revised in order to bring certain actions under the spotlight or require 
further reform. 
It is particularly interesting to consider this in the context of positive 
conditionality and negative conditionality of the ENP. A clear example of advance in 
relations between the EU and a partner country can be found in the negotiation of a 
visa facilitation agreement with Georgia. There is nothing to suggest that such 
advancement in the relations between the parties depended on Georgia"s adherence to 
democratic principles. Rather it can be suggested, that the talks on the agreement 
were initiated after the 2008 August war within the general approach of the EU's 
support to the country. 
As regards negative conditionality, it should be noted that it has not been 
referred to in relation to any of the South Caucasian states to date. Despite, the fact 
that Azerbaijan made no or limited progress in political reform as evaluated by the 
Commission in its Progress Reports, the negative conditionality was practically 
disregarded. It is apparent that the EU will unlikely undermine the progress on energy 
cooperation with the state invoking negative conditionality related to political 
reforms. Also, in the case of Armenia, one can question why the EU did not use 
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negative conditionality after the 2008 Presidential elections. The most reasonable 
explanation is that in this case the country clearly demonstrates willingness and 
efforts to implement the policy: should one instance of non-compliance trigger the 
negative conditionality mechanism, the prospect of future cooperation would be 
undermined. Not only does this demonstrate one of the drawbacks of the application 
of negative conditionality, but also it illustrates the mostly formal nature of this type 
of conditionality. 
An even greater gap in the ENP mechanism should be noted with reference to 
the assistance allocation, despite a greater emphasis the ENPI puts on promotion of 
democracy, together with a more inclusive approach to the participation of the civil 
society. The only two general instruments relevant for democratisation mentioned in 
the ENPI documents are the new Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights for 
Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Governance facility for Georgia. Two years after 
these documents were established neither of these instruments has been enacted for 
any of the countries. 
Thus, a flexible approach to the assistance based on annual action 
programmes focusing on certain priorities of the National Indicative Programmes is 
the main EU strategy in the South Caucasus. What is striking is that despite 
democratisation being identified as a priority area in all three National Indicative 
Programmes, the only area to be financed in the first two years is the reform of the 
judiciary for 2008. The progress reports do not identify any other general 
programmes in this area financed through the ENPI. Although certain ad hoc projects 
can be identified, such as a programme to support Parliament or assistance issued for 
elections under the Stability Instrument in Georgia, or a programme strengthening the 
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institutional capacity of the Ombudsman in Annenia, nevertheless, the blueprint 
approach of the ENPI Regulation is not apparent in practice. 
The Eastern Partnership was noted to increase the budget for the 
neighbourhood, suggesting that the South Caucasian countries will have bigger shares 
in comparison with general ENPI countries, which include Russia and Southern 
neighbours. However, it is too early to assume that the Eastern Partnership will lead 
to any modifications to the assistance allocation procedures or additional focus on 
financing projects on democratisation. 
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CHAPIER VIII 
Conclusion 
The major political developments of the last two decades have radically 
changed the European continent. The fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the subsequent enlargement of the EU, transformed the EU substantially 
bringing it closer to geographical areas previously considered remote. The ENP has 
been created to respond to the EU's enhanced role in its new and old neighbourhood. 
The new neighbourhood includes the South Caucasus, whose own importance 
increased substantially since Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan gained independence 
from the USSR. The significance of the region as an alternative energy root and a 
potential source of insecurity for the EU could not have passed unnoticed for the EU 
institutions and the Member States. With the inclusion of the South Caucasus within 
the ENP, the EU established a framework for pursing its interests therein and 
preventing threats that might potentially emerge from the region. At the same time 
the ENP declared the EU's inherent interest in transformation of the countries 
concerned via bringing them closer to Europe, through promoting its values to the 
neighbourhood. 
Within its transformation agenda the EU faces three countries undergoing 
both economic and political transition. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are 
developing countries, whose economic performance has improved throughout the last 
few years. The export of Azerbaijan's natural resources via BTC and BTE pipelines 
ensured a rapid increase in the state budget, benefiting also Georgia as a transit 
country. Armenia's economic isolation has not allowed the country to benefit from its 
transit position to date. Politically the three countries undertook an obligation in their 
Constitutions and before different international organisations to establish democratic 
republics. The Rose Revolution in Georgia gave a new impetus to political reforms in 
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the country which had its own drawbacks. Armenia's transition is expressed through 
democratic development via constitutional and legislative reforms, which are not 
always the practice in reality. Azerbaijan's transition is at the stage of power 
concentration in the hands of the President, where strong patronage networks allow 
the President to control different areas of public life. The conflicts in Nagorno-
Karabakh, Ossetia and Abkhazia interrupted the democratisation process at the 
beginning of 1 990s and continue to affect the political life of these states. 
In this context, the region was too troubled and too far away for the EU to 
engage closely in the 1990s. Thus, within the general approach towards the countries 
of the CIS, bilateral PCAs were signed with each of South Caucasian states based on 
Articles 133 and 308 EC in order to make a distinction with the Association 
Agreements signed with the CEE candidate countries. The partnership and 
cooperation within the agreements mainly evolved around the integration of the 
countries to the international market. Most importantly, political dialogue was 
established between the parties aiming at rapprochement. 
The PCAs contained hard versions of democracy and human rights provisions 
usually present in standard trade agreements at the time. The fact that it was an 
essential element of the agreement allowed the parties to undertake measures in case 
of its breach via the 'Bulgarian clause,' which nevertheless, has never been invoked 
in respect of the countries of the South Caucasus. Despite the inclusion of separate 
titles on cooperation in the area of democracy, the agreements did not cause 
significant consequences in tenns of political reforms. Apart from the absence of 
motivation to undertake reforms, the mainly technical and limited nature of T ACIS 
assistance also affected the ability of the PCAs to democratise either of the South 
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Caucasian states. The PCAs continued their operation within ENP framework, which 
should be considered as an attempt to compensate for past failures. 
However, as opposed to the EU's previous reluctance to engage with the 
countries closely on a differentiated basis, the ENP creates a framework for closer 
engagement of the EU with the three states in order to pursue its interests. These 
interests currently entail a differentiated approach from the EU, where each of the 
countries has its own attraction. The EU's interest in Azerbaijan revolves around 
energy cooperation. The Rose Revolution in Georgia reoriented the country towards 
integration to Western alliances, thus asking for the EU's presence in the country. 
The EU has not shown as strong an interest in Armenia as it has in Azerbaijan and 
Georgia. The EU's interest can still however be connected to the transit position of 
the country, especially taking into account the political dynamics of the region in 
light of the ongoing process of normalisation of the relations between Turkey and 
Armenia. 
The diversity of interests suggests a difference in the initial EU role for each 
of the countries. Prospects of economic cooperation with the EU are important for all 
three states. The EU's role for Georgia and Armenia is built around the urge of both 
countries to integrate to the EU or to its internal market. In circumstances where the 
both countries do not have their own leverage on the EU, this suggests that the EU's 
normativity is not necessarily threatened by rationalist considerations. As to 
Azerbaijan, the country does not have equivalent interest in integrating to the EU and 
it has much to offer to its partner in terms of its natural resources. This decreases the 
EU's 'power of persuasion' from the start. But even in case of Georgia and Armenia 
the ability of the EU to act normatively through the ENP is not straightforward due to 
the presence of numerous other actors in the region. 
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The complex relations each of the countries developed with Russia, the USA, 
Turkey and Iran influences major political developments among these world and 
regional powers, as well as their relations with the EU. Such disposition guarantees 
that politics in its rationalist understanding is deeply rooted in the South Caucasus. 
The Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 demonstrated how the efforts to 
democratise a country through the ENP can be undennined if political developments 
with one of the actors take a wrong tum. The past inability to establish a common 
agenda on the shared neighbourhood with Russia, for instance, will undermine not 
only the EU-Russia relations, but the ENP itself. Political developments in the region 
therefore will require the EU to act rationally, whether in terms of establishing its 
dominance as opposed to other actors, or reacting to the political events. For instance, 
the decision to start negotiations on visa facilitation with Georgia after the August 
2008 war can be considered as realpolitik with the EU making a statement of its 
support to Georgia, even though it could not have taken a tough response to Russia 
due to the split of its Member States on the matter of sanctions. Thus, the geopolitical 
reality of the South Caucasus can be considered as a fault line that is capable of 
undermining the ENP's agenda to democratise the EU's neighbours. 
The role of democratisation of the EU's neighbours within the ENP agenda is 
not straightforward. Although the official objectives of the policy are articulated 
around the idea of avoiding new dividing lines in Europe and spreading stability to 
the neighbourhood, gradually the shifted focus on security-oriented cooperation areas 
allowed positioning of security concerns as central to the ENP's objectives. Other 
articulated objectives, such as the stability and prosperity of the neighbourhood are, 
therefore, contributing to the objective of the EU security. In this context, the 
democratisation of the countries of the South Caucasus has a peculiar connection with 
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the EU's security. On the one hand. according to the presumption that democratic 
states do not fight wars with each other, long-term security in the EU's vicinity 
requires democratisation of its neighbours. On the other hand, security in the short-
term perspective can undermine the necessity to democratise neighbours. In 
particular, in order to ensure security, understood widely to include economic 
security, the EU might as well cooperate with those neighbours, which despite an 
absence of significant progress in political reform, ensure effective border control or 
the fulfilment of their obligations in the energy sector. The ENP as a foreign policy 
instrument is 'civilian' in terms of the means of cooperation without use of force. 
However, the importance of security on its agenda suggests that the second element 
of the concept of civilian power, that is the normativity of actor, might be given up to 
due narrower, short-term self-interest. 
Since the early days of articulating the idea of a neighbourhood policy, 
democracy has been cited as one of the values the EU intends to spread in the wider 
Europe. How is one supposed to understand democracy as the EU's value and its 
transposition to the neighbourhood? In the view of the debate on the Union's 
democratic deficit, its democratic life requires substantive consideration to justify the 
EU's normative rhetoric on democracy promotion in its vicinity. Looking at various 
stages of the EU's constitutional development, it should be noted that EU has its own 
unique, evolving democratic model required by its multi-level governance system. It 
does not replicate state models of democracy, rather democratic features of state 
governance are transposed to the European level with their peculiarities. In addition 
the EU's democracy is not static and has a dynamic nature. This statement is 
supported with continuous constitutional developments in the EC/EU with the 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, once entered into force, being the latest indicator of 
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such evolution. In addition, the democratic models of the Member States should be 
considered as one of the EU's democratic values. In this context, the EU can be 
viewed to be in a position of transposing its democratic values, such as representation 
of citizens, liberal governance, citizens' participation in decision-making etc, to its 
neighbourhood. 
The experience of transposing democratic values through the last two phases 
of enlargement, as the most successful example and as the policy on which the ENP 
is largely based, has been considered for comparative purposes. Despite the 
acknowledged success of this experience, the transposition of democracy to candidate 
counties was not flawless. The political reform had a limited nature and was 
concentrated on the operation of the three branches of power. In addition, its 
importance was limited to formal criteria of democracy at the stage before opening of 
the accession negotiations. This means that even when the EU institutions did not 
hesitate on their position as to the necessity of the candidate countries to improve 
their democratic record, the results of the political reform were still ambiguous. 
Operation of this pattern from the enlargement experience can be more 
complicated due to instrumental and methodological aspects of the policy. In 
particular, considering the role of the EU institutions in the policy formation, it is 
hard to expect unity from all institutions on their vision of the EU in the 
neighbourhood. The European Commission preserving its central role from the 
enlargement experience has a key position within the ENP. Nevertheless, its initial 
all-promising attitude towards the policy was subsequently narrowed down by the 
Council in terms of incentives of the policy and its guaranteed presence in the process 
of policy formulation, such as Action Plan preparation, as well as subsequent 
monitoring of the process. Among the EU institutions the European Parliament is the 
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one with a strong normative vision of the EU in its neighbourhood. However, despite 
a more enhanced presence in the EU's external relations, the European Parliament is 
not able to influence major policy outcomes. 
The 27 Member States have the capacity to provide leadership but cannot 
agree on a common stance for the EU's action in the neighbourhood. Rather, different 
groups of the Member States will be interested in promoting relations with their close 
neighbours in their own backyard. The 27 Member States will hardly share a common 
normative identity based on which the EU will cooperate with its neighbours. Even if 
the Commission and the Council decide on a common denominator for their 
neighbourhood, the political context for enhancing relations will ultimately depend on 
the Member States. For instance, the Eastern Partnership is initiated by Member 
States and its development to date depends inter alia on the priority given by the 
rotating Presidency. It might be suggested that the initiative will have more stable 
agenda under Lisbon, once the lead is given to the new President of the European 
Council and High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. 
In order to ensure all encompassing security, the ENP, as a hybrid type of 
Europeanisation policy, envisages cooperation in all three pillars of the EU's 
constitutional structure. Constructing a policy combining elements from the three 
pillars entails complex competence issues. In order to bypass such complexities, the 
ENP legislative instruments elaborating the policy are mostly soft law in substance. 
The only hard law instruments are the PCAs which will probably be replaced by 
Association Agreements, and the ENPI regulation setting conditions for provision of 
assistance. The main instruments through which the relations between the parties 
were established resemble those used during the pre-accession process. The use of 
Action Plans setting the conditions for cooperation, the Commission's monitoring 
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reports evaluating the implementation, and the assistance instruments suggest that the 
ENP is based on logic similar to enlargement transformation. Indeed the 
conditionality based on the Copenhagen criteria is present within the ENP, though in 
a weaker version. While the Copenhagen criteria were used to establish the conditions 
for cooperation by the European Commission, the ENP's language of political 
conditionality is nevertheless much weaker, since it is based on the rhetoric of 
adherence to 'shared values.' Moreover, if during the enlargement the focus on 
political reform required primary attention of the candidate countries in order to 
qualify for opening accession negotiations, in the case of the ENP, there is no specific 
phase for which significant progress in political reform is required. Thus, the 
inclusion of the countries in the Eastern Partnership can be regarded as missed 
opportunity in this context. At the moment, the possibility of signing Association 
Agreements can be used as a precondition for the neighbours to make a strong 
commitment in terms of political reforms. 
The ENP's conditionality is also undermined by other elements of the ENP 
methodology, such as the principles of joint ownership and differentiation. The three 
principles are based on a different rationale. The conditionality manifests the coercive 
in civilian understanding approach aimed at transformation. On the contrary, the 
principles of joint ownership and differentiation entail a more cooperative approach. 
The principle of joint ownership allows for neighbours with their own leverage on the 
EU to influence the course of relations between the parties. In the South Caucasus, 
Azerbaijan is the case, where the principle of joint ownership would permit the 
country to benefit from its importance for the EU. Thus, the EU/ Azerbaijan Action 
Plan provides as the first priority area the contribution to the resolution of Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, while in the Georgian Action Plan, despite the desired focus on a 
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stronger presence of the EU in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts, the joint 
ownership of the process did not have similar results. The differentiation has a two-
fold connection with conditionality. On the one hand, it will allow for each country to 
establish closer links with the EU at its own pace depending on its progress. On the 
other hand, due to differentiation, the EU cannot be accused of being arbitrary, since 
the principle implanted in the ENP's methodology allows for a flexible approach 
towards each of the countries. 
The effect of these principles is apparent in the operative elements of the ENP 
as applied in the three South Caucasian states. These elements are the Action Plans, 
the monitoring of their implementation and the assistance issued to the neighbours. 
The Action Plans, as soft law instruments and political documents, do not entail legal 
obligations for the parties. The Action Plans with the three countries inherit the weak 
conditionality in terms of its formulation around the concept of 'shared values' and 
the incentives. The three Action Plans promise the South Caucasian countries 'a stake 
in the internal market,' but only in the Georgian case is reference to the . four 
freedoms' made. Thus, Georgia in comparison with Armenia and Azerbaijan has 
apparently more to look forward to. 
The three Action Plans share certain similarities. First of all, the Action Plans 
contain priority areas on democratic measures which should be considered as a major 
advance in comparison with the PCAs. However, in all three of them the conditions 
for political refonn are phrased in most general tenns without a defined approach 
towards democracy. The measures on democratic refonn are mixed with those on the 
rule of law, and at points are even situated in the priority area on human rights. Very 
few deadlines are specified in the Action Plans. The major issues the EU is paying 
attention to are the functioning of the judiciary and executive together with general 
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requirements as regards separation of powers. Such important issues as the role of the 
parliament and public participation are either omitted or mentioned in section 4 on 
general actions, which is supposed to have a complementary role. Most importantly, 
the EU does not impose the necessity of democratic reform as its own value. Rather it 
relies on the obligations the three countries undertook in the Council of Europe and 
the OSCE. While it can be suggested that in this way the EU tries to allow the Action 
Plans to invoke democratic reform in the three countries by referring to their legal 
obligations in the relevant organisations, it nevertheless fails to create and uphold a 
role of its own for the EU as an organisation which promotes democracy. 
Thus, all three Action Plans fail to create a framework for political reform 
establishing concrete conditions for compliance. Rather the 'wish list' of actions 
merely states objectives for political reform leaving their implementation to the 
political will of the country. In addition, the effect of principles of joint ownership 
and differentiation is apparent. Differentiation is present in all three Action Plans 
highlighting different actions for different countries although around similar lines of 
the reform of the judiciary and executive. 
The principle of joint ownership is most evident in the EU/ Azerbaijan Action 
Plan. As noted above, the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict found its place in the first 
priority area as opposed to EU/Georgia and EU/ Armenia Action Plans. Also the 
priority area on democratic development presents the most generally formulated and 
scarce list of actions to be implemented with practically no deadlines. In addition, the 
reform of judiciary is included in the Action Plan priority area on human rights. 
While apart from joint ownership, such an outcome of the negotiations of the Action 
Plan can be also attributed to the importance of Azerbaijan in the energy cooperation 
sector, the case of Georgia demonstrates another type of retreat from the EU's 
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normative stance. Taking into account Georgia's determination to integrate into the 
EU, it is strange to note the insufficient attention paid to democratic reform, including 
it in the common bulk of measures on the rule of law measures and human rights with 
a major focus on the continuation of the judicial reform. In this context, the 
EU/Armenia Action Plan seems to be the most loyal to the EU's determination to 
promote democracy, despite the fact that the general criticism noted above applies 
also in this case. 
In this light, the South Caucasian Action Plans on their own should be 
considered as a major retreat from the EU's determination to instigate political 
reforms. The most peculiar observation should be made in connection to the fact, that 
the joint discussions of the Action Plans involved the Commission, the Presidency 
and the High Representative for the matters of political cooperation and CFSP. Thus, 
it should have been mainly the Commission responsible for negotiating these 
documents where the Member States could not have had much opportunity to 
sabotage the stance on democracy issues. 
The actual implementation of the Action Plans can nevertheless create 
prospects for future reforms. In Georgia and Armenia a clear institutional and 
legislative determination is notable for the Action Plan implementation. At this stage 
of the ENP implementation, the democratic reform is viewed as a necessary element 
of the policy implementation and will likely result in legislative reforms establishing 
formal prerequisites of democracy. The substantive prerequisites might even be 
undermined by the process of the Action Plan implementation. As in the case of 
enlargement, it creates strong executives responsible for major reforms without 
sufficient engagement with the Parliaments, with marginal roles for civil society and 
practical unawareness of the general public. The prospects of democratic reform in 
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Azerbaijan through the ENP are even more limited. The country did not express any 
eagerness to implement the Action Plan in institutional or legislative terms. 
The Action Plans serve as basis for subsequent monitoring of the ENP 
implementation. The actual monitoring takes place annually, when the Commission 
issues the progress reports. The role of the PCA institutions in the monitoring of 
progress is limited to political dialogue ensuring the presence of democratic rhetoric 
between the parties annually. The features of the Action Plans noted above suggest 
indefinite basis for the Commission's evaluation of each state's progress. Indeed, the 
Commission is inconsistent in its evaluation based on priority actions and sometimes 
the general actions contained in section 4 of the Action Plans. Moreover, the degree 
of scrutiny varies from action to action, and from year to year. The main role of the 
Commission in drafting the documents does not demonstrate adherence on behalf of 
the EU to democracy as its value. 
Most importantly, it is not clear what the practical implications of the 
monitoring are for the ENP implementation. The progress reports are not indicative of 
the further refonn and do not fulfil a purpose of assisting the countries in their 
transfonnation. Nor did they lead to the revision of any of the three Action Plan 
priorities, even though such a possibility is envisaged in all three documents. Besides, 
it is uncertain to what extent the results of monitoring are important for developing 
the relations between the parties. There is no apparent reliance on the results of 
monitoring for positive or negative conditionality. The example of negotiating a visa 
facilitation agreement with Georgia mentioned above can be cited here in relation to 
positive conditionality. 
Another example can be taken from the 2007 and 2008 progress reports for 
Azerbaijan where no progress has been noted in the Action Plan implementation. 
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Such evaluation did not result in any revision of the Action Plan, nor has any 
substantial action been taken to invite the country's attention to the Action Plan 
implementation. Therefore, the results of the monitoring are not particularly essential 
in terms of negative conditionality. It might be suggested, the negative conditionality 
will be probably used as a last resort, since it would potentially undermine the pursuit 
of the EU's rationalist interests, such as energy cooperation with Azerbaijan, or it 
would alienate a country willing to undertake reforms and therefore discourage it 
from further reforms, what can happen in the case of Armenia. Although this 
questions the rationale of the negative conditionality within the ENP, it seems that the 
ENPI Regulation, as a hard law instrument, is used to make a statement on the values 
of the EU, including democracy. 
The ENPI regulation upholds the ENP's rhetoric of the democracy promotion 
m the neighbourhood, envisaging it as one of the areas for assistance, and 
demonstrates a more inclusive approach towards civil society. However, issuing 
assistance as the third element in the chain of the EU's involvement with 
neighbouring countries can be controversial. The allocation of the assistance for 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan provides for approximately a third of the funds to 
political reform, including democratic development and human rights issues. 
However, in practice, the direct budgetary support issued to the countries leaves the 
national Governments in charge of the assistance, thus excluding the civil society. 
Also, in none of the countries the civil society had been noted to receive assistance. 
The direct budgetary support naturally does not issue money to the civil society. Most 
importantly, out of the measures financed through the ENPI in all the three countries 
the reform of judiciary was the only measure related to democratic development in 
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the first two years of the ENP implementation. Certain ad hoc programmes are 
financed in Georgia and Armenia. 
To conclude, this thesis demonstrates, in seeking to answer the research 
question posed, that in the short term perspective the effectiveness of the ENP on 
democratising the countries ofthe South Caucasus based on the EU's values is rather 
marginal. In Georgia and Armenia the importance of integrating to the internal 
market will require accompanying democratic reform, suggesting that the ENP can 
positively affect at least the formal criteria of democracy in the medium to long-term. 
Thus, positive conditionality can deliver in these countries, if the incentive of 
integration to the internal market is supported in practical terms. Such a prospect can 
hardly be seen in the case of Azerbaijan, where rationalist interests for energy are 
likely to continue to dominate for the foreseeable future. The principles of 
differentiation and joint ownership are required for developing relations in the most 
needed areas with focus on energy cooperation. They may ultimately overshadow the 
principle of conditionality, especially taking into account the insignificance of the 
ENP incentives for the country as opposed to Georgia and Armenia, therefore, one 
can conclude that the start of ENP was not particularly significant for the democratic 
reform in the three countries. 
There is more however to look forward to. Most importantly, the entry into 
legal effect of the Lisbon Treaty will have important implications for the EU's 
neighbourhood. As elaborated in Chapter IV, Article 8 of the amended EU Treaty 
will oblige the EU to establish relations with its neighbours 'founded on the values of 
the Union.' The promotion of democracy in the neighbourhood will become concrete 
obligation imposed upon the EU by the Treaty. Furthermore, the new provisions on 
democratic principles of the EU will reiterate the EU's role as democratic entity. 
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What will remain for the EU is to establish this role in the neighbourhood. 
The question to ask is whether the ENP offers sufficient mechanisms for this. Despite 
the faultlines inherent in the ENP in terms of its objectives, instruments and methods, 
it can be suggested that the EU possesses certain mechanisms to influence the 
democratic reforms in the countries concerned. First of all, the Eastern Partnership 
brings signing of new agreements to the immediate agenda in the relations between 
the parties. 1071 The new agreements should alter the positive conditionality as it 
operates currently. The EU should make a shift from the weak conditionality phrased 
in 'shared values' to Copenhagen-like criteria while acknowledging officially that the 
values are yet to become shared. This will require further clarifications of the 
incentives of the policy. It is time for the EU to make up its mind in relation to the 
South Caucasian countries. The logic of its policy should be either to offer a genuine 
routemap to membership or a halfway house, such as an EEA style arrangement, in 
which the transposition of the EU's democratic values is paramount. 
With the new posts of the President of the European Council and High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, it can be suggested that a unified 
front in dealing with the neighbours can be created, where a common EU position can 
be established notwithstanding the dissenting approaches of the Member States. Also, 
the regional dynamics in the advancing relations between Armenia and Turkey, EU 
and Russia, and the EU's perceived role as an independent arbiter, suggest that it 
might be possible to neutralise the necessity to act in rationalist way, therefore giving 
room for the EU to carry out its normative role. 
1071 In the context of Article 8 EU as amended by Lisbon Treaty, the first neighbourhood agreements 
might be signed within the framework of Eastern Partnership. 
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ANNEXES 
ANNEXA 
Interview I 
Anonymous Commission official/, DG RELEX 
European Commission. 
28 April 2009. Brussels 
1. Negotiation of the Action Plan: to which extent the inclusion of democratisation 
issues within the first priority areas reflect the Commission 's position/persistence on 
these matters? To what extent the opposite party agreed or resisted it? 
-The issue of democratisation is the basics of cooperation. Understanding of the 
values is not new, it was also in the PCA. This is one of the features which make the 
EU different from other international actors. From this perspective it is not a 
coincidence that the first priority area is devoted to democratisation. 
':In case of Georgia specifically, the EU could see a potential to do a lot in short 
period of time. However, democracy per se cannot be achieved shortly, there should 
be a culture to change, people have to learn to adhere to rules, there should be shift 
from politics based on leaders to politics based on ideas and programs. We could see 
that this stage is not complete. It was obvious that the reforms were ideology-oriented 
and not all of them were positively evaluated, for instance the constitutional 
amendments strengthening the executive. Although, this could be justified based on 
the fact that the country just came out of a revolution. So instead of attributing a good 
mark, the Commission could see a start of a promising process, especially in 
comparison with neighbours. Georgia is a 'laboratory' for the ENP where the EU can 
see the ENP can work. 
2. How were the Action Plans drafted? Why do general actions and objectives 
(section 4) follow the priority areas? Based on which criteria were the priority 
actions chosen? (section 4 also includes actions on pressing malten), In case l?f 
Armenia. for example political pluralism. functioning of political parties is not 
reflected in either of priority areas, but is mentioned within the general actions. 
-The position of sections should not be given much importance, since it is just a 
matter of presentation. The idea was to include the important issues in the priority 
areas, and section 4 to complete with other issues. However, they always made it 
clear, that it doesn't mean that they should implement the actions under priority area 
and abandon the ones in section 4 or vice versa, it is a comprehensive package. 
Section 4 is more about establishing the objectives. During the implementation no 
distinction was made between these two. The Action Plan can be considered as 'a 
wish list'. During the preparation of the document there wasn't much focus on this, it 
is a political document (things included by Commission, by Georgia) and not a legal 
one: no mandate by Council. It is not binding on the parties, there are no legal 
obligations. It is left to Georgia to implement it or not. It is not signed by any of the 
institutions. 
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3. How is each of the countries different from the other two? Is there a practice ( ~ r r
considering the democratisation of each of the countries in a comparative or regional 
perspective? 
-Provisions are more or less the same, most of them derive from international 
obligations these countries have in the Council of Europe. Sometimes they can be 
more specific, sometimes they make reference to international commitments, in this 
sense they are similar. There are some differences related to specific issues, for 
example freedom of media should be more urgent in case of Azerbaijan. However, 
the core of objectives is the same: separation of powers and working towards 
participatory democracy, rule of law, independence of judiciary, protection of HR, 
strengthening democratic institutions. 
4. The monitoring process: can it be assumed that it is undertaken by the Cooperation 
Council and the Commission (more evaluation)? 
-Having an EU Delegation is a major development for analysis. There is regular 
political dialogue on high level, the Commissioner or Troika during their meetings 
always stress the issues of democratisation. 
5. What is the role of the Cooperation Council? It meets only once a year and makes 
rhetorical statements. Is it more about political dialogue than the monitoring of the 
implementation? For instance, the 2008 Georgia and Armenia Cooperation Council 
notices 'significant progress in certain areas ': how is the progress measured? b; it 
evaluated by the Cooperation Council at all? Or the detailed evaluation is left to the 
Commission? 
-The Cooperation Council is a rather formal meeting which takes talk of number of 
events which took place on lower than ministerial level. This monitoring process has 
continuous nature that starts with contacts between the EU delegation and relevant 
government, with support to NGOs, parliament directly, reform strategy of criminal 
justice in case of Georgia, summarised the work which was done in an intense 
dialogue. So, there is already a good knowledge of what was happening, having a 
delegation is a major achievement here. In case of Azerbaijan, there was no 
delegation until recently which was restraining the capacity for analysis. Another 
important source is international organisations, their reports, which help to build an 
idea of what is going on. 
-There is a constant political dialogue. Troika, visits of the Commissioner also adds to 
this. Democracy, rule of law and human rights are always a part of discussion. So, 
there is a systematic and continuous process of where the implementation stands with 
some points of more formal checking which is the Cooperation Committee and 
Council. So, the revision doesn't take place only once a year, the work is already 
done, so when there is a meeting in Cooperation Council the other side already knows 
the position of the opposite side. In case of Georgia the EU embassies are closely 
cooperating, trying to come out with a consolidated vision of whether the reforms are 
advancing or not. It is part of informal process, continuous interaction, especially in 
such dynamic country as Georgia. 
-In November 2008 Georgian President made new commitments in respect to 
democratisation. There was a joint statement signed when the Commissioner 10 
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Tbilisi a week ago, acknowledging these commitments and also the fact that the 
financial assistance is increased by €500 million, the Commission will be even more 
attentive to the process of implementation of these commitments. It is in this sense 
that Georgia is viewed as a laboratory: there are commitments, there is assistance and 
also close scrutiny. There is a legal framework to implement this, although not ideal. 
Georgia has very lively civil society, the opposition is fragmented and weak, but there 
are some influential people appearing. And this is one of the messages sent to 
Saakashvili: his government has a moral obligation to deliver, since there is not 
serious opposition, and the idea of assigning key positions to the representatives of 
the opposition is very important. The EU tries to encourage the opposition, the 
Commission regularly meets the opposition representatives. In addition, the 
Commission tries to bring the government and opposition together, expecting 
constructive dialogue from both sides. The opposition should be willing to engage 
within the existing framework and not only orient towards changing the power. 
6. Sub-committees of the Cooperation Council: are there any subcommittees whose 
competence includes democratisation issues? The European Parliament in its 2008 
Resolution called on the Commission to negotiate with all three countries 
establishment of human rights subcommittees: are there any developments in this 
respect? 
-The subcommittees are quite technical (for issues such as trade, transport, 
environment, taxation). As regards democracy related issues it is the political 
dialogue (high level meetings, Troika demarches, informal meetings) which is 
important, and assumes a high level of interaction, non-technical. There is Justice, 
Liberty and Security Committee which focuses inter alia on judiciary. There is a 
principle of dialogue on human rights, however there has been no meeting so far. The 
Czech Presidency wants to have a meeting. This definitely takes account of the 
Parliament's recommendation. Subcommittee is a heavy machinery, creating too 
many instruments can be dangerous, dialogue is more efficient. 
7. Are the opportunities offered by the EIDHR for implementing and monitoring the 
implementation of the ENP used by the Commission (as recommended by the EP in 
its resolution)? /fyes, then how? 
-The EIDHR and the NGOs and Non-State Actors -two major budget lines-
programmes are separate from the Government, while the ENP and the ENPI 
primarily engages with the Government. There is EUJUST mission-high profile, 
endorsed by the president and the parliament of Georgia-implemented the reform of 
criminal justice system in 2007. Receiving more funding is conditional on 
implementation of reforms. So, instead of having particular projects, they have a 
dialogue with the government, decide on particular goals, and then give the money to 
government based on conditions that certain achievements should be recorded-more 
forward-looking, more structural approach. 
Criminal justice is related to democratisation, where independent judiciary is 
necessary. Otherwise, there is some small project under the ENPI with the aim to 
strengthen the Parliament. Apart from this, the Stability Instrument (exceptional 
intervention) has been used in 2008 between the presidential and parliamentary 
elections, to address the shortcomings of the reports of the international missions. 
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8. Technical and Financial Assistance: Commission's 2006 Communication on 
Strengthening the ENP notices that 'for those ENP countries which were covered hv 
TACIS, the ENPI will mark a major improvement, moving/rom technical as.\·istanL:e 
to fully-fledged cooperation ': what will the 'fully .fledged cooperation' mean for 
democratisation? 
-The ENPI has a project to strengthen Parliament's capacity. Also there IS the 
Stability Instrument for 2008. 
9. Georgia ENPI Indicative Programme notices that financial resources for Georgia 
might be increased under new Governance Facility. This is not provided for Armenia 
and Azerbaijan: is it because there is more significant progress achieved or expected 
to be achieved by Georgia? 
-After the last 2 elections and the 2007 election aftenuath there were concerns 
regarding Georgia's commitment to democracy. This will depend on the joint 
statement reiterating the commitments announced by the President Saakashvili. 
Before 2007 Georgia was considered to be a very good candidate. 
Whether it was a coincidence or no, it was after the war with Russia that the President 
came up with a new wave of democratic refonus: it is important to have stable 
democracy when the country is faced with serious problems, the opposition has been 
pretty calm (united against Russia), there was tendency not to criticise much, this is 
changing. The fact that the opposition is more active, precondition for the opposition 
to become more constructive, the leadership is realising the need to be more 
democratic, the opposition understands the need to be more organised and mature to 
challenge the ruling majority from a more solid position. 
10. In the ENPI documents the Commission mentions on several occasions 'boltom-
up' approach? Does this mean that not only the Governments will benefit from 
financial resources, but also the NGOs? If yes: how does it happen? How are the 
NGOs chosen? 
-It is a different unit in the Commission which IS responsible for financial 
implementation. 
11. What is the importance of the peA within the ENP? 
-It is a legal document, binding in its nature, the two things are absolutely 
complementing. The values under the PCA were stated in general tenus, and there 
was less operational character, whereas there was more specificity on trade and 
economy related issues. In this sense the ENP is more operational, able to translate 
the general tenus of the PCA as regards democracy. The ENP can be considered as 
'changing the gear' ofthe cooperation, however the PCA is a treaty/legal basis. 
12. How do you think the ENP will develop through the Eastern Partnership? Will it 
have mainly economic consequences or might also affect democratisation? 
-The Eastern Partnership will definitely affect the democratisation. To start this 
fundamental partnership there should be a strong commitment to democracy, to show 
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that it is functioning before any developments on signing the Association Agreement, 
or the financial assistance is increased or any dialogue on free movement is started. It 
is believed that the Eastern Partnership will be a stronger incentive, at least for 
Georgia which was ready to undertake reforms. 
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Interview II 
Anonymous Commission official II, DG RELEX 
European Commission, 
28 April 2009, Brussels 
1. To which extent the inclusion of democratisation issues within the ,first priority 
areas reflect the Commission's position/persistence on these malters? To what extent 
the opposite party agreed or resisted it? 
-There is a general presumption that the issues of democratisation are always urgent. 
In response to the criticism that the priorities are not concrete and comprehensive, it 
should be kept in mind that this is a mutually agreed document. The respective 
Government must be willing to sign it. Because if the Government is not willing to go 
beyond what has been proposed by the Commission, then there is simply no 
ownership of that document from both sides. 
2. Democratisation issues are positioned after Priority Area 1 on Settlement of 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: did Azerbaijani side insist on prioritisation of conflict 
settlement? Is the latter considered to be more urgent than democratisation? 
In evaluation by the Commission first focus is on political issues despite the fact that 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a priority area 1 in the Action Plan. It is a relatively 
small paragraph on Nagorno-Karabakh in the end of political part. Not matters really. 
3. The EU identified numerous issues in the Country Report which was used to 
develop its negotiating position. However, not all of them are reflected within 
Priority Area 1 or those reflected seem to be rhetorical statements without specificity 
or deadlines. Did the AzerbaiJani side insist on less stressed political commitment? 
Or is the EU is paying more attention to other matters of cooperation, such as 
energy? 
-The Government has to agree to this document: it is based on joint ownership. The 
negotiation of the document assumes that the sides have to agree to it. Another 
important factor is that different desk officers deal with different countries. This 
means that to some extent there might be some subjectivity reflecting their ambitions. 
Even writing the progress report might reflect this. Writing a report by a desk officer 
to a large extent depends on the way he gets information, or perceives the 
developments. The desk officer might be able to put it in a tone, in a negative or 
positive light. S, this assumes some extent of subjectivity (only one person is dealing 
with that). The information and level of detail is less and less the higher you go in the 
hierarchy, it has a big impact who's preparing the first draft. 
4. How were the Action Plans drafted? Why general actions and objectives (section 
4) follow the priority areas? Based on which criteria were the priority actions 
chosen? 
-There's been a lot of criticism especially for Southern Caucasian Action Plans. 
Criticism in particular is received from the civil society: the priorities are very general 
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and not specific (this is particularly true if you compare them with the Ukrainian or 
Moldovan APs). 
5. How is each of the countries different from the other two? Is there a practice of 
considering the democratisation of each of the countries in a comparative or regional 
perspective (which is not evident from Action Plans)? 
-There is no regional or comparative context for the evaluation really. There is a 
horizontal unit on Neighbourhood Policy coordination in Directorate D. They have a 
responsibility to compare the progress reports in order to make sure that the 
evaluation of Azerbaijan makes sense for example in comparison with Tunisia. 
Comparison by this unit is better because they are more distanced from those issues 
and they can compare countries, because they deal with all of them. 
6. The monitoring process: can it be assumed that it is undertaken by the Cooperation 
Council and the Commission? 
-There are several instruments of monitoring. These include the institutionalised 
structures of the PCA: Cooperation Council, Cooperation Committee and 
subcommittees. It involves also monitoring through the Commission's Progress 
Reports. Besides, monitoring takes place through high-level contacts. The visits by 
the Commissioner, who is aware of the assessment, also allow pushing the speeding 
up of the reforms. 
7. What is the role of the Cooperation Council? If it meets only once a year and 
makes rhetorical statements: is it more about political dialogue? Is the detailed 
evaluation is left to the Commission? 
-The role of the Cooperation Council is practically a formality, lasting about 45 
minutes. There is not a lot of evaluation in the Cooperation Council, it is a channel 
for political dialogue. The Commission is providing debriefings, so it can be noted in 
which areas there are achievements or not. It is very general, no specific references to 
any actions. 
8. Sub-committees of the Cooperation Council: are there any subcommittees whose 
competence includes democratisation issues? The European Parliament in its 2008 
Resolution called on the Commission to negotiate with all three countries 
establishment of human rights subcommittees: are there any developments in this 
respect? 
-There are two subcommittees for Azerbaijan on energy, environment, transport; and 
trade and economic issues. It was decided in spring 2008 that a human rights dialogue 
will be established in Baku, however, it is always up to the Presidency. The French 
Presidency did not follow this up, so it is expected that the Czech Presidency will 
launch this as an urgent measure. 
9. Are the opportunities offered by the EIDHR for implementing and monitoring the 
implementation of the ENP used by the Commission (as recommended by the EP in 
its resolution)? If yes, then how? 
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-No, they are not used for monitoring the ENP Action Plan. The EIDHR stands 
separately. EIDHR in Baku has been launched recently. It was launched only on 22nd 
of January. A number of NGOs were selected to start projects. EIDHR is a global 
instrument. It also covers countries not included in the ENP. There is no direct link 
with the ENP. They are linked only indirectly through general objectives of the EU 
external policy to promote democracy and human rights. The EIDHR is not envisaged 
to implement any of the actions under the Action Plan. 
10. In relation to technical and financial Assistance: Commission's 2006 
Communication on Strengthening the ENP notices that .'for those ENP countries 
which were covered by TACIS. the ENPI will mark a major improvement. moving 
from technical assistance to fullylledged cooperation. . What will the ' f i t l ~ v v fledged 
cooperation' mean for democratisation? 
-There is an annual programme on support of justice system to Azerbaijan concerning 
the rule of law and indirectly human rights. Also f18 million from 2008 budget has 
been allocated. There is no financing agreement signed yet. It should be signed at the 
latest in September 2009. This is the only large programme. 
11. In the ENPI documents the Commission mentions on several occasions 'botlom-
up' approach. Does this mean that not only the Governments will benefit from 
financial resources. but also the NGOs? If yes: how does it happen? How are the 
NGOs chosen? 
The Action Plans are agreed with the Government. The Commission tries to promote 
also dialogue with the civil society: both the Government and the civil society. Civil 
society is very keen to provide information and contribute. The Commission has an 
obligation to include the civil society for the programming documents from 2011. 
The Commission opened its delegation only recently, so there was no opportunity on 
spot to engage with the civil society. Round table was organised with civil society to 
get information for the progress report. However, I fully agree with the criticism that 
there is more engagement with the Government and there should be more done for 
civil society. Much more money should be given to civil society, however it's 
difficult, because the projects are very small on funding. They are very labour 
intensive, and there is nobody in Azerbaijan to implement those projects. The 
situation is going to improve in that sense. Although, it is easier for the Commission 
to issue money to Government for one large programme. It assumes less 
administrative burden for the EU side, rather than ten micro programmes assuming 
the work to be 10 times more. There is no resistance from the Government in 
involvement of the civil society. The representative of the Government attended the 
EIDHR opening ceremony. 
12. What is the importance of the PCA within the ENP? 
-The PCA gives us the institutional framework important for dialogue, but there is not 
PCA regular monitoring as in case ofENP. And the ENP is a step further, it's a closer 
relationship requiring closer monitoring. 
13. How do you think the Eastern Partnership will affect the ENP? Will there be any 
implications for democratisation? 
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-It's no clear what form the Eastern Partnership will take, especially with some 
Member States being concerned with such issues as freedom of movement of persons, 
visa regulations etc. The Eastern Partnership is less interesting for Azerbaijan since 
trade related issues are not offered to them. Azerbaijan is not a WTO member, 
therefore it cannot have a deep comprehensive free trade agreement. Either the 
country will have to decide to join the WTO or it will not benefit from the Eastern 
Partnership. I'm not sure which stand will be adopted by Azerbaijan: contradicting 
signals are being sent. I'm not sure ifthere will be reforms for example in agriculture 
sector. Azerbaijan exports mainly oil, hence it is not very interested in joining the 
WTO unless they opt out for diversifying their economy. 
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Interview III 
Anonymous Commission official Ill, DG RELEX 
European Commission, 
28 April 2009, Brussels 
1. Negotiation of the Action Plans: to which extent the inclusion of democratisation 
issues within the first priority areas reflect the C o m m l : ~ ' s i o n n 's position/persistence on 
these matters? To what extent the opposite party agreed or resisted it? 
-These issues are very important in all Action Plan: they are not treated as additional 
or complementary measures. 
It was part of a general approach. I assume there was not much opposition by the 
country's government. In addition, the Commission already had an experience with 
Action Plans with Ukraine and Moldova. Therefore the negotiation of the Action 
Plans with the South Caucasian countries was quite well handled. They may be not 
very concrete, but they shouldn't be very specific. They shouldn't bind the hands of 
the parties. Also the joint ownership of the process affects the outcome of the Action 
Plan, the partner can agree or not on something, that's why the nature of some 
measures is general. The issues are more or less the same, but the countries are 
different assuming different platform for negotiation. 
2. How were the Action Plans drafted? Why general actions and objectives (section 
4) follow the priority areas? Based on which criteria were the priority actions 
chosen? 
-The Action Plans with these three countries are similar. It involves work by different 
Directorates. Also the delegations and the countries themselves take part. Only then 
the documents are being composed after long discussions on what is more important, 
what is less important. That's why the result might be disappointing. The results of 
negotiations with the countries were supposed to be agreed in the Council, by the 
Member States. The Action Plans have a lot of actions which are beyond the level of 
ambitions of the country, 80 percent of priorities were not fulfilled. If the imperfect 
actions under the Action Plan are implemented, the country can be at a level of a 
candidate to membership. It's not easy to implement. Also the document is for 5 
years, so the country is not expected to achieve everything in 1 year. Country specific 
issues, like the elections in Armenia, can slow down the process. When there are 
elections, the legislation should be in place, however it is the implementation which is 
important. It all relates to lack of experience, administrative staff, people are trained 
under TAIEX and twinning. 
3. How is each of the countries different from the other two? Is there a practice of 
conSidering the democratisation of each of the countries in a comparative or regional 
perspective? 
-The interrelation was more geographical than mental, because of the general 
situation. The PCA were signed at the same time, they have common Cooperation 
council meetings. For instance, if the Commissioner goes to one of the countries, it 
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goes to the other as well. In this case they are treated as 'treated as a basket'. Georgia 
in fact is different: the level of cooperation with the EU is different, and it is not 
justified that they are treated as a block in the Council. The free trade agreement is 
considered for Georgia, therefore it will be considered for Armenia too (not for 
Azerbaijan, since it's not a member of the WTO), it's just a matter of time. The 
difference only is in case of support to the conflict. 
4. Can it be assumed that monitoring is undertaken by the Cooperation Council and 
the Commission? 
-The main role of the monitoring of relations, not only for Action Plan takes place on 
several levels. It includes subcommittees, which are very technical. Committees play 
crucial role in monitoring which takes place at ministerial level. Normally it is a half 
of the day meeting. This is the level where the details are being talked, different 
ministers present the situation in relation to the implementation of the APs and the 
general situation. This is organised by the Commission involving deputy ministers 
and deputy prime-ministers. The Cooperation council is more of a hand-shaking 
exercise, it has political nature. It takes place once a year to sum up the developments. 
The main role is for the committees. This is organised by the Council, so it's not a 
Commission exercise. 
5. Sub-committees of the Cooperation Council: are there any subcommittees whose 
competence includes democratisation issues? The European Parliament in its 2008 
Resolution called on the Commission to negotiate with all three countries 
establishment of human rights subcommittees: are there any developments in this 
respect? 
-There is one subcommittee established on trade, economic and legal related issues. 
Second subcommittee might be created on justice, liberty and security if the 
Armenian Government agrees. It might be brought together with the human rights 
dialogue instrument (not started yet). There are six subcommittees in case of Ukraine. 
6. The first review of Action Plans' implementation by the Commission took place in 
2008. When is the next report due? 
-It is the progress in implementation which matters. Not important where you start, 
you have to show progress. The progress reports are not a general assessment of the 
country, they concentrate on the actions, it should be very dry, it's not assessment 
oriented paper, it is actions-oriented paper. Sometimes, the countries, especially the 
opposition, expect more radical evaluation. It is difficult to be neutral in moving from 
numbered actions to the achievements. 
7. Are the opportunities offered by the EIDHRfor implementing and monitoring the 
implementation of the ENP used by the Commission (as recommended by the EP in 
its resolution)? /fyes, then how? 
-The Government engages with Action Plans. EIDHR is not engaged with the 
Government, it is not big money. The projects are interesting for EU, may give some 
advantage for country through developing the civil society. It's difficult to use the 
EIDHR for these purposes, the main reason being the fact that the Action Plans are 
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with the Government, it has very weak relation with the Action Plans. It operates on 
the level of small scale projects which are not visible for the ENP Progress Reports. 
And also this programme was established before the ENP. 
8. Which are the programmes related to strengthening democracy and good 
governance (if any at all)? 
-The assistance to the Government will include judicial reform (new code entered 
into force, independence of judges is the main goal). There was a project on 
Ombudsman strengthening. Also an EU advisor and expert group is being established 
under Stability instrument, but not under the ENPI. It is an unprecedented pilot 
project. 
9. New Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights is mentioned in Armenia 
Country Strategy Paper: is it established? Who is the beneficiary? Will this be the 
only programme through which the financial allocations will be used? 
-There was discussion on this for quite a long time in the Commission, however no 
developments were recorded. 
10. In the ENPI documents the Commission mentions on several occasions 'bottom-
up' approach? Does this mean that not only the Governments will benefil from 
financial resources, but also the NGOs? If yes: how does it happen? How are the 
NGOs chosen? 
-It will be through the EIDHR. 
12. What's the importance of the peA within the ENP? 
- PCA can stay there for another 10 years. There is no big pressure to replace these 
contracts. But there are political reasons for signing an Association Agreement. The 
PCAs' might be outdated politically, but not practically. Politically it becomes too 
tight to go to Association Agreements. 
13. How do you see the ENP developing through Eastern Partnership? Will it have 
mainly economic consequences or it might also affect democratisation? 
-Creation of the civil society forum will be important, it will ensure exchange of 
practice between different countries. It will serve also as a platform for Government 
to meet with the Commission to exchange the views on situation in comparison with 
other countries, for instance looking at how Ukraine succeeded in establishing 
political pluralism and what hasn't been done in Armenia. Good for Eastern 
Partnership countries, because of the common history, mentality, issues. The general 
conditionality will remain the same. The Eastern Partnership is another way to 
upgrade the system, it will add new multilateral platform, no major difference for 
democratisation or for human rights. 
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ANNEXB 
Interview I 
David. Darchiashvili, Chairman of the Committee on European Integration, 
Parliament of the Republic of Georgia 
7 April 2009, Tbilisi 
Interview conducted in Russian 
1. What is the role of the Georgian Parliament in the institutional structure jor the 
ENP Action Plan implementation and monitoring? 
-The fact of functioning of the Parliament's Committee on EU integration is the result 
of the relations between Georgia and EU within the ENP framework. The committee 
was established in 2004 after the Rose Revolution and after the South Caucasian 
countries were included in the ENP. The main task of the Committee, as was in the 
pre-accession countries, for instance in Baltic countries, is to assist in the process of 
harmonisation of Georgian legislation to the EU norms and regulations. A legislative 
amendment was introduced obliging all initiators of legislation to note whether the 
legal draft is in contradiction with EU rules. This is the main task. There can be two 
approaches to this process which is to initiate legislation aimed at harmonization with 
the EU norms or to deal with the monitoring of the process. The second way seems to 
be more adequate, since as in many countries most of the legal drafts are initiated by 
the executive, because the executive deals on daily basis with different areas of 
politics, it is more aware of what and where is not working. The Parliament has to 
filter this. If the Parliament had to deal with the initiation of the legislation, then the 
process would have been the opposite one, where the Parliament has to go to 
Government and prove its position, it is more complicated, especially when there is 
such a workload, several hundreds of legal drafts. 
-Most of the drafts have technical nature, because Georgia has a general system of 
legislation, and very often amendments and additions to already existing legislation 
are required. The Action Plan and also the PCA serve as criteria to observe whether 
the country departs from its obligations. Of course one can question how detailed and 
fully elaborated are the actions of the Action Plan, and often Georgian government 
during the last years had objections to some of the requirements of the European 
Commission. For instance, there were serious disagreements related to labour 
legislation or slow advancements in ratification of certain international agreements. 
And despite the fact that in the autumn 2008 the Government had to deal with the 
post-war situation, it was able to reform the labour legislation and ratify a Protocol on 
Genetically 'modified products, which gave Georgia an opportunity to extend the GSP 
for another 3 years. 
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2. What is the place of the principle of democracy within the process of legal 
approximation? 
-It is a paradox that most of the debates with the EU take place in the social-economic 
field, and if the opposition wants to criticize the Government they should pay more 
attention to this area instead of democratic issues. The Georgian economic policy 
until recently was aimed at total liberalization, elimination of as many regulations as 
possible. Several licensing agencies were abolished, the vehicles did not have to pass 
technical control. In order to fight the corruption all structures where the corruption 
could take place were supposed to be abolished, and sometimes it results in 'throwing 
the baby with the bath water.' Currently a process of reconsideration is taking place 
regarding the issues that have to be regulated, for instance sanitary control, on which 
there are a lot of debates currently. We think that there is going to be some progress 
in this sense. As regards democratic reforms, the Action Plan's first priority area 
focuses on the issues of democracy, however I cannot not recall that there were 
serious disagreements, objections from the Commission on these matters. The 
Commission is paying more attention to whether Georgia implements its obligations 
in the Council of Europe. Also NATO requires democratic reforms and looks at the 
obligations in the Council of Europe or OSCE as organizations having a stronger 
leverage as to how they evaluate the situation. There was a concrete focus relation to 
human rights and the rule of law, that is to the system of justice where within the 
ENP the first large mission took place which was the EU Justice Themis within 
CFSP. Certain issues are still under development, for instance related to the Criminal 
Procedural Code, however almost all is completed. In this sense the EU should be 
satisfied. On the legislative level there are almost no problems. Of course, there are 
certain disputable issues, such as the age for criminal responsibility that should be 
discussed with human rights organizations, but I cannot recall pressure from the EU 
side on particular issues. They are interested in whether the system works in overall. 
There were discussions on probation system, shelters, but it's mostly on technical side 
and not on certain aspects of legislation. 
3. What about the project on empowering Georgian Parliamentfinanced by the EU? 
-The Technical Reform of Georgian Parliament is still continuing, it will be 
completed soon. On the one hand it was directed at establishing a centre for 
Information and Documentation. On the other hand the project assisted the 
Informational department to ensure proper informational basis for the legislative 
process, including providing with computers, software, and developing Euro-
vocabulary in order to ensure proper translation. The project paid some attention to 
civic education as well, in this term not much had been achieved and it is still in the 
future. It is not clear whether the project was financed through the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). All the financial issues are 
decided by the Government. As to the Parliament's involvement in the allocation of 
assistance, it just gets informed eventually. The Parliament's participation is on 
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substance, how the project will develop, the Parliament will not be ignored. It will be 
decided what the project will focus on, but most importantly the Information centre 
will be operating. There are also other programmes: Twinning, T AlEX. Parliament's 
opinion on what to do within this assistance programmes is taken into account, but we 
don't deal with technical issues such as who should get how much salary. 
4. How can the effects of the ENP be summarized to this point? b' there a connection 
between the democratization process in the country and the ENP implementation? Or 
is the implementation process confined to the approximation q( the legislation? 
-Certain issues are progressing and some others are not. The GSP was extended, 
despite the fact that the Europeans can get scared when someone from Georgian 
government states that the model from Dubai or Singapore is attractive. Despite this, 
steps are taken in the right direction. Georgia is currently required to implement a 
stricter border control, regulate migration processes. There are ongoing negotiations 
in this sense, and they are expected to be successful. They are connected with the visa 
regime facilitation. Concluding an agreement with the EU on readmission is a 
possibility. It is not that the Georgian government lacks political will or does not want 
to implement reforms. This is just a matter of additional time, the workload is 
enonnous. For instance, when the EU gives 4 million Euro to build a shelter for 
illegal person from third countries, the response might be that this is not just the 
matter of constructing a building, it is an entire institution. Resources are required to 
implement this task: the country might just lack the human resource to do that. So the 
matter is what, when and how. The Europeans ultimately have understanding for this: 
they want us to start the process, to show that the country moves in a right direction. 
It is not an easy task, but it moves forward. 
-The problem with the Action Plan is that in any case each Government has its refonn 
agenda, a lot of reforms are taking place in parallel without indicating whether it is 
for the ENP. The process is ongoing; there is a radical reform of the judicial system. 
The claims of the opposition that the courts are not independent are partially 
unjustified and partly are a matter of resources and professionalism. On the legislative 
level, for instance, the Council of Justice was a consultative body during the previous 
Government, from 2006 it is an independent institution. This supports the rule of law, 
but it might not necessarily be indicated in the ENP reports. 
5. Are the ENP incentives sufficient for undertaking similar to enlargement reforms? 
-The main issue where the country lacks behind is the adoption of the bulk of the EU 
legislation. It is a quite complicated task. The Baltic states have succeeded probably 
due to the fact that they had a clear incentive which was the membership promise. It 
might be that the absence of such perspective is some sort of an impediment to the 
implementation of this task, but nevertheless the country is moving in that direction. 
First of all it is necessary for the Georgian society and the EU: the country is just 
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moving with its own speed. If there were clear incentives promising that in case of 
certain speedy reforms the country would join the EU, the process would have been 
much quicker. There is also the issue of implementation: it is not only the adoption of 
the bulk of legislation. There is no use of doing that if the legislation is not ultimately 
adequately implemented. It would have been cheating oneself and encountering 
problems in implementation leading to a new wave of middle and low level 
conuption. 
6. Do you think the Eastern Partnership will bring more motivation to the 
implementation of the reforms, in particular to the democratic reforms? 
-It will not bring motivation for reforms, the current Government came to power with 
the reforms in mind, it might have succeeded in some and failed in others, but 
Georgia did not have such a government before with such reform agenda. The 
process became more complicated currently, because the Government is not as 
popular as it used to be, and the traditional threats have increased. Nevertheless the 
reforms are being implemented and will continue in any case. As to the incentives, 
they have increased, especially after the involvement of the EU in the Georgian-
Russian war. Georgia realized that NATO is a matter of long time, the US cannot 
deliver everything that was promised, and it is the EU whose close cooperation the 
country must seek. In this sense the incentives have increased also with the link to the 
security of the country. We need to do what the EU requires in order to ask for what 
Georgia needs, for instance a larger mission/presence in the occupied territories. 
-As to the Eastern Partnership, it has a more detailed and technical nature in relation 
to Ukraine, the bilateral relations are more advanced, they are already negotiating on 
the conclusion of FT A agreement. Not yet with Georgia. The Eastern Partnership will 
help Georgia to speed up the process and catch up with Ukraine. Also it will bring a 
symbolical political pressure, because Russia started to oppose this-as in case of 
anything that might lead to diminishing its influence. Any increase of EO's influence 
is important for Georgia politically, and also symbolically-the fact of being 
'associated' with the EU, whatever this means, gives self-confidence to the country in 
being 'associated.' 
7. What about the awareness and participation of the general public? 
-A sociological survey by Soros foundation was undertaken in 2006 which showed 
that the popUlarity of the EU and the willingness to integrate was even higher than to 
the NATO, which shows that the public is interested and consider it important. It is a 
different matter whether they have detailed knowledge on what the process assumes. 
Their awareness on the EU is probably not sufficient, that's why together with the 
Information centre a bulletin is being published. It used to be published previously for 
members of Parliament in its short version, but currently it is more extended, on 4 
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pages with illustrations for the purposes of propaganda. The Parliament tries to 
organize meetings, there is going to be a meeting with businessmen soon. 
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Interview II 
Anonymous Official, State Ministry for European Integration, Republic of Georgia 
7 April 2009, Tbilisi 
Interview conducted in Russian 
1. What is the institutional structure for the implementation of the Action Plan? 
-The pennanent institution is the Ministry for European Integration which was 
created in 2004 after the Rose Revolution. Initially it was dealing only with the 
coordination of European integration processes, but later on the Euro-Atlantic 
integration was included as well. The State Minister, who at the same time is the Vice 
Prime-Minister, coordinates these issues. In parallel with this institution a State 
Committee is established under the Prime Minister. The office of the State Minister 
for European integration serves as a secretary to this committee. The committee 
practically repeats the composition of the Government; the ministers are the members 
of this committee. The committee coordinates the activity of the Government in the 
area of European integration. Apart from these main two institutions there is also a 
horizontal network, there are responsible people dealing with these issues in each 
ministry. It can be departments on foreign relation or legal departments in some 
institutions. At the same time there are responsible officials in the management of 
each institution: Vice-Ministers or vice-head of other institutions. This provides the 
comprehensive nature of the institutional side of the activity on European integration. 
2. What is the role of the Georgian Parliament in this process? 
-According to Georgian Constitution the Parliament is the institution adopting 
political decisions. The issues which require serious decisions to be taken on the 
direction of economic and political development are, of course, the prerogative of the 
Parliament. At the same time the Parliament carries out monitoring of the activity of 
the Government and hearings are taking place with certain regularity, the government 
reports to the Parliament on its activity. 
3. How does the Government programme the implementation of the Action Plan? 
-The implementation of the AP goes on already for the third year. It is one of the 
priorities of the current Government, and of course we're trying to match our desires 
with our capabilities. Certain reforms are quite complicated and require relevant 
finances and economic preparedness; the economy should be adapted to these 
reforms. So summing up different directions, we gradually advance in this process. 
The Action Plan is generally a convenient instrument for the implementation of the 
objective on integration. Every year we establish annual programmes for its 
implementation where in the form of matrix it is established which institution is 
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responsible for which issues, the deadlines, certain concrete activities are established 
in time and also relevant financial allocation. 
4. And who is responsible for the preparation of the annual plans? 
-The Ministry of European Integration in cooperation with other ministries IS 
responsible for this task. 
5. So, it is mainly the Government? 
-Yes. 
6. Are these annual plans based on the monitoring by the European Commission? 
-Yes, of course. The comments received in the process of monitoring by the European 
side in the annual report are maximally taken into account. We have a special meeting 
with all relevant ministries in relation to separate issues with certain explanations. So, 
the comments are taken into account according to possibilities, whatever is necessary 
is taken into account. 
7. How central are the issues related to democracy in the programming <?f the 
implementation? 
-These issues are very important issues, and they are constantly paid special attention. 
In fact much is being done in relation to these issues. Of course, there are certain 
drawbacks that the Government accepts and works towards their solution. This is one 
of the compositional parts and it's constantly paid attention to. 
8. Can you say that social-economic development is more important than democratic 
reforms? Is democratic development a priority for Georgia or for European side? 
-We do not implement reforms to demonstrate it to the EU. First of all, the reforms 
are being implemented, because we think that they are very important for our country. 
So the question is that our vision of the process coincides with the EU's, so we can 
say that it helps to attain our goals, and these are our goals and not European. We 
consider this to be very important itself, that is why we are not trading: you do 
something for us and we will implement these reforms. This is not the case and it 
cannot happen. These reforms are irreversible. On the other hand we also want 
economic integration to the EU and there are certain difficulties there as well, so we 
move in this direction. 
9. So, do you connect the democratic reforms with economic integration? 
-No, Georgian side does not tie economic reforms with the democratic ones. 
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10. And what about the European side? Do you think such connection is made on the 
European side? 
-I cannot say they do: more no, than yes. Of course, all reforms are connected with 
the political themes. You cannot build fully functioning market economy without 
relevant democratic institutions. But the process takes place in parallel, and, as I 
mentioned, we don't trade on these. There are difficulties in political reforms, there 
are difficulties in economic reforms, but they are implemented independent of each 
other. 
11. How are the financial resources allocated? How is it decided which priority 
actions to finance? 
-The issues of assistance are decided based on the source of assistance. If it is 
European assistance, decisions on allocation of the assistance are made by the 
Government in consultation with relevant European institutions. We can say that the 
Government actively participates in the allocation of the assistance, but it is being 
done according to certain scheme and there is very close monitoring from the 
European side. Taking into account that the work on technical assistance is going 
quite well, we had certain success, and from last year the amount of budget assistance 
has been increased. It means that this assistance goes to certain areas, but the 
mechanism is that you implement the reforms not directly receiving the money from 
the EU, but with your own capabilities and the EU is just giving additional financial 
resources to your budget. And the budget is single, so the money that goes in different 
directions cannot be directly tracked. 
12. Is financial assistance being allocated to the NGOs? 
-We can say that the big part of the assistance goes to state institutions, because as 
usual the result of this financial assistance are certain projects in different areas, and 
the projects are implemented by non-state institutions. There is certain mechanism for 
allocating assistance through a tender. 
13. And this financial assistance is being allocated through the ENPI? 
-There are several directions, I don't deal with the issues of financial assistance. We 
have a special coordination unit which deals with these issues, so I cannot really 
answer this question. 
14. Do you know if there is any thematic program dealing with the issues of 
democracy? 
-There are some, but you better ask this Unit. It's called Coordination Unit. 
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15. How would you summarise the effects of the ENP to this point? Do you connect 
them with democratic processes in the country? 
-Of course, the ENP is an instrument which helps us to implement reforms. There is 
much done already, you can check our website which will be updated soon, the 
information on which reforms have been implemented. However, there is still a lot of 
work. And generally the ENP Action Plan does not concretise what should be done 
and its full implementation cannot be discussed, because it's impossible to fully 
implement it. It just stipulates the directions for development. It is hard to access how 
fast you are moving in that direction, we wish we could do it faster. But in any case 
we are moving in that direction. 
16. What about the awareness of the Georgian society on the ENP and its 
implementation? 
-We work with Georgian public, there are many NGOs working on European 
integration. There have been special surveys related to the EU integration, where the 
popUlation strongly supported the idea. The majority supports these processes. As to 
the awareness, we are trying to provide objective information on European 
integration, EU values, institutions, we assist in publishing certain literature. We 
work in different directions. One can say that the objective of such work is not to 
attract more supporters of EU integration, they are enough even without that. The 
goal is to just explain the process, the benefits and the disadvantages of the latter, to 
provide objective information to the public. Probably after giving such information 
we risk losing rather that gaining more supporters of EU integration process, but in 
any case we try to give objective information. 
17. Is there a general understanding of the obligation regarding the promotion of 
democracy under the ENP? What about 'common values' within the neighbourhood? 
-The EU political leaders, of course, understand the advantages of democracy and 
they are willing to promote democracy in the regions where they expect certain 
destabilizing processes, conflicts, including the South Caucasus, thus trying establish 
stability on the continent. 
18. You mentioned that Georgia doesn't bargain on reforms. What about the 
incentives of the ENP? What if they were clearer? And also what are your 
expectations from Eastern Partnership? 
-Of course, you always want more than you are offered. From the very beginning, 
when there were the first negotiations on the ENP, we wanted to include very 
important points relating to free trade and free travel. It would have been very 
attractive to us and would have led to more intensive implementation of those 
reforms, quite complicated ones that the ENP requires. Ukraine was particularly 
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critical of this document. In any case despite this criticism, we are in such a state that 
we will soon start negotiations on FT A agreement. This is for the first time that such 
significant promises are made. We have already negotiations on readmission. Within 
the last 20 years there have been no discussions on visa facilitation regime. We are 
starting a dialogue in this relation. Even the start of this process is already a very 
important moment. So, the progress, in the directions that interest us, is already 
visible and it is impossible to imagine the progress without the ENP. Certain 
objective might not be indicated in the document itself, but the results of the reforms 
that are undertaken within this policy give an opportunity in the future for closer, 
perhaps within another framework. This is a very slow process requiring hard-work, 
which will certainly bring tangible results. 
-So, do you consider the Eastern Partnership to be promising in this re,\pect? 
-Yes. The Eastern Partnership is what will eventually lead to serious integration of 
participating states. At the same time it will make the goal of membership for those 
countries that have it more tangible results. Despite the fact that the Eastern 
Partnership does not talk about it directly, it nevertheless will lead to the EU. 
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Interview III 
Ivane Chkhikvadze, Eurasia Partnership Foundation 
6 April 2009, Tbilisi 
Interview conducted in English 
1. What can you say about general institutional structure for the Action Plan 
implementation and the role of the civil society? 
-The dividing line is to be drawn between the Government and the civil society from 
the moment of inclusion of Georgia in the ENP. The Government EU integration 
committee was established headed by Vice-Prime-Minister, Minister for European 
integration and it still exists. The FES-Eurasia Partnership Foundation-Open Society 
Georgia Foundation signed a Memorandum of Understanding and created a working 
coalition involving around 80 NGOs and prepared an alternative action plan 
advocating the inclusion of recommendations in the Action Plan that was later on 
signed by the Government. According to the Government, around 40 percent of these 
recommendations were included in the ENP Action Plan. The coalition still exists and 
now it took the role of monitoring the AP implementation, they organize round tables 
on different topics. They elaborate recommendations and send it to Brussels, or meet 
with the representatives from the European Commission and European Parliament. 
Unfortunately, there is no formal or official triangle for cooperation between on the 
one hand the EU, on the other the Government and the civil society. However, there 
is an informal practice: for instance, the civil society representatives participated in 
the meeting of the Georgian Parliament's Committee on European Integration, which 
then presented the recommendations made by the civil society to the Government. 
2. What about the ENP Implementation Strategy? 
-It was adopted in 2007, it is called an ENP Action Plan Implementation Plan. It is 
not a strategy as such. The Government wanted to call it a strategy, but then it was 
downgraded to some sort of decree on implementation (it can be found on the website 
of Minister for European Integration). 
3. What about the involvement of the civil society in the monitoring? 
-The civil society is involved through the coalition mentioned above with the focus 
on different topics. The Eurasian Partnership Foundation worked on the possible 
FT A. There was a visibility study done by CASE, a Polish think-tank. It tried to bring 
together all the stakeholders to discuss the FT A and then communicate all the 
messages to the Government from stakeholders, businesses, and professional 
associations: what they think about this FT A, the benefits and the costs of the FT A. 
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4. What do you think about the efficiency of the monitoring by the Commission 011 
political dialogue level and through the Progress Reports? 
-More hopes are attached to Eastern Partnership. Hopefully, it will create more room 
for civil society involvement. As regards, the ENP we can't say that there was a big 
room for civil society involvement in the monitoring process. The only chance for the 
civil society is the stage before issuing the Progress Reports. In 2008 some Georgian 
NGOs, Green Association, Young Lawyers Association send their recommendations 
to the Commission before issuing the Progress Report. It was noted that some of the 
opinions presented by the civil society were shared by the Commission and were 
reflected in the Report. 
5. Do you think the Eastern Partnership will add anything to the democratic 
conditionality of the ENP? 
-Firstly, what is very important about the Eastern Partnership is that it separates the 
neighbours of the EU and the European neighbours. The positive side to it is that the 
European neighbours are now in a different basket. However, there is not much 
financial assistance regarding the implementation. There are also the institutional 
changes, the annual meeting of the heads of the state, much more regular and 
regulated. However, in terms of the offer, there is not much there that was not 
included in the ENP before in case of Georgia. If you take visa facilitation example, it 
was in the ENP. If you take the FTA, it was in the ENP. What is significant is the 
possibility of establishing sectoral agreements, which are important in terms of 
meeting the EU standards in relevant areas. So, if you take the European Energy 
Community and the Agreement on that, Georgia changes from an observing party to a 
neighbour of this community, it will definitely be better. The Eastern Partnership 
gives a better opportunity for approximating Georgian legislation to that of the EU, 
but at the same time it will be very difficult for the Georgian Government to 
implement so many sectoral agreements. 
6. Will the incentives 'clarified' by the Eastern Partnership stimulate the 
implementation of the conditionality (democratic)? Will this be a way to 
membership? 
-At this stage there was no official statement by the Georgian government that they 
want EU membership. Approximately a month ago President Saakashvili announced 
in Barcelona that membership to the EU is much more important for Georgia than 
NATO membership, that was viewed positively from civil society, but it was just a 
sentence. Personally, I support if one day Georgia claims that it wants EU 
membership and even tries to apply for it. The Georgian Government's position is that 
they're trying to postpone it for longer and longer, however this is a process where 
you should push harder rather than the EU, since the EU will never invite you to 
become a member. Even if you look at the 1995 enlargement the EU was reluctant to 
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accept Austrian membership, nobody would wait for us there, so we should press 
harder this topic. I don't think that Eastern Partnership will change much: Georgia 
needs the EU just against Russia. If there is no Russia, Georgia does not need the EU, 
so we don't really need the EU as such for integration, but we need to use the EU 
against Russian presence. 
7. So would you say that the geopolitical situation around Caucasus affects ollr 
external policies? For instance. Armenia is too dependent on Russia to make clear 
choices in its external policy. 
-Integration to the EU is to counterbalance Russia. On the other hand there is 
reluctance from the EU to get engaged more in Georgia. I do not believe in 
romanticism in politics, I more rely on realpolitik. From realpolitik view what can 
Georgia offer to the EU Member States, in particular to the countries representing the 
engine of the EU, that is France and Germany? Not too much, not more than Russia 
can. I don't think that in the foreseeable future the situation will change from what it 
is currently. 
8. What is your opinion on public awareness on the ENP. or actions on beha([ of the 
Government to raise awareness and involve the public? 
-People don't really know much about the ENP. There is GALOP Report, survey done 
on EU integration in the EU. Half of the population does not know what's going on. 
The process is between the EU and the governments, general population is not aware 
on what's going on there. In this regard Georgia has done almost nothing to make 
people aware what are the EU values, what are the EU institutions. If you go outside 
and ask people, they will say that they support the EU integration and want the 
membership. What matters for them is visa free travel, this is some tangible 
opportunity. They don't really want to hear about democracy: democracy is 
something which you cannot see, cannot touch, so in this regard people do not know 
much. Particularly in the regions the awareness is even lower. Eurasia Partnership 
foundation is going to start a household survey designed to reveal exactly what 
people know about the EU, what the Georgian government should do in order to raise 
awareness on EU values and institutions. There are not many TV talk-shows on the 
EU integration, there used to be some on NATO, but not many on the EU. When 
there was a plebiscite hold in 2008, 72% supported NATO membership, but half of 
them probably don't know what NATO is about. It is the same in case of the EV: 
people want the EU membership, but they don't know what the EU is. What they see 
is just benefits, they consider the EU as a paradise without seeing the costs to get 
there. 
9. What about the financial assistance. Is anything allocated to the civil society? 
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-There is straight budgetary support from the EU to the Government, the civil society 
doesn't know how the Government spends this money, it is the EU which monitors 
its. And then there is also the ENPI-120 million-a little chunk of this money goes to 
the civil society development, there are some grants issued by the European 
Commission Delegation in Tbilisi, but the amount is not huge. It's not surprising: if 
you go back and look at TACIS, its allocations for civil society were very small. The 
trend seems to continue. 
10. How can the effects of the ENP be summarized to this point? 
-The population is not really aware of the ENP, the processes are not linked to the 
ENP. Even in the Government there are supporters of the EU integration and those 
against it. Particularly in the economic bloc of the Government some members were 
anti-EU, so from economic perspective Georgia did not do much. From democratic 
perspective, if you look at the relevant priorities of the Action Plan, much is not done, 
for instance freedom of speech is in worse state that it was before (especially after the 
Imedi TV station was shut down), or property rights protection. 1 can't say that the 
ENP effected Georgia much from this perspective. The Government steps over its 
obligations under the Action Plan, because it is not binding, they can do whatever 
they want. Even with the PCA they have a reluctance to implement, since they say 
that it was Shevardnadze's government that signed it. With the ENP Action Plan the 
Government can choose some topics, they are not obliged to implement all the 
priorities. 
11. Will this change with signing an Association Agreement under Eastern 
Partnership? 
-I think so, because it should be legally binding, it should reflect the new realities. 
The PCA came into force in 1999 and various changes happened after, and also 
democracy was not reflected much in there. Much will depend on what will be 
included in the Association Agreement, if it is drafted after an Association Agreement 
with Egypt for instance, we can see that the latter doesn't implement it. There should 
be the mechanism of carrots and sticks, which should be strong enough. 
12. To what extent the influence from membership in Council of Europe. OSCE 
affects the democratization process? What is the connection with the ENP? 
-The country itself tries to follow more the obligations in the Council of Europe, 
rather than_ those put by the EU. But even in this case, the country can make 
constitutional amendments and send it to Venice Commission only after the approval 
and the latter cannot really do anything as a clear example of how the Government 
abides with the Council of Europe obligations. But overall, the country will not 
totally ignore the Council of Europe, because they are afraid of losing their 
membership. As to the OSCE, their mandate is supposed to expire. 
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13. General understanding of the obligation regarding the promotion o.l democracy 
under the ENP. Do they relate to the EU's notion 0.[ 'common values' in the 
neighbourhood? 
-I don't think of these as shared values. At the point of drafting the Action Plan, the 
priorities on democracy and human rights were not something forwarded by the EU, 
rather it was dictated by the EU, we can't say that these are shared values. This is 
something that the EU offers and you can accept it or not. Also if you look at the 
Action Plans with all three countries, they are similar: these countries don't share 
these values between themselves, Azerbaijan is different from Georgia, so even this 
fact that the Action Plans are so similar indicates that these countries were not really 
interested in these priorities to offer them, it was the EU putting them forward. 
14. What is the current process of implementation in relation to the priorities on 
democracy? 
-The Commission gives a lot of money to Ombudsman development, this institution 
is quite weak, the person himself is quite objective, he says what he thinks. There was 
also support to the Parliament, however it did not bring any tangible results. The 
project on Parliament did not change much-the Parliament itself is quite weak. A 
clear example is the Law on Food safety which was amended several times, this law a 
precondition for signing a free trade agreement, but it was the Parliament which made 
amendments and suspended the implementation of the law, so the Parliament is not 
independent. It cannot be said that in the results of the project on Parliament it got 
empowered. 
15. Is it possible to summarize that the ENP did not affect much the processes taking 
place in Georgia? 
-It is difficult to say that something which was done was done because of the ENP. 
Certain developments can be attributed more to deregulation than regulation. Another 
important issue is that at the beginning when the ENP Action Plan was signed, there 
were no clear objectives and goals, it was like an open process without clear 
knowledge as to where the process is going to. That's why the Eastern Partnership 
should bring clarity to the objectives. Also when you don't have a goal, it is difficult 
to measure the success of the developments. If we take the priorities on visa 
facilitation, FT A, conflict prevention, we can say that none of them has been 
implemented so far: FTA is not signed, the negotiations haven't even started; visa 
facilitation-first negotiations took place last week, but the agreement is not signed. In 
tenus of conflict resolution, the war speaks for itself. In terms of timeframe as well, 
AP was signed in 2006 for 5 years, it expires at 2011, and the Government announced 
that they will implement it in 3 years time, which means they were supposed to 
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implement it by the end of this year, however none of these 3 clear objectives were 
implemented. It is hard to say whether it was because of Georgia or the EU. 
-Do you think that if the incentives were clearer it would have worked? 
-I think so. Sarkozy's idea on identifying the borders of the EU is positive. We should 
know where our future lies, maybe it's in Shengen cooperation agreement or 
something else, so we will see the incentives. 
-Do you think the Eastern Partnership will work as it is now, without membership? 
-I don't think so. It will depend on the Association Agreement. And also, it should be 
first defined what is success, if it is the ultimate EU membership, it doesn't seem that 
the Eastern Partnership will bring this-there are so many other countries waiting for it 
currently. Also much depends on Turkey's accession. Unfortunately, there are not 
many discussions on this, and the Government of Georgia does not have any official 
statement supporting Turkey's accession. Even in case of good neighbourly relations 
Georgia loses in this sense, because of its relations with Russia in case there is an 
issue of accession. 
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Interview I 
Varas Simonyan, Head of Department of EU and International Economic Allilirs, 
Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Armenia 
20 April, 2009, Yerevan 
Interview conducted in Armenian 
1. What is the institutional structure for Action Plan implementation? 
-As you know the priorities of the Action Plan include many important areas and the 
first two of them are devoted to democracy and human rights issues which show that 
both the EU and Armenian side considered them very important: the principles of 
democracy-the founding values of the EU which are the human right, freedom of 
speech and media. The principles of market economy are impossible without 
democracy, these two are connected. 
-As to the institutional structure, for undertaking the negotiations a working group 
was created consisting of three sections by a Presidential decree. It was coordinated 
previously by the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development, currently the 
Ministry of Economy which remained the same after the negotiations. And also the 
PCA had its institutions: the Cooperation Council meetings taking place annually in 
Europe, Cooperation Council which is its executive body and is co-headed by our 
Minister. So the Ministry is carrying out the executive activities. Last year at the 
Cooperation Council meeting it was decided to create a new subcommittee which is 
currently is in an unclear state for judicial issues. It exists de jure, but not de facto. So 
in order to avoid duplicating institutions and create new ones, our Ministry undertook 
these activities. 
-When the Action Plan was signed in 2006 and entered into force in 2007 the 
Ministry initiated and drafted together with other interested ministries a programme 
for the measures to be implemented in 2007 based on the Action Plan. And these are 
not only the measures to be implemented in 2007 only, but starting from 2007 
onwards, it also establishes a timetable. The decision entered into force quite late, 
because it's is a quite complicated document, Decision No 927, July 19. Each 
institution which is involved in the decision as a responsible institution presents a 
report every three months on the activities on the Action Plan implementation. 
Procedurally we present our activities on the implementation to the EU side through 
the Cooperation Council and the Cooperation Committee. In the end of 2007 a 
document was presented officially by Armenia on the measures implemented within 
the Action Plan. Subsequently after different questioning, also working in parallel 
with public organisations in order to form an independent opinion, in April 2008 the 
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Commission published the first Progress Report. Since it was the first one, it was 
generally stating which are the strengths and weaknesses of Armenia, which are the 
areas we should concentrate our efforts on. 
-In parallel the Ministry is also working on another document which will not establish 
annual measures but will be a global document dividing the measures according to 
years, so there is no need to present a new decision to the Government every time. 
Also in September 2008 a Council on Cooperation with European Institutions was 
established under the President of National Security Council involving all Vice-
Ministers. One of the objectives of this Council is the successful implementation of 
the Action Plan. So, based on the document that we have prepared, the activities 
began on drafting a paper of new quality. Within this period we had to present again 
to the EU what has been done in 2008. Continuing to collect information on the 
measures that haven't been finalised in 2007-2008 a new report was prepared on what 
has been done, and the President presented this in the European Commission during 
one of his official visits. The results were also presented by our Minister during the 
Cooperation Council meeting. Now we're waiting for the second Progress Report. 
Another document that I mentioned is being drafted by the Council under the Security 
Council defining the priority directions taken from the Action Plan and was taken into 
account by the Government. But since these are just the directions, we need concrete 
measures and for this purpose there is a Committee under the Prime-Minister on 
cooperation with European Institutions. The ministry have prepared a relevant 
'benchmark' and the priority objectives were included, which were established by the 
Security Council. All institutions were supposed to present a list of measures and 
expected results for 2009-2011, since the document that was established was called 
the Program for measures guaranteeing the implementation of the Action Plan for 
2009-2011. 
-Is it available currently? 
-No, not currently. I am currently making the final amendments and then it has to be 
presented for approval of the President. So, look, here is the measure which is taken 
from the AP, and then the measures that have to be implemented in particular, and the 
measures have sub-measures. Another column shows whether the measure coincides 
with the Government's program, and if yes then with which part, since our main 
source for activity is the Government's program. And since the Action Plan has a 
mandatory nature, it's a bilateral document that the country has signed ... 
-But isn't it a political document and isn't its implementation left to the political will 
o/the country? 
-Yes, but probably in this relation we can pass to the next question, which is the 
assistance. The document is a good one. Through this document we have new 
qualitative cooperation with the EU, from a partner country through the PCA we 
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became a neighbouring country. It might seem to be unrealistic but at the same time 
this initiative allows for a deeper integration with the EU economically and in other 
areas. In this way we can avoid duplication of functions and measures, so we have 
measures coinciding. If some institution is implementing certain measure based on 
this or that document, then we can attribute the implementation of the measure to the 
relevant point. This will be a more efficient document, and the results will be 
summarised according to years. As to financial assistance: it is very important to 
consider whether a particular measure requires financial assistance. So we are trying 
to implement more efficiently our obligations and reach the goals we have 
established. The document also stipulates the responsible institutions. The document 
will be available publicly after its official adoption, since one of the principles of 
implementation is the involvement of the civil society in all activities, including 
monitoring. Why do we do this? This is one of the principles, ways of reform with a 
view of changing our living conditions. It's not only the Government: we need the 
civil society which feels the changes faster. We have to also accept the criticism, both 
the positive sides and negative sides, so we can work more efficiently. 
2. Were the representatives of the civil society participating in the drafting process of 
this document? 
-I mentioned the Committee under the Prime-minister, within this committee there is 
a Coordination Council which is being reformed with our immediate initiative, and it 
will be soon approved at the Government's session. And there are civil society 
representatives involved in the Council, which is the first one to engage the 
representatives of the civil society on issues of EU integration. We have to keep in 
mind, Armenia, as a young developing state, is trying to do something that has been 
done for 30-40 years in other countries. So we accept the best practice as a basis and 
try to make it local which is not an easy task, but we have to do it. One might ask on 
why we didn't do it before, say in 2007. It's a matter of practice, we had different 
practice, the results were not bad, but we want to improve further. This is the reason 
why we want to reform this process, which will lead to a more successful 
implementation. 
3. While preparing this document did you take into account the results of the 
monitoring by the European Commission. the Progress Report 2007? 
-We take the results into account to the extent that when the Progress Report 
mentions for instance that in relation to customs there were some developments but 
they were not sufficient, they can be deeper- wider, all the measures that we haven't 
done before are now included, the measures are established in a more detailed way 
with submeasures. 
4. What about the issues related to democracy? 
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-The Ombudsman has been involved in the process. The document regularly had been 
presented to him. Besides, a new committee is being established under the Secretary 
of the Security Council, also working groups are being created under the Cooperation 
Committee with the EU. So, we received comments in relation to this document 
which were fully accepted. 
5. For instance, in 2008 Report the Commission noted the lack of development in 
relation to freedom of media. Is this taken into account? 
-They are taken into account, and they are included in the document with the 
expected outcome. Why do we indicate the expected outcome? The purpose is to 
ensure that the measures we are undertaking adequate for the objective we are aiming 
at. That's why we fix the results. All ministries, agencies have participated in this hard 
work. The document currently comprises 113 pages. This is the first document in the 
history of Armenia where the expected results are already put on paper with 
institutions responsible for implementation. 
6. And what about the National Programme/or peA implementation? 
-The National Program is standing, it was for 2006-2009, but it lacked relevant 
financial assistance necessary for implementation of such extensive and wide 
document, not all institutions started its implementation. For instance, Ministry of 
Agriculture is trying to implement it including relevant measures in its annual 
programme. But the National Programme as such is not a 'national' programme, it's 
just a programme for legal approximation which is not a national program for PCA 
implementation, but only Article 43 of the PCA on legislative approximation. At this 
moment we don't need that document. If we're aiming at developments in certain 
areas, we can consider it, since we have obligations to approximate Armenian 
legislation and standards. But we cannot start its implementation without appropriate 
financial resources and clear motif 'why are we doing this.' It is the candidate 
countries who implement national programme for legislative approximation. After 
signing an Association Agreement they create working groups and start negotiations 
based on the acquis chapters. Without the latter we established a National Programme 
which is a good document in the areas where we are trying to ensure legislative 
compliance. For instance, for phyto sanitary regulations: if we need our products to 
conform with EU standards and reach the market easily, we can open the document 
and find out the regulations we need. It will be very useful for relevant experts in 
order to assess the conformity or to figure out what needs to be done. Another factor 
leading to its stagnation was that the Government just adopted it and did not make its 
implementation mandatory. 
7. As you mentioned the issues on democracy are necessary because of their link to 
market economy. So while preparing this document did the matters 0/ democracy 
have priority, or they were simply included because of their necessity for economic 
reform? 
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-Of course, they are necessary. This document includes all measures including those 
in the Priority Areas and in Part 4. As to the measures on establishing market 
economy, they are merely the same which were fixed in the PCA. They include the 
principles on democracy, human rights, market economy- all the founding values of 
the EU which we accept. We have our directions of EU integration and that is the 
direction we move in. 
8. So do you consider that the ENP really assumes the general obligation 10 promote 
democracy as EU's notion of 'shared values '? 
-Yes of course. 
9. How is thejinancial assistance allocated? Is it directed to the Government? 
-The financial assistance by the EU is allocated in two ways: budgetary support and 
technical assistance (Twinning and T AlEX, also cross border cooperation). The main 
line is the budgetary support which has preconditions stipulated in the National 
Indicative Program for 3 years, establishing the areas where monitoring will be 
carried out. For each year an annual financial agreement is concluded. If the National 
Indicative Programme establishes for 2007-2011 about 100 million Euro, for each 
year that's 20 million, out of which 5 goes to twinning and vocational educational 
training. There are preconditions for monitoring. It's not important that the measures 
are immediately undertaken with that assistance, it doesn't directly go to the 
programme, it goes to the budget and then the allocations will be made from the 
general budget. Based on what you've undertaken, the second and then the third 
transfer is taking place. The country is more developed than it was before to give 
money for fixed projects. The EU considers us as more as a developing state where 
you know what the priority areas are for you. That is why the EU gives the money to 
the Government, but while giving the money they establish preconditions on VET or 
judicial reform which is considered for this year. 
10. Are there any programmes related to democratisation issues currently? 
-Yes, there are within Twinning programme, which are usually for I or 2 years. And 
already a project on the Ombudsman office has been agreed within the discussions 
with the European Commission. The projects that are being implemented within 
Twinning should be put on the Ministry's website soon. 
11. How can Ijind out what are the projects that the money is allocated to? 
-Through the Law on Budget. And for Twinning we have a special agency-Project 
Administration office which is dealing with Twinning, Taiex and cross-border 
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cooperation instruments. But I don't think that they have a comprehensive document 
to have a look at. 
12. And are there any resources from budget allocated to the NCO-v? 
-The budget doesn't give money to the NGOs. There are procedures for receiving 
money from the budget. For instance, if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carries out a 
project related to the development of civil society, it will apply according to 
budgetary procedures, and then will implement the project. 
13. How would you summarise the results of the ENP to this date? Are they 
connected to the democratisation processes in the country? Is the public aware ( ~ l t h e e
ENP? 
-To some extent the public is aware. I would lie if I say they are fully aware. It is 
related to social issues and conditions of the population. For instance ifI was 
unemployed and I was occupied with the task of finding something to eat for the day, 
of course I wouldn't be interested in anything like this, especially if it hasn't been 
shown on TV. So, it is closely connected with the social conditions and the fact of 
how much the civil society participates. Frankly speaking, I can say that not 
everybody is aware, we have to undertake a major PR campaign and lobby this 
process. The role of civil society is very important here. We need to lobby to show to 
the public that this is important for our life. But for now the social-economic 
conditions do not let people to think about this. 
14. Is the ENP influencing the democratisation of the country? Can you say that the 
OSCE, Council of Europe are more influential? 
-The Council of Europe is an international organisation whose main task is the human 
rights, democracy, freedom of media. Armenia has its obligations there. The OSCE is 
similar organisation with a wider mandate. And the ENP is an economic initiative 
which tries to transform neighbouring countries. It is aimed at reforms, including 
political component. And for us this is a good opportunity to accept the good practice, 
including the EU experience, to take the best practice and try to use it for us instead 
of going through everything again. But we can't take and accept all EU standards in 
one day, the country will stop functioning from the aitports till supermarkets. We 
have to achieve it with time. 
15. I'll try to ask the same question in a different way. We have obligations in these 
organisations. But through the ENP we are offered certain incentives if we undertake 
certain measures. Which do you think will be successfitl in motivating us to undertake 
political reforms? Does the ENP give us such incentive? 
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-Yes, it does. That is why I mentioned at the beginning that it is connected with the 
market economy. It is impossible to transform the country from state planned 
economy to market economy without democracy. For example, if there is a factory 
trying to produce something and if I have certain impediments I could address them 
through the media, rule of law would work. The fact that it does not work properly is 
also a matter of ethics, it's not only the law that should be changed. You can always 
amend, revise the law, but it is the mindset of people that should change: so they 
understand there are institutions they could apply to etc. The same is the Council of 
Europe, which can be used efficiently. 
16. What about the Eastern Partnership (EP)? Will it add anything to the ENP, in 
particular in relation to political reforms? 
-The EP is mostly politically directed to Ukraine and Moldova and then to South 
Caucasian countries, but we should try to take as much as possible from this 
initiative. I'll try to come from economic to political. The EP envisages the creation of 
a free trade area. The free trade agreement with the EU will assume deep economic 
integration which leads to solution of political issues. So it is similar to the creation of 
the EU: stemming from political perspectives, but based on economic unity. The 
creation ofECSC developed further into different structure-EC-EU which is currently 
solving political issues. So the two are related, you can solve economic issues through 
political and the opposite. 
-It's just when the ECSC was being established, the countries more or less satisfied 
the criteria for democratic states. So, when I had meeting in European institutions, 
for EU officials considered that adherence to democratic values should be a 
precondition for proceeding with thefree trade area agreement? Do you consider it 
in the same light? 
-Yes, I agree with that. We have similar experience already. I will give you an 
example of the GSP. We were granted GSP for undertaking certain reforms at the 
time. GSP+ is a more heavy and strict system requiring membership to 27 
international conventions and their effective implementation. So signing these 
conventions only would not be sufficient for us to obtain GSP+, we showed the 
implementation records. In addition the country undertook a commitment to strictly 
follow the provisions of the conventions. 
17. Do you think the ENP as it is currently provides stimulifor political reforms in 
our country? 
-Definitely yes, because it cannot be otherwise. 
18. Do you think Armenia is free politically to express its E U intentions taking into 
account Russian presence? 
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-Currently politically and economically we are ready and we actually cooperate with 
everyone, EU, Russia, US, Asian countries. We are building our state accepting the 
best practice whether it comes from the EU, Russia or somewhere else. We cannot 
aimed at EU membership now, we need to see the signals from the EU. So I can't 
really speak for that moment what will happen with Russia. Currently, we have 
relations with Russia in different framework, the CIS, etc. You can cooperate with all 
parties trying to obtain all possible benefits for the country. 
19. Would you consider the EP as a way to membership ifwe implement all measures 
required by the EU? 
-It is a document for deeper integration, it is not for membership, it isa refonn 
agenda which will take the country to a new level. So if in several years the EP 
succeeds and there is a free trade area between Ukraine, Moldova, Southern Caucasus 
and we have customs union with the EU, then a political process will start: 
monitoring, democratic institutions will start working. Then there might be a question 
of membership. 
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Interview II 
Artak Kirakosyan. Civil Society Institute. NGO. Armenia 
21 April. 2009. Yerevan 
Interview conducted in Armenian 
1. What is the role of the civil society in the Action Plan implementation? How 
involved are you? 
-In fact we are not involved. There is an objective reason to that which the way it was 
programmed: the involvement was very problematic. We had certain meetings with 
the representatives of civil society, where we presented certain issues, problems. But 
because there is no reciprocal connection to understand what our influence is, 
somehow you lose motivation to waste your efforts on preparing reports etc. 
-And what about the Government? Does it create any opportunities. frameworks for 
civil society participation? 
-I'm not aware of any. We are mostly interested in human rights, and as far as we are 
aware they haven't organised anything in this area. 
2. And what about monitoring? Are you participating? 
-Certain public organizations are carrying out some activities. There was some 
monitoring group created, not sure whether it was for the Council of Europe. When 
we meet with European bureaucrats they are very enthusiastic and tell us to write 
reports promising that they will take into account everything ... 
-So your interaction is mostly with the European side and not internal? 
-Well, internally we know what is going on. For instance we are interested in certain 
Protocol to the Torture Convention. There are certain activities undertaken for this, 
but the requirement is general, there should be this, should be that.... We have 
everything on the level of 'should' but deeper understanding of how it is applied, 
whether it is properly implemented, the civil society does not get a say in this. There 
is no opportunity to participate. We are trying to undertake some activities with the 
Government, but the issue is that there is no common arena. When there were talks on 
ENP, one of our suggestions was creating a forum, where the Government, civil 
society and the EU side can come together. So if there is no feedback, no response to 
your activity, you don't see it us necessary. 
-So can I say that your interaction is with the EU? 
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-No, on the opposite: our interaction is with the Government on specific issues. Since 
the issues brought up by the EU have quite general nature, the interaction with them 
is meaningless. Even if we carry out some activity or present something, we have no 
idea what is the result of it. This is the main issue. 
-How eager is the Government to involve the society? 
-There is no difference whether we are talking about the ENP or any other area. The 
civil society's stance in this respect is taken into account as much as on any other 
issue. Again to say that there are special mechanisms for involving the civil society in 
particular as regards the ENP, I have not heard of any. 
3. What about the ENPI? Do you think any assistance will go to the civil society? 
-I do not really know, but I strictly doubt that. The program itself is a positive one, 
but I don't' really see a space there for the civil society or measures undertaken. 
4. What about the EU's monitoring? Is it efficient? 
-Of course it has certain effects. 
5. What about democracy as a 'shared value' within the ENP? Is this on declarative 
level? 
-In any case the Action Plan provides for concrete actions, it is not only declarative. 
In the long-term it will have impact. The problem is that in the short-term the 
Government tries to distort all the mechanism, so they have very little influence 
today. As a strategic instrument it is very important, since currently Armenia has a 
strategy for the European integration, certain relations with NATO, relations with the 
Council of Europe. Besides, there is no policy or document with Russia, US or any 
other partner like the ENP. 
-So, in these terms do you think the conditionality of the ENP will work in Armenia? 
-Certainly it will. But the issue is: does it affect current processes or we are talking 
about slow future progress, where the Government will have to implement little by 
little, avoiding this, doing that, or avoiding that, doing this. But, still there will be a 
prospect of these actions being carried out. So, this suggests that eventually it would 
be implemented and in this sense it is promising. 
-Can I say that the democratic processes in the country, if there are any, don't have 
strict connection with the ENP but they might have some in the filture? 
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-There is a connection. The problem is that if we talk about democratisation, I can't 
say that there is democratisation process as a result of the ENP, but it creates 
institutional opportunities for democratisation in the future. 
6. What about Council of Europe and OSCE, connection with the EN?? 
-Well, they have influence, you cannot say that they don't. The problem is that the 
mechanisms are bureaucratised. For instance, in relation to elections, the evaluation 
by the OSeE is really focused on improvement of mechanisms, organisational issues, 
but of course people expect more. For instance, they expect that the issue of 
legitimacy will be addressed. So, there are different expectations. Even in the case of 
Azerbaijan's elections, they were evaluated as well organised: what does this mean? 
7. What do you think about the Eastern Partnership? Will it add anything to the ENP 
conditionality ? 
-Well, there are hopes that it will be more flexible. So far it's not clear what the 
policy would entail. So there will be a forum for civil society, may be more will 
become clearer then. So far it is more of a desire to deepen the relations with the EU, 
but there will be issues with bilateralism and which countries to include. If Belarus 
included as well, then this will lead to comparing and drawing an average, where 
Armenia will not look that bad. 
8. What is your opinion on the effects of the ENP to this date, in particular as regards 
democracy? 
-Developments are hard to notice when you live here. Also it is hard to notice 
positive developments, especially when we are talking about such developments 
which should be considered as 'normal' or 'ordinary' criteria. The society in 
institutionalised form is not ready to have any influence. That is why we consider it 
necessary to have certain common forum. What is taking place currently is that they 
invite the representatives of the civil society to discussions and either nobody turns up 
from the Government or may be a single person will tum up, or the Europeans might 
appear or not. And all the criticism is usually directed to those who turned up, which 
is usually the European side: they don't really like this. So, it is very important for the 
Eastern Partnership to introduce a forum like this, where all parties can talk to each 
other. 
Also, it should be mentioned that very few know about this policy, which is so 
important: it is the only strategic program for country's development. 
9./fyou were given an opportunity to add something to democratic conditionality of 
the ENP in relation to Armenia, what would you do? Would you make it stricter? 
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-I would think about the necessity of creating certain institutional framework for 
bringing together the EU side, Government and the public sector, so all these various 
circles are interconnected. This will raise the interest of the general public, the media 
would be more interested and the developments will have more sustainable nature. 
10. Can I conclude that the ENP implementation process currently is led by the 
Government without the society participating or being aware much? 
-Yes, quite so. 
11. To sum up, are you optimistic about the effects of the policy? 
-In general yes: we better have the ENP than nothing. On the other hand, much more 
could have been done. It has a lot of potential. More focus should be directed to the 
bilateral element, which I'm sure we need more, because the comparative element can 
let us down. For instance, we shouldn't be compared to Azerbaijan. because we are 
very different states at this moment and constant comparison will lead to the average 
and none of us will move forward. Azerbaijan doesn't have an objective of moving 
forward. We have clearly different directions for development, and bringing these 
states together will not satisfy any of the parties. 
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Interview III 
Karen Bekaryan, European Integration, NGO, Armenia 
20 April, 2009, Yerevan 
Interview conducted in Armenian 
1. What is the role of the civil society in the implementation of the ENP in Armenia? 
-We should break the question into some points. First of all, there is the ENP and its 
political component. As you know the ENP includes very different countries. It will 
be impossible to have the same standards in Ukraine and Jordan. Therefore, to say 
that the ENP in institutional terms has big impact in relation to democratic issues will 
be wrong. You have to keep in mind the logic of the ENP as an instrument for 
ensuring security through establishing relations with neighbours. The neighbours 
would be more predictable and will not threaten the EU's security understanding the 
latter in wide terms (trafficking, drugs, migration, economic security etc). Therefore, 
on the one hand it is wrong to expect this from the ENP. On the other hand, during 
the last five years quite close coordination is noted between the European institutions 
(meaning the EU and the Council of Europe). 
-We are being monitored within the Council of Europe, and in case of Armenia the 
process of monitoring on the issues of democracy and human rights is ongoing. Even 
more, after each elections we have new issues, new resolutions: resolution 1643, 1621 
etc. 
-The question to ask is what the opportunities offered by the ENP and how the EU 
can use them. So now, the Council of Europe has certain problems with the country: 
the ENP can be used, including its financial and consultative tools, to ensure 
compliance. This can be called ancillary connection. So even if the tool does not have 
that opportunity in itself, in ancillary way it offers such a possibility. Of course the 
situation is changing with Eastern Partnership, which I will address later. 
-From the moment when the ENP was initiated, all the Eastern neighbours were 
convinced that the same instruments and principles for these countries and the 
southern neighbours are not justified. With time also the Europeans started to reflect 
this, because in fact it is not adequate to have these tools in the same format for these 
different regions. And from time to time there were different conversations on format, 
for instance on ENP+, where the idea was to separate this 5 or 6 (with Belarus) 
countries which eventually led to the EP. 
-Another question is what is taking place in terms of planning? In difference with 
other international programmes, including the Millennium Challenge with the EU, the 
ENP, as such, does not provide for the NGO sector participation. And this always has 
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been considered as one of the major omissions of the ENP and its Action Plan 
implementation. We all know that in developing democracies if the Government is 
not obliged to do that, it will not willingly with its own initiative open up a space for 
the participation of the civil society. So, on the one hand, there is this 'not being 
written' code with its consequences. On the other hand, we should not forget that the 
Action Plan is a bilateral document between the European Commission and the 
Armenian Government. The party that is taking obligations is the Government and 
not the public in general, which in its tum leads to a situation where it is left to the 
good will of the country or the Government. The question here is how willing or 
ready will the Government be to engage the civil society. 
-There are states where such participation will amounts to zero, such will be the cases 
of Middle Asian countries or even Azerbaijan. Armenia is in a quite average 
situation, where it did not follow the path the Ukraine followed and Georgia tried to 
follow, but didn't succeed very much, but on the other hand it also didn't follow 
Moldova or Azerbaijan, where there are limited opportunities for civil society 
engagement. Such a comparison is not something to be proud of, but at least there are 
certain opportunities. But if you ask whether the civil society had participation in the 
programming of the implementation, I would say no. 
-The civil society had another opportunity. For instance, when the Action Plan was 
signed for 5 years, its declarative nature caused a strong resonance which was 
followed by a programme of measures adopted by the Government annually. This 
was already a step. It introduced certain elements of concreteness. The next element 
that can be positively viewed in this line is that the European countries and 
institutions initiated assistance to civil society to implement projects on monitoring of 
the Action Plan implementation. Our organisation performed monitoring with the 
assistance of DFD in four areas of the Action Plan, including regional cooperation, 
Nagomo-Karabakh conflict resolution, migration and sustainable development and 
environment. 
-Did this assistance come from the ENP!? 
-No, it had no connection with the ENPI whatsoever, it was a project directly initiated 
by us which was presented to DFD. There were also other partner organizations 
which undertook various monitoring tasks, but again it did not have any connection 
with the ENPl The first annual program for Action Plan implementation was widely 
criticized because it was adopted for 2007 in the August of that year. This on its own 
was already a problem. After this criticism the next year programme was adopted in 
April. Hopefully, we will gradually reach the point when we adopt the programme 
and then start implementation. 
-In terms of results, the ENP was not considered to be a financial tool for us, it was 
seen to be primarily a political tool which gives an opportunity for EU integration to 
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reach totally new level. This is a different approach. We have these opposing 
examples: Ukraine always considered that the ENP too little for it and it always 
wanted something like associated membership. I'm not even discussing the Southern 
neighbours. Amongst former Soviet Union countries, Azerbaijan is an opposite 
example: it is not interested in political factors. What's important for the latter is the 
money: if the amount is real, it would cooperate. These are the two extreme 
examples. Armenia is somewhere in the middle: it behind Ukraine not only on 
declarative level but in terms of process, but it wants more than Azerbaijan. It is 
rather tricky to compare Armenia with Georgia. In Georgia the declarations were too 
strong, but the underlying actions are quite unclear and complicated. At the same time 
we are more advanced than Moldova, which does not consider the relations with the 
EU independently. Either these relations were considered through Romania, however 
it was impossible to join the EU with Romania. And now it is considered that if 
Ukraine joins, then also Moldova will join. This is the picture of the region. 
-Of course, there will be changes with the Eastern Partnership, which offers wider 
opportunities. The political underpinnings are that it was for the first time that even 
half-officially EU membership perspective was expressed for these countries. Before 
that it was always stressed that the ENP has nothing to do with membership. Apart 
from this new political context, the Eastern Partnership is a more real program in two 
ways. First, it is really a programme which is projected for similar countries. The 
southern element was taken out and naturally the criteria have immediately changed. 
Second, it is much more real in terms of instruments: it is much clearer in terms of 
what is at stake and what it wants. 
2. Do you think the Eastern Partnership will add anything to the political 
conditionality of the ENP? 
Yes, it will. Again in ancillary way, but in this case it will be followed up more 
extensively. 
-So the Eastern Partnership will not have the democratisation as a central issue? 
-No, again there will be no focus on democracy. But there is this essential factor that 
when increased attention on behalf of the EU will come with more scrutiny over 
'values'. They will be more apparent, because it will be hard to cooperate as partners 
if there are contradictions in this area. Here the ancillary mechanism will work in a 
more real way. For instance, if the EU members decide to proceed with some 
sanction they can do via Council of Europe. 
3. So did I understand correctly that you consider that democracy is not a central 
issue within the ENP even though the first two priority areas of the Action Plan are 
devoted to the issues of democracy and human rights? 
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-Yes, it does not have such focus. Of course, it does on a declaratory level. But apart 
from this, there is an institutional dimension to it. For instance, in relation to the most 
essential elements of democracy-the judiciary, the ENP calls for action in this area, 
however the implementation is left out to the ancillary effects, under very weak 
monitoring. Hopefully the Eastern Partnership will make it stronger due to an 
increased focus on the country itself, due to its political factor. So the attention on 
Armenia is currently much more than before August 2008, Georgian-Russian war. 
There are various factors that will add on and bring more clarity to the requirements 
and their implementation. 
-And also the increase in budget assumes stronger monitoring. 
4. Does that mean that the idea of 'common values' within the neighbourhood had 
declarative nature from the beginning? How was it perceived by the neighbours? 
-This is a very interesting question: how declarative or real it was. I did not mention 
security rationale accidentally. The issue is that if the EU undertakes this for its 
security, it offers an opportunity and relevant financial instrument, so each of the 
neighbours will 'Europeanise'. Each of the neighbours 'Europeanise' as much as it 
considers reasonable, but in any case the EU will have guarantees that the neighbours 
are no longer 'threats'. So, whether the issue of the call for commitment in relation on 
the one hand wasn't declarative, because that's what Europeanisation assumes. 
-So this is important for the EU? 
-Yes, of course. From this point of view it wasn't declarative. But starting from the 
point where the EU has to follow this up, it is clear that this is not going to happen: 
the EU will not work instead of neighbours. It is left to one's own opinion whether it 
was declarative or not. 
-So democratic reforms will be left to the political will of the country? 
-Naturally. It is left to the neighbouring countries creating something in this ancillary 
way within the ENP, which might be strengthened by the Eastern Partnership. What 
does a competitive space assume? It assumes an opportunity and challenge at the 
same time, so it's not only left to country's our political will. Ifwe assume that within 
these six countries Belarus is the one with the worst democratic record, naturally their 
financial assistance will be less to the advantage of the others. And naturally the 
policy perceived in relation to this country will be less beneficial. If this happens, for 
example, with Palestine or Jordan, you might take it easy, but here, in this 
competitive space, it is your neighbour that benefits: also to some extent on your 
account. This is not only political will, if you don't want to lose in your external 
politics or on your way to Europe, then be kind to cooperate and deliver. This is not 
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only an issue of political will, but also of interests. So, the policy can work through 
this competitive element as well. 
-So, the Eastern Partnership will add more to this competitive element especially 
when we're talking about the creation of a free trade area. 
-Most certainly. 
5. What do you think about the EU's monitoring? Would you consider it to be 
effective? Do you think our Governmentfollowing the results of monitoring? 
-I'll try to answer that question maximally honest which might be also surprising to 
you. Our society in general suffers from very interesting disease which can be called 
naivety. There are some objective reasons for this: short existence of statehood, the 
tendency to avoid responsibility etc. In fact the problem is the following: I don't 
doubt that the EU carries out efficient monitoring and I also don't doubt that they are 
totally aware of what's going on, but I have serious doubts as to how much from this 
is being published. There is a part in everything published which reflects political 
interests and creates opportunities to have leverages in relation to the country. 
Therefore, asking the question whether the monitoring is efficient or not, we should 
also question efficient for whom? For European side it is always efficient. Because if 
the EU closes its eyes on certain drawbacks, it will be only seemingly so. In fact it is 
leverage for its interests, some sort of political opportunity which it can use to pursue 
its own interests at some point. So this is the issue. 
- So does the Armenian Government follow the results of EU monitoring, the 
comments of the Progress Report? 
-On the level of announcements they do of course, but in reality they take it into 
account not in 100 percent. Annenia submits its report annually reporting on what has 
been undertaken. 
6. Do you think that the conditionality borrowed from the enlargement experience is 
working? 
-Of course it does, it works in a particular way. I can transfer the example to the 
Council of Europe. There are so many discussions in Annenia that we had so many 
breaches, so many violations, so many issues but there are no sanctions, aren't these 
double standards? Pro-governmental forces consider this as double standards, arguing 
that there are states that are worse than us but we are always discussed. On the other 
hand, the opposition also considers this as double standards arguing that we don't 
satisfy necessary conditions but yet we are not punished. So the both sides manipulate 
this politically. The reality can be compared to family relations between a parent and 
a teenage child. For instance, ifthe child doesn't behave, the parent doesn't expel him 
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from the family. Instead he will try to bring him to more predictable and reasonable 
behaviour through long-term activity. It is the same with the Council of Europe or the 
EU. If you close the door, that country will become a 'black hole' - lost for you, you 
will no longer have influence over the latter. 
-As in case of Belarus. 
-Yes, Belarus can be an example. On the other hand, if you disregard all drawbacks, 
the country will become the 'weakest link' in relevant community which infects also 
the others. Therefore, the EU will opt for the situation in between these two. It has to 
try to educate these countries but not by slamming the door. This is what in fact 
happens in reality. 
7. What about the financial assistance? The ENPI documents talk a lot about civil 
society. even as an addressee of assistance. But the assistance is mainly budgetary. 
So are there any resources for civil society? 
-For the first two years there was no such task, no such attention to civil society. But 
there are some developments. The civil society comes forward as a professional 
service provider in certain areas. And this is a culture not yet properly developed in 
Armenia. We just have the initial steps and it's not clear where they wiJIlead to. To 
suggest say that it's related to huge financial sums won't be true. There's also another 
aspect to the issue. A programme has been arranged to send experts for different areas 
in state institutions. So, there is a positive element in this, but how fully it will be 
implemented is another question. Also, there is a matter that at times the European 
side refuses to accept: the question is who the experts are. Sometimes you can look at 
the age of experts and that will indicate the level of their expertise. The country has to 
have the threshold of requirements, where the experts can really make a contribution. 
8. How would you summarize the effects of the ENP so far and their connection to the 
democratisation of the country? 
-It will be wrong to say that there are no effects. But we are citizens of this country 
and therefore we hurry to see the results. The main point is that if there was no 
involvement by the European side, mainly through the EU, we would have been in 
much worse and complicated situation both in political terms and in terms of 
indefmite direction generally. However, there are two problems: one of them is the 
slow pace of the process, which might be even objective. And the second one is the 
heavy machinery of EU bureaucracy. Sometimes quick response on their behalf can 
be a huge problem. So, from the ENP to the EP there was wasted time and wasted 
energy: bringing together so many different countries was already a problem. On the 
other hand, it's at least good that our countries were involved. As you know the South 
Caucasus was included in the policy later. So from one side, it's good that we were 
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involved and they started to pay attention to the region, but on the other hand much 
time and effort was wasted. 
9. Are there any efforts on behalf of the Government to engage the civil society in the 
implementation process or programming? 
-The civil society has its unique role in relation to EU integration. It's currently 
popular to talk about these issues, but the trends for EU integration had their roots in 
the civil society and it cannot be disregarded currently. We as an organization 
cooperate with Parliament's Committee on EU integration, EU department of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mutual consultations, discussions or even involvement 
on certain issues started to appear gradually. Since the Eastern Partnership itself 
widens the cooperation, the participation of the civil society will also widen. 
-There will be more beneficiaries. 
-Yes. Even in media area the enlightenment on EU integration and development was 
never state-motivated, it was more stemming from public organizations. There are the 
elements which show that this culture is slowly developing throughout the last several 
years. 
-What about the awareness of general public? 
-It is quite low. In addition the situation is different when we talk about Yerevan and 
the regions. This is one of the biggest problems and there is a lot of work to be done 
there. We raise these issues both in front of the Government and the EU. 
-So would you describe the ENP implementation as a process solely led by the 
Government detached from the general public? 
-I wouldn't say that it is totally disconnected, but I can say that the public is not 
aware of many processes taking place within the ENP. But this is not only the 
Government's problem, it's first of all the problem of media, there should be editorial 
policy to bring this topic out. There was a very important event within the ENP's 
social component, which is very vital for the public, and the media presented it 
without indicating the basis for this policy. The public probably thought that the event 
was carried out by the Govenunent on its own initiative. 
10. What about the role of the Parliament? 
-My opinion about the role of the Parliament is not very positive. However, its role 
might increase. The Committee on European Integration has been created only during 
the last Parliament, just for a year, so now it has a task of finding its place and role in 
the process. If it succeeds in doing this, then we can talk about Parliament's role. 
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There are certain objective barriers currently. For instance, we suggested that draft 
legal acts should be reviewed by the Committee on their conformity with the ED 
standards. However, the members of the committee are mostly not familiar with the 
ED system, and their administration comprises 3 or 4 staff members. So would it be 
able to undertake this function? Naturally, not. It should be also mentioned, that the 
civil society sees its role in attracting international donors in order to start projects on 
helping the Parliament to undertake this role. 
11. To what extent the influence from membership in Council of Europe, OSCE 
affects the democratisation process? 
-We don't really expect the OSCE to influence our democracy, because their mandate 
is different. Also taking into account the fact that members of the OSCE can be 
Russia, Turkmenistan, which brings it down to certain average gray criteria. Let the 
OSCE deal with security issues. The Council of Europe has a serious role in this area, 
because democracy and human rights are its main function. Armenia's membership to 
the Council of Europe brought many results: from 2001 till now the developments in 
institutional terms are incomparable to previous period starting with independence. 
This is a irreversible process that has been started, and therefore the Council of 
Europe has a serious role here. The EU had other instruments as well before the ENP, 
the PCA which to a certain extent touched upon these issues. However, the EU is a 
different institution which uses political instruments very gently and it is a source of 
political force in difference with the Council of Europe. In this context, working in 
different directions with different organizations will entail more effects. 
12. Do you think the EU integration process that our Government seemingly chose is 
an irreversible process? Why I am asking this question is that ifi! is mostly a 
Government-led initiative-without general public involvement, then the next 
government might not be so keen on these issues. 
-It's in a human nature to follow example and experience, so we we're within this 
process of choosing examples. We can see that the ED is one way of developing, 
even irrespective of the fact that the awareness on the EU itself is not high. It is still 
viewed in its prosperity and opportunities for individual: we will not have a huge 
clash in terms of values with the EU. People gradually understand that you cannot 
develop alone in a globalized world. Here comes the question in which direction to 
develop. In any case the choice will be for the EU: it is what happens now and will 
continue. It is irreversible in the sense that there's so much to be gained. We cannot 
say: we don't need you. This will lead to the Belorussian collapse. 
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